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INTRODUCTION 
1. Statement of Purpose. 
The generic purpose of this dissertation is to examine 
the nature of the self in its responsive relationship to its 
world. Such an examination can, according to the point of 
departure adopted, be understood as an investigation within 
either epistemology or fundamental moral philosophy~ 
2. Statement of the Problem. 
The problem with which this dissertation is most di-
rectly concerned is that of locating, if possible, the most 
fruitful method, or combination of methods, of scrutinizing 
the self as it is, as it knows, and as it acts. In attacking 
the problem, it has been deemed advisable to take cognizance 
of at least one continuing schism within the main philosophic 
stream: the division between what may broadly be called 
realism and idealism--this in order to see what differences, 
similarities, and possible syntheses may be brought to light. 
In broadest possible summary it may be suggested that realism 
is understood to mean that reality is independent of its 
being known by any mind, and is possibly of a nature other 
than mind; idealism is understood to mean that reality is 1n 
some sense either of the nature of or dependent upon mind. 
3. Statement of the Thesis. 
The thesis of this dissertation is that both realism 
and idealism, having profited greatly in this century and in 
this country from association with pragmatism, may also bene-
fit from a close inspection of what has come to be known as 
"existential" thought. Accordingly, a large share of the 
present study is concerned with expounding and juxtaposing 
the philosophic thought (again broadly speaking) of a real-
ist: Ralph Barton Perry; an idealist: Edgar Sheffield 
Brightman; and two existentialists: Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Spren Kierkegaard. 
4. Justification of this Selection. 
One may wonder at the choice of a neorealist and a 
personalistic idealist as examples of realism and idealism in 
general. Aside from the reply that one would be hard-put to 
find an advocate of either position in general, one reason is 
the contemporaneousness of Perry and Brightman--to each other 
and to the present. More importantly, however, there are 
definite points of community between them. Both Perry and 
Brightman seem more interested in personality than in other 
possible focal-points in philosophy. Both are American--and 
fairly typically American in their approach. Both are inter-
ested in the relationships between science and practical 
human behavior (and in the science of practical human be-
havior, ethics). Both are beholden to William James and to 
2 
pragmatism at critical points 1n their respective systems . 
Both are friendly to empiricism--and yet each, 1n his own way , 
may also be called a rationalist . And finally, both are 
worthy and devoted followers of philosophy "in the grand 
sense 11--the type of philosophy the task of which is seeking a 
coherent understanding of all the phases of human experience . 
Both, in short, speak the same language . 
The selection of Sartre and Kierkegaard is, perhaps, a 
natural one that requires no special justification. Both are 
included because existentialism, as the present writer sees 
it, need be no more irrevocably divided on the question of 
the existence and nature of God than do realism and idealism 
need to be divided irrevocably on the issue of the priority 
of being and being lmown. It may be said at this point that 
in accordance with the thesis mentioned above, it is hoped 
that a "synthetic" existentialism--if such a synthesis proves 
to be feasable--possibly could help to effect a larger synthe-
sis between all of the four positions set forth herein. Such, 
at least, is the task contemplated. 
5. Method of Presentation. 
The method used in realization of this task is indi-
cated by the organization of material in the Table of 
Contents. Each system will be expounded and criticized, inso-
far as is possible, in isolation from the others . Exposition 
of each system will be as complete as is deemed requisite to 
3 
insure proper contextual accuracy. A critical chapter will 
follow each expository chapter. Criticism, however, will not 
attempt exhaustiveness, but will rather select points for 
critical appraisal that, in the estimate of the writer, bear 
most directly on the question of the self and its relation-
ship to its world·. It may be noted that in the critical 
chapters the writer does not quite make good his claim of 
isolation. The constructive aim of all the critical chapters 
taken together is to move inward, as it were, successively 
through each chapter to what is felt to be the center of 
selfhood. The concluding chapter is the writer's attempt to 
set forth his view of the self and its world--the self being, 
knowing, and doing. 
6. Previous Scholarship in this Area. 
11 The self and its world 11 is not, of course, a radically 
new theme in philosophy. Nor has previous scholarship been 
wanting in exposition, criticism, and interpretation of each 
of the four philosophers discussed in this dissertation~ 
Less work (but some, nonetheless) has been done comparing 
either Perry and Brightman or Sartre and Kierkegaard~ The 
present writer's search has, however, discovered only one 
instance of what might even remotely be considered as "previ-
ous scholarship in this area. 11 The Challenge of Existential-
ism by John Wild (see bibliography) is a serious and pene-
trating attempt to assimilate into contemporary philosophy an 
4 
existential theory of awareness. However, since Wild has 
selected Martin Heidegger as his primary exponent of 
existentialism, since his aim appears to be an absorption of 
existentialism by realism, and since his theory of awareness 
differs markedly from that offered in this dissertation, the 
parallel is, indeed, remote. 
It seems to the writer that existentialism, while it 
has certainly received able exposition and criticism at the 
hands of American philosophers, and has even a generous share 
of competent (and incompetent) afficionados, has thus far 
only progressed to the point of being considered an interest-
ing foster child. It is possible that there are good philo-
sophic reasons for this·. On the other hand, it is possible 
that the foster child 1s worth adopting. The present writer 
is of the opinion that this process, not yet begun, will take 
place in the next decade. His work is intended to move in 
that direction. 
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CHAPTER I 
EXPOSITION OF THE THOUGHT OF 
RALPH BARTON PERRY 
1·. Introduction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the moral 
philosophy of Ralph Barton Perry. To this end the major 
portion of this chapter will be directly devoted. In order, 
however, to present this part of Perry' a thought in as com-
plete a context as possible without losing the primary ob-
jective, it is deemed advisable to preface the exposition of 
moral philosophy with a summary of pertinent methodological, 
epistemological, and metaphysical elements of his thought. 
To one who has studied Perry, such a preface may appear to be 
unnecessary. Indeed, there does seem to be a radical shift 
from Perry as a neorealist1to Perry as a "moral idealist. "2 
In order that such preliminary exposition may be expedited, 
a tentative defining of some terms is desirable. They are 
~eorealism has not yet been defined. However, it may 
be well at the outset to limit ita meaning, as well aa that 
of terms which will emerge in later chapters. Unless other-
wise stated, neorealism will be considered as exemplified in 
Perry, personalism as identified with Brightman, and exis-
tentialism as limited to either Sartre or Kierkegaard. Re-
garding the last~entioned term, the context should make 
clear the referent. 
2R. B. Perry, The Moral Economy (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1909), p. 251~ 
presented here in the hope that they may also serve the 
p.tr];X)se of showing Perry 1 s general attitude toward "ideal-
ism." 
A. Idealism. 
For Perry, idealism may be defined in its most general 
terms as that philosophy which rests uJX)n the cardinal 
principle of "the assertion of the priority of 1ru!, cognitive 
consciousness, the assertion that being !! dependent ~ the 
knowing 2! ~."1 For Perry, then, idealism confuses thought 
with being, epistemology with metaphysics. Perry has his 
own "cardinal principles" of criticism, the fallacies of 
idealism, which will be listed here as an aid to definition. 
1. The egocentric predicament consists in 
the im:POssibility of finding anything that is not known·. 
This is a predicament rather than a discovery, because 
it refers to a difficulty of procedure, rather than to a 
character of things. It is impossible to eliminate the 
knower without interrupting observation; hence the pe-
culiar difficulty of discovering what characters, if any, 
things possess when not known~ When this situation is 
formulated as a proposition concerning things, the re-
sult is either the redundant inference that all known 
things are known, or the false inference that all things 
are know.n.2 
1R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies (New 
York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1912), p. 114. Italics 
in the original. 
2E. B. Holt and others, The New Realism (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1912), pp. ll-12. Cf. Perry, 
Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 129-130. 
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2. The fallacy of initial predication1stems, 1n large 
part from the mood created by the egocentric predicament. 
A subject of discourse is viewed initially under one 
of its aspects •••• Then ••• it is assumed that this 
subject of discourse can have no other aspect, or belong 
to no other relational manifold.2 
3. The speculative dogma is 
the assumption for philosophical purposes that there is 
an all-sufficient, all-general principle, a single 
fundamental proposition that adequately determines or 
explains everything.3 
Perry makes some allowance with regard to the third 
fallacy . There is no reason to deny that philosophy is the 
search for some kind of unity. This, however, must be the 
nature of the quest, and not its presupposition. 4 Further, 
realism does not necessarily deny that all things in the 
universe are related in some manner. What it does deny is 
that all relationships are relationships of dependence, and 
that "knowing" is such a relat1onsh1p.5 
Let us carry idealism, as Perry sees it, one step 
further, and, with the general definition and the fallacies 
1This will treat "pseudo-simplici ty 11 and "exclusive 
particularity" as one with initial predication. In moral 
theory the "pathetic fallacy" appears to be a variation, 
also. Cf. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 163. 
2 Holt, New Realism, p. 15. 
3 Ibid., p. 16. Cf. also Perry, Present Philosophical 
Tendencies, pp. 64-65 and chap. VIII passim. 
4Ibid., p. 17. 
5Ibid., pp. 113-114~ Cf. also Perry, Present Philo-
sophical Tendencies, pp. 173-174 and below page 20. 
8 
in mind, describe the idealist as one who 
carries into his philosophy all the importunity and 
high aspiration of life. For him ''the teleological 
standpoint," that of inner meanin§1or significance, is "the standpoint of philosophy. 
It may be said in passing that there is likely to be 
considerable difficulty in applying all of these fallacies 
to any particular philosophy flying the banner of idealism. 
B. Moral Idealism. 
A definition here must be offered with extreme diffi-
dance. It appears obvious that Perry, in the above defi-
nition of idealism, has identified it with the subjectivism 
of either solipsism or absolutism. In a certain sense, this 
identification is carried over, so that Perry, in affirming 
his own moral idealism, may well be intending to indicate 
2 his affirmation of the subjectivity of values. More, how-
ever, appears to be intended, as is evidenced by the final 
chapter of Present Philosophical Tendencies, where moral 
idealism appears to be an adjunct of realism. For Perry, 
metaphysical ("romantic 11 ) idealism bases itself on the 
principle that 
men are to be reassured and comforted by being guaran-
teed the eternal pre-eminence of the good. Their hope 
is to lie in the fact that the indifference of nature 
and the failure of man are apparent and not real. Their 
hope is to be realized by that act of imagination or 
1 R. B. Perry, A Defense of Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1931), p. 28. 
2 This point is to be discussed later in this chapter. 
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thought which recovers the whole, and seeing it, judges 
it to be good. 
Perry, in contrast 
proposes that philosophy, like science, shall illuminate 
things in order that action may be invented that shall 
make them good.2 
For Perry, then, to be a moral idealist probably means 
nothing more than that one believes that "something can be 
done." The machinery of the doing, as well as what it is 
that needs to be done, may be left undescribed for the 
moment. 
c. Realism. 
As a definition of idealism was presented from Perry's 
point of view, so also here realism will be defined through 
his eyes. Realism opposes "both the narrowness of natural-
ism and the extravagance of idealism. 113 It seeks "to unite 
the empirical temper of the former with the latter's recog-
nition of problems that lie outside the field of the posi-
tive sciences, 114accept1ng "neither the finality of physical 
fact nor the validity of the ideal of the absolute. 11 5 Real-
ism "detaches itself from life, and attempts to see things 
1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 330. 
2Ibid. 
3 1.!?1£.' p. 39. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
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in their native colors through a transparent medium. "1 
The last statement may indicate the "cardinal princi-
ple" of realism, that it is both possible and desirable to 
see things in their native colors, as they really are, 
through a medium which is transparent, but which is still a 
medium. The principle of realism appears to be description. 
D. Neorealism. 
Two additional principles may serve to distinguish 
Perry's philosophy from that of others who would also em-
brace the general cardinal principle of realism. 
1. Analysis as the method of neorealism is as fUnda-
mental to the neorealist's system as is synopsis for ideal-
ism. The term "analysis" refers "not to the special method 
of any branch of knowledge, but to the method of exact 
knowledge in general, and to that method of procedure in 
which the problematic is discovered to be a complex of 
simples. "2 
2. "Panobjectivism" sounds more like a conclusion to 
Perry's thought than an introduction. It implies the theory 
of immanence as perhaps description implies the theory of 
independence and analysis implies the theory of the neutral 
entities. Yet the term has its use here in distinguishing 
Perry's realism both from substantialism and from represen-
1 llli· ' p. 40. 
2Holt, New Realism, p. 24. 
11 
tationalism. The neorealist intends to go back 
beyond Kant, beyond Berkeley, beyond even Locke and 
Descartes--far back to the primordial common sense which 
believes in a world that exists independently of the 
knowing of it, but believes also that the same i~de­
pendent world can be presented in consciousness. 
Panobjecti vism is thus a term intend'ed as a move outward 
from subjectivism without encountering dualism in the 
process. It is thoroughly realistic in that it places not 
only the object of consciousness, but consciousness, itself, 
in the "same independent world." 
E. Conclusion. 
Perry has separated himself from the extravagance of 
idealism, from the narrowness of naturalism, from the limi-
tations of positivism, and, by an emancipation from the term 
11 experience, 11 for which he has substituted 11 panobjectivism,n 
from pragmatism. Nevertheless neorealism is 
in agreement with Naturalism, Idealism and Pragmatism 
respecting many important doctrines. With Naturalism, 
for example, it maintains the unimpeachable truth of the 
accredited results of science, and the independence of 
physical nature of knowledge; with Idealism it maintains 
the validity and irreducibility of logical and moral 
science; and with Pragmatism, the practical and empirical 
character of the knowing process, and the presumptively 
pluralistic constitution of the universe.2 
With this introduction as a basis, we may now present 
a brief exposition of the arguments intended to defend this 
lw. P. Montague, "The New Realism and the Old," Journal 
of Philosophy, IX (1912), 39. 
.• ~ ... 
2 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 272. 
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type of realism. 
2. Summary of Perry's System Exclusive of Moral Philosophy.1 
A. Methodology. 
There appear to be four elements characteristic of 
Perry's method: description, empiricism, analysis, and 
behaviorism. Each of these will be considered briefly. 
1. The validation of descriptive method entails at 
least four problems. 
a) Is it both possible and desirable to abstract the 
individual from the observation? If by "abstraction" is 
meant literally "doing away with the observer," then the 
answer is that desirability is irrelevant, because it is a 
simple impossibility to remove the observer and still retain 
observation. This, apparently, is not what is meant, how-
ever. For Perry, 
that theory will best serve life which abstracts from 
life. The profit of religion, like the success of any 
worldly enterprise, is conditioned by the truth of the 
presuppositions, the correctness of the adaptation, on 
which it proceeds •••• Hence, to cherish illusions is 
to buy a subjective satisfaction at the cost of a real 
failure. • • • Religion is no exception to the rule that 
man conquers his environment, and molds it into good, 
through forgetting his fears and renouncing his hopes, 
until he shall have disciplined himself to see cooly and 
steadily. For what he then sees becomes thereafter the 
111Moral Philosophy" as here used is a generic term 
intended to include "the larger issues with which religion 
and philosophy have to do. 11 Of. Perry, Present PhilosoJ2h1-
cal Tendencies, p. 330. The term is clearer here than it 
will be when used in conjunction with Brightman's philosophy. 
Perhaps synoptic method renders it so general as to be 
useless·. 
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means through which his fears are banished and his hopes 
fulfilled. I.-
The abstraction of the individual, then, for Perry, is 
affirmed as both possible and desirable, provided that it is 
clearly understood what is to be abstracted. Through disci-
pline, the observer "abstracts" extraneous elements of his 
personality precisely in order that he may bring to bear 
needed faculties for accurate observation. 2 There are limits, 
however, imposed by man's psychological make-up, by the ego-
centric predicament (which remains a predicament), by the 
nature of the objects observed (e.g., laws regarding obser-
vation and calculation in quanta-theory), and by the basi-
cally telic nature of awareness, itself. But the hopes and 
fears of the observer do not form part of these limits, ex-
cept in extreme cases, where man's psychological make-up, as 
mentioned above, may force the observation into subjective 
channels.3 
b) Is descriptive method valid for science? Perry's 
defense of descriptive method appears to be centered around 
a direct attack on religious and romantic incursions into 
1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 40. 
2The Socratic "fits of abstraction" are a good illus-
tration. 
3For example, a man observing his own impending death 
may be excused for abandoning scientific abstraction for 
existential concreteness. This may have application in a 
later chapter, where man's death is explained as by no means 
an isolated and rare event. 
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science in the name of teleological explanation. 1 Science 
has only recently escaped the appeal to powers or purposes 
as explanatory of physical or psychical events. By 
description, here, is meant simply precise classification 
and measurement, the laws developed by descriptive science 
being themselves descriptions rather than regulations. 2 
Once again, it must be remembered that descriptive 
accuracy is attained only when the scientist has disciplined 
himself so that while much of him remains aloof from the 
observation, that portion which describes, classifies and 
measures is thoroughly "involved" in the scientific process. 
The result, for science, is a solid body of dependable 
calculations; the result in the eyes of the victim or the 
attack, religion, is that science is relegated to its own 
realm, bounded by space, time, matter, and motion, thus re-
serving for religion the realm of reality. 
c) Is descriptive method valid for philosophy? The 
success of science in its precision-work generates the sus-
picion that reality, itself, is amenable to scientific 
method. In this manner religion and teleological expla-
nation are forced out entirely, or are reduced to the status 
of poetry. 
1cf. the "Pathetic Fallacy"; R. B. Perry, General 
Theory of Value (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 
1926), pp. 56-59. 
2 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 53-56. 
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There appear to be four alternatives for religion: 
it can "give up the ghost" and merge itself with science;1 
it can stand off and bombard the incomplete, often mistaken, 
hypotheses of science; 2it can scan the newest scientific 
theories for hopeful evidence that can be worked into teleo-
logical shape;3or it can seek elsewhere for its proper 
sphere. Perry holds that there is such a sphere, and that 
the science of ethics is the discipline which probes it~ 
Ethics is ••• correlative with physics, since what it 
describes is as truly found in the world as that which 
physics describes.4 
Thus, even 1n this spnere, descriptive method has a 
place, for even teleological processes--even faith, hope and 
poetry--are real events to be described, classified and 
measured accurately. Thus, descriptive method is given 
charge of reality. 
d) What is the nature of the entities described? The 
body of scientific knowledge is the patient work of classi-
fication, counting, measuring--in short, the describing of 
relations~5 The laws of nature are neither mechanical nor 
1compare the philosophies of Comte and Spencer. 
2American religious fundamentalism may be cited here. 
Cf. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 93. 
3vitalism, chemism, activism, panpsychism, emergent 
evolutionism, all these must defend themselves against this 
accusation. 
4Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 109. 
5 Ibid., P• 61. 
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material nor phenomenal for the scientist; they are simply 
the ways that ttthingsn happen (where "things" is understood 
to mean the happening). What are found, thus, are relations, 
and the methods of science are, when experiment is complete, 
logical and mathematical in nature·. 
A word of caution here. Both logic and mathematics 
have been termed normative and form al disciplines, names 
which would appear to place them apart from objects of 
description. The difficulty seems to lie in a general, but 
non-realistic assumption that the laws of logic and mathe-
matics are derived from, or contained within, the nature of 
the mind. For the present, their abode must be left problem-
atic--until the nature of consciousness is discussed. Suf-
fice for now to suggest that the logician and mathematician 
uncover logical and mathematical relationships because, for 
Perry, they are there to be discovered, not .just because 
they have that kind of mind. 
The theory of the neutral entities is thus forecast~ 
We shall touch upon this theory directly in the section on 
metaphysics. 
2. It will be recalled that Perry shares with pragma-
tism "the practical and empirical character of the knowing 
process." In its most general terms, "empiricism" will mean 
the "testing of an idea by a resort to that particular 
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experience which it means. ul Broadly speaking, empiricism 
has only one anemy--apriorism. However, within the broad 
category of empiricism there are distinctions to be made. 
One can be empirical--describing experience and making no 
assertions about the natura of experience. This is phenome-
nalism. One can be empirical--describing states of conscious-
ness . This is subjectivism. One can be empirical--describ-
ing things and relations as unrelated to thought. This aP-
pears to be Parry's realism~ 
If the principles of logic ~ essentially inherent 1n 
thought or knowledge, and we are to accept the priority 
of logic over all other sciences, then an idealistic 
metaphysics is the only possible conclusion, if there is 
to be any metaphysics at all~2 
Parry does grant the priority of logic over all other 
sciences. 
Rationalism singles out and emphasizes the relations 
of logical implication and organic unity. Such re-
lations are not to be denied; and it is 1n the interest 
of knowledge to discover them wherever they can be found. 
Indeed, the discovery of such relations may even be said 
to be the principal motive of thought. But a thorough-
going empiricism will admit that such relations are 
never found except in the company of other relations.3 
The peculiarity of these entities lies in their being so 
highly abstract as to be contained or implied in all 
other entities. They are necessary for thought only in 
that they are so ubiquitous that t~ought can deal with 
nothing without dealing with them. 
1 Ibid., p. 363. 
2 Ibid., p. 147. Italics 1n the original~ 
3 ~., p. 244. 
4 Ibid., p. 147. 
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There are far-reaching implications to this stand on 
empiricism: for example, the theory of external relations 
and that of the additive nature of knowledge, as well as the 
metaphysical pluralism derived from them, all spring from 
this particular point of view~ 1 
3. Empiricism, itself, does not appear to imply analy-
sis directly. Experience, for example, appears in patterns 
or gestalten, and, while empiricism seems to give a prima 
facie bias toward pluralism, it is a qualified pluralism 
which has not yet, so to speak, realized that even the 
"lumps" of experience will yield more if broken down into 
their constituent elements. It seems to be the scientific 
methodological tool of exactness of measurement which 
furnishes analysis with its legitimacy, just as it is the 
fineness of calibration on an instrument which gives it its 
sensi ti vi ty. 
Scientific description, then, is governed by two motives, 
on the one hand, unity, parsimony, or simplicity, ••• 
and, on the other hand, exact formulation.2 
Let us keep in mind the various directions which analy-
sis may take. First, analysis permits abstraction of the 
data of one field of investigation from another. Second, 
analysis permits the descriptive scientist to deal in exact 
terms which, so to speak, hold still for study. A vitalist 
1 ~., p. 244. 
2 Ibid., P• 55. 
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such as Bergson~ay complain that motion is misunderstood 
when it is crystallized into moments; it is nonetheless true 
that more solid work has been done in motion-study by analy-
sis than by viewing it as an unanalyzable whole ·. Third, 
analysis provides the clue (the first point above) by which 
the findings of epistemology and metaphysics can be harmo-
nized with those of science, thus allowing a community of 
knowledge between the sciences and philosophy and religion 
and philosophy, but, at the same time never failing to keep 
science and religion separate·. Failure to keep them sepa-
rate has, according to Perry, cost idealism dearly. It is 
here that analytic method is purged of voluntarism. 
By providing for a division of labor between the 
sciences, and between science, religion and philosophy, 
Perry introduces the general theme of harmony into method-
ology. It should be shown here, at as early a stage of in-
vestigation as possible, that the methodological roots of 
his ethical theory are by no means unrelated to the theory 
of independence·. Stated concisely by Perry, the theory of 
independence is as follows: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
Independence is non-dependence. 
Dependence is not the same as relation, but is a 
special type of relationship, in which the dependent 
contains, implies, or is exclusively caused or im-
plied by that on which it is dependent. 
The independent may be related or not, provided it is 
not related as above (b). 
1 ~., pp. 229-230. 
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d) 
e) 
f) 
g) 
h) 
The object of consciousness is related to conscious-
ness, but it does not follow that it is dependent on 
consciousness. 
There are entities, embracing all simples and some 
complexes, which are not dependent on consciousness, 
because not related to it as above (b). 
This in no way prevents their being otherwise re-
lated to consciousness. 
There are casas of subjectivity, that is, of 
complexes, that, as such, are dependent on conscious-
ness. 
Subjective complexes both contain entities that are 
independent of them, and also are independent of 
secondary fonscious relationships into which they 
may enter. 
It should be noted in the above summary that all three 
phases of independence are included. Statements (a), (b), 
and (c) deal with relations between things, thus leading to 
the doctrine of neutral entities and pluralism; (d), (e), 
and (f) translate this general theory of independence into 
the special theory of the relation between the entity which 
knows and the entity which is known; (g) and (h) concern the 
relations within the complex which is called subjectivity. 
It is by virtue of the theory of independence that 
knowledge is possible of parts without requiring knowledge 
of the whole as a presupposition. The autonomy of each area 
of investigation is thus secured, philosophy becoming the 
rigorous theoretical solution of special problems that 
lie outside the range of the positive sciences, problems 
such as "consciousness, 11 11 space," "causality," "truth, 11 
and "goodness."2 
The "harmonious happiness" of the various areas of investi-
1Holt, New Realism, p. 151. 
2Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 25. 
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gation becomes the task of philosophy, thus, not by virtue 
of any special principle by which the philo.sopher assigns a 
place within a peculiarly philosophical whole, but because 
of the nature of the various areas of in~estigation, them-
selves. This may stand as a defense of the sometimes per-
plexing ease with which Perry moves between subjects of 
analysis~ 
The point is that since knowledge is additive in 
nature, the total quest for knowledge must be synthetic 
rather than synoptic, and the task of the philosopher is, 
apart from his own special investigation, 1a synthesis of 
knowledge which pays due respect to the sources of the ele-
ments of the synthesis--which, in short, does not saddle 
them with speculative dogmas. It may be suggested that the 
respect accorded to the various sciences as sources is 
closely paralleled by the respect accorded to the individual 
interests within the synthetic complex called "the person," 
and the social complex called "the polity. 11 It is when 
synthesis is given its proper place as complementary to ana-
lytic method that Perry's metaphysics and his moral philoso-
phy are able to resist the threat of reductionism. 
4. Behaviorism, as a method for examining that 
complex called "subjectivity," operates on the general 
1The "special problems 11 for philosophy appear, however, 
to be so general in nature (see quotation above} as to 
constitute a synoptic approach. 
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realistic premise that the man fitting the coat and the coat 
fitting the man come to the same thing. According to Perry, 
behaviorism, in the general sense, is simply a return to 
the original Aristotelian view that mind and body· are 
related as activity and organ. The activities of mind, 
so construed, are observable and describable functions 
of the physical organism, continuous with those of life, 
and differing from them in pattern and complexity rather 
than in consti tuents~l 
"Observable" and "describable" show the empirical 
nature of the method of "general observation 11 which is be-
haviorism. "Pattern" and "complexity" indicate a predis-
position toward analysis into "constituerits. 11 Thus, it may 
be said that analytical empiricism, in forming the basis of 
scientific method in general, includes, as a special case of 
scientific method, behaviorism~ 
Perry does not intend to go to the extreme asserted by 
Watson: that consciousness is nothing but behavior . 2 For 
Perry, the observation of behavior and such experimentation 
as is possible is more scientific, and hence more exact as an 
indication of the content of consciousness, than is the 
method of introspection. At this stage of exposition there 
is a natural transition from Perry's methodology to his 
theory of mind. Before crossing this bridge, however, three 
points may be mentioned. 
1Perry, General Theory, p. 142. 
2 1£1£. , p. 143 n . 
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a) Introspection usually has been associated with 
some theory of the immediacy of the data of introspection to 
consciousness, i.e., intuitionism, and the priority of self-
consciousness. Here, Perry charges that the error is that 
of exclusive particularity and initial predication. 
b) Introspection rests a considerable portion of its 
case on the admitted difficulty of general observation of 
the content of a private consciousness. Perry's theory of 
mind intends to remove a great deal of this difficulty by 
showing how it is possible that the contents of a mind are 
not necessarily as private as is sometimes assumed. 1 The 
remainder of the difficulty Perry assimilates as an adjunct 
to the theory of general observation. "At the same time 
that it seems necessary to retain introspective data, intro-
spection itself continues to prove its unreliability. "2 His 
plea is that introspection be referred to as "self-obser-
vation," a change which, it is hoped, will carry with it the 
dispassionate attitude of scientific description. 
c) Introspection, according to Perry, fails to make a 
proper distinction between the action of a mind and the 
content of a mind. In this important point, Perry charges 
that the feeling of action is not itself active, and thus 
1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 287. 
2R. B. Perry, Realms of Value (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1954), p. 20. Cf. also Perry, Present 
Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 273ff., p. 285. 
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properly belongs to the content rather than to the action by 
which that content is known. Failure to make a distinction 
at this point enables introspective method to assert that it, 
and it alone, is able to reach, cognitively, that act by 
which cognition, itself, is made possible. For Perry, the 
apparent depth of the self which introspection is thus able 
to plumb exclusively is illusory, and is based on the error 
of pseudo-simplicity--the assumption that the contents of my 
mind are the passive objects of my active perceiving, think-
ing, or willing. 1 The point, for Perry, is that there is no 
reason why something cannot be both active and passive. The 
effect is that introspection is robbed of its need to posit 
an activity by which it may view the passive contents, is 
disenfranchised in its claim to an intuitive knowledge of 
this activity, and loses, thus, its value as a unique method. 
Perry's substitution may be shown in his criticism of James. 
The true solution of the matter lies near at hand. If 
instead of defining mental action in terms of the feel-
ing of bodily activities, he had defined it in terms of 
the bodily action itself, ••• these difficulties would 
have been obviated. But this would have2required the abandonment of the introspective method. 
At this point it is necessary to allow the transition from 
methodology to theory of mind and knowledge to complete 
itself. 
1This important point will receive consideration in 
several other contexts. We may suggest in passing that we 
agree wholeheartedly with Perry's charge; not so with his 
solution. 
2Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 287. 
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B. ...Theory of Mind and Knowledge. 
1. Application of the method of general observation 
continues as a theory of the nature of mind--the type of 
mind which can best be apprehended from without. Certainly 
this much seems to be true, that the mind "makes sallies 
into the neighborhood" and "gives marked evidence of it-
self."1 
If the mind acts and is effective in an area 11 external 11 
to itself, leaving evidence of this activity, it would ap-
pear that this evidence should be usable to construct a fac-
simile of the activity of the mind·. 
The question to which behaviorism addresses itself, 
then, is: "Shall the mind be considered to be the cause of 
the actions productive of observable effects, or shall the 
mind be considered as identical with the actions?" Perry's 
choice of the second alternative might appear to take an 
overly materialistic stand; in reality it intends to be-
little neither the mind nor the body, nor their actions on 
each other. Thus, his assertion is that "mental action is a 
property of the physical organism·. "2 In this way Perry ex-
pacts to preserve an element of privacy while at the same 
time allowing scientific method entry into the field of 
mental activity. Perry's explanation appears to have three 
1 ~., p. 274. 
2~.' p. 298'. 
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parts·. 
a) First, an analysis of the knowing {in this case 
perceptual) situation reveals three factors . For example , 
seeing a sunset involves the sunset, the seeing, and the ex-
pression.1 Of these, the first and last factors are common 
property". 
b) The problem that remains is the seeing. Perry , 
here seems to regard this as the strong point of intro-
spective theories; his procedure is to show that since there 
appears to be some unavoidable privacy at this point, an 
explanation which avoids introspection constitutes a refu-
tation. The explanation is the simple one that, since 
mental action is being considered as a property of the 
physical organism, it is by no means improper that there be 
some privacy in the content of a mind since it is derived 
from the fact that there is privacy in ownership of my body~ 
It is no more mysterious-- albeit more difficult to overcome 
technically-- than your inability to feel a shock while wear-
ing gloves when I feel the shock barehanded. Our equipment 
is different . This fact is expanded by Perry to account for 
the continuity of personal history {memory) 2and for the di -
versity of personal histories~ 
c) Lest it appear that this concession to privacy be 
1Perry, Realms of Value , p·. 23 . 
2Perry , Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 296. 
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too great for his epistemology to assimilate, Perry next as-
serts that this privacy need not apply to the conceptual 
contents of a mind. "When I am thinking abstractions, the 
contents of my mind, namely the abstractions themselves, 
• • • are not possessed by me in any exclusive sense. ul 
Thus, the conceptual contents are on the order of the 
sunset, rather than the seeing, an assertion, of course, 
totally in keeping with the realistic assertion concerning 
the "abode" of mathematical and logical entities. 11\'le are 
thus led to the view that elements become mental content 
when reacted to in the specific manner characteristic of the 
central nervous system." 2 
The "specific manner of the central nervous system" is 
the topic for analysis by Perry in his theory of interest 
and cognition. The remaining problem for Perry is that of 
indicating a process by which mental action directed toward 
its own content is possible. In part, the nature of 
consciousness as seen by Perry, must support this expla-
nation. Thus, we are led to examine his theory of imma-
nence. However, it may be said now that for him self-obser-
vation is only a particular case of general observation seen 
as the response of a neural system to an object. Specifi-
cally, self-observation (of self) is a neural response of 
1Ibid., p. 297. 
2 1.1212:·' p. 299. 
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one part of the organism to another part. This is made 
theoretically possible by point (h) in the theory of inde-
pendence.1 
Two interesting corollaries follow from this theory of 
self-consciousness: first, reflection is not in any sense 
self-transcendence; second, self-consciousness is a deriva-
tive, rather than a primary, form of consciousness. These 
will prove useful in the subsequent examination of Jean-Paul 
Sartre. 
2. The theory of immanence continues the explanation 
of consciousness, its activity, nature, and content. Return-
ing, then, to the sunset and the seeing, the relation to be 
examined is that which may obtain between the sunset as an 
event in nature and the sunset as content in my mind. For 
Perry, the various realisms (Locke, Reid) 2have all been at-
tempts at the same time to assert and deny this connection. 
Perry's solution is unequivocal. 
I have not resorted to a general and vague insistence 
that true knowledge must "correspond" to its object. 
Experience seems to me to reveal the identity of true 
knowledge and ita object. The object with what is true 
of it, and knowledg~ when true for the thinker, are one 
and the same thing.:> 
If "object" is taken to mean "thing" in this quotation, then, 
1
see above pp. 15-16. 
2 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 307. 
3R. B. Perry, "A Review of Pragmatism as a Theory of 
Knowledge, 11 Journal of Philosophy , IV (1907), 374. 
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the sunset as a fact in nature and as a content of my 
consciousness are "one and the same thing." 
The object or content of consciousness is any entity 
insofar as it is responded to by another entity in a 
specific manner exhibited by the reflex nervous system. 
Thus physical nature, for example, is, under some 
circumstances, directly present in consciousness.l 
The theory of independence, in its differentiation be-
tween the cognitive relationship and other relationships, 
has protected the sunset from losing its own identity in be-
coming a content of my consciousness (and perhaps thousands 
of other consciousnesses as well). Nonetheless, it seems to 
be the case, for Perry, if "seeing " is taken to mean an 
organism's response to the sunset as a portion of the en-
vironment, that consciousness is to be taken as the total 
situation, including both the response and that which is re-
sponded to as it is responded to. This is Perry's epistemo-
logical monism; it is designed to remove two dualisms: the 
first, between the "object of knowledge" and the object as 
thing, has been mentioned; the second, between the mind and 
the body, will be considered presently~ 
3. The tenns "consciousness" and "awareness" seem not 
to be equivalent for Perry. The former appears to be used 
as a description of a structure which includes, a) the sub-
ject, b) the activity, c) the content, d) the thing (at 
1Holt, New Realism, p. 475~ 
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least in some of its aspects). 1 Awareness, on the other hand, 
appears to be confined to (b), with (a) presupposed. The 
theory of immanence asserts the identity of (c) and (d). 
They [things] may enter directly into the mind; and 
when they do, they become what are called 11 ideas.n So 
that ideas are only things in a certain relat~on; or, 
things, in respect of being known, are ideas. 
The theory of awareness, on the other hand, traces the 
process of "coming to consciousness,u and thus describes a 
function of the organism, rather than the structure of 
consciousness, itself. Since it appears to be here, rather 
than in the description of consciou.sness, t hat the problem 
of error is met, this must be regarded as an important 
portion of Perry's epistemology. Let us retrace the steps 
of the process, keeping in mind the three terms underlined 
below: 
The natural mind, as here and now existing, is thus an 
organization possessing as distinguishable, but comple-
mentari, aspects, interest, nervous system, and QQB-
tents.) 
a) There must be, in some sort of co-presence to each 
other, an organism (nervous system} and an environ-
ment. 
1R. B. Perry, "A Division of the Problem of Episte-
mology," Journal of Philosophy, VI (1909), 711. Perry uses 
the following terms: a) the person who knows, b) the 
knowledge which the person has, c) the something known, 
d) the thing of which something is known. My shift in 
terms, a shift which confessedly does some little violence 
to Perry's list, is made in order that awareness as an ac-
tivity may come out more clearly'. 
2Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 308. 
3l,lli.' p. 304. 
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b) Because of the nature of the environment (edible, 
blinding, pretty, threatening), a stimulus is 
given. 
c) Because of the nature of the organism, the charac-
ter of the stimulus as stimulus is possible. The 
nama given to this nature is 11 interest." 
d) The stimulus from the environment, because of the 
interest of the organism, elicits a response from 
the organism. This is termed 11 awareness. 11 
e) At the point of response of the organism, the en-
vironment becomes an 11 objact." It in no way loses 
its character as a thing by this transformation--
as I in no way lose my character as a man by be-
coming a father--yet the transformation, itself, is 
dependent on the response of the organism-. 
f) The total situation, including the responding 
organism and the environment as responded to, will 
be called 11 consciousness." 
The identity of thought and thing in consciousness pre-
cludes any question of error (or truth), if error is defined 
as a discrepancy between thought and thing. Yet frequently 
an organism reacts strangely to a stimulus--as if it thought 
it meant something else--so that it may be considered to have 
been mistaken in what it 11 thought it was."1 This apparently 
means that the possibility of truth and error must lie in the 
activity of cognition, an act which suggestively reverts even 
in realistic hands, to the phrase "awareness of." 
4. The problem of error thus becomes closely associ-
ated inversely with the pragmatic accent on truth as success, 
implying both the futurity of verification and the close 
connection with interest. Yet, lest pragmatism interpret 
1see Perry, Realms of Value, p. 48. 
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success too subjectively, the realistic reminder is present: 
that while success is certainly relative to interest, it (as 
well as the nature of the interest) is determined by the en-
vironmental circumstances. 
Truth or error arise when some content of mind is 
further dealt with in a characteristic fashion. It is 
possible for the mind to apprehend, speculate or im-
agine, merely; but in this there is neither truth nor 
error •••• The truth or error ••• is then relative 
to the interest and the circumstances which determine 
the success of the action·. 
It would appear from this that one is able to be aware with-
out interest, cognitive or practical. How this awareness 
may occur so as to be a "response to a stimulus," and yet 
fail to be relative to interest, is a question which is not 
answered by Perry. 
A criterion of truth is thus suggested by PeiTy. 2 
Broadly conceived, that content will be considered true if 
action in accordance with it is found to be successful. Yet 
this does not quite meet the problem. One would like to ask 
Perry what state of affairs would be termed successful? It 
appears that the environment is rigid enough to dictate the 
terms of success, if the realistic anchor to windward is not 
to drag, and therefore, it would seem t hat a realistic cri-
terion of truth should include a consideration of that en-
vironment. But for this we must investigate the metaphysics 
1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 236. 
2Perry, Realms of Value, pp. 449-450. 
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of the neutral entities. 
c. Metaphysics. 
Perry's epistemology has indicated a reality inde-
pendent of the knowing process, an antecedent reality which 
can be described and, in other relationships, manipulated, 
but which also claims ontological status. The nature of 
this reality must now be summarized. 
1. The first characteristic is neutralism. The 
second dualism which the theory of immanence makes it possi-
ble to escape is that between the mind and body. 1 The sug-
gested solution so far, that mind and body are reducible to 
"organism responding, 11 must be regarded as a functional-
epistemological solution requiring justification. It re-
ceives this justification here, where the mind-body dualism, 
and the theory of ultimate reality receive their characteri-
zation as the end result of analytic method. 
The orders of logic and mathematics, of mind and of 
conduct, stand upon the same footing as those of me-
chanical nature. So the anal~tical method inevitably 
leads beyond naturalism to a 'logical realism," that is 
as independent of physics as it is of psychology.2 
Thus the nature of the neutral entities is discovered, 
and the neutralism of them appears to mean ttneutral as 
common to both physical and mental events." By means of this 
1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 308. 
2Ibid., p. 79. The preceding pages show the influence 
on Perry of Ernst Mach. Mach's positivism, however, is 
amended by Perry's logical realism. 
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neutralism the apparent absurdity of a mind reaching out to 
encase a physical thing is removed. The thought and the 
thing interpenetrate because they are of the same texture. 
Similarly, the mind and the body can be viewed as identical 
without prejudice toward either naturalism or spiritualism 
because each is a configuration of something more basic~ 
Physical and psychical complexes have in common not 
only sensible qualities, but also certain more funda-
mental formal relationships, such as implication, order, 
causation, time and the like.l 
Thus, Perry's theory of immanence is fully recognized only 
when it is seen that the same elements compose both mind and 
body; and that these common elements embrace both sense 
gualia and logical abstractions. Reality is thus conceived 
as a field of interpenetrating relationships. 
There is an additional meaning, however, to neutral-
ism--a meaning which renders the new realism akin to medi-
eval realism. Neutralism here refers to existence. The 
goal of logical realism is existence in a logical, rather 
than a cosmological sense. First, there is no purposing 
mind discoverable as containing the logical-mathematical 
classes and relations which are the end product of analysis. 
Second, the logical meaning of existence means that a class 
exists by virtue of having members, and that members exist 
by virtue of the class. 2 In this sense numbers exist. 
1 Ibid., p. 310. 
2Perry, Realms of Value, p. 442. 
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Existence in the more strict sense signifies membership 1n a 
specific class, namely the class of participants in the 
space-time-causal nexus. 1 This, of course, does not show how 
a logical relationship can produce a causal relationship. 
It does, however, give indication of the formal priority 
which logic has over existence. To the hypothetical as-
sertion that "life is greater than logic, 11 Perry has are-
joinder to the contrary. This should suggest that his final 
criterion of truth must at least pay its respects to logical 
consistency. 
2. Pluralism, as the second attribute of reality, is 
suggested by two converging approaches. The first is empiri-
cal~2 The prima facie conclusion of empiricism is 1n favor 
of pluralism~ Empiricism also shows, as a method, that 
knowledge moves inductively from part to whole. This does 
not mean that, in terms of dialectical method, knowledge is 
not complete (is only partial knowledge) until it is 
knowledge of the whole. Certainly this is not the assumption 
on which the empirical sciences have made so much progress. 
It is intended, rather, to mean that there can be knowledge 
of parts. "If knowledge is additive, if things can be known 
one at a time, then the things known must possess their 
1 Ibid., p. 443. 
2cr. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp·. 244-
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natures independently. nl 
The second approach is the systematic argument for the 
independence of relations, which proceeds from the empirical 
assumption that things can be known. The theory of inde-
pendence does not deny that all things are related, at least 
as tenuously as by being in one universe, and perhaps in 
many other ways; but it does deny that all types of relation-
ships are definitive of the terms they relate~ 2 Hence, the 
universe exhibits two characteristics of pluralism: first, 
there may be a plurality of things; 3second, there may be a 
plurality of systems and relations within a class-inclusion 
hierarchy~ Thus, allowance is made for a plurality of 
causal chains. Both characteristics affect Perry's moral 
philosophy~ 
3. The reality-status of space, time, and causality 
must be scrutinized in the light of Perry's findings con-
cerning the neutrality of entities. It will prove illumi-
nating to place three quotations by Perry in proximity to 
each other for examination~ 
I am led to conclude, therefore, that all of these 
concepts (motion, velocity] are essentially ratios or 
relational complexes of the simple terms of experience, 
such as space, time, color, sound, etc.; and that each 
1 Ibid. , P• 243·. 
2
cf. above, pp. 21-22, points (a), (b), and (c). 
3This is an empirical finding only. For Perry, there 
seems to be difficulty in ever really reaching an "entity" 
which is not a relational complex. 
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of these ratios or relational complexes expresses some 
specifi9 complexity or configuration, which is found in 
nature.l 
We shall then be led to conclude that physical hy-
potheses as descriptive of physical facts, employ and 
presuppose logical and mathematical hypotheses, which 
in turn are descriptions of logical and mathematical 
facts. Lo~ic and mathematics describe the nature of 
"relation, n "order, 11 "dimensionality," "number," and 
"space"; physics studies particular cases of these· • 
• • • Thus a critical philosophy of science carries 
one beyond physical science to simpler non-physical 
terms, and provides for non-physical methods and non- 2 physical theories with which to formulate these terms~ 
The theory of immanence escapes • • • by employing the 
notion of relation in place of the notion of substance~3 
The first quotation indicates that space and time are 
not mental, but are found in nature and therefore are real·. 
It also suggests that they are simple, experiencible terms 
that are found in nature. Thus, for nature, space and time 
are some of the ultimate realities. At this point, however, 
Perry diverges from evident similarities with the system of 
Samuel Alexander.4 
The second quotation raises a problem, for it asserts 
that nature, while certainly real, cannot claim final reali-
ty, since, while nature is logical, logic is not per §! 
1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 62. 
Italics mine. 
2 Ibid., p. 83. 
3 Ibid., p. 308. 
4samuel Alexander, Space, Time and Deity (2 vole.; 
London: Macmillan and Company, 1920), Chaps. I-VI. The use 
of "configurations," a term not normally associated with 
logic, indicates a psychological kinship with Alexander· •. 
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physical. It is at this point that the separation of 
structural analysis and functional analysis becomes acute, 
for, while one does not "get behind" nature to a more ulti-
mate source, it is nonetheless the case that nature is a 
specific case of more ultimate logical relationships. It 
is tempting to claim that Perry has left us in a "realm 11 be-
yond space and time, inhabited by simple, non-physical 
terms--a singularly Platonic dwelling plaoe--which can be 
nowhere because "anywhere" is, of course, a spatio-temporal 
term. 
The third quotation pushes this ttrealm" of simples 
even beyond the range of speculation, thus making a di-
vergence from Platonic substantialism. Instead of non-
physical terms subsisting beyond nature, Perry "escapes" the 
ultimacy of simple terms by affirming a relational theory of 
reality ·. This avoids substantialism; it d.oes not appear to 
avoid the problem of the second quotation, for one is still 
left wondering what "relationship11 there might be between 
logical relations and natural complexes. Perry's answer to 
this difficulty serves also to suggest that causality, once 
it is understood, does not present any special problems that 
are excluded from the discussion of space and tim.e. For 
Perry a cause is "the law or its implication. "1 
Not necessarily the mechanical law; for analysis and 
description is, as we have seen, by no means limited 
1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 100. 
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to the type exhibited in physical science. But a logi-
cal cause, a mathematical cause, an ethical cause, will, 
I believe1 turn out, in each case, to be a law or constant. 
D. Conclusion. 
Perry has been found, in general, to be on the side of 
science, the empirical sciences as well as the exact 
sciences, and opposed to what he has called "romanticism," 
in method, in theory of mind and lmowledge, and in meta-
physics. As science may be characterized above all by its 
ideal of precision of measurement, description, and classi-
fication, we may look for these ideals to be manifested in 
his moral philosophy·. Yet we need not look for an aloofness 
which is content only to describe and which makes no attempt 
to prescribe the conditions of the good life. As science is 
descriptive in order that it might learn how best to control 
man's environment, so may Perry's philosophy as studied so 
far, and certainly portions of his theory of value yet to be 
studied, be dispassionately, analytically, descriptive in 
order that man might learn how best to control himself in 
his environment. Let us conclude this section, and intro-
duce the next, with Perry's final words in Present Philo-
sophical Tendencies: 
There is nothing dispiriting in realism. It involves 
the acceptance of the given situation as it is, with no 
attempt to think or imagine it already good. But it in-
volves no less the conception of the reality and power 
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of life. It is opposed equally to an idealistic antici-
pation of the victory of spirit, and to a naturalistic 
confession of the impotence of spirit-. In this sense 
all bold and forward living is realistic. It involves a 
sense for things as they are, an ideal of things as they 
should be, and a determination that, through enlightened 
action, things shall in time come to be what they should 
be.l 
3. Summary of Perry's Moral Philosophy. 
A. Theory of Value. 
1. It may be wise to introduce an exposition of Perry's 
theory of value with a warning~ As the conclusion to the 
preceding section suggested, we may look for continuity in a 
generally scientific approach as Perry turns his remarkable 
analytic powers on this subject. We may also look for sup-
port for his affirmation of the additive nature of knowledge 
in the broadly synthetic system which he is building. But 
we may be somewhat surprised to find that, as Perry leaves 
epistemology behind, he leaves with it his celebrated pan-
objectivism. Justification for this lies, if it lies any-
where, in his calculated refusal to mingle description and 
11 explanati.on." The result is that, upon the refusal to 
trace a causal chain beyond nature, nature, itself, in all 
its spatial, temporal, physical, and biological concreteness 
becomes the point of departure. This does not, emphatically, 
mean that descriptive analysis is forsaken, but it does mean 
that Perry is now focussing on a different problem, namely, 
1 Ibid., p. 347. 
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an analysis of the behavior of the human organism. 
It is for this reason that Perry's epistemology and 
metaphysics may be labeled "logical realism" and may admit 
to dissatisfaction with the conclusions of naturalism, while 
his theory of value appears to be thoroughly naturalistic. 
There is no conflict because Perry has claimed a disjunction. 
Yet, even so, the forces of synthesis are at work to take 
Perry beyond naturalism; the role of reason, both as a 
function of the human organism and as the cognitive tool 
with which man is able to grasp the configurations of 
reality, is clearly primary 1n his system of moral philoso-
phy. If man is a natural animal for Perry, thinking man es-
capes mere naturalness even as logic escapes the specific 
case of spatial-temporal-causal existence, to become both a 
force in shaping his behavior and a norm in guiding it. It 
may be that only when this is taken into consideration can 
Perry's criterion of truth be completely formulated . Empiri-
cally, it may be considered to be cognitive satisfaction; 
the nature of cognition, however, requires the expansion of 
this so that the nature of cognitive satisfaction, itself, 
might be known. Let us then express Perry's criterion of 
truth as inclusiveness and consistency. 1 
This is a functional criterion. Structurally, it is 
in direct conflict with the asserted nature of knowledge as 
~- B. Perry, Approach to Philosophy (New York: 
Charles Scribner and Sons, l905), p. 149. 
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additive. Were it not that Perry has also asserted dis-
junction, rather than conflict, between a structural and a 
functional analysis, the conflict would be a pressing one; 
as it is, we already know that truth and error have no place 
in the theory of immanence, and we may thus depart epistemic 
monism for the more generic criterion which suggests that 
that proposition is true which expresses a consistent logi-
cal relationship with other propositions, and which most in-
clusively satisfies cognitive interest. The value-criteria 
of harmony and inclusiveness parallel this criterion of 
truth. 
Thus it is that synthesis does its work for Perry, 
bringing together apparently disparate fields of investi-
gation, and becoming identical, when one leaves the area of 
science (including the science of ethics) for the broader 
area of a philosophy of life, with harmony. Let us trace 
this path. We begin with the analysis of value. 
2. In the discussion of Perry's theory of awareness, 
it was suggested that a thing becomes an object by being 
"responded to" by an organism. At the beginning of the 
process there is an environment providing a stimulus. The 
stimulus elicits a response from the organism. At this 
point cognitive contact is established, and the object is 
generated as an accidental characteristic of the portion of 
the universe responded to. It is at this point that value 
enters the universe. Before this point there is no value. 
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In the beginning is a background of 
mechanical chaos. Nature, as interpreted by the inor-
ganic sciences, presents a spectacle of impassivity . It 
moves, transforms, and radiates, on every scale and in 
all its gigantic range of temporal and spatial distance, 
utterly without loss or gain of value.l 
Nothing matters, for there is nobody for it to matter to. 
The spirit of God does not brood upon the waters, and it is 
of no import to the neutral entities what exists and what 
does not. "one cannot rightly attribute to such a world 
even the property of neglect or brutality. Its indifference 
is absolute."2 Into such a world life is introduced. Why it 
is introduced is an illicit question, betraying disbelief 
that the indifference is absolute. How it was introduced is 
a problem for the biochemist to ponder. That it was intro-
duced marks the beginning of value. 
When life is introduced, as when a river is introduced, 
it does make a difference; the environment begins to act on 
it; storms, erosion, floods and drought in turn make a 
difference to the existence and nature of the river or the 
bit of protoplasm; but the annihilation of either is a 
matter of indifference, for only the bit of protoplasm cared, 
and it is no more. Life, in short, is not good in the eyes 
of the universe except in the specious sense that "the uni-
verse is favorable to life." But in the eyes of life, 
1Perry, Moral Economy, pp. 9-10. 
2 Ibid., p. 10. 
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nature becomes a new system with a new center [the 
stimulus becomes an object]. The organism inherits the 
earth; the mechanisms of nature become its environment, 
its resources in the struggle to keep for a time body 
and soul together. The mark of life is partiality to 
itself.l 
It is here that life confers value on those aspects of its 
environment which aid it or threaten it in its project . "An 
interest, or unit of life, is essentially an organization 
which consistently acts for its own preservation." 2 
It is well to note here the similarity and difference 
between this rudimentary value-conferral and mechanical 
action and reaction. The distinction is between teleology 
and mechanism. For Perry, there is a graduated scale of re-
action (or response) from the simplest reflexive tendency3of 
the amoeba to the intelligent, purposive action of the human 
being--a graduated scale where "there is an option as to the 
level where the terms "interest" and "value" are intro-
duced."4 An absolute difference, however, lies, not between 
the amoeba and the human organism, but between the amoeba and 
the river, which reacts mechanically. 
Yet even this difference is absolute only when viewed 
1Ibid. 
2 Ibid., p. 11. 
3Perry's word "tendency" is used here to indicate that 
minimal point, wherever it may be, of activity which could 
be called interested-. 
4Perry, Realms of Value, p. 48. See also p. 49. 
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in a certain way. 1 Here we must make use, once again, of 
the terms 11 structural" and 11 functional." It is of the 
utmost importance that the present usage not be confused 
with the earlier usage. If it is, criticism in the sequel 
chapter will be misunderstood. It has been granted Perry 
that the present investigation deals with physical nature 
and need not concern itself with neutral entities. Thus the 
functional portion alluded to in the theory of awareness is 
the present general area of discussion. However, within 
physical nature there are both structures and functions also, 
and these must be kept distinct~ Thus, the difference, for 
Perry, between a river and an amoeba is absolute only when 
viewed in a certain way. Structurally, the river and the 
amoeba differ only in complexity of organization. Function-
ally they differ absolutely. Perry adopts an emergence hy-
pothesis in order to account for the structural relationship 
and the functional disjunction~ 
Life is not purposive by virtue of being emergent or 
organized; but organization is purposive in the particu-
lar case of life by virtue of certain special properties 
which emerge.2 
Perry, himself, makes good use of the distinction made here 
in combatting attempts to reach a teleological universe by 
1Perry, General Theory, pp. 147-148. 
2 Ibid., p. 155. 
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means of an analysis of biological structures.1 We may ac-
cept the distinction, recognizing that henceforth analysis 
is to be of living organizations which exhibit some grade of 
interested action, with no attempt being made to derive 
interest from something more primitive. Let us trace a 
simple example of value-conferral in order to bring out 
implications which will be needed as analysis proceeds. 
An organism is confronted by a thing. The thing pro-
vides a physical stimulus in the form of a sharp jab (of a 
thorn). The direction of movement thus far is from thing to 
organism. The neural system of the organism "interprets" 
this stimulus as painful. 2 At this stage the organism enters 
into a relationship with the thing in the sense of object. 
The epistemological task is now complete, and consciousness 
as a panobjective event is the result·. One may now ask le-
gitimately if value has not been conferred. Now it may be 
quite true that there is a alight temporal lag between the 
physical reception of the stimulus and the consciousness of 
pain, and it may well be true that a further act on the part 
of the organism is required in order to translate the 
1R. B. Perry, "Purpose as Systematic Unity," Monist, 
III (1917), 352-375·. 
2Perry's discussion of pain receptors is omitted here (cf. Perry, General Theory, pp. 282-285). It forms an im-
portant part of his argument distinguishing his interest 
theory from hedonism. For our analysis, space-considerations 
require the assumption that when the organism "interprets" a 
stimulus as painful, this interpretation includes both the 
physical response and the consciousness of pain. 
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consciousness of pain into the negative response which inar-
ticulately "decides" that "it doesn't like to be jabbed by 
thorns." If this is the case, then it must be admitted that 
value cannot be conferred until cognition has "captured" its 
object. The consciousness of the pain and the object as-
sumed to have provided the stimulus must be brought together 
by cognition before interest can be said to have any materi-
al to work with in granting value. Let us put this in a 
series of steps. 
a) Initially the event requires a capacity on the 
part of the thorn to hurt, and on the part of the organism 
to be hurt. Given this, the two must be brought together. 
b) But (a) is not cognition. The second step is the 
consciousness of the pain and the thorn as connected. 
It appears to be at this point that a basic value-be-
stowal occurs. It is important to fix the precise place, 
not only because it will reflect the position of cognition 
in value-conferral, but also in order to find, if possible, 
whether expectancy is a requirement of value or is only a 
refinement of value already conferred. It may be submitted, 
at this point, that, for Perry, cognition is a presuppo-
sition of value-conferral; one must first have an object be-
fore one can value it. 
However, in the higher organisms, memory and expec-
tation provide the means of refining both cognition and 
value-conferral. As cognition requires expectancy in order 
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that there may be a theory of truth and error, so, it would 
appear, does expectancy furnish the basis of a value 
judgment. The distinction is between the value-conferral 
which states that "I do not like the pain of a thorn-prick" 
and that which states that "thorn-pricks (and a further 
sophistication would simplify this to thorns) are to be 
avoided." The first appears to confer value, and second to 
define future behavior in the light of value-conferral. 
In this second phase of what may be called a relation-
al theory of value-conferral (because it is the object and 
not the pain upon which the value is conferred), cognition 
emerges more clearly as a separate activity. It is inti-
mately intertwined with interest, however. Cognition gives 
to interest the inflexibility of a world whose demands must 
be met, while interest gives the flexibility of value-
judgments relative to a given organism. Let us see, now, 
what Perry has accomplished. 
First, he has shown that cognition must precede value-
bestowal. Second, he has thus founded his theory of value 
realistically to this extent, that the stimulus and the re-
sponse both are required for cognition. This does not mean 
that the stimulus determines the nature of the response, or 
even that there must be a response, but simply that it is a 
necessary condition of any response. Third, the priority of 
cognition permits a descriptive analysis of nature to pre-
cede value-judgments upon nature--in short, science 
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(including the science of descriptive psychology) is de-
scriptive before it is practical. Fourth, in the separation 
of cognition and interest, he has indicated the separation 
of truth and value. Finally, in that very separation, he 
has provided for the subjectivity of values, without, at the 
same time subjectivizing truth. In short, he has escaped 
the vicious relativism, for example,, of Protagoras. 
The sequel chapter may disclose reasons for tampering 
with this analysis. It may be that an interest has been 
overlooked--the interest which prompted the organism to take 
note of the thorn in the first place. It may be that the 
bifurcation of truth and value is not as complete as Perry's 
analysis suggests. 
Whatever their common roots may be, and at whatever 
phase of cognition interest appears, it is evident that, for 
Perry, they are in close and continuing association. As is 
clearly indicated by descriptive method, cognition "mediates" 
interest. Put as simply as possible, "mediation" means that 
by verification of cognitive expectancy, a fund of experi-
ence is built up which will act to guide interest in avoid-
ing what it does not want or getting what it does want. Ap-
proached biologically this means that, in its efforts to 
survive, the organism, with varying degrees of elasticity 
dependent upon the complexity of its structure, will adapt 
itself to its environment. Approached psychologically, 
interested or purposive action is adopted because the 
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anticipatory responses which it arouses coincide with 
the unfulfilled or implicit phase of a governing pro-
pensity.l 
Through their organization into life, the mechanisms of 
nature thus take on the generic quality of good and evil. 
They either serve interests or oppose them; and must be 
employed or assimilated, or avoided and rejected ac-
cordingly. Events which once indifferently happened are 
now objects of hope and fear, or integral parts of suc-
cess and failure.2 
This, then, we take to be the original source and 
constant feature of all value. That which is an object 
of interest is!£ ipso invested with value. Any object, 
whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, what-
ever it be, is taken in it; just as anything whatsoever 
becomes a target when anyone whosoever aims at it~3 
The intent of this subsection has not been to belittle 
the famous and important assertion by Perry quoted immedi-
ately above. The attempt has rather been to make way for it 
by attempting to understand Perry's epistemology of value. 
All-too-frequently exposition of Perry's theory of value be-
gins where this section has ended. The statement above 
indicates Perry's value-subjectivism. It is hoped that the 
exposition so far has helped to indcate why he is a sub-
jectivist, and in what sense it follows from his realism·. 
A definition of interest may now follow its description. 
For Perry, "an act is interested in so far as its occurrence 
is due to the agreement between its accompanying expectation 
lPerry, General Theory, p. 209. 
2Perry, Moral Economy, pp. 12-13. 
3Perry, General Theory, pp. 115-116. 
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and the unfulfilled phases of a governing propensity."! A 
governing propensity is a determining tendency which is at 
any given time 11 in control of the organism as a whole." 2 
Let us conclude by suggesting that, however inter-
twined the roots of interest and cognition may be, the 
"second phase" of value conferral, that which acts on the 
basis of expected results is the point, for Perry, where 
interest proper receives its definition. The parallel with 
his theory of verification is unmistakable. "However he may 
have come by it, the animal is supposed at the moment of 
action to possess a capacity for prospiciently determined 
action. u3 He acts, not from what is or has been, but because 
of what he anticipates. 
The agent views the situation, whether by association, 
inference, or spontaneous insight, in the light of some 
aspect or relation that tre.nscends given fact; and he 
acts accordingly, that is, his acting as he does ks de-
termined by his viewing the situation as he does. 
Why he views the situation as he does is thus pointed up, as 
has been suggested in this section, as a question for criti-
cal appraisal in the next chapter~ 
3. Now, if it is granted that value enters the world 
by means of the interest of some organism, we may continue 
1 Ibid., p. 184. 
2Ibid. 
3 Ibid., p. 178. 
4 Ibid., p. 179·. 
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and make some few hints of the various combinations and 
modes of interests. One interest, alone and unqualified, 
straining for satisfaction, brings value into the world, but 
one interest is not sufficient to provide a basis for morali-
ty. It is when more than one interest, or an interest in 
more than one object, or a similarity of interests in differ-
ent objects, occurs that the questions arise to which axi-
ology addresses itself. Values must be scaled and graded if 
interested action is not to go off in all directions at once. 
The plan of his latest book, Realms of Value, indica tes that. 
Perry has appended to the psychological scale of interests 
of General Theory of Value a scale of values that associates 
them with the great institutions of human life, morality, 
culture, politics, science, ar~ religion, history, and edu-
cation-. Ttle must content ourselves here with bare mention of 
the psychological scale of interests only,ltrusting that the 
criterion of value will emerge, and that this will point to 
the inclusiveness with which Perry deals with the great 
human institutions. 
Direct quotation may serve as the most concise means 
of presenting the various scales of interests. 
Preference, intensity, strength, duration, number, ~­
lightenment, and inclusiveness of interest are all le-
gitimate, and more or less explicitly recognized, modes 
of comparison. Intensity and preference provide 
lrn this scale, t he object of positive interest is 
better than the object of negative interest "by definition." 
See Perry, Realms of Value, p. 50. 
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comparison between different objects of the same inter-
est; strength provides comparison between the interests 
of the same subject; number, duration and enlightenment 
provide comparison in these respects between any inter-
ests of any subjects; and inclusion, or the whole-part 
relation, pro~ides comparison between any interests in 
all respects.l 
The standard of inclusiveness is the standard imf.licit 
in the superior claims of the total "personal will' 
[governing propensity?] as compared with any of the 
separate appetites of the same person; and the claims of 
the total social interest as compared with those of its 
several personal or class interests·. 2 
There are also modes of interest. While the scope of 
this study once again prohibits detailed treatment, they 
must be given an item account , since some of them will con-
cern us later. 
Under the heading of deficiency of interests3may be 
listed those which are latent, opposed to active; potential, 
opposed to present; playful, opposed to executive; and false, 
opposed to true. In each case it may be noted that there is 
the possibility of awakening or correcting the interest, 
which, in turn, implies the possibility of discussion, 
1Perry, Realms of Value, p. 53; the italics in the 
first two lines only are mine. For discussion see Realms of. 
Value, pp. 53-61, or, in much greater detail, General Theory, 
Chaps. XX, XXI. 
2Perry, General Theory, p. 60. 
311Deficiency 11 here does not mean a tendency toward in-
difference. "Indifference" is the middle point on the scale 
of positive and negative interests. 
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education, or reappraisal of any particular 1nterest~1 
Interests may be of a nature which tend toward repe-
tition or prolongation, or they may be progressive. Anyone 
who has delighted in returning again and again to a favorite 
spot in order to recapture a particular mood cannot fail to 
understand that it is at least possible that a conservation 
of values need not imply a progression. If one is intent on 
a quantitative accumulation of values, of course, then a con-
tinuation or repetition may appear to be a progression. 
There is a notion of heaven, for example, which is not in 
sympathy with progress, but which rests content with blessed-
ness. Poets and philosophers2have joined in ridiculing this 
view. As Perry, himself, insists, the hYpothesis of heaven 
must contain the possibility of growth in interest. Yet the 
hypothesis that heaven be ''more of the same 1131ncludes within 
it the notion that values as found here, now, are frequently 
not progressive. 
Interests may be primary or secondary, dependent or 
independent. This makes possible the distinction between 
~aterial presented here under the general heading of 
"combinations and modes of interests" is a summary of Perry, 
Realms of Value, chap. v. A much more detailed account is 
given in Perry, General Theory, chaps. VIII, IX, and X; a 
good preface is presented in General Theory, pp~ 213-214. 
2cr. G. B. Shaw, Man and Superman (Baltimore: 
Penguin Books Inc·., 1952), pp. l25-l75; "Don Juan in Hell." 
3Perry, Realms of Value, pp. 489-490. 
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interests as ends and interests as means, or as final and 
instrumental. 1 It is worth noting here that Perry's usage of 
"primary" and "secondary" is not intended to indicate 
strength or priority. The conflict of interests will be 
discussed shortly. Apparently the use of these terms is de-
signed to avoid difficulties involved in the more common 
terms "intrinsic" and "extrinsic." It is also apparent that 
"final" does not mean final in any ultimate sense, but only 
in an ulterior sense. 
Interests may also be impersonal, where the object 
(not, of course, the subject) is other than a parson; re-
flexive, where the object is the self, and where the terms 
"self-interest," "self-love," "selfishness," and "self-per-
faction" find their meaning; and social, where the object of 
one person's interest is the interests of another person. 2 
By virtue of the fluidity of all of these modes, it is possi-
ble to give a problematic definition of love which will com-
bine social interest with either progressive or prolonging 
interests. The result is of importance, since the two re-
sultant theories ultimately disagree on the proper object of 
love--the person "as is," or the person as his ideal possi-
bilities. These theoretical considerations also apply to 
the love between man and God. Further, the distinction 
1 Ibid. , p. 79. 
2 Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
between social and reflexive interests, and the analytic 
failure to bring them together, provides the beginning _of 
opposition between moral theories of self-perfection and 
those of benevolence. 
B. Conflict of Interests: Moral Theory. 
Interests conflict in various senses. 1 Interests may 
be contradictory, such as positive and negative interests in 
the same object, as when I am drawn to a work of art and you 
are repelled by it (such contradiction may also happen with-
in one person). Interests may be non-contradictory, but 
incompatible, as when we both want the same woman, or when I 
want, at the same time, to enjoy my cigar and avoid lung 
cancer. The key to Perry's constructive moral theory lies 
in the concept intended as a remedy to the malady of con-
flict of interests--harmony. The other aspect of harmony, 
designed to provide operational efficacy to harmony, as well -
as supplying it with 11 thickness," 2is inclusiveness. Thus, 
morality "takes conif'lict of interest as its point of de-
parture and harmony of interests as its ideal goal. 11 3 The 
value of this broad a circumscription of morality is that at 
1 Ibid., pp. 84-85. 
2This word is intended to indicate the "thinness" of 
consistency before it is thickened by the stock of benevo-
lence, which would will consistency at the richest possible 
level. 
3Perry, Realms of Value, p. 87. 
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one blow it removes from morality the four onerous miscon-
ceptions by which morality is commonly understood--and be-
littled: asceticism, authoritarianism, preceptualism, and 
utopianism. 1 
Perry's psychological approach has revealed man as a 
complex of intertwining interests, controlled by a governing 
propensity, 2and mediated by reason. These give the elements 
of purposive action, and produce the human individual as the 
basis of moral action, or, as the "moral unit." Purposive 
action in the individual is defined thus: 
Interested or purposive action is action adopted be-
cause the anticipatory responses which it arouses coin-
cide with the unfulfilled or implicit phase of a govern-
ing propensity·.3 
The initial role of reason in this drama has been suggested. 
Thus far, however, its duties have been merely cognitive·. 
Possibly the distinctive feature of Perry's philosophy, and 
particularly of his moral theory, is that from beginnings 
obviously deep within naturalism he is nonetheless able to 
derive man, in true devotion to Aristotle, as the rational 
animal. 
1~ Reason as a function of thought: that the human 
organism is capable of thinking rationally, that is, relat-
ing his experiences, abstracting from them and relating 
1 Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
2Perry, General Theor:y: , p. 184·. 
3~., p. 209. See above, pp. 49-50. 
concepts, planning ahead and remembering previous experi-
ences, all this according to the "laws of thought, 11 appears 
to be evident. The difficulty has never been (at least 
theoretically) whether or not man could make his mind work 
according to the laws of thought, but rather whether these 
laws are valid, and if so, for what. 
2. Reason as cognition: Perry's descriptive attitude 
toward the laws of nature is disarming. The laws of nature 
are simply the empirically discovered ways that things 
happen. The laws are not regulative. However, this same 
attitude, directed toward the neutral entities, in discover-
ing the way "things" happen, discovers also the logico-mathe-
matical keys to the universe. That is to say that thinking 
man, analyzing his experience, finds the most pervasive and 
the most ubiquitous elements of his experience to be--the 
laws of thought. 
3. Reason as normative: thus, when he also finds 
that nature is a special case of logico-mathematical princi-
ples, namely the case of these principles as found in ex-
istence, he knows that, whatever else his experience con-
tains, it must obey the laws of the universe, which are also 
the laws of thought. 
4. Reason as causative: now, while Perry has emphati-
cally not argued that the structural analysis which dis-
covered the logico-mathematical relationships will also dis-
cover them to be the efficient causes of existence, he does 
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have, within nature, an organism which is able to think and 
act according to the laws of thought. This means that while 
reason, itself, produces nothing, thinking man, as a reason-
ing, natural creature, can act and construct and modify his 
environment. This is intelligent behavior. 
5. Reason as a cause of man's behavior: in a uni-
verse where there is a law of logic governing every event 
that happens (although it does not, by any means, govern the 
happening), as appears to be the case (3), whatever happens 
interestedly happens not only according to the laws of logic 
but also is done for reasons. 1 
We must be careful to distinguish here between Perry's 
logical realism and a form of rationalism which argues that 
since the universe is constructed according to rational laws, 
nothing can be done except that which is already pre-cast to 
be done by rational necessity. Perry only argues that what-
ever happens mu.st happen according to the laws of logic, and 
that whatever is done interestedly must also be done for 
reasons, whether poorly founded or well founded. Thus, the 
only reason which makes things happen in certain ways is the 
reasoning in man's thinking. Now, perhaps we are prepared 
to discuss Perry's views on rationalization. 
1This outline does not attempt to make use of Perry's 
epistemological monism in showing a relationship between the 
structure of the neutral entities and that of consciousness. 
It seems to the writer that to make use of this at this 
point detracts from Perry's descriptive empiricism. 
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Rationalization, popularly defined, is the act of find-
ing reasons ~ post facto in order that an act done for poor 
reasons or no reasons at all might seem more reasonable 
either to oneself or to others. Usually, a moral situation 
is in question, so that rationalization will mean the at-
tempt, again ~ post facto, to seek honorable reasons for 
what appears to have been an ignoble act. The patent ab-
surdity of trying to exchange unreasonable for reasonable 
motives after the motive has already produced its event is 
what makes rationalization, itself, so absurd; the difficul-
ty of knO'\dng anybody's real motive in the first place is 
what makes rationalization so infuriating. 
For Perry, rationalization, far from being either ab-
surd or infuriating, illustrates the moral force which 
reason exerts in its own right. Let us return to Perry's 
notion that no interested act is performed without a reason. 
Every interested act has a reason, for every interest-
ed act has at least one mediating judgment •••• Recog-
nition of this fact, that every agent has a~ fide 
reason for his action, whether true or not, and whether 
he profess it honestly or dishonestly, is the beginning 
of all historical and social wisdom •••• No interested 
act is understood ••• until it has been made to seem 
reasonable in terms of those expectations with whi~t 
was associated in the agent.l 
For Perry, rationalization is actually the "finding of new 
reasons, "2in terms of the agent's expectations, or in terms 
1Perry, General Theory, p. 385. Italics in the 
original. 
2Ibid., p. 386. 
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of what others may expect of the agent, and possesses the 
peculiar ability of "introducing integration where it did 
not exist before. 111 Interests are brought into new relations, 
and what may have been erroneous behavior because of errone-
ous cognition, or imprudent behavior, or immoral behavior, 
may become the opposites of these through rationalization 
(at its best). It seems safe to say that reason enters 
actively into the integrating process, rather than waiting 
outside as coachman. Successful rationalization can, not 
only make a wrong act seem right, but can make it right by 
providing a new frame of reference . The importance of this 
must be understood. The provision of a new frame of refer-
ence--a new set of expectations--has the effect of producing 
a new set of motives, 1n terms of which the earlier motives 
are rendered reasonable·. 
This caricature of rationalization [as hypocrisy ] 
arises primarily from the false noti~n that the reasons 
for action are not causes of action·. 
This might possibly be anti tled "the naturalization of 
c. Harmonious Happiness. 
If we are able to define happiness as the satisfaction 
of interest, the main features of Perry's moral theory may 
begin to emerge. We must keep in mind the role of reason, 
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here, lest we err in two possible extremes. First, if 
reason is regarded merely as the "tool of the emotions" 
which the shrewd animal uses to get what he wants, no matter 
what it is that he wants, we underestimate the power of 
reason; second, if we consider reason as legislating a norm 
of behavior, discoverable by rational thought and binding on 
the rational individual irrespective of the interests of 
that individual, we err on the side of moral rationalism.1 
In order to pass between these two extremes, we must have 
equal regard for reason and for interest. 
Happiness has been defined as consisting in the satis-
faction of interest. This may be true, so long as the satis-
faction of one interest only is being considered. Yet even 
here, the structure of nature may be seen as such that this 
interest can be satisfied only in certain ways, and perhaps, 
if the interest is "unrealistic," not at all. Reason is 
more than a tool of the emotions, but lese than a dictator 
to them; it is the formal rule, which must be obeyed if an 
interest is to succeed in being satisfied. There may be 
many ways, each with its rule. 
But, perhaps Aristotle was correct in opining that one 
swallow does not make a summer, nor one satisfaction happi-
ness. As interests become more numerous, more varied, and 
1
"Moral rationalism" is used here as distinct from 
11 rationalism" as used above. The prefix "moral" indicates, 
not that one cannot act except in a certain way, but that 
one ought not~ 
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focused on a plurality of objects, the role of reason, while 
not increasing in power, does increase in the complexity of 
its rules, so that, while the point of departure is still 
the complex of interests, the rules for their satisfaction, 
may intersect so that there are fewer alternatives. Such 
would seem to be the meaning of the one rational-moral norm 
in Perry's system, inclusiveness. As the criterion of truth 
began with expectations, so does the criterion of value; but 
as truth builds synthetically on expectations and their ful-
filment to produce a pyramid resembling a dialectic, so also 
does happiness build synthetically". It begins in interest, 
and it begins nowhere else, but as interests become more 
complex, the alternatives become fewer, and the limiting 
principle of 11most inclusive" may leave open only one path. 
It is this which gives the rationalistic cast to Perry's 
moral philosophy. 
In a complex of interests, whether in a person or a 
society, the reasonable path of their fulfilment may 
frequently require modification of one or more interests--
lest reason find no path at all to their satisfaction. Thus 
harmonious happiness takes the form of conciliation and 
compromise, with proper respect given to the claims of each 
interest to be heard (an excellent hint for self-analysis) 
and to be merged, without turbulence, in the stream which 
will become the governing propensity of the individual~ 
Perry's intention here is to present a picture of plaited 
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interests, each being satisfied, with a minimum of modifi-
cation, and each contributing to the strength of the whole. 
So long as it is remembered that the whole is a synthesis, 
Perry can be said to affirm that the truth (or the greatest 
value) is the whole. The enemy is suppression; the keynote 
is sublimation. The picture of the individual will thus be 
that of happiness rather than that of moral rigor, although 
the latter is by no means excluded. The function of the 
"will" is taken over by the integrated force of the several 
interests, mediated by reason, and merged into a governing 
propensity. It remains true that, in some sense, at least, 
the individual can be "moral''--in that he takes charge of 
"his" interests and merges them into a life-plan. It is 
democracy by reason and diplomacy rather than the tyranny of 
majority vote or the tyranny of the moral will. 
However, there seems, so far, to be nothing to dis-
tinguish Perry's moral philosophy from enlightened self-
interest. This close affinity indicates the redundancy of 
speaking of "benevolence" toward oneself. If an interest 
must fall by the wayside through utter perversity, this, 
first, is not as common an occurrence as one might suspect, 
and second, is not a cause for great theoretical worry, 
since it is not a person which is being jettisoned, but one 
of the constituent elements--for the sake of the person. 
How far the principle of self-interest and the princi-
ple of harmonious happiness coincide depends on how the 
self in question is constituted. Given a man whose 
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interests are already harmoniously attuned to those of 
others it is then a matter of indifference whether the 
argument for morality is presented in terms of his self-
interest or 1n terms of the interests of all. But since 
unhappily there is no guarantee that self-interest is so 
attuned, it must be morally certified before it can be 
taken as the premise of the argument. Morality can be 
argued from self-interest only when it has already been 
put into self-interest.~ 
With this we enter Perry's social philosophy and develop a 
new term. 
D. Social Philosophy. 
1. Love.--The principle of self-interest, as such, 
proves insufficient when the harmoniously happy individual 
is confronted by other individuals and must take account of 
them. In this section the kinship with self-interest is re-
versed, and we will find that the development of benevolence 
as a moral term focusses the self outward toward other 
parsons. Benevolence, 1 t may be suggested, is "other-
centered," rather than self-centered. Perhaps this is the 
social equivalent of the scientist's interest in the speci-
men before him, rather than in himself. 
It has been suggested above that interests can be im-
personal, reflexive, or social. The meaning of interest as 
social is that it is a non-reflexive interest in a person~ 
Perry's definition of love is that it is 
benevolence focused upon an individual; or positive 
interest in another's interests because they are his; 
it is independent benevolence mediated by recognition 
1Perry, Realms of Value, p. 131. 
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and familiarity.l 
The root attitude is benevolence or good will. It is the 
object of love which makes this definition important. If 
the object of love is another person as a set of attributes 
(from blonde hair to tenderness or reciprocity), then what 
one loves are the attributes, and, in the case of reciproci-
ty, there is some question whether the interest is social or 
reflexive. If what one loves is another person as an ex-
ample of mankind, then what one loves is the generalization, 
mankind. If the object of love is another person as his 
ideal possibilities, then what one loves is the ideal. It 
seems to follow that in each of these cases the person is at 
best the concrete exemplification of the object of love--and 
at worst, the accidental title-holder. 
There is another possibility. If love is of an ideal, 
the medium through which the ideal is being realized presum-
ably is also in love with the ideal~ In this case the love 
of two persons may be a sharing of admiration toward a third 
object. This notion of love is a possible explanation of 
the connection between the love of God and the love of one's 
neighbor, and the priority of the former as a means to the 
latter. The "community of saints" of American protestantism 
is suggested by this. Its main difficulty, aside from theo-
retical problems, is its tendency to deteriorate from a 
1 ~., p. 366. 
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society of communal admiration to a mutual admiration socie-
ty. 
For Perry, these misplacements of the object of love, 
mise the social meaning of love entirely. "Benevolence 
focused upon an individual" must be taken strictly; other-
wise interest loses its social characteristic and becomes 
impersonal or reflexive. It is the individual who is loved. 
One might, at this point somewhat prematurely, inquire as to 
the nature of this individual who is to be loved for himself 
"as is." Parry has defined the individual in terms of a 
complexity of interests. It is not, of course, clear how 
this meets the requirements of individuality; yet it is par-
haps as close as analytic-synthetic procedure can get to an 
individual. At least it has the virtue of pointing to the 
parson who is there, now. Thus my love for you is my good 
will toward your interests as they are right now. Perry 
credits this version of the meaning of love to the Christian 
tradition, opposing to it the Greek notion of love of the 
abstract. 1 The Platonic love of the Good and the Christian 
love of God express this difference. 2 
1Ibid., pp. 367-368. 
2on the other side of the ledger, Perry debits the 
Christian tradition with the debasement of sex. The histori-
cal truth that Christianity has elevated spirit to the de-
basement of carnality cannot be denied. It is difficult, 
however, to assign any particular responsibility for this 
schism. The Platonic distrust of Dionysus, the Manichean 
division of the universe, the Parmenidean hatred of chaos, 
the Buddhist doctrine. of renunciation, all have been 
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Love, as the interest in another person's interests, 
provides the basis for social life and the harmonious happi-
ness of groups of persons. That is to say that there ap-
pears to be nothing whatever in the concept of love, so con-
ceived, to suggest that one person's interests must be the 
exclusive recipients of the good will of another. It might 
be argued that love, defined in this manner, either contra-
dicts the necessities of social life or furnishes nothing 
but a utopian halo more fitting to poets and liberal protes-
tants than to philosophers and reformers. The reason for 
this argument is that love of a person's interests "as is" 
appears to be little more than indulgence. However, it is 
within the jurisdiction of the lover to point out conflict 
of interests within the beloved, and to undertake his edu-
cation both in enlightenment and preference. In short, the 
love of an individual does not preclude--indeed, makes manda-
tory--interest in the integration of the personality of the 
beloved. Thus the lover makes judgments. The great differ-
ence is that when one loves the abstract ideal, its abortion 
forces the lover to reject the incompetent medium and search 
for another medium out of devotion to the ideal, while, when 
attempts to transcend the sometimes demoralizing union of 
spirit and flesh. It is interesting to reflect on the 
varied associations accompanying the word ttecstacy, 11 and to 
wonder if there is not contained within the very germ of 
spirit its pathological as well as its sinful exercises. In 
any event, wherever the blame may lie, Perry seems convinced 
that naturalistic realism provid.es the proper synthesis of 
body and spirit. 
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one loves the person the person is never discarded. The 
first alternative suggests Don Giovanni; the second suggests 
the prodigal son.1 
Since it is the business of morality to remove 
conflict, while at the seme time avoiding the "thinness" of 
over-formalization, the task of society as the custodian of 
the "realms of value'' is laid out clearly. Reason seeks the 
relations which protect harmony--and freedom of expression 
is its social form; interest provides positive happiness--
and tolerance allows the maturation of interests; love is 
the outgoing interest in another person--and in an inte-
grated society of persons. Thus, both the machinery and the 
goal of social, political, and economic organization resides 
within the individual~ Each individual is an end in himself, 
is a moral legislator, both for himself (autonomy) and for 
the community, and each individual labors for harmony by sub-
mitting himself to the requirements of reason. The possi-
bility of absolutism in any form, whether of a despot, of a 
pressure-group, or of a majority is thus precluded on princi-
ple. 
1rt may be recalled that the father has no assurance 
that the prodigal son, having reinstated himself, will not 
repeat the performance, perhaps many times. The danger that 
love will become indulgence is always a present one; thus 
integration is of vital interest to the one who loves. 
Cases of recurrent alcoholism, or other forms of immaturity, 
provide an excellent example of this threat, and this vi tal 
need. The sentimentalization of religious conversion, and 
the picture of Jesus waiting in lowly patience outside the 
fast-closed door require the remedy of some good 
70 
2. Freedom.--It is implied by Perry's moral philoso-
phy that the end of government is to promote the harmonious 
happiness of its constituents, where "constituents" means 
the individual in contact with other individuals. It may be 
noted here, in passing, that the dual notion of an individu-
al who is real apart from his relations with other individu-
als, but who enters into real relationships with them is en-
tirely consistent with Perry's theory of independence in 
epistemology and metaphysics, although it is not established 
by them. It appears to follow that government must exercise 
two functions: one positive function and one negative 
function. The imbalance between these two leads to the ex-
treme of socialism on one side and laissez faire on the 
other. Thus, political freedom has two aspects derived from 
these two functions, commonly known as "freedom from" and 
tt freedom for. "1 The failure of government is its failure to 
provide these freedoms, and this failure points to another 
freedom--freedom of the moral community to design and to 
change government. While Perry speaks out strongly against 
revolution as over-emphasis on the material aspect of 
psychology. At the same time, an integrated psyche must not 
be contused with spirit. It is a difficult choice, which is 
more dangerous to religion: the secularization of Freudian-
ism or the "numenizat1on 11 of recent Jungian-existentialist 
psychologists·. 
1R. B. Perry, Puritanism and Democracy {New York: The 
Vanguard Press, 1944), p. 5l2. 
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morality, i.e., radicaliEm, 1he also understands clearly 
(note his deep opposition to nationalistic absolutism2) that 
the power to make government is the power to remake govern-
ment. 
Men may justly challenge existing authority if it ig-
nores their interests. The human individual is the 
proper judge of civil institutions, and it is to their 
fruitfulness in tenns of human happiness and well-being 
that these institutions owe their justification·. Sub-
mission to government should be an act of free consent 
based on a sense of benefits received·.3 
Civil liberty involves, then, 1n its negative aspect, 
freedom from tyranny, tyranny taking the forma of an op-
pressive church, the state, big business (or labor), or any 
specific parts of these and other groups~ 4 Positive liberty 
will mean the heightening of capacities culminating in 
freedom of opportunity, where not only are barriers to free 
action removed or minimized, but also the abilities of indi-
viduals to follow those opportunities are cultivated and 
guaranteed~ 
A man enjoys liberty in proportion as he has interests 
and 1n proportion as these interests are both unimpeded 
1 Perry, Moral Economy, p~ 5; Perry, Puritanism and 
Democracy, p. 636. 
2cf. R. B. Perry, The Present Conflict of Ideals (New 
York: I.ongmans, Green and Company, 1918}, chaps. VI, XXVI. 
3Perry, Puri taniam and Democracy, p. 59. The proper 
sense of society as a community of moral individuals con-
taining social interests safeguards this statement from at-
tack as advocating government by 11 pork barrel." 
4Ibid., p. 513. 
72 
from without and implemented from wi thin·. 1 
Working downward from the state, one may inquire as to 
the duties of the individual within the state, with regard 
to its laws. His duty appears to derive clearly from the 
liberty guaranteed him by the state. First, he must obey 
the laws of the state, or, he must, by sanction of moral 
2 authority, take steps to change them. This indicates that 
he must give approval to the laws. In order that this can 
be done, he must be educated to think for himself, to draw 
conclusions based on thinking. Second, he must take such 
steps as are allowed him by the positive aspects of liberty 
to mature his capacities and 11 carry his weight." Third, he 
must work toward the like maturing of capacities of the 
other members of the state. Thus, the activities of the 
individual, as moral, are provided for and demanded by, the 
social and political relationship of the polity of which he 
is a part. 
Perry has a great deal more to say about the nature, 
growth, and preservation of social and political democracy~ 3 
For our purposes, however, it must suffice to suggest the 
nature of the moral individual within a state and society. 
1 Ibid., p. 515. 
2 Perry, Realms of Value, p. 234. 
3Two world wars have prompted a literary defense of 
democracy of considerable size (cf~ bibliography), all of 
which have as their reason for being the threats to democra-
cy in the twentieth century~ 
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This has been done. At this level, freedom means a reci-
procity of those freedoms guaranteed by the state, that is, 
freedom is freedom to develop oneself to his utmost, not as 
the most important product of the polity--that was the duty 
of the state toward him--but as the most important contribu-
tor to the polity. Thus, society provides freedom as soil 
for the development of integrated individuals, who, by their 
freedom, perform the moral office of broadening, deepening, 
and strengthening the society which nurtured them. In this 
sense, even the tastes and eccentricities of a person become 
moral equipment which will enrich or impoverish a society. 
Only in this way can the emptiness of conformism be avoided, 
while at the same time restraint is placed on licentious 
disintegration~ 
Finally, the nature of freedom within the human indi-
vidual must be considered. It makes sense to speak of liber-
ty as freedom from tyranny and freedom of opportunity, and 
to neglect the metaphysical causes of human conduct, only so 
long as one does not take the trouble to outline the duties 
of the individual within the state . Once this has been done, 
it is no longer possible to speak of freedom without con-
sidering what man is able to do for himself and what he is 
unable to do-. Unless a man can in some sense "elect to be 
what he is,"1democracy is nothing but a government by 
1Perry, General Theory, p. 181. 
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tropism, of tropism, and for tropism. 
For Perry, the springe of moral action are interest 
and cognition, both of which are firmly rooted in the 
spatial-temporal-causal network. "In short, whatever 
freedom man enjoys is the freedom of the natural man. ul Ac-
cording to Perry, the question of freedom of the will re-
duces to the following two: "Is human choice a causa?" and 
"Is human choice an affact?112 Except for extreme mechanism 
and epiphenomenalism, there seams to be little philosophical 
opposition to an affirmative answer to the first question~ 
That I choose to do something, and that I would not have 
dona it had I not so chosen, seems so abundantly verifiable 
empirically as to be banal~ For Perry, however, it is not a 
trivial question, for it leads directly to the next point~ 
The second question, "Is human choice an affect?" sug-
gests the determinism-indeterminism dichotomy. A detailed 
description of the dichotomy would be superfluous here. 
Perhaps the case may be rested by paraphrasing the contri-
butions which Perry makas.3 
a) If man is 1n a position to influence the natural 
and social world around him by hie choices of 
action, then it seems fair to assume that he also 
can be influenced by them. In short, whatever 
freedom man has will be limited and conditioned, 
1Perry, Realms of Value, p. 454. 
2 Ibid., P• 455. 
3This summary, paraphrased above, is to be found in 
Perry, Realms of Value, PP• 455-457~ 
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if not determined, by causal chains of which he 
forms a part·. 
b) If the attempt is to save the world for morality 
by indeterminism, then the effort is fruitless, 
since chance is as implacable a foe of morality 
and responsibility as is necessity~ 
e) Yet to state that every event must have a cause is 
a dogma. The only conclusive proof that en event 
has a cause is to find the cause. Empirically 
speaking human behavior is notoriously unpredicta-
ble. Those causes that are found are generally 
found after the event. 
d) Sub-molecular theory supports the possibility of 
genuine random action in the universe. 
e) Modern science also supports mutation theories of 
change, and the general idea of emergence, both of 
which assert that new structures appear in the 
course of nature which behave 1n a manner that 
could not have been predicted. 
The general conclusion, suggested with a curious air 
of both tentativeness and finality, is that it is quite 
possible that there is both determinism and indeterminism 1n 
the world--enough determinism to provide continuity and pre-
dictability, and enough indeterminism to account for discon-
tinuity and unpredictability~ One may conclude that the 
answer to the second question is also affirmative, but that 
one must understand that to be an effect does not exclude 
organizational or qualitative changes which are unpredicta-
ble in advance; and that random action is not necessarily 
uncaused action. 
If one were to ask yet another question: "Assuming 
man to be a cause by virtue of his interests, is it possible 
that man could be free to act against his interests?" Perry 
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would, undoubtedly, see no meaning to the question. If it 
meant to inquire if man can sometimes aot contrary to his 
best interests, then Perry's answer is certain to be un-
qualifiedly affirmative. If it is asking if man is able by 
virtue of reflection (enlightenment) to change the course 
of his interests, or substitute one for another, the answer 
will again be affirmative. But to ask if man can draw power 
for use against those motive forces which enable him to act, 
and therefore to act against the sources of his own action--
this is either to speak nonsense or to draw surreptitious 
strength from sources other than those available. It is 
patent for Perry, however, that even if such a source should 
be located, it still must make its force felt in nature, and 
to move man is either to move him by means of his interests 
as a human organism, or to impel him from outside, e1 ther of 
which would appear to preclude freedom to act uagainst his 
nature but by virtue of his nature~" Still, let us not 
lightly dismiss the quotation already mentioned in another 
context: that man "in some sense has elected to be what he 
i . II s. 
E~ Philosophy of Religion~ 
It may be said at the outset that Perry's philosophy 
of religion is an amalgam of his moral theory, his social 
philosophy, and hope. Let us review briefly the nature of 
the universe as seen through the lenses of the naturalistic 
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realist. 
The first task confronted by Perry in a philosophy of 
religion is to purge himself of the implicit antireligious 
psychology and metaphysics of the cult of science, and, at 
the same time, to avoid falling into the arms of those re-
ligious idealists who "mistake one's own palate for the 
theater of history"."1 It may well be that the 11 far-off event 
proclaimed by science is a dead planet, 112yet science pro-
claims evolution, and if man has emerged from dust, this 
speaks well for dust~ In any event, life has emerged out of 
nature, and in this emergence the value-event was born. 
Morality thus springs originally from the love of life~ 
The primal determination to be, and to sell oneself 
dearly, is not different, except in its limits, from the 
moral determination to be and to attain to the utter-
most.3 
The refinement of this love of life through consciousness and 
intelligence p~oduces the possibility of the complex, but 
integrated, individual~ Similarly, society, as the result of 
the efforts of intelligent individuals, itself becomes inte-
grated so that each individual is acknowledged; the intelli-
gent communication between these individuals being the means 
of welding society into something resembling a macroscopic 
individual in the integration of its constituent interests--
1Perry, Present Conflict of Ideals, p. 74. 
2
_!lli., p. 120. 
3Perry, Moral Economy, p. 27. 
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though in no other way. This is how life fights back at the 
cosmos, finding that, directly proportional to the concen-
tration of intelligent effort, nature becomes more and more 
plastic, thus allowing the struggle for life to grow into 
the struggle for the good life. 
The good life is life in which conflict has been re-
placed by harmony, parochialism by inclusiveness, and error 
by enlightenment. This makes it safe to say that whatever 
the ultimate fate of the cosmos, even if at some instant a 
massive, morally indifferent stroke is to reduce the uni-
verse to dust, still the project of man toward harmony, con-
sistency and inclusiveness has, in morality, chosen its 
proper vehicle.1 Man may or may not find cause for hope, and 
this will be considered next; but whether ultimately 
hopeless or not, man is committed to life--and to choose 
life is to choose the moral struggle to end struggle. This 
is the dominant role played by morality 1n religion. 
Let us take, as a tentative definition of religion, 
this: that religion is 11m an's sense of the disposition of 
the universe toward himself."2 This definition is broad 
enough to include the most primitive as well as the most 
sophisticated, the most perverted as well as the most ele-
vated, manifestations of religion~ It also suggests, in 
1contrast this with Sartre's position below, Chap. V~ 
2Perry, Approach to Philosophy, p. 66. 
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germ form, the reciprocal disposition of man toward the uni-
verse, i'lhether "the universe" be conceived in natural, 
philosophical, or naively supernatural terms. A refinement 
of this definition appears in The Moral Economy. 
Religion is belief on the part of individuals or com-
munities concerning the final or overruling control of 
their interests.l 
Analysis of the possible attitudes of the universe 
toward man appears to show four basic elements. Let us list 
them and then elucidate. 
1. The universe is friendly to the best values of man. 
2. The universe is indifferent, and therefore basical-
ly unfriendly to the best values of man. 
3. The universe is friendly to the efforts of man. 
4. The universe is indifferent to the efforts of man. 
The terminology above may need some explanation. What it is 
intended to convey is that, while the terms used are similar, 
there are four distinct positions, the first two being fatal-
istic in that the disposition of the universe is all-im-
portant. The last two are melioristic in that the dispo-
sition of the universe is not so much toward what men hope, 
but toward the value of their efforts to realize this hope. 
1. This is the position which may be called by the 
general name of "absolute idealism." Briefly stated, it 
argues, either from philosophical or religious premises that 
the nature of the universe is such that the good will pre-
vail (or has prevailed). Perry's refutation of idealism on 
1Perry, Moral Economy, p. 218. 
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epistemological grounds has already been considered. His 
opposition to it on m.oral and religious grounds can be 
summarized by a series of points. 
a) Time must be considered unreal. The development 
of the universe from something containing less good to 
something containing more good, must be held as illusory. 
From a religious point of departure, a universe 1n which 
time is real is a universe in which change is real. Such a 
hypothesis must mean either that the universe "changed its 
m1nd"--an indication either of capriciousness or of falli-
bility, or that the universe is faced with an intractability 
which it must overcome by succeeding stages. The alterna-
tive is absolute idealism's universe which is "rigid, glassy 
and motionless."1 
b) Evil is unreal. It follows that if the universe is 
good, the problem of evil must be solved on a basis which 
renders the human experience of evil illusory. 2 
c) If time and evil are unreal, so is moral effort. 
It is not just that moral effort is made unnecessary 1n a 
perfect world, where all that is required is to remove the 
glasses and see that reality must be good or it could not be 
real;3it is also the ease that moral effort is rendered 
1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 192. 
2Perry, Approach to Philosophy, pp. 365-368. 
3Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 181-182. 
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impossible. What might be considered as moral effort must 
then either become something like mystical preparation or 
Puritan proof-by-attitude that one is a member of the elect·. 
d) If the universe is one and perfect, then there is 
no room in it for me. This does not only mean that the 
theory of internal relations permits no such independence as 
is required by my existence as real and yet finite. Much 
more vitally for religion and morality, it means that my 
pains, sufferings, inadequacies, my feelings of despair, 
loneliness, in short, all the negative side of my inner life 
are blended into the total good--and so are nothing in tham-
selves.1 This is such a reversal of the attitudes which are 
the dominant movers in religion, that Perry's claim against 
2 
absolutism, of empty formalism strikes home with unquestion-
able force. 
It must be admitted that Perry's accusation goes far 
to nullify the very principle which defines this point, 
namely that the universe is friendly to the values of man·. 
It is not difficult to prove that the world as it is, 
is pre-eminently the place for the parfonnance of the 
duty of agreeing with the world as it is. But this is 
cold comfort to the man who still cherishes the old idea 
of duty and had hoped to be shown that the world was the 
incarnation of specific moral values such as justice or 
love.3 
1 Ibid., p. 182. 
2 Ibid., PP• 166-168. 
3Perry, Present Conflict of Ideals, p~ 241. Of. Perry, 
Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 181-182. 
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In addition, it is interesting to nota the frequent in-
version of this absolutistic formalism in its moral appli-
cation. The degeneration of puritanism into worldliness, 1 
and of absolutism into nationalism2finds expression when 
••• It will not, strictly speaking, recognize obli-
gations to anything save God; and since God is not 
commonly at hand to make his will known unmistakably, 
those who act find no difficulty in interpreting that 
will in a manner agreeable to their own.3 
2. The possibility of the universe being indifferent 
needs little explanation·. The 11cult of science 11 in its 
broadest aspects, has accepted an absolutism similar to that 
of idealism, and subject to many of the same criticisms~ 4 In 
its metaphysical and religious scope it extends from materi-
alism to the substantialism of Spinoza. Our concern, here, 
is only with the religious scope, the common term of which 
seems to be fatalism. The point of departure is opposite to 
that of the teleologically oriented absolute idealism, 
1cr. Perry, Puritanism and Democracy, chaps. IX, X~ 
2
cf. Perry, Present Conflict of Ideals, chaps. XXII, 
XXIII. 
3Perry, Present Conflict of Ideals, p. 251. 
4The division attempted between points (1) and (2) 
corresponds more closely to Perry's division between re-
ligious attitudes derivable from scientific philosophy and 
romanticism, Present Philoso~h1cal Tendencies, p. 36, than 
it does to what Perry callsAbsolute realism" and "absolute 
idealism, 11 cf. Approach to Philosophy, chaps. X and XI. 
From Plato onward, the mixture of the logical and teleologi-
cal aspects of idealism renders Perry's separation of the 
two difficult to maintain in any system except, perhaps, 
that of Spinoza. 
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choosing instead to scoff at the hopes and fears of men as 
alien emotions in a universe ultimately devoid of them. 
Sartre, though by no means a prophet of absolutism, voices 
its attitude toward aspiring man as de trop. The ultimate 
pessimism of both the Stoic and the Epicurean are different 
aspects of this view, which can find its loftiest religious 
expression in the rapt contemplation of the awesomeness of 
the universe-machine. 
Aside from the difficulties encountered by any abso-
lutism, viz., formalism, equivocation, and dogmatism, 1there 
is a certain lopsidedness of mood inherent within a view 
that makes every effort of man fruitless in a hopeless uni-
verse. It is this attendant mood which gives reality its 
somber cast for the artistic "realist." For Perry, the 
realist is perfectly willing to look t he facts in the face, 
but he is not willing to be driven by a particular specu-
lative dogma to look only certain facts in the face, or to 
doff the rose-colored glasses of the absolute idealist only 
to don gray ones; he is not willing to admit that uto know 
the facts means to know the worst. "2 The heroism of the 
modern stoic is, for the realist, a contrived heroism that 
paints as black a picture as possible--in order, perhaps, to 
seem the braver thereby. 
1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 166-168. 
2Perry, Present Conflict of Ideals, p. 52. 
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3. For the next two possibilities, two of the man 
under consideration 1n this paper, while dividing on views 
regarding the countenance of reality, combine in their obli-
gation to William James for the general doctrine of melio-
1 
rism. The personal idealism of Edgar S. Brightman is an 
instance of the assertion that the forces of the universe 
are at least tipped in favor of man's moral struggle, and 
are in concert with it. A detailed description of this po-
sition will be given in Chapter Three. It must be suf-
ficient for the present to suggest that, for Perry, person-
alism is in an unstable balance between absolute idealism 
and pragmatic pluralism, 2and that it avoids one by invoking 
the other. It might be added that it is difficult for a 
genuinely empirical inspection of the world to conclude that 
it contains mora good than evil, and, while this is not a 
direct criticism of either phase of m.eliorism, it does render 
suspect any empirical argument intended to point to a good 
author of natura by means of an inspection of nature.3 
4. The final possibility, that the universe is in-
different to the efforts of man, is the position of Parry's 
moral idealism, and, aa such, needs some explanation. In 
materialistic absolutism (2) it was suggested that the 
1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 373-375. 
2Perry, Present Conflict of Ideals, p. 219. 
3For a discussion of the pathetic fallacy, see Perry, 
Realms of Value, p. 180. 
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indifference of the universe implied enmity--that the values 
of men found no counterpart in reality and were thus doomed. 
The present position is not intended to mean that the 
efforts of men do not make a difference in the universe, but 
rather that the universe is indifferent--does not care. 
Perry's realism points to a natural order characterized by 
space, time, and causality, and in which qualities such as 
life and intelligence emerge. Because man is thus implanted 
within the natural order, it does not follow that he can have 
no ideals or that he can do nothing toward realizing them. 
On the contrary, it seems to follow that if they are going 
to be realized, it will have to be man who does it. For 
Perry, the whole point of morality is that life may avert 
1 
extinction and avoid, for a time, death. That it also may 
not is the possibility which a realistic meliorism leaves 
open. 
What can be said about God with this moral philosophy 
as a basis? It is implicit in the realistic position above 
that man must not rest secure 1n the notion that God is in 
his heaven seeing that all was good from eternity or that 
all will go well, either from God's point of view or from 
man's. The very nature of Perry's melioristic realism 
forces a dispa.ri ty between what is (nature) and what might 
be (nature, including man, at ita plastic and harmonious 
1Perry, Moral Economy, p. 84. 
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best) . An examination of what is must proceed along lines 
laid down by Perry's methodology. Thus, if any God is, he 
must be discovered by the method of analytic empiricism or 
not at all. The alternative is to search the path of moral 
idealism. 
It is to be understood that this path will not lead to 
knowledge of the existence of God. This presents something 
of a dilemma. The question of the existence of God is not 
primarily a moral question, 1and yet epistemology and meta-
physics are barred from the search. The only escape from 
the dilemma is to stop thinking about God entirely. This 
appears to be Perry's course. It follows that whatever re-
ligiosity is dependent on a personal relationship between 
man and the disposition of the universe must be repudiated~ 
This thread will reappear in the following chapters. 
Something, however, must be superadded to morality as 
the quest for harmonious happiness on the most inclusive 
scale possible, or else the term "religiont• is lost as any-
thing more than the name of an institution2dedicated to the 
ends espoused by morality . It is this, but it must also be 
something more . 
lwe will meet this separation of morality and meta-
physics again when Brightman's position is discussed. 
2Perry, Realms of Value, p. 379. Discussion of re-
ligion as an institution is regretfully omitted from this 
investigation. 
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Religion cannot escape the requirements of morality 
for the very simple reason that it is a state or activi-
ty of men living among men~l 
Religion, ••• though it be more than morality, 
cannot be less. It must contain morality however much 
it may add thereto.2 
The "more" that is added is certainty by faith, and hope. 
Piety implies not only a settled conviction but some 
degree of hopefulness. Irreligion is a fundamental 
sense of hopelessness~ frustration, or despair--a decla-
ration of bankruptcy~J 
Hope is the hope, not that God exists, but that moral effort 
will yield success--that the struggle is not in vain, and 
that despite setbacks in a life-span or a century the lot of 
man will improve. The certainty by faith receives its 
justification from necessity--the necessity of the forced 
option. 4 The pragmatic basis of meliorism penni ts a double 
relationship between faith, or the "will to believe," and 
the reality of the natural-social world~ In the first place, 
faith, as practical commitment is related to life as a com-
muter is to a moving train. The moral experiment parmi ts no 
retakes, and the man who would live must jump aboard life or 
be left behind. In this sense, faith is an extension of 
knowledge--the willingness to act on the best hypotheses 
1 ~-' p. 471. 
2Ibid. 
3 Ibid., p. 469. 
4cf. William James, The Will to Believe and Other 
Essays 1n Po?}lar Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green and 
Company, 1907 , p. 3. 
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available. In the second place faith acts on the commuter 
running for his train. Faith will not hold the train, but 
it may well provide the additional impetus in the leap which 
carries the man aboard--or give him confidence to make the 
leap. 
So far, there seems little to distinguish Perry's 
thoughts on religion from what might broadly be called human-
ism. It is a strange quirk of absolute idealism that it 
argues strongly in favor of the individual. 1 Correlatively, 
the melioristic emphasis on man as a member of society de-
emphasizes the individual as such. Perry has taken steps to 
mitigate this de-emphasis by expressing a non-theistic be-
lief in personal immortality. 
As regards theoretical evidence for immortality, or 
even arguments for its probability, I come empty-handed. 
But, while plead~ng the common ignorance, I also share 
the common hope. 
The hope which he shares is of an entirely traditional sort 
of immortality, including the immortality of a physical ex-
istence. \fhile there is no theoretical evidence for immor-
tality, there are moral guides to the type of immortality 
hoped for. The hope which stems from religion and pervades 
morality is the hope that the basic love of life which 
drives the organism to fight death will continue on the same 
basis as ''more of the same." 
1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 188-189. 
~. B. Perry, The Hope for Immortality (New York: The 
Vanguard Press, 1945), p. 3. 
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There must be a margin of hope over fear--whether this 
proceeds from a biological will to live, from a tempera-
mental optimism, from religious dogma, or from moral 
resolution. The desire for more life springs from the 
belief that life on the whole is good, and to ask for 
more time is to have some affirmative reason for its 
use.l 
In short, the only immortality of which we could approve is 
one based on the life of which we already do approve. For 
the rest, we must wait--or rather work, and hope. Any other-
worldly view which robs morality of its vigor and urgency, 
as well as robbing it of its basic approval of biological 
life, will necessarily demean man's attitude toward morality 
and cannot, therefore, be tolerated. 2 
Mention of tolerating or not tolerating types of immor-
tality is bound to raise the suspicion that if immortality 
is a possibility, it might be better to be less demanding of 
its nature. This, in turn, might lead to the suggestion 
that the plans of the universe for man may not coincide at 
all with man's plans for himself. Perry is protected a-
gainst this suspicion by his views on the nature of the uni-
verse and his uncompromising opposition to absolute idealism. 
The hope for an immortality consisting of doing God's will, 
whatever that might be, is so remote from the problems of 
the experience of good and evil which prompted religion 1n 
the first place, that the charge of empty formalism appears 
1 !ill·, p. 24. 
2Perry, Realms of Value, pp. 486-487. 
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to be a strong one. Yet the suspicion does continue, that 
possibly there is an existing God, and that possibly, 
sometime, he might make his will known. 
In other words, the question of the relation of re-
ligion--defined now as man's concept of the disposition of 
the universe toward him--to moral knowledge and behavior 
must enterta"in the possibility of a divergence between the 
demands made on the individual by the nature of the universe 
{insofar as it is conceived religiously) and the demands of 
morality. Further, pronouncement must be made, in the event 
of such divergence, no matter how improbable such conflict 
may be. The fact that Perry has chosen to define the re-
ligious hope largely in terms of morality does not in the 
least render the question irrelevant--unless one is prepared 
to assert dogmatically that the universe is incapable of 
making demands other than those me.de by nature and morality; 
that is, that God does not exist~ 
First, one might ask, since religion is conceived 
within morality, but is more than morality, "does religion 
provide sanctions for moral behavior?" That the hope, the 
content of which is the disposition of the universe toward 
man, generated by religion lends strength, and that grati-
tude toward the God of a particular religious consciousness 
will have an effect, are assumed. But for Perry, this does 
not imply that the force of morality "rests on religious 
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premises.1 Aside from the difficulty of verifying the com-
mands given by God, there is a double threat that: 1) moral 
action will be performed for reasons that are other than 
moral, thus upsetting the delicate means-end mechanism of 
harmonious happiness, 2) it might just happen that the im-
perative handed down by God was in conflict with finite 
moral conclusions. In this latter event, Perry's position 
is clear. 
The duty to be just and charitable rests on the ground 
of moral goodness. The commands of a god who induced 
men to do what on other grounds was not their duty, 
would be as arbitrary as those of a capricious father or 
king. Only an unprincipled god can be freed from the 
requirements of principle; and only an abject and un-
reasoning worshipper can subject himself to an unprinci-
pled god.2 
The mere existence of a God, whatever be his nature, 
can neither invalidate nor establish the ethical princi-
ples of prudence, justice, and goodwill. Were a God 
whose existence is proved, to recommend injustice, this 
would not effect in the slightest degree the moral obli-
gation to be just •••• In consequence of this fact it 
may even be necessary that a man should redeem the truth 
in defiance of what he takes to be the disposition of 
God •••• Whatever a man may think of God, if he con-
tinues to live in the midst of his fellows, he places 
himselt within the jurisdiction of the laws which obtain 
there.3 
Perry has answered clearly and unequivocally the 
question, "What should be rendered unto Caesar and what unto 
God?" He has raised, however, an equally important question. 
1 l12!,9;., p. 472. 
2Ibid. 
3Perry, Moral Economy, pp. 229-230. 
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By what means does man know the will of God? This question 
will be raised intermittently throughout the remaining 
chapters of this investigation. 
We have been a long time expounding Perry's system. 
The conclusion is abrupt; first, because the above quo-
tations are deemed to be of importance in terms of the 
general aims of this dissertation and should thus be left 
standing starkly--without verbal relief; second, because the 
sequel chapter continues to deal with portions of this 
system. We move, now, to a critical appraisal, which should 
constitute a recapitulation of salient elements of Perry's 
philosophy. 
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CHAPTER II 
APffiAISAL OF THE THOUGHT OF 
RALPH BARTON PERRY 
1. Introduction~ 
The critical appraisal of Perry's philosophy to be 
found 1n this chapter does not attempt to be exhaustive. In-
stead, it is hoped that some points at which the system 
meets difficulties may be touched upon with a degree of com-
pleteness which will render these points useful in the later 
chapters of this dissertation. This, in itself, poses a 
problem 1n the methodology of criticism. 
The very selection of "points of difficulty 11 to be 
criticized imposes some externality on the critical point of 
view. This, it appears, can only be avoided by exhaustive-
ness 1n criticism. To this extent, then, criticism below 
admits to the externality of a particular point of view. 
On the other hand, "external criticism" usually means 
the placing of another system of thought figuratively 
"alongside" the system in question and then criticizing that 
system in view of the standard externally imposed. Although 
the present writer must confess to loyalties 1n view of 
which this investigation is being conducted, it is hoped 
that, aside from the selectivity mentioned above, criticism 
will be confined to pointing out, a) points in which it is 
felt that Perry has been inconsistent, b) avenues of human 
experience which Perry's philosophy does not adequately ac-
count for. Both of these are conceived to be in the spirit 
of internal criticism. 
Finally, it should be understood that there will be no 
attempt to balance criticism with indications of approval~ 
The reader should be aware that the philosophers included in 
the discussion of this and later chapters were chosen be-
cause, in general, the writer feels a deep philosophical 
kinship with them. The critical spirit will loom large be-
low; it should not be concluded that this overshadows a 
general feeling of hearty approval, felt by the writer, of 
the efforts of each philosopher to see reality as it is. 
Specifically, the points of criticism may be listed as 
follows: 
A. Perry's method of descriptive analysis will be ac-
cused of inadequacy as a philosophical method~ 
B. Perry will be charged with making illicit use of 
his monistic theory of knowledge in order to pro-
vida a realistic point of departure for a dual-
istic theory of cognition (awareness). 
c. The method of general observation of behavior will 
be criticized for its de-emphasis of subjectivity". 
In particular, general observation will be 
challenged with regard to purpose. 
D. In Perry's theory of value, the relation between 
reason and interest will be appraised, and his 
social philosophy will be examined, particularly 
with an eye to his doctrine of benevolence (love)~ 
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E. Perry's thoughts concerning God and his relation to 
morality will be discussed. Here the reader may 
expect a slightly different type of criticism. Ad-
mittedly "external, II it hopes to confront Perry's 
thought with some hypothetical propositions, the 
import of which may not be entirely clear until the 
final chapter of this dissertation is scrutinized~ 
In the development of these six points, it is inevita-
ble that boundaries will be crossed, and that material dis-
cussed in Chapter One will be mentioned, but not discussed 
fully. It was in order that this might be done with a mini-
mum of confUsion that the expository chapter was written. 
2. Critical Comments. 
A. Descriptive Analysis~ 
1. Description would seem to characterize the general 
mood of Perry's realism. 
There is little question that the efforts of any phi-
losopher should be directed toward seeing reality as it is. 
If this were a sufficient definition of descriptive method, 
it would be unchallengeable. Even if it is added that de-
scription implies accuracy of classification and precision of 
measurement, these qualifications need not be offensive to 
any philosophy. Where, then, is Perry's charge against 
11 idealism 11 ? What constitutes the specific characteristics of 
description as a methodology, rendering it opposed to other 
methodologies thereby? The answer appears to lie in the al-
leged ability which the observer has of 11 the reporting of 
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• things~ they~ found . 111 This is a broad phrase , but it is 
given a specific meaning by Perry . 
First, the distinction must be made which sets apart 
11 the symbolistic version of modern science, "2wh1ch has no 
metaphysical pretensions, from Perry's version, which de-
scribes the real world-- 11 fits the man to the coat. 113 Second, 
Perry would have us understand that "things as they are 
found" does not mean 11 as they are fotmd to bear on life . " 
Reality ~have a bearing on life, and it is necessary 
that reality should be so construed. But it does not 
follow that such a construction should, as the idealist 
would have us believe, take precedence of all other con-
structions . It may be that while reality affects life, 
it does so only accidentally; for philosophy to overlook 
this possibility, by employing the religious method ex-
clusively, would b~ sheer bias . To this bias idealism is 
peculiarly liable~ 4 
Thus, it appears that the scientific method of description 
claims the ability to describe reality, a) uncorrupted by 
any influence of the knowing subject apart from his cognition 
of reality, b) in its "native habitat" unqualified by the 
presence of the observer. The first of these poses a problem 
in psychology; the second deals in a general metaphysical 
mood characteristic of realism . I t may be that · a confusion 
of these two has lent credence to Perry's argument against 
1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 95. 
Italics in the original . 
2 ~. , p . 94. 
3Ibid., p. 96. 
4 ~. , p. 107. Italics in the original. 
97 
what he conceives to be idealism--a mixture of subjectivism 
and religion. Let us examine them . 
a) In dealing with the purity of cognition we may 
grant to Perry the distinction which he makes between value 
judgments and mediative judgments . A mediative judgment1is 
a cognitive judgment which may condition a value judgment, 
but is not, in itself, a value judgment. "Thus to rejoice in 
the victory of the Allies in 1945 it was necessary to judge 
that the Allies ~ victorious . "2 It is such mediative 
cognitive judgments which provide interest with its object . 
Our concern, however, is not with this early excursion into 
theory of value, but with whatever conditioning and continu-
ing role the total personality may play in cognition, itself~ 
i) First let us suggest that it is the knowing subject 
which selects his field of observation. He chooses what he 
will count, measure and classify. It may well be true that 
the environment provides a stimulus , but if it is true, then 
it is also true that the stimulus cannot act as such unless 
there is something to be stimulated; it is also true, even as 
Perry argues, that the stimulus, as an "external" event, re-
cedes in importance (to the vanishing- point) as its meaning 
1A "mediative judgment" is also called a 11 conditioning 
judgment. " See Perry, Realms of Value, p. 35. 
2Ib1d. Italics in the original . 
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is recognized by the observer . 1 Both of these hypotheses 
point to the importance of the role of the observer in obser-
vation. However intractable reality may be, cognitive ex-
pectancy can neither be satisfied nor surprised until it as-
sumes the waiting attitude of expectancy and directs it 
toward a certain field. Only then may cognitive expectancy 
purge itself "of all motor-affective attitudes save the 
cognitive interest itself, 11 and approach 11 the last refinement 
of 'pure' cognition~" 2 
ii) Second, we must ask just how effective this purge 
is. Let us do this by drawing out what may at first appear 
to be an obscure instance where it may be impossible to main-
tain any refinement at all of "pure cognition." What, for 
example, is the relation between a strong emotion, such as 
terror, and the 11 dispassionate" cognitive observation of the 
object of such an emotion? It may be that it is possible to 
effect the kind of self-transcendence which can be terrified 
and at the same time can observe, with a degree of detachment, 
the emotion of terror that one is presently feeling. But 
this is to focus on a di f ferent object. It does not seem 
possible to hold two conflicting attitudes, one the required 
scientific attitude and the other the emotionally colored 
1 Ibid., p. 37. "All studies of perception recognize 
the fact that the stimulus is a small and even accidental 
factor in the perceptual object." 
2 Ibid., p. 41. 
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attitude, of the same object at the same time. It would ap-
pear that if an object inspires terror, it cannot, at the 
same time and to the same subject, inspire merely curiosity. 
By means of a well-chosen example, Perry is able to separate 
subjects into two different persons1and show the difference 
between an interested subject and a judging (only cognitively 
interested) subject. Our question is whether this can be 
done when only one person is being considered. The de-
scriptive attitude requires a purity which excludes other 
attitudes. 
Now, let us continue, and, remembering the initial role 
of the total observer in responding to and interpreting the 
stimulus, expand the illustration of terror so that any re-
lationships bet.ween "interested" response and cognitive re-
sponse may be seen. First, and it is doubtful that Perry 
would argue this point, the cognitive response may be con-
sidered as a specific type of interested response. Perry 
terms this "cognitive interest . " This, it would seem, should 
reflect a similar specificity in attitudes, so that the scien-
tific attitude is a special case of attitudes in general~ 
Thus, to make use of descriptive method is to prepare oneself 
by selecting an attitude and "abstracting" other possible 
attitudes·. 
However, this is to admit that the other attitudes are 
1 IE!£·, p. 34. 
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present and require abstracting·. What have they done to the 
object before this abstraction is effected? The admission 
that cognition provides interest with its object ignores two 
facts: that it was interest which motivated cognition in the 
first place, and that once presented by cognition, the object 
is invested with other than merely cognitive value~ This 
need not mar cognitive expectancy to the point where calcu-
lation and measurement are impaired, but it cannot be left 
out of account. Descriptive method does not see things as 
they are; it sees thing s as they are colored by the attitude 
of the observer, and if this attitude is one of scientific 
aloofness, then this attitude is neither primary nor pure , 
but is an interest which has confined itself to one aspect of 
its object, insofar as it can·. Science counts the scales on 
a snake , art reflects on its beauty, my wife abstracts every-
thing but its horridness. But the question of which appre-
hends the real snake, and therefore the defense of de-
scriptive method, cannot be solved simply by postulating one 
subjective response as better than another; it must be solved 
by showing that reality is such that its nature is akin to 
one subjective response rather than another--not that one re-
sponse is not subjective while all the rest are~ 
b) We have suggested that the knowing subject cannot 
help but qualify the object of his cognition. Let us now 
move "outward" from the knowing subject and examine his 
presence in the total complex of reality·. In order to do 
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this, we must assume that such an epistemological feat is 
possible. 
First, let us understand clearly what Perry conceives 
as the task of philosophy. While one may not assume without 
being caught in the trap of the "speculative dogma" that re-
ality is an internally related unity, Perry does grant that 
"Philosophy makes a distinct and peculiar contribution to 
human knowledge by its heroic effort to measure all knowledge 
and ideals by the standard of totality, 111and warns us that 
"we are commonly so absorbed in some particular flower or 
fruit that we forget the roots and the design of the whole. 112 
"Perspective is [ the philosopher's] moat indispensable requi-
site. n3 With these assertions we may move, with some confi-
dence of Perry's good will, into an hypothesis which he had 
earlier declaimed as the religious bias of idealism~ 
A general motif of descriptive method is that the ego-
centric predicament is an operating difficulty only, and that 
this difficulty is evaded by recognition that the cognitive 
relationship between an entity and a subject is accidental--
does not alter the structure of the entity in any way. Be-
cause of this, the observer may be confident that his speci-
men is not blurred by his observation. This is what is meant 
1Perry, Approach to Philosophy, p. 33. 
2 ~., p. 11. 
3~ •• p. 149·. 
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by "seeing things in their natural habitat." However, let us 
once again remind Perry that in order for there to be obser-
vation, the re must be an observer . Even if he be so well-
disciplined as to be only an eye , and not a man with a wife 
and family, still that eye must be presupposed as a real 
basis for observation. 
Now, descriptive method requires the observer to assume 
the status of a spectator-- one who watches, but does not 
enter the game . However, if we consider the design of the 
whole , is this possible? The suggestion, here, is that de-
scriptive method cannot possibly choose a broad enough 
context without taking the observer into consideration~ Let 
us illustrate. 
There is a similarity, and yet a great difference, be-
tween the visitor at a football game, who observes, but does 
not become involved in the game, and the quarterback who , 
just before the ball is put into play , takes a moment to scan 
the defense in order to call the most productive formation~ 
He observes, and if he is a good quarterback, he observes 
accurately and precisely-- his high aspirations for the moment 
quiet before the task at hand--but he is all the same in the 
game and knows it. He sees reality as it is, but he is 
acutely aware of his own peculiar place within that reality~ 
The difference is as great as is the detached obser-
vation of a scientifically-minded bird-watcher from the 
equally careful expectant watching of a mother bird. Both 
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are waiting for something to happen, waiting with cognitive 
faculties straining. The bird-watcher sees reality "under 
glass; 11 the bird sees it ready to pounce on her, ready to 
provide her with breakfast, ready to drive her from her young. 
The point to be made is not a complicated one. The 
charge here is not that the bird-watcher fails to describe 
reality in its dynamic, vital movements. For this we must 
not criticize description, but analytic method. The question 
to be asked here is simply whether philosophy, as it seeks 
after totality, can afford to forget, as science can, perhaps, 
afford to forget, that reality envelopes me; and if I seek 
for the design of the whole without considering this, I have 
not merely performed a needed abstraction for the sake of 
clarity, I have taken as my specimen, artificiality, and not 
reality at all. 
It is hoped that we have been successful in separating 
"subjectivism" from "religion." If we have, Perry 1 s defense 
of descriptive method ,as the alternative to "teleological 
explanation" can no longer thrive on a confusion between 
cognitive "involvement" and nphilosophical involvement," thus 
emerging as the method which does not naively consider re-
ality to revolve about me, and therefore as the method which 
can most accurately grasp reality as it really is~ Sub-
jectivism need only assert that my cognition and its objects 
revolve about me, and religion need only assert that reality 
includes me. Neither must assert that both come to the same 
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thing. 
2. The criticism of analysis follows naturally from 
that of description. First, it seems that it must be granted 
that analysis is unquestionably a valid method for certain 
types of investigations~ It is absurd to argue that taking a 
watch apart does not help one to learn what makes it tick. 
It is equally absurd to think that precision in the measure-
ment of time is impaired by considering a minute as composed 
of sixty smaller units, themselves composed of even smaller 
units. Difficulties emerge only when method as operating 
procedure is expanded into a methodological theory~ 
a) Analytic method, thus expanded, takes the form of a 
propaedeutic to a metaphysic in which the end-products of 
analysis are considered the terms of ultimate reality~ Con-
sider the steps by which Perry arrives at his basic meta-
physical position~ 
i) The method of analysis, and the accumulation of 
knowledge thereby, have proven to be spectacularly 
successful in advancing our understanding of our 
environment·. 
ii) It is difficult to believe that such success could 
be ours if the elements uncovered by analysis had 
nothing whatever in common with the structure of 
reality~ 
iii) Thus, it is a reasonable hypothesis that ultimate 
reality consists of a plurality of simple entities 
which so organize themselves as to form the inter-
related complexities which are the "things" of our 
experience·. 
The argument, as it stands, is compelling. However, a 
difficulty may be pointed·out~ We must remind Perry that his 
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partial reliance on pragmatism for his criterion of truth re-
quires him to explain what is meant by 11 successful" in (i) 
above . The realistic "anchor to windward" as mentioned in 
Perry's theory of awareness indicates that "successful" 
should mean 11 cogni ti vely successful . 11 Thus we may ignore the 
more emotive implications of this term . However, once again 
it must be suggested that even cognitive success must be in-
terpreted in terms of the agent ' s expectations . That is , a 
tool has been chosen (analysis) in view of a particular task. 
That it performs this task well is praiseworthy, and certain-
ly it must be concluded that the adequacy of the method 
should mean that reality is disposed in favor of the method 
for the task at hand . But it has not been shown that the 
progress of science is the same task as the philosophical one 
of understanding reality as such. In order that this can be 
done it is first necessary that the relations between the 
findings of science and reality be postulated as identical~ 
Thus a hidden assumption is discovered. 
b) Problems not amenable to solution by analytic 
method are discarded. It is one thing to argue the meta-
physical problem of whether the worl_d is ultimately one or 
many . It is quite another to have the problem solved, before 
it is even asked, by a selection of one ' s methodological 
tools . When analysis is the operating method, no other so-
lution is possible but that one which asserts reality to be 
the end-products of analysis·. 
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It might be suggested that the criticism above cannot 
fairly be applied to Perry, since it would appear that what-
aver one ' s method of investigation may be, the results will 
be in terms of it-. It would be unwise to minimize the 1m-
portance of methodology, but at the same time, there seems 
to be a kind of reverse 11speculative dogma 11 at work, which, 
if nothing else, cancels that charge against other systems~ 
Perhaps it does more. When Perry asserts that we must 
resist every impulse to provide a home for these ele-
ments of experience . ·• • ·• They find a place wban they 
enter into relationships; but they bring to these re-
lationships a character whicf they possess quite inde-
pendently and by themselves, 
it may be that he has refused any place whatever to either 
competing or complementary methods . The method of analysis 
is ill-adapted to finding a "home" (presumably a teleologi-
cal explanation) for anything. But it would be difficult 
to support the claim, by means of analytic method alone, 
that therefore there can be no such explanation~ 
3. Criticism of Perry ' s methodology has attempted to 
point out two totalities which the method of descriptive 
analysis, it is felt, does not adequately recognize~ The 
first totality is that of the subject. Here Perry ' s retort 
might well be that the fallacy of pseudo-simplicity is being 
perpetrated, causing the critic to miss entirely the point 
that while it may be that the subject is involved in 
1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 316 . Cf. 
also Holt, New Realism , pp. 128-129. 
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cognition, this does not mean that therefore there can be no 
separate act of cognition as an ideal of scientific pro-
cedure. The fact that this ideal cannot be attained in full 
is an indictment of human personality, not of scientific 
method~ Perhaps this is so~ In order for Perry to prove 
his point, however, he must do more than tack a label of fal-
laciousness on what appears to be a solid empirical fact; he 
must show with considerable more clarity than he has done 
that cognitive interest is different 1n kind from any other 
kind of interest, and he must show that meaning can be ana-
lyzed so that it can apply to cognitive expectancy without 
referring, at the same time, to a relationship between the 
stimulus and the responding subject as a whole~ It may be 
futile for any species of teleology to try to force the 
thesis that judgments of fact and judgments of value are 
equally rooted in the nature of the entity in question, but 
this does not, in itself, prove the realistic point that 
they are similarly unrelated in the knowing subject. 
The second totality is that of reality as a whole. 
Perry has granted that there may be such a totality, reserv-
ing only the claims that this totality, a) does not mean 
that relatedness is the same as dependence, 1b) is not de-
2 . 
pendent on consciousness·. But the theory of independence is 
1 See point (b), "theory of independence, 11 chap. I, 
p. 20 above·. 
2see point (d), chap~ I, p. 21 above. 
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not now the point at issue . 1 The point is that if there is 
any totality under any conditions, philosophical method is 
bound to consider that totality as its specimen, and such a 
totality will of necessity include the observer as well as 
his observation as part of that which he observes . Whether 
totality is 11 synthetic" or "synoptic" would appear to make no 
difference, insofar as it is the totality which is being in-
vestigated. 
B. The Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Awareness . 
We enter, now, a portion of Perry's philosophy in which 
the criticism is not that inadequate coverage of human ex-
perience is given, but that two theories are inconsistent 
with each other. Reference is to the structural account of 
consciousness and the functional, or processual, account of 
cognition. 2 
Consciousness is discovered by Perry as a panobjecti• 
vistic relationship which escapes the dualism of thought and 
thing, and thus escapes the egocentric predicament . However, 
the unity of thought and thing (insofar as it is known), in 
1
rt is unfortunate that space prevents making this a 
point at issue . The theory of independence provides the 
basis for the assertion of the additive nature of knowledge, 
which, in turn provides justification for analytic method as 
applicable to philosophy". 
2
rt is interesting to note w. P. Montague's division of 
epistemology into two separate studies . See 11 The New Realism 
and the Old," pp. 39- 46. 
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resolving the dualism , raises the question of how it is 
possible for the thought to be misapplied to the thing-- in 
short, the empirically undeniable situation of error is 
theoretically impossible~ 
In order to explain how we may be mistaken, Perry 
turns to an analysis of the process of knowing. That 
process , as outlined 1n Chapter One , remains rooted in a 
duality between the organism (a nervous system) and a 
portion of its environment (the stimulus) . Cognition thus 
emerges as a functional activity which attempts to explain 
the relationship between the entity which is a thing and the 
entity which is an object of knowledge, a relationship which, 
in the structural analysis above was already explained as 
one of identity'. 
The criticism is that, while each of these analyses 
seems forceful when they are separate from each other, much 
of their force is lost in combination. Unfortunately, they 
must be combined if Perry is to argue, as he does, from the 
repudiation of the egocentric predicament to a realistic 
theory of cognition which is able to approach the problem of 
verification with the epistemological dualism between the 
knowledge and the thing known already resolved. It appears 
to be this combination which justifies, for Perry, beginning 
his theory of verification without having to examine the 
role of the subject in objectifying the entity which it is 
in the process of knowing. Because the egocentric 
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predicament has already been removed, the subject may be 
viewed realistically as a nervous system~ 
The theory of awareness , however, is forced by the 
problem of the acquisition of knowledge, and of error, to 
examine more closely the process by which the entity adds to 
its other characteristics that of being an object of 
lmowledge. 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
iv) 
Here some suggestions may be made . 
On Perry 1 s own tenns, an entity can become a 
stimulus to an organism only if the organism is so 
constructed that its functioning will include the 
ability to be stimulated~ In some sense, the 
nature of the response determines the nature of 
the stimulus as stimulus~ 
If the critic ism of the scientific .,.method of de-
scription is not mistaken, the meaning of the 
entity in terms of the expectancy of the organism 
is an important factor in cognition. The "subject" 
rather than simply the "organism" must be intro-
duced as a tenn to be reckoned with 1n cognition·. 
Point (g) of the theory of 1ndependence1suggests 
that "there are cases of subjectivity •• ·• that, 
as such, are dependent on consciousness . " 
Perry's definition of value as the object of any 
interest , does not follow easily from his episte-
mology except on the ground that subjectivity have 
a hand in forming the object of cognition as well·. 
Now, the theory of independence does not argue that 
the entity as lmown is independent of the knowing of it , but 
only that its becoming an object of knowledge does not alter 
its status as an independent entity . It is the theory of 
immanence which asserts the identity of "true lmowledge and 
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its object.1 But the theory of immanence intends to es-
tablish only the structure of consciousness and is unequipped 
to solve the problem of error-. It would appear, thus, that 
while it may be possible to assert the panobjectivism of 
consciousness, the resultant monism cannot be used to strip 
subjectivity of its active role in the formation of the 
object of knowledge~ 
This criticism will be linked with that of Perry ' s 
moral philosophy . It may also be linked with the earlier, 
more general, criticism of descriptive method. Once again, 
what Perry seems to have ignored is that reality includes me, 
the observer of reality~ The enthusiasm with which he has 
emancipated epistemology from metaphysics (and the observer 
from that which he observes) has obscured from him the stake 
2 
which subjectivity has in reality . 
Perry uses the egocentric predicament to lessen the 
importance of the mind, itself, in the epistemological 
process . With this done , and realism posed as the alterna-
tive to subjectivism, he is then able to describe the ac-
tivity which is apparently requisite for the process of 
1see chap. I, p. 29~ 
2Perry ' s resolution of the mind-body dualism, so that 
''mind and body are both complexes capable of being analyzed 
into more primitive terms " (Perry , Present Philosophical 
Tendencies, p-. 310), prepares him to assert a kind of' double-
aspect theory of "mind-from-within11 and "nervous-system-from-
without. " Had he maintained this resolution and given as 
large a role to subjectivity as he does subsequently to the 
organism, much of' the above criticism would be needless . Be-
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knowing from the outside--that is, as the activity of an 
organism confronted by its environment. But the separate-
ness of the two types of analysis is illusory, since a real-
istic epistemology is the ground for the naturalistic theory 
of awareness. Thus, the charge is made that Perry's theory 
of awareness both depends upon and is incompatible with his 
epistemological monism~ 
c. The Method of General Observation, with Particular 
Reference to Purpose. 
The result of Perry's treatment of awareness appears 
to be that response is to be seen as in some sense episte-
mologically active in the selection and formation of its 
object. 
Psychology thus supports the contention that the object 
of cognition is what it means, that is, what is expected 
of it; or, to eliminate the "it, 11 a system of expec-
tations, where "expectation" is1to be construed as the expected, the what is expected. 
It may be added, in Perry's behalf, that cognitive expectan-
cy requires only that expectation, itself, be rooted in the 
cause he does not, subjectivity loses its touch with being, 
while being assumes control of thought. With this, the be-
havioristic method of general observation also assumes con-
trol of knowing subjectivity. It may be difficult to pre-
serve a unitf. of "mind-from-within" and "nervous-system-
from-without 1 so that a dualism between the "scientific" and 
the "existential" is avoided, but such a unity is a concise 
statement of the philosophical aspirations of the wri tar·. 
This dissertation hopes to constitute a beginning in that 
direction. 
1 Perry, Realms of Value, p. 38. Italics in the 
original. 
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subject; the conditions wnich will satisfy or surprise that 
expectation remain a part of the environment . With this 
concession, notice is given that the problem here is not 
that of the egocentric predicament . 11Man proposes; nature 
disposes 11 appears to be a valid realistic claim. Our con-
cern is with the knowledge of that equipnent by means of 
which man proposes--expectancy. 
Expectancy looks forward , and does not disclose itself 
except through a train of subsequent events . The de-
scription of expectancy in static int rospective terms , 
or in static physiological terms, violates the tempo-
rality of what is essentially temporal . It attempts to 
confine the process to the moment--to a momentary inner 
state, or to a momentary arrangement of nerves and 
muscles . It substitutes the beginning for the end, the 
first step for the course; as though one were to de-
scribe a journey not in terms of1its destination but in terms of its point of departure. 
It seems clear , therefore , that meaning and expectancy, as 
central elements in the theory of verification, require, 
even in cognition, "looking forward , " to a future event. 
Now let us apply this when the object of cognition is telic 
action, itself. 
For Perry , awareness is a function of an organization 
so synthesized that it has the characteristic called 11 life . 11 
The neural structure of the higher organisms provides them 
with a capacity for "triggered" response- action in a variety 
of degrees and modes relative to a given st1mulus . 2 The 
l Ibid., p. 39. 
2
see Perry, General Theory, pp. 146-147. 
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method of general observation is able, by observing these 
response-actions, to discover the mental content which ac-
companies them. 
In an article in The Monist , 1Perry criticizes the 
notion that purpose can be discovered by means of a 
structural analysis. As the argument develops, it appears 
that purpose in a human baing requires not only systematic 
structure, not only an observable stability of tendency , not 
only a determinate relationship between a "rule of action" 
and the agent's tendency, but also, in order for action to 
be . purposive, the agent should mean to do it-. 
In the same article, Perry insists on employing general 
observation to discover purpose because "what we wish to dis-
cover is the nature of the thing [purpose~ , and not the 
natura of the consciousness of the thing. 112 
The question before us is, "What data are available 
for observation which will disclose agency as the cause of 
any overt event?" The charge is that Perry has concerned 
himself with the "destination," to the exclusion of the 
"point of departure . " For if the decisive characteristic of 
a purposive event is that the agent mean to do it, this, 
aside from his verbal report (radically unreliable evidence, 
as is indicated by our system of jurisprudence), cannot be 
1 Perry, "Purpose as Systematic Unity . " 
2 ~ •• pp~ 356-357. 
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located by the method of general observation. How can it be 
possible to locate meaning as intentionality without search-
ing for it through consciousness of meaning? The two are so 
intimately bound up together that intentionality, apart from 
consciousness is "meaningless. 11 It may be possible, on 
realistic premises, to seek a bird, for example, rather than 
consciousness of a bird, but it does not seem possible, even 
on realistic premises to seek purpose apart from the 
consciousness of it~ 
Perry, however, has shown that consciousness is an 
inner event only!-reducible, it is true, to neutral terms , 
but not consciousness when so reduced. "Motor-affective11 
designates "mind-without," "consciousness" designates ''mind-
within." Thus, it would seem that consciousness as such is 
required in order that there may be purpose; it would also 
appear that consciousness cannot be located by general 
observation. The important difficulty is that therefore 
purpose has no corresponding outer side, except behavior. 
Now it may be granted to Perry that before purpose is to 
complete itself, it must be translated into behavior. 11 As 
mind appears in nature and society, it consists primarily in 
1It would be dangerous to be misled by this statement. 
For Perry , of course, consciousness embraces its object, and 
in that sense is not an "inner" event·. "Inner" above refers 
to the object as the content of a mind rather than as the 
reaction of a nervous system to a stimulus . It is in this 
sense that consciousness can only be an inner event~ 
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interested behavior,"1which, of course, can be observed. 
But here there is a relationship of antecedence and conse-
quence which does not entitle Perry to the assertion tha t 
apparently interested behavior is identical with purpose . 
Purposes sometimes die stillborn, and in any event, no be-
havior can be called purposive unless intentionality is 
first clearly established. 
Thus, it would appear that purpose must either be in-
ferred by means of the cognitive expectancy of another 
person, or it must be found through that consciousness by 
which that purpose is defined. It seems tha t we should con-
elude that the only possibility left open to Perry is to 
argue from his definition of consc i ousness as a panobjective 
event to the identity of purpose and behavior . But this ap-
pears to be merely another instance of relying on a 
structural analysis in order to support the conclusions of a 
functional analysis . This, it has been argued , is incon-
sistent . Perry is not unaware of this difficulty, and ap-
parentl y seeks to meet it by suggesting that 
every complex object presents i ts parts in a different 
order when approached in diff erent ways , but i n the 
object as wholly known these parts fit and supplement 
each other • . As introspection obscures the instrumental 
and action factors of mind , so general observation ob-
scures its content factor . But when these factors are 
united , they compose a whole mind, having a structure 
1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies , p. 300 . 
117 
and a function that may be known by any knower, whatever 
his initial bias.l 
If this passage means that the two methods are comple-
mentary in that each does something the other cannot do, 
then there is no quarrel, for introspection has been repos-
sassed of its duties; if it means that the two methods are 
complementary in that each studies the same thing, but from 
another approach, then Perry must show that there is no 
meaning to purpose which is not at the same time reflected 
in behavior. This Perry has not done. The result is that 
subjectivity is not given its due. 
D. The Roles of Interest and Reason in Perry's Theory of 
Value. 
Let us make a beginning by giving a summary of Perry's 
biological and psychological approaches to theory of value~ 
1. For Perry, interest is synonymous with life. That 
is to say that life, as the property which emerges as 
characteristic of a certain level of organization, may be 
described functionally as that which acts in behalf of what 
concerns it. 2 An organism is a biological unit by defi-
nition. Part of this unity is derived from its physical 
properties, part from its biological structure. It is a 
unit, loosely speaking, in space and time, and it is a unit 
1 Ibid., p. 305. 
2Perry, Realms of Value, p. 15. 
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because of its peculiar "organic" organization (different, 
for example, from a crystalline structure). Thus there is 
possible a biological account of life-interest by means of 
which these characteristics may be considered as the single 
function of a biological unit·. 
2. As the analysis moves to its psychological phase, 
it may be noted that any specific living organism, while it 
has only one life, has it as a synthesis of many interests·. 
Where there is interested action on the part of the organism, 
this action is deemed to be by virtue of a "governing pro-
pensity," which is, strictly speaking, nothing more than a 
description of that action~ In any instance of interested 
action of an organism it may be assumed that a governing 
propensity is at work. 
However, when the analysis is on psychological grounds , 
it should be noted that the governing propensity is the re-
sult, and not the definition , of an effort at unification of 
a plurality of interests, each of which presumably is striv-
ing to become a governing propensity . On a biological level, 
there is a unity, that of the organism; on a psychological 
level, the only unity thus far remains on the biological 
level, since the only unifying factor is precisely the same 
as it was on the biological level, nemely, the behavior of 
the organism. Until other elements of interested behavior 
are considered, we must charge Perry with a misuse of the 
method of general observation to provide a specious unity 
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where there is none. 
3. Harmonious happiness, so far, appears to have 
little meaning in Perry's system. We may suggest that har-
monious happiness is constituted by an optimum combination 
of interests into a governing propensity. By "optimum 
combination" is meant simply that each interest is con-
sidered, first, apart from other interests, so that its 
voice may be heard clearly, and second, in conjunction with 
other interests, so that the combination of interests will 
be as inclusive as possible of all claims of all interests 
within the individual·. In this way the cacophony of inter-
est-claims becomes a concert, and that concert is the 
governing propensity. We must note here that if we confine 
ourselves to a psychological analysis, the governing pro-
pensity is the result of i'Thatever conjunction there is, and 
cannot be considered as a force engaged in bringing about 
that conjunction. Any harmony which comes about must come 
from the interests themselves--much as any harmony in a town 
meeting must come from the individual participants. 
But, we must ask, is the constitution of an interest, 
as such, sufficient to provide such a harmony, except by 
virtue of "survival of the fittest?" According to Perry's 
description, the merger of interests does not rob "Peter" to 
pay "Paul," but both are limited to a degree so that both 
can draw advantage from the union-in-harness. In this way, 
each interest is fUlfilled, insofar as its urge to 
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satisfaction combines with that of other interests to form 
the direction and force which is the governing propensity~ 
The governing propensity forms no merger; it is the merger. 
In this way the conferral of value remains basically the 
property of interest. 
Perry thus looks at the positive side and sees that no 
interest, unless its direction is entirely opposite to the 
flow of interests, is suppressed--and even then, of course, 
its force must be felt in a general "slowing-down" of the 
governing propensity . But it must be asked of Perry if this 
is an adequate description of interests . The positive side 
cannot be denied; but the negative side--that part of each 
interest which is deflected even as it exerts its force 
against the general flow--does not appear to find its way 
into the description of the governing propensity . If each 
interest is, to a degree, satisfied, it must remain true 
that each is also, to a degree, left unsatisfied. Peter and 
Paul may be pushing in the same direction, but they also may 
not; they may push less than they are dragged, and, although 
their effort is felt, the general direction is only coinci-
dentally one which will render them more satisfied than 
frustrated. Now it is true that, if the governing propensi-
ty is to be defined as the resultant direction of flow which 
emerges from the efforts of all the straining interests, 
then harmonious happiness may also be defined as the optimum 
combination of interests . But, unless "optimum" be defined 
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in some other terms, such, perhaps, as the survival of the 
organism, it is difficult to see just what means Perry has 
provided for any distinction between "governing propensity" 
and "harmonious happiness." The alternatives seem to be 
these: either Perry must provide his psychological 
structure with a unity by means of which each interest can 
be judged acceptable or not in terms of an optimum govern-
ing propensity, in which case such a structural unity must 
be explained (in other terms than those of a biological 
organism), or Perry must show that each interest is capable 
of judging its own relative worth as measured agains t a 
scale of possible governing propensities . Other than these 
alternatives, there seems to be no possibility of theorizing 
about a harmonious happiness which is in any way different 
from whatever governing propensity happens to result from 
the confluence of interests, whatever its momentary di-
rection might happen to be. In short, either reason must 
enter as the arbiter and final judge of the acceptability of 
any given interest, or the interests, themselves, must be 
granted the ability to monitor themselves in view of an 
optimum governing propensity. It appears, consequently, 
that the role of reason must be examined as it functions in 
the determination of harmonious happiness. 
4. The role of reason·. 
What, then, combines interests so that the optimum 
governing propensity is achieved and maintained--or, if not 
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maintained, then changed in view of changing circumstances--
so that the body of interests may be properly served? For 
Perry, that which effects this combination is reason. Let 
us quote two passages, first, in an effort to see what 
reason is, and second, to see what it does--and does not do·. 
Human action is mediated throughout by cognition, and 
••• the degree to which this factor is present is a 
distinguishing characteristic of action which is deemed 
human. This does not mean that reason is by itself a 
motive of action, still less the only motive, but that 
if "reason 11 is taken to ~ cognition in all its wide 
range from sense-perception and meaning to formal 
thought, and whether true or false, then reason is a 
condition of all motivation, since it provides interests 
with their objects.l 
Reason, thus, is cognition, and, insofar as it furnishes 
interests with their objects, must hold an extremely im-
portant position, not only in mediating between an interest 
and its object, but also in mediating between interests. 
For, since cognition is not only able to frame a single 
object, but a multi tude of objects for a multi tude of inter-
ests, it must also be able to note relationships between 
these objects, and must take on the task of reporting these 
relationships to the interests involved. 
Insofar as "irrationalism" means that human conduct is 
generated by feeling, emotion, and desire, or that the 
motor is inseparably linked with the affective--no ex-
ception can be taken. Insofar as it means that human 
conduct is l argely erroneous, incoherent, illogical, and 
uncalculated, it is based on fact; and is a wholesome 
corrective of that self-flattering fiction of man as a 
1 Ibid., p. 47. Italics are mine. 
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being who deduces his acts in in orderly manner from a 
true idea of the supreme good. 
It would appear that we may conclude from this that reason, 
as a function of the higher organisms, operates much as a 
legal counsellor does in behalf of his client. 2 It explains 
the alternatives, the conditions, the possibilities and im-
possibilities of any action proposed by the client, and in 
this way it exerts whatever force it may. But the client 
makes the decision. Let us put it this way : cognition pre-
sents the environment to the several interests, and , in so 
doing, it presents it in all its interrelationships. Then, 
because it is also cognizant of the relationships between 
the several interests, reason seeks out the best path, braid-
ing the objects of cognition into one system and at the same 
time braiding the interests into a com patible cognitive 
system. Reason is, for Perry, the arbiter of the town meet-
ing. 
At this point, one may ask two questions of Perry. 
1) It appears that Perry has here the needed psychological 
structure by means of \vhich a governing propensity may be 
judged and aided. Certainly, if reason is to have any mean-
ing, it must be a function of the whole organism. But just 
how clear is the relationship between interest and cognition? 
If cognition provided interest with its object, what has 
1Ibid. 
2 Ibid., p. 310· •. 
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motivated cognition, itself? Only in the artificial situ-
ation which refuses to recognize that the observer is in the 
same world with his object can it be said that there is no 
motivation needed for cognition--and even then he must be-
stir himself to look. This leads to the second question. 
2) If cognition really does see things as they are (which 
is not questioned in (1), is it not true on the very grounds 
which Perry argues to the contrary that there is a true idea 
of the supreme good for me, in my circumstances (which are 
also real), and which can be deduced in an orderly manner 
insofar as cognition is capable of apprehending it? Whether 
or not interest will accept the deduction as binding on it 
is another matter entirely. But this is not the point. The 
point is that the true and the good are re al for my particu-
lar situation and can be located by cognition but only if 
cognition is a lso mediated by my interest. For my interest 
acts to produce my situation, and cognition, if it does not 
take account of this, does not see reality, and it stands 
aloof from the interest which it mediates·. 
It may thus be that Perry has effected an admirable 
union bet"'l'leen re ason and interest, a union which makes due 
allowance for the frailties of each without, at the same 
time, demeaning their importance. The consistency and cogni-
tive inclusiveness which are the natural goals of reason, 
may thus be blended with the satisfaction which is the goal 
of interest. The result of the blend is harmonious 
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happiness. The difficulties suggested, however, are : 
a) Without the activity of re ason superimposed on the 
several interests, there are no standards by which the 
governing propensity can be measured and judged. 
b) With the activity of reason so superimposed, two 
points should be considered·. 
i) The question of its motive-force must be raised, a 
question which threatens to return cognition to the status 
of an act motivated by interest, thus robbing it of its uni-
fying function, and forcing it to compete with other inter-
ests. Let us be reminded of our earlier criticism: that 
psychological unity either depends upon a pre-established 
biological unity, or has so far not been established at all. 
Presumably, it is the task of reason to furnish the needed 
psychological unity of the multiplicity of interests by pro -
viding a cognitive vieiv of a matrix within which the several 
interests may find their objects--and to which matrix they 
must be referred for their fulfilment. Now it certainly may 
be argued that the cognitive interest is such that, while it 
is a specific interest among the several other specific 
interests that go to comprise the governing propensity, none-
theless it ha s as its object the entire panorama of its en-
vironment, and the motivation identified with this interest 
is purely cognitive rather than conative. In short, this 
interest is "interested" in knoi'ling all that can be known, 
but is interested in knowing alone . In view, however, of 
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the biological derivation of the interests, themselves, one 
may wonder, first, if there can be so complete a separation 
of the cognitive interest from the general "interest in sur-
vival" of the organism, second, if there cannot be such a 
complete separa tion, \"'hether the sought-for unifying factor 
has been provided at the psychological level claimed for it, 
and third, if there is a complete separation, where this 
purely cognitive interest could have been derived from. The 
problem, of course , is whether cognition provides t he cement 
needed or whether it is, itself, the result of a psychical 
unity that has been assumed , but not accounted for. 
ii) The relation of cognition to the universe at 
l arge forces the question, regardless of the fallibility of 
cognition, of the supreme truth and the supreme good--rela-
tive to my situation and my interests. This, in spite of 
the relationship with my interests, forces Perry dangerously 
close to rationslism·. The most inclusive and the most con-
sistent harmony of interests is bound, in spite of Perry's 
wish to limit its scope to nar rower naturalistic t a s ks , to 
consider the nature of all reality and its relation to my 
interests in their totality". 
c) Cognition, if it is to perform its task properly, 
must not only furnish interest with its object, but must 
also complete the introduction and examine interests, them-
selves, cognitively". This will mean that interest , together 
with its object (that is, a s they stand in a concrete 
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relationship with each other as part.s of reality) must re-
ceive cognitive scrutiny". This cannot be done descriptive-
ly, for the object, together with my interest, comprises 
what the object means to me·. With this, we meet earlier 
criticisms.1 
5~ Interest and social morality~ 
The sections on interest and reason may be concluded 
by taking note of what Perry has suggested as the formal and 
the material elements of moral philosophy~ 2 The formal ele-
ment is reason, and the material element is interest~ To-
gether they are the harmony and the happiness of Perry's 
system~ There are few who would quarrel with the term "har-
monious happiness" as an enviable goal of morality; more 
might ask how it is that form imposes itself on matter with-
out itself being provided with some power of its own~ The 
difficulties suggested in bringing reason and interest to-
gether while yet keeping them distinct are distantly paral-
leled by the problem of Perry's metaphysics--that of keeping 
the formal structure of the universe distinct from its ex-
istence~ In either case, a possible solution might follow 
from the abandonment of the attempt to maintain such a dis-
tinction~ The difficulties of Perry's system, as noted thus 
far, point to a concept which might effect a plausible blend~ 
1
see above p. 99 (ii)~ 
2
see Perry, Moral Economy, pp~ 74-78~ 
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It is possible that voluntarism might contribute a suitable 
alternative, or complement, to portions of Perry's system~ 
The fact that Perry precludes such a notion by his espousal 
of descriptive method (as opposed to teleological expla-
nation) may throw doubt on the concept; but then again, it 
might sow some seeds of doubt, also, about the scientific 
method of description as an exclusive method~ 
Thus far appraisal has been confined to a biological 
and psychological account of interests and cognition·. A 
thoroughgoing criticism of Perry's moral philosophy could 
not expect to ignore what might be called the epistemology 
of value theory; indeed, the relation between interest and 
its object, and the value conferred by that relation, is a 
prime area for criticism of Perry~ 1 That such criticism is 
not repeated here points at least to the opinion of the 
writer--that Perry is correct in asserting that value re-
quires a relationship between an object and an interested 
awareness. Whether or not this implies a subjectivistic 
theory of value is a topic for later discussion~ 
1t/'ith this we move into what might be called the area 
of morality proper·. Perry has presented us with the moral 
unit, the elements of which are: a) a biological organism 
1cf·. E. s. Brightman, 11Neorealistic Theories of 
Value," in E. C. WilJn, Studies in Philosophy and Theology 
(New Yorlt: Abingdon Press, 1922), chap. III, pp. 22-64·. 
Cf·. also arts. by c·. M·. Perry, H. H. Dubs, DeWitt Parker, 
in International Journal of Ethics, IV (1930)~ 
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distinct from, but interacting ,,ri th, an environment, b) a 
plurality of interests flickering over that environment and 
investing it with value; the action of the organism as a re-
sult of interest is the "unitas multiplex" termed the 
"governing propensity," c) a cognitive ability to present 
objects to interest, both in isolation and in their natural 
interrelatedness--an ability which is able to judge the 
governing propensity and to pronounce it \<tell- aimed or ill-
aimed at its goal·. 
The result of this is an individual capable of pur-
suing a course, within the limitations of cognition, leading 
to its o\m harmonious happiness. This position, remarkably 
similar to "enlightened self-interest," escapes self-
centeredness and becomes the goal of society with the 
emergence of love as an interest among other interests, and 
yet with the characteristic of "other-centeredness," which 
pl aces it in a unique position among interests. It is this 
interest, taking as its object t he interests of others, 
which performs as the motivation toward a greater inclusive-
ness in harmonious happiness. Thus, the harmony of inter-
ests , not confined to those of a single organism, becomes 
the goal of the individual as a moral unit. Granting the 
presence and function of love as Perry describes it, the 
role of reason in his social phi losophy appears to lose the 
ambiguities described above and becomes well-defined and in-
cisive. Perhaps this is because love needs cognition only 
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as its counsellor, the urge toward harmony and inclusiveness 
apparently being part of the intrinsic nature of love. 
Empirically, this seems an apt description of love. 
Hm'lever, let us press this point for a moment before '\'le 
grant its presence and function, in order to see ''~hether it, 
too , poses problems when its lineage is traced back to 
interest and when its object is brought more clearly into 
focus. Certainly the analytic philosopher, more than most, 
should be on guard against the challenge that he develops or 
"discovers" a term or power simply in order to strengthen a 
theory". 
a) Love appears to be an interest. That is to say, it 
may be mediated by cognition, it confers value, and it pre-
sumably aims at some sort of satisfaction. More importantly , 
however, it would seem that in order to be classified as an 
interest, love must take its place within the dynamic bundle 
of interests that '"orks to produce a governing propensity". 
Thus , it forms part of the material of the moral unit, 
rather than its form ·. On the other hand, love is unique 
among interests in that it takes as its object (thus bestow-
ing value upon) other interests~ Thus, it seems to exercise 
(albeit blindly) a kind of paternalistic function over 
interests; it is, in this sense, what might be called a 
"transcendental 11 interest·. Its interest is catholic and is 
directed toward other interests·. This is what creates the 
difficulty". 
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i) Since, in spite of its transcendental nature, love 
is still an interest among other interests, one wonders 
whether any power has been granted it whereby it can dis-
criminate among interests·. Can love direct itself toward 
persons as persons, and thus discriminate between one person 
and another, or between the self and another person; or must 
love remain at the level of the several interest only, 
making other interests its object (and seeking the greatest 
harmony of the greatest number) regardless of where these 
interests originate? If this is true, then love is inter-
personal incidentally and not fundamentally. 
ii) Suppose love to be between persons·. Perry 1 s claim 
is that my love for you is best described as my interest in 
the fulfilment of your interests (or the resultant vector, 
which has been called a governing propensity) as they are. 
That is to say that I love you as you are now, not as you 
might be at your best--individually or socially~ This does 
seem to describe love more in keeping with Perry's intent~ 
However, if this is true of love, does not this urge toward 
pure altruism appear to act independently of (and possibly 
in opposition to) any alleged tendency toward harmony and 
inclusiveness? Now it may be quite true that my love for 
each of two persons engaged in some conflict may lead me to 
attempt to make peace between them on the grounds that each 
will be happier when the conflict is settled harmoniously~ 
However, even if all conflicts could be settled to the equal 
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advantage of the antagonists, one senses here the germinal 
stage of a personal and social idealism that assumes (arbi-
trarily, it is suspected) the happiness of an individual to 
lie in a properly-structured society (or universe). Suppose 
my governing propensity to be such that it does not thrive 
in this society; am I then an improper object for anybody's 
love? 
It would seem that Perry has either undershot or over-
shot his mark. In a system ''Then the person is a synthesis 
of interests and a society is a synthesis of persons, it is 
difficult to focus on the individual for any length of time 
without that individual either becoming an incidental aggre-
gate of interests or becoming an incidental member of a 
society~ Perry's statement, that love is toward another 
person as he is, is a good statement; it is difficult to ac-
cept, not on grounds of its absurdity, but because Perry has 
not begun with an individual, and therefore seems unable to 
derive one satisfactorally~ Perhaps, as Perry argues in the 
case of the egocentric predicament , the fallacy of pseudo-
simplicity indicates only an operating difficulty rather 
than a basis for a philosophical system·. 
E. God and Harmonious Happiness·. 
The discussion below hopes to point out some problems 
arising from the scientific method of descriptive analysis 
when it is applied to questions concerning God and his 
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relationship to the moral ideal of inclusive harmonious 
happiness ·. I t intends to do no more; the further impli-
cations of these problems must await development in a 
later chapter·. 
1·. First, we may point out the difficulty encountered 
by the method of descriptive analysis when it makes any at-
tempt whatever to consider the question of the existence or 
nature of God . The repudiation of the "religious" method of 
teleological explanation specifically precludes any hypothe-
sis about God as the "power" behind the universe ·. Only if a 
structural analysis actually reveals a complex of neutral 
entities to which the name "God" might properly be attached, 
would the method of descriptive analysis find any material 
for investigation, and even then , a) this complex would be 
composed of subcamplexes and finally of simple entities, b) 
no explanation could be provided of how the universe pro-
ceeds from this structure·. It might be thought that vthere a 
structural analysis is precluded, a functional analysis 
might have better success . However, it will be recalled 
that a functional analysis is based on general observation 
of the behavioral functioning of a structured complex~ Un-
less it is assumed that the world is (or is the result of) 
the behavior of a deity--an assumption once again explicitly 
precluded--no function is before us for analysis~ It ap-
pears to be conclusive that, for Perry, no God- hypothesis 
recognizable by traditional theology belongs in modern 
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philosophy. 
2. Yet Perry does have a philosophy of rel igion·. If 
we accept his definition of religion as quoted in Chapter 
One, we find that it is 11belief on the part of individuals 
or communities concerning the final or overruling control of 
their interests·. 11 It is the nature of this belief which 
Perry hopes to make clear in his philosophy of religion~ He 
quotes Leslie Stephen in support of a belief which "puts 
heart into men 111and against "that state of suspended ani-
mation , of hesitation, and general impotence, which is 
properly to be regarded as unbelief·. "2 
The man has most faith, in the sense in which faith 
represents a real force , • • • whose convictions are 
such as are most favorable to energetic action, and is 
freest from the doubts which paralyze the will in the 
great moments of life . He must have a clear vision of 
the end to be achieved , devotion to \'lhich may be the 
ruling passion of his life and the focus to vThich all 
his energies may converge·. 3 
In line with pragmatism , 4then, Perry will define be-
lief or faith as the resolution of doubt into a theory as-
similated into a plan of life . In particular opposition to 
orthodoxy and absolutism , Perry will repudiate a faith (that 
is , a theory assimilated into a life- plan) which, while it 
1 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 7. 
2Ibid. 
3 Ibid., quoted by Perry from Leslie Stephen, An Ag-
nostic's Apology (New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons), p. 50. 
4 Reference is to the thought of c. s. Peirce . 
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may resolve doubt, induces an even more chilling impotence 
in action. Thus, Perry's faith emerges as a belief that the 
universe is such that man , by dint of dedicated effort, can 
make himself the final and overruling control of his own 
interests. It is this, coupled \'lith the negative findings 
of descriptive method--that man is, in a cosmic sense, alone , 
with no guarantees, but with cause for hope--that defines 
Perry's religion. Perhaps it may be titled "humanistic 
meliorism." 
3. This leaves little to criticize except by posing 
as an alternative an entire philosophy of religion with 
other philosophical bases. Perry has, however, stated some 
critic isms of his own, which may provide material for a 
counter-charge. In making these critical statements, it may 
be noted that Perry has, so to speak, stepped outside of his 
own system. We must do the same, not forgetting, ho1-.rever, 
that Perry has doubtless intended his comments to provide 
support for his own religious-moral hypothesis. 
a) Religion is more than morality; it is morality plus 
hope that moral effort will yield a return. With this we 
meet the problem of religious sanction for moral effort. 
Assuming that religion embraces morality, there arises 
the ••• question, whether morality depends on religion 
or has its own independent, secular ground. That re-
ligion provides morality with an auxiliary motivation, 
and that this auxiliary motivation is often a necessary 
condition of moral practice, is unquestionable. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
But it does not imply, as has been contended, that the 
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force of morality rests on religious premises.l 
We have assumed that there can be a separation of re-
ligious from moral premises. That this is impossible under 
the terms of Perry's system may be obvious. It may be im-
possible under the terms of any teleological system; however, 
Perry 's point seems to be that of dependency, not separation. 
Here we must make a large assumption--that the commands of 
God as well as the demands of justice can be known by us, 
but not as emerging from the same source. With this, the 
\~Thole problem seems to disappear. Just as most of us be-
lieve the theorems of geometry on geometrical, rather than 
religious, principles, so also does morality proceed from 
its own principles . The result may, however, be surprising, 
for the problem is solved by the above "division of labor" 
only to redound with even greater force. Religion, thus 
"emancipated" from morality, takes with it the teleological 
structure upon which morality rests. Hence, an act per-
formed for moral reasons becomes a "merely moral" act , while 
an act performed for religious reasons is an act which bears 
directly on the universe at large, and my relation to it. 
b) It is still possible to perform the "merely moral" 
act with a moral heroism which is able, in the very face of 
God, to stand up for what it believes to be right. We have 
assumed separate sources for moral and religious imperatives 
1 Perry, Realms of Value, p. 472. 
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(an assumption which E. S. Brightman would find meaning-
less). \'le may thus entertain the theoretical possibility of 
a conflict between the demands of morality and the commands 
of God. God may, in short, be cast in the role of a "ca-
pricious father or king." But here, Perry ts hope, that the 
universe is such that moral effort is "rewarded" (results in 
a better world) must be re-introduced. It is this which 
constitutes the faith of both Perry and many theists . Conse-
quently, the conflict is not exactly bet"VTeen the demands of 
justice and the commands of God, but between the hope that 
the course of morality will lead to this better world, and 
the belief that God knows, far better than we do, the compo-
sition of this better world. The whole question, in short, 
revolves about the claim of humanity that it is better 
served by its own devices (science and morality) and the 
claim of humanity that it is better served by a (scientifi-
cally unjustified) faith that the commands of God will ful-
fil our moral ideals even when they appear to countermand 
them directly". 
Let us keep in mind that the question of apprehending 
the "VTill of God is not the problem under consideration. We 
(including Perry) have assumed that Godts will is known to 
us. "The empirical approach to God" will be investigated in 
the next chapter. Here , the question involves only the "hy-
pothesis" that God loves us--is interested in our interests--
and in this situation, admittedly a far cry from Perry's 
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conc-lusions about the existence of God, it may be suggested 
that Perry has postulated a God, for the purposes of argu-
ment, without postulating also the possibility that what ap-
pears to be an arbitrary command, in conflict with our best 
moral principles , may only be an indication that our finite 
moral principles are inadequate . It may, of course, indi-
cate that God is immoral. Our faith is that he is not~ 
Once again, this leaves unanswered many questions 
about the relationships \1hich may exist between God and "the 
Good." Let us regard this as the central thread of this 
dissertation, and permit it to unwind slowly. At this point, 
Perry is charged, first, with presenting a method which pre-
cludes positive theistic conclusions; second, he has emanci-
pated morality from dependence on religious sanctions, but 
at the cost of severing the connection between morality and 
the disposition of the universe as a totality; third, he has 
posed a hypothetical conflict between the imperatives of 
morality and religion which regards both as absolutes, thus 
forcing the critic to choose between the moral and the re-
ligious, when it is precisely the content of religion, inso-
far as it is separate from human moral ideals, to believe 
that God's perspective is greater than ours and must 
sometimes work as a corrective even to our best moral 
efforts. We shall encounter this "teleological suspension 
of the ethical" again~ 
Perry has presented religion as a system catering to 
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our interests, but only provided that the proper magic formu-
la is used. He has shown morality as catering to our best 
interests harmoniously and inclusively. Our intent has been 
to show that religion may be seen as belief in a God who 
also is interested in our best interests, and whose view of 
inclusiveness is totality . 
3. Conclusion. 
We have, generally speaking, attempted to criticize 
Perry's philosophy precisely at the points where his system 
appears to assume its polemical attitude--and its strength. 
If the appraisal has been in any degree successful, the 
reader may perhaps conclude that the present writer is 
largely dissatisfied with the general position of realism. 
This is not so . It is, however , felt that a true realism 
should have proper regard for the realities of subjectivity. 
It is hoped that this does not imply subjectivism . It is 
also felt that realism need not avoid theistic hypotheses so 
assiduously as does Perry, nor need it insist that because 
the world is obviously so full of a number of things, 
therefore numbering is the only way to find out anything 
about them . In short, realism need not impose the methods 
of "science" to the exclusion of the methods of "religion," 
particularly if the methods of religion can be shown to have 
made some progress of their own since the childhood of the 
race- -or even since the Middle Ages~ 
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However, in spite of what may appear to be a coldly 
analytic approach to philosophy, Perry has contributed 
heavily to areas of thought normally reserved for the com-
mitted reformer. Perhaps, in closing this account of Perry, 
a few suggestions may be made of how elements which have 
been dealt with critically in this chapter might have been 
carried over by a mind such as Perry's from a descriptive 
account of reality to a prescriptive message for American 
democracy". 
The theory of the independence of terms from their re-
lations could mean also that I am not just the clubs and 
fraternities I join, but something else as well--something 
which cannot be developed simply by joining groups . The 
theory of immanence could mean also that I must adapt myself 
to circumstances; because they are a part of me , I cannot 
remain aloof in a room with the blinds drawn. The theory of 
general observation could mean also that whatever my private 
dreams and delusions about myself may be, the thing that 
counts is the work I do, the goods I produce. The refusal to 
construct a cosmology could mean also that existence is 
brought out of essence by the sometimes tedious, dirty, 
stupefying labor of man. The theory of interest conferring 
value could mean also that man's fate is intimately tied up 
with the fate of nature--that nature and his nature are akin. 
The opposition to absolutism could mean also that there must 
be no rest before the work is done, and above all , no 
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relaxing of personal responsibility in the arms of the state. 
Whether or not all these follow from Perry's systematic 
philoso phy , or are even compatible with it, is something 
else again . Perhaps there are other possibilities . Let us 
continue by examining some of them~ 
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CHAPTER III 
EXPOSITION OF THE THOUGHT OF 
EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN 
1. Introduction. 
Perhaps the most pervasive single statement that can 
be made about the systematic thought of Edgar Sheffield 
Brightman is that it at no point loses sight of the funda-
mental importance of selfhood and parsonality.1 This could 
have epistemological import. Perry has commented on the 
epistemology of personalistic idealism, observing that it 
leads to no implications whatever in the remainder of the 
t . 2 h sys em. T e observation is somewhat surprising in view of 
his fundamental polemic against idealism: that it founds 
its metaphysics mistakenly on epistemology. Perhaps the 
very fact that Dr. Brightman's dualistic epistemology3leads 
to no metaphysical implications whatever4accomplishes, 
better than any monistic epistemology can, the sought-for 
1The distinction between a self and a person is not 
emphasized in this chapter. For such a distinction see E. s. 
Brightman, Personality and Religion (New York: The Ronald 
Press Company, 1934), chap. XIV, especially p. 268~ 
2 Perry, Present Conflict of Ideals, p. 189. 
3This position is discussed below. 
4It would be more accurate to say that Brightman's 
epistemology forces no specific metaphysical conclusions~ 
"emancipation of metaphysics from epistemology." 
However, it remains true, at least somewhat metaphori-
cally, that whatever systematic implications epistemic dual-
ism, for example , might have in the system of thought to be 
examined below, it is clear that the sanctity and privacy of 
the self is preserved in a dualism, and that such preser-
vation is all but impossible where consciousness "reaches 
out" to embrace its entity. Let us place before us, as the 
topic of this chapter, the question: "can personality be 
validated as a philosophical concept in terms of which a co-
herent philosophy can be constructed?" It is hoped that 
this manner of capsulizing Dr. Brightman's philosophical 
aims will suggest the focus of this investigation; it is not 
intended to flout the open-minded search for truth--the 
cornerstone of any philosophical method worthy of the name . 
To a more detailed exposition of personalistic method we may 
now turn our attention~ 
2·. Methodology. 
A. Radical Empiricism. 
From different points of departure each of the four 
philosophers under investigation claims his method as em-
pirical . Dr. Brightman has appropriated James' term, "radi-
cal empiricism, "1which, together with synopsis, furnishes 
1cf. William James, Essays in Radical Empiri cism (New 
York : Longmens, Green, and Company, 1912). 
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the t i tle for his method. For Bri ghtman, radical empiricism 
means that 
the word 11 exper1ence , " • • • refers not to some one 
aspect of consciousness , such as sense-experience, and 
not to some i nferred entity, such as atom, but to the 
immediate and ongoing activi ties and data in conscious-
nesa . l 
At one stroke three items are asserted in radical empiricism~ 
Firat , experience is identif ied with consciousness so that 
henceforth, to be conscious is to be an experient and to ex-
perience is to be conscious. Neither consciousness nor ex-
parlance exists in any other form . Second, all data of 
consciousness are included, not merely sense-experience. 
Third, all except data of consciousness are excluded, such 
as my body, atoms, or God. In the triad of common sense--me-
experiencing-something--both ends are eliminated as entities 
and are reduced to the one middle term, experience, with the 
non-pragmatic proviso that all experience is consciousness·. 
This, then, is the field from which the arrow of in-
telligibility is to take its departure. It is difficult to 
see how any other could be selected. 
B·. Syno pais ·. 
Brightman's methodology takes on an added dimension in 
ita opposition to analysis as an exclusive method. There 
1E. S. Brightman, Person and Reality (New York: The 
Ronald Press Company, 1958) , p. 23. Of. also E. s·. 
Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1925 ( 1951 ] ) , p. 69·. 
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-appear to be two factors comprising synoptic method, factors 
by no means unconnected, but which should be mentioned in 
distinction from each other. First, perhaps in partial 
opposition to Berkeley, there are the experienced facts of 
structures or 11 Gestal ten," "which cannot be deduced from the 
properties of their parts~ 111 They must be studied as wholes 
if they are to be studied at all·. Second, it is evident, 
for Brightman, that "every i tam of experience belongs to a. 
self, "2and that "experience, without a parson is an un-
warranted abstraction. 113 
Thus, there is not only unity to elements within ex-
perience, but also a unity to conscious experience, itself. 
It might appear, here, that Brightman avoids describing ex-
perience as hanging in a vacuum by an all-too-quick in-
sertion of the term, "person, 11 as a substantial dwelling for 
experience. This is not the case. "Person" or 11 self,n at 
this stage of investigation, is to be regarded as simply the 
conscious unity of -experience. "By self, personalism means 
1Brightman, Person and Reality, p. 26. Opposition to 
Berkeley may occur only if Gestalten are conceived as cross-
ing sense boundaries. 
~. s. Brightman, ed., Proceedings of the Sixth Inter-
national Congress of Philosoph~ (New York: LOngmans, Green 
and Company, Inc., 1927), p. l 2. 
3Br1ghtman, Person and Reality, p. 26. 
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i nl 1 2 ••• consc ousness. 'The self is conscious experience·." 
Brightman intends only that the commonplace observation that 
experience centers 11here, in my experience," be amended to 
mean that this unity of experience is what I am; I am no 
more, but it, also, is not less. 
To generalize, then, synoptic method is that which 
recognizes that a valid approach to the understanding of the 
data of experience should consider that experience, like the 
flower in the crannied wall, is contextual. It does not ex-
clude analysis as an operating procedure--a means of focus-
ing on this or that element of experience; but it does as-
sert that analysis is inadequate as an exclusive philosophi-
cal method. 
c. The Criterion of Truth. 
Contrary, perhaps, to the niceties of philosophic 
classification, there does appear to be at least a tenuous 
linkage between the synoptic approach and empirical coherence 
as a criterion of truth. The linkage is that neither de-
velops in a vacuum; both are founded on the experienced uni-
ty of experience. Radical empiricism means that all the 
facts of experience are to be considered--none are to be re-
garded as irrelevant to a theory of the nature of experience 
1Brightman, Sixth International Congress, p. 161. 
;;. s. Brightman, "The Finite Self" 1n c. I Barrett, 
Contemperar;y Idealism 1n America (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, f932}, p. f74. 
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--lest experience be distorted thereby . Thus, empirical co-
herence as a criterion of truth is developed basically from 
the interrelatedness of experience, itself. Because of the 
basic belief that experience is "honest" in interrelational 
aspects, the work of intelligent thought is not to impose 
i taelf on experience "downward, " so to speak, from an 
abstract synoptic principle , 1but rather the task of intelli-
gent thought is to move hypothetically in an effort directed 
solely toward clarification of experience. Hence, empirical 
coherence is the organizing of data in the light of an hy-
pothesis which, better than any other, illuminates or ex-
plains the problems raised by the data. As Professor 
Bertocci remarks, "so far as we can see, there is no reason 
why a philosopher should not be allowed an assumption, "2so 
long as it is justified by ita "ability to explain the facts 
of experience most coherently~"3 It appears to follow that 
while truth will belong to the propositions comprising the 
structure of the hypothesis (thus forcing the logical requi-
site of consistency--unavoidable for any structured view 
whatever), the adequacy of any hypothesis will be dictated 
solely by its ability better to resolve the problems raised 
1cf. P. A. Bertocci, The Empirical Argument for God in 
Late British Thought (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 
1938), p . 47. 
2 Ibid. , p. 48 . 
3Ibid·. 
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by present experience (thus guarding against tendencies to 
condemn the most characteristic features of experience in 
service of a logical ideal) ·. It may be suggested here that 
this criterion of truth is implicitly invoked 1n any theory1 
of truth which takes as its criterion prediction and the 
satisfaction of cognitive interest, since any prediction is 
an hypothesis which awaits experiential verification~ 
The method is synoptic; the criterion of truth is em-
pirical coherence. Curiously enough, we have now to justify 
the method and criterion, not alone by its application--the 
thought-experiment in its totality must provide this--but by 
turning inward, as it were, and examining that without which 
"experience is an unwarranted abstraction~" In distinguish-
ing between "facts of experience" and hypotheses concerning 
them, the fundamental question is implicitly raised as to 
the status of the self~ 
1It may seem strange to expound the criterion of truth 
without making mention of Brigh'bnan' s theory of truth. One 
might suppose a theory of truth to be logically prior to a 
criterion of truth. As a matter of fact, the two are almost 
inextricably bound up together, so that it seems almost a 
matter of choice which is to be selected for appraisal first 
--as with the chicken and the egg. However, a theory of 
truth seems equally bound up with a theory of mind, and, be-
cause of this the writer (as well, it seems, as Dr. 
Brightman) has decided that one must present his criterion-
credentials before the "truth of his theory of truth" can be 
entertained. As we shall see presently, the nature of truth 
for Dr. Brightman consists in the reference of thought to 
thing--of concept to percept, and thus involves a prior 
analysis of experience into at least these two factors ·. 
Truth, thus, is a function of propositions about experience~ 
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3. Psychology. 
A. Self-experience. 
One cannot go far in Brightman's system wi thout being 
referred back to the second element of synopsis mentioned 
above, namely the unity of experience as belonging to a 
self. This section is devoted to defining the datum self. 
It can be done briefly. "The idealist ••• believes that 
consciousness exists only as a self, so that to be conscious 
means to be a self. 111 "The word datum means 'what is given.' 
••• The mind or the self is the datum. "2 Thus the datum 
self is confined to the "shining present" of the situation 
actually experienced. This includes all present experi-
ences: memory experiences, space experiences, object ex-
periences, other-person experiences, value experiences, all 
in their certainty as present experiences. 3 These experi-
ences, with their experienced togetherness, constitute the 
datum self. Wherever there is an experience or a Gestalt of 
many experiences, there is consciousness, and there, also, 
is a self. The personal datum self is always first-personal; 
the experience is always mine, and it is always now. The 
1 Brightman, in Barrett, Contempgrary Idealism in 
America, p. 174. 
2E. s. Brightman, The Philosofhy of Ideals (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1928), p. 1 • 
3cf. E. s. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion (New 
York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1940), p. 351; "Characteristics 
of a Minimal Self. 11 
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1 situation-experienced is always concrete. 
B. Self-consciousness. 
Self-experience, we have suggested, is another name 
for the unity of experience, and is simply consciousness of 
this unity--awareness of the experiential panorama. Self-
experience is thus fundamental; reflective self-conscious-
ness is presupposed by it. Reflective self-consciousness -is 
what happens when the experiencing self thinks about--is 
aware of--itself experiencing. Hence it is a reflective act 
in which self-experience is the object of self-experiencing. 
Self-experience ••• is not to be confused with re-
flection on self. Self-experience is always present 
wherever there is consciousness; it is the experience of 
the whole consciousness as belonging together and thus 
as being "mine." But reflection on self, or self 
knowledge, is what occurs when we stop to think about 
self-experience.2 
"All experience is not self-consciousness, but all experi-
ence is self-experience." 3 "Self-consciousness rests on an 
immediate experience of self. 114 
It may be suggested, then, that for Brightman self-
1It is well to note Brightman's usage of 11 concrete." 
Cf. Brightman, Personality and Religion, p. 15; Brightman, 
Introduction, pp. 4-5. Its meaning here is that there 
cannot be an experience "out of context" whether the context 
is its relation to the self or to the field of experience. 
This usage of the term will not exactly parallel that of 
"baing-in-a-situation" as used by Sartre; cf. chap. V. 
2 Brightman, Introduction, pp. 203-204. 
3Brightman, Sixth International Congress, p. 163~ 
4Ibid. 
-
151 
experience is immediate (and hence, not knowledge); re-
flective self-consciousness, while it is knowledge, is thus 
not immediate. It is here that his dualistic theory of 
knowledge begins to receive its expression. "It is true 
that since introspective knowledge is epistemologically 
dualistic it is liable to error •••• But what we thus know 
mediately has once been immediate experience."1 How this can 
be known, except mediately, is unclear; but, in any event, 
it does become clear that the relationship between knowledge 
and its object--the theory of truth--is seen as dualistic 
also-. 
c-. The Analysis of Self-experience .. 
An empirical glance at the content of self-experience 
indicates two general types into which experience falls. It 
is difficult to express these types without treading on 
ground that is reserved for epistemology. Yet it does seem 
apparent on inspection that within self-experience there is 
to be observed an element of control and elements which are 
to be controlled·. 
It is clear on inspection that every complex timespan 
of first-personal consciousness contains actually or 
potentially two basic types of process: what can be 
controlled as an aspect of the total "owned" experience 
in the shining present, and what cannot be changed, or 
"the Given." In this perspective the agent of control 
functions as "activity." ••• The Given, furthennore, 
1Brightman, Introduction, p. 188. 
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is of two quite different types--the rational and the 
non-ra tional·.l 
The rational Given is comprised of rational norms, 
certainly logical norms; for Brightman ethical, aesthetic, 
and religious norms as we11. 2 The non-rational Given con-
sists of "brute facts'' of experience (gualia) which "in 
themselves have no logical structure, and which are entailed 
by no logical necessity. Examples are sense qualities, de-
sires, emotions, pleasures, and pains."3 
Activity is the experience that these two areas of the 
Given are, to a degree, united. It is here that the theory 
of truth may best be presented; for it is 1n this discovery, 
that there are areas of experience where the rational Given 
has merged to give structure to the non-rational Given, that 
the mandate is given to mind to work at understanding its 
experience. It is because mind can refer to experience, can 
act to understand that which is at least in part under-
standable, that such a criterion of truth as empirical co-
herence is possible. Thoughts are not things, but thoughts 
(also a part of experience) can refer to things--and truth 
is such a fait~l reference. The activity of thinking is 
the experienced result of this discovery'. 
A note of caution at this point: we must be reminded 
1Brightman, Person and Reality, p. 56. 
2Ibid. , P• 57·. 
3 Ibid., P• 58. 
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that wha t inspection reveals is activities as experience, 
operating on other types of experience. Empirically , 
consciousness of activity is not the same as action. vlith-
out this warning it is all too easy to slip from the action 
to the agent and thence to the assumption that '\'te are the 
agency we experience. In this broad sense, all experience 
is given--for a truly radical empiricism . 
4. Epistemology . 
A. Duration in the Shining Present . 
It may be suggested, as a foreshadowing of person-
alistic conclusions, that Professor Brightman's tempo-
ralistic position has its roots deep in his epistemology. 
It is true that nothing can be deduced from the "innocence 
of the shining present."1 Yet it is also true that the 
present manifold of experience, conceived as an instantane-
ous flash, reduces to near-vacancy. Indeed, it is not easy 
to see how, if such were the nature of experience, one could 
experience activity; for activity implies a process, or at 
the very least a series of states, and neither a process nor 
a series can be illuminated by an instantaneous flash. In 
short, the fact that present experience is not near vacancy 
argues for a reappraisal of the elements of experience . 
First, ther e is the immediate experience of duration . 
1 Ibid., p. 57. 
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This may be called experience of a "time-span," of a 
"specious present, 111or of "primary memory . "2 It appears to 
be the case that within the shining present there is a du-
rational quality which is able , perhaps for the briefest of 
moments, to hold fast to an immediacy which possesses tempo-
ral "thickness ." This means that within a small, but 
doubtless measurable, time - span I am able to grasp immedi-
a tely the processual identity of my own being. I need not 
assert that it was the same I that experienced then and ex-
periences now, for it is the same I, within the structure 
and certainty of the shining present that sees, and is , 
continuity, or, unity encompassing change . It is sm all, but 
it is enough to break the vacuum of the non-temporal instant. 
An overlapping of such time-spans, "a series of 
linkages, "3gives the present unity "a unique relation to 
past experiences . "4 It is true that the linkages must , at 
some point, reveal their inferential character, an admission 
which will weaken their uniqueness somewhat, even while 
making the knowledge-event possible . But at least experi-
ence does seem to refute any attempt to reduce the 
1 Ibid. , p. 58 . 
2The term is Santayana's; see Scepticism and Animal 
Faith (New York : Charles Scribner's Sons , 1923), p. 151. 
3Brightman, Person and Reality , p. 44; cf . also pp. 
53- 54. 
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experience of time to a "series" of non-temporal flashes~ 
Thus, while solipsism is not yet avoided, the solipsism of 
the present moment does appear to be a needless abstraction 
from the concreteness of a present durational moment~ 
B. Reason end Control. 
As temporal, the shining present shows instances of 
rational structure, end of control end counter-control. A 
durational experience provides these, but it does not pro-
vide their meaning·. The fact seems to be t hat reason is at 
work trying to understand; end the further fact is that 
reason, trying to understand, to a degree is successfUl. 
This is the area of empirical coherence and knowledge. 
The fact that rational structures and processes appear 
in experience, and that reason is able to take note of these 
--formulate ideas and hypotheses concerning them, indicates 
a "level of uni ty 11 both broader than and more complex then 
that of immediate durational experience. The level of "ana-
lyzed 1mmediacy"1indicates a duality-within-unity of an 
active reason applying "ideas" to a rationally understandable 
(in part) experience; in short, the larger unity of the self 
encompasses the duality between "propositions" and "experi-
ence" to which these proposi tiona refer. 
The level of "causal 1mifonnity" shows a further ex-
pansion of the self in an empirically verifiable ability to 
1 ~., pp~ 61-62. 
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generalize from analyzed immediacy and make use of memory 
stretching beyond the limits of the specious present in 
order to predict the fUture on the basis of experience no 
longer present, but remembered. It is here that "the unity 
of the experiencer" is shown to be nessential to the co-
herence of any statements about science and its causal laws 
in any field." 1 It is here, also, that objective reference 
begins; but, in order that issues may be properly dis-
tinguished, let us set aside objective reference as such for 
a moment and continue to concentrate on the expanding unity 
of the self. For, whether or not objective reference signi-
fies anything about an illuminating absent, it signifies a 
great deal about the reason-activity of the self~ 
A higher level of unity is encountered when we reflect 
that the self does not confine its activity to remembering 
and predicting descriptively the course of its experience~ 
"Experience contains plans of action toward desired goals~"2 
Thus there appears to be empirical evidence for a level of 
"nonnative control." This is the level of ideals·. Let us 
relate this to uactivity 11 in order to emphasize the unity of 
reason and volition~ 
In the human exper1ent, ~ •• this activity seems to 
be a conative or selective experience. It is what has 
been called will. Activity, then, is both selection 
from the Givan and use of it·. It is voluntary control·. 
1 Ibid., p. 62. 
2Ibid~ 
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••• Ideally, the task of the shining present is: 
(1) an increasing exploration of the realm of the Givan, 
both rational and nonrational; and (2) increasing con-
trol of the nonrational Givan in accordance with the 
rational Givan~l 
c. Objective Reference. 
The dialectic of the unity of experience, or salfhood, 
however, is not permitted to continua indefinitely. Experi-
ence, itself', testifies to its own limitation. By usa of 
the term, "Givan, 11 Dr. Brightman indicates that there is a 
characteristic "refractoriness" to portions of experience, a 
stubbornness and resistance to molding which serves notice 
that experience cannot be conceived as causa ~· Thera is 
a stubbornness to the rational Given--in that soma laws can 
be re-discovered, re-interpreted, as knowledge grows, evaded 
or broken, but they cannot be abrogated or canceled--and 
there is a stubbornness to the nonrational Given, forcing 
the unity of' experience to struggle for evan limited success 
in understanding and than shaping experience in terms of 
ideals. It has been suggested that memory of events beyond 
the scope of the specious present is required in order even 
to begin to understand the shining present; it is now sug-
gested that a coherent interpretation of the shining present, 
including the refractory nature of the Given, strongly indi-
cates the need for a bold hypothesis--that there is a source 
(or sources) absent from experience, but responsible for 
1 ~., p. 60. 
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some aspects of it·. Objective reference is a fact of ex-
perience; the hypothesis is an attempt to account for this 
fact coherently~ 
There is an intermediate form of objective reference 
which requires prior mention~ Trans-temporal reference to a 
past which now must be known mediately, but which once was 
immediate, implies inference in a "longitudinal" sense, not 
precisely to something not first-personal as a cause of ex-
perience, but rather to a first-personal "cause" of present 
experience. If the empirical fact of distinction between 
memory-inferences and other inferences is justifiable co-
herently, it must be on the basis that trans-temporal refer-
ence to a continuous (though no longer immediate) self-
identity is of a more intimate nature than other sorts of 
objective reference~ . My memory, in short, is not only mine, 
but also it refers to what is mine, namely, my past~ 1 
Thus, while it is true that an "overlapping of 
linkages" must somewhere admit its inferential character, it 
is also true, both that what is mediate 1n this case was 
once immediate, and that the inferential character of this 
apprehension provides, so to speak, a precedent for other 
forme of objective reference. Thus the "bold hypothesis" is 
1Yet even here there is an aspect of something very 
much like the Given; for, if we set aside the notion that 
much of the original experience is given, there still re-
mains the absolute refractoriness of past events. Even what 
was once active is now 11 given 11 to the present unity of ex-
perience. 
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in part justified by the requisite unity of experience which 
precisely makes this (or any) hypothesis possible. For the 
rest, justification must be based on the coherence of the 
hypothesis, itself·. 
You may call it a leap of faith, hypothesis, postu-
late, assumption, or what you will; it is grounded in 
the evidence of the present and is validated by thinking 
in the present·. The present, then, consists largely of 
clues, signals, signs, effects, messages--in short, it 
is crammed with messages which it did not create and 
which it can understand only if our mind is recognized 
for what it is: a receiving station for messages from 
beyond-.1 
The nature of that which is beyond is also beyond the 
limits of epistemology-. The hypothesis that there is a be-
yond standing in a certain relationship to present experi-
ence is Dr. Brightman's epiatemic dualism. The final 
comment of the personalistic epistemologist is to suggest 
the types of experiences for which the illuminating absent 
must account·. We may list them briefly as: social experi-
ences (communication and response2), understanding of 
11nature,"3understanding of norms, 4and the overarching inte-
gration of all the foregoing--the appropriation of these by 
the growing self-. 5 This last implies that the greater self 
1Brightman, Person and Reality, p. 34. 
2Ibid., p. 68-. 
3Ibid., p. 69. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
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is the more coherent self , and, by this very token, a more 
coherent experient and understander. Thus the end is always 
a means to a further end~ 
These are the "types" of objective reference. \ve must 
now examine their various and combined claims of being 
rooted in a reality independent of the experient. 
5·. Metaphysics. 
A. Introduction: Ratio Cognoscendi and Ratio Essendi . 
Dr. Brightman's epistemic dualism has separated ratio 
cognoscendi from ratio essendi,1and has thus shaken loose 
the egocentric predicament. That is to say that, while the 
shining present is the source of whatever knowledge we may 
have of the illuminating absent, we cannot conclude from 
this that shining is its own source, and that there is no 
absent~ On the contrary, Dr. Brightman's argument is that 
unless there is being absent from but illuminating the 
shining present, either as its cause or its meaning (or 
both), human knowledge can proceed no farther than de-
scription of what is immediately present to it--a limitation 
as binding on the positivist and scientist as it is on the 
metaphysician and religious believer~ 
In one sense, then, it must be admitted that ratio 
cognoscendi and ratio essendi are not irrelevant to each 
1 Ibid. , pp. 72-73·. 
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other. Ratio essendi is sought from the point of view of 
ratio cognoscendi, and in order to account coherently for 
the shining present. Thus we may note that empirical co-
herence as a criterion of truth and synopsis as a method 
will seek to describe reality, but will seek to describe it 
by what Perry would call the method of teleological expla-
nation. It would appear that no epistemic dualism could do 
otherwise and still make sense, but it would also appear 
that the vital issue between neorealism and personalism 
(among dualisms) is not confined to methodology, psychology, 
and metaphysics, but must also embrace epistemology--for in 
each case one hopes to describe reality as it is, but only 
in dualistic theories will the search for reality be quali-
fied by the requirement that reality explain experience; in 
monisms the two coincide. Perhaps we may suggest, then, 
that personalism is able to draw unexpected support, not 
only from other idealistic systems (even monistic idealisms 
such as absolutism and subjectivism, where its support is in 
areas other than epistemology), but also from dualisms such 
as critical naturalism. 1:/e shall return to this problem in 
Chapter Nine. 
Meanwhile, an examination of the shining present re-
veals certain general characteristics of experience, the 
systematic investigation of which is necessary--so that we 
may have some idea of what reality may be "accused." Refer-
ence is to the categories. 
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B. The Categories: A Summary. 
It will be wise to recognize the distinction between 
reference to a universe and reference to a universe of dis-
course. The "realm" of the categories appears to lie 1n the 
hinterland between epistemology and metaphysics where, meta-
phorically, "the case for the prosecution" against reality 
is being prepared, but is not yet presented. Iii th this 1n 
mind it may be possible to express Brightman's meaning of, 
usage of, and 11 derivation11 of the categories in a series of 
i tams. 
1. The categories are not classes (of particulars), 
but are systems or principles of systems. 1 
2. These systematic principles are ~ priori in that 
they are essential to any empirical whole~ 2 They are thus 
presuppositions of any unified universe of discourse~ 
3. They, nonetheless, arise from and must be justi-
fied by experience, both as to their own nature and to their 
relative place within any larger categorial system~ 
The apparent conflict thus bared between apriorism and 
empiricism in dealing with the categories is resolved with a 
minimum of difficulty by appealing to an empirically justi-
fiable hypothesis: that mind is at work trying to under-
stand its experience·. If it is borne in mind that mind, 
1 ill.§.., p. 91. 
2
.!121.9.., P• 101~ 
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itself, is part of experience (let us, for the moment in-
terpret Brightman as indicating that ''mind" is the active 
process of discovering the rational Given and, by means of 
this, of controlling the nonrational Given), then we may 
suggest that the ~priori element is the mind's capacity to 
understand categorial systems, while the empirical element 
means that experience is partially understandable precisely 
because it is arranged categorially~ The task of deriving 
specific categories and their interrelationships thus may 
proceed on the basis of empirical coherence--with the all-
important caveat that we are dealing 1n radical empiricism. 
This proviso warns us to be scientific in two directions: 
we must not close the door arbitrarily on any present cate-
gory-claim, and we must be prepared to re-examine. the 
system 1n the light of any fUture experience which might not 
fit nicely into the present system..  Personalism is not pre-
pared to write a "prolegomena to eny future metaphysic~ 11 
c. The Categories: A Partial List~ 
In this section no attempt will be made to recreate 
Dr. Brightman's lengthy treatment of the various categories~ 
It is hoped that a list will suffice to bring out salient 
features, while at the same time such a list illustrates 
that, of the categories, three only will be of concern to 
us: Time, Value and Obligation, and Personal Identity~ 
1·. Time: there is no question that time is one of 
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the most pervasive aspects of experience; for Brightman it 
is more; it is a category of all possible being. An earlier 
section has pointed to time as duration (as opposed to 
"clock t1me 11 ), and it is duration which is under consider-
ation. A distillate of Brightman's argument for time as a 
category of all possible being (absent as well as present) 
is that 
were there any being independent of all experience, 
either it would endure or it would not endure. So far 
as we can tell, if it did not endure at all, it could 
not even be; and if it endured it would be temporal·.! 
Further, Brightman adds that since empirical coherence 
requires any hypothesis about the absent to account for the 
shining present, there must be nothing in 11 objeotive 11 time 
which renders the actual experience of time illusory~ 2 Thus, 
views of "eternity11 as either being timel&ss or as exhibit-
ing an "infinite qualitative difference 113are excluded as hy-
potheses which fail to explain our experience of time·. 
2. Change and Identity: Brightman sees time as 
fundamental to change, rather than vice versa. The reason 
for this appears to be that in the absence of all other 
change there still will be that change which is the time in 
which an experience occurs. This kind of change is gener-
ated by time--and for other changes it serves as the vehicle. 
1 116. ~., p. 
2 12o·. Ibid., p. 
-
3 
lli.9:·' p. 131. The phrase is Kierkegaard's. 
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At the same time (and reminiscent of substantialism) the 
category of identity provides for the permanence without 
which change, and indeed time, itself, would be meaningless. 
Change and identity are thus also categories of all possible 
being. 
3. Actuality and Potentiality: given time, "every 
present of every kind is • • • the potentiality of a future. 
If there were nothing actual, there would be nothing po-
tential. On the other hand, everything actual is also a po-
tential. nl These, too, are categories of all possible being·. 
4. Space and Motion: "Space seems obviously to be a 
category of the orders of being described by geometry and by 
physics . The physical order requires a further category, 
motion, which is a synthesis of time and space and thus has 
a more derivative character than most categories."2 
5· Value and Obligation: "Value designates the fact 
that moral choice presupposes an end to be chosen which is 
desired or ought to be desired·. Obligation designates the 
irreducible experience of duty". "3 The specific categorial 
nature of value and obligation will lead, in a later section, 
to an investigation of the "realm of values. 11 For the 
present, it should suffice to indicate that value and 
1 105·. ~ .. p. 
2 
ill£·' p. 106-. 
3Ibid. 
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obligation has perhaps at least as great a claim to cate-
goriality as has , say, space. Each may be relatively inde-
pendent of the other, but each, if removed, would preclude a 
complete sector of experience·. 
6. Personal Identity : at this point 1n the list of 
categories , we are met once again by the distinction between 
ratio cognoscendi and ratio essendi~ With some care , 
Brightman hesitates to assert the fundamental tenet of 
personalism , that all being is persons and the experience of 
persons . This assertion must rest on further argument~ For 
the present, 
the experience of personal identity is a category be-
causa the denial of it would deny the fact of experi-
enced unity in the shining present and would destroy the 
meaning of all memory and all purpose·. Without the cate-
gorical affirmation of personal identity, the shining 
present would be reduced to a durationless vanishing 
point- -to nothing at all~ ~ •• Personal identity is the 
necessary presupposition of every possible process in 
every possible shining present~ l 
Whether or not personal identity is a category of all possi-
ble realms of being-- whether or not anything can exist which 
is not personal--is another matter. 
7~ Cause: it is nonetheless true, for Brightman, 
that continuation of the list of categories will reflect the 
position of that of personal identity. Cause, for example, 
is "an account of change~ "2 But diverse usage of this phrase 
1 Ibid. , pp~ 107-108 ~ 
2 ~ • • p·. 160~ 
will force a distinction between "account" as description 
and "account" as explanation, and thus will divert the cate-
gory of causation into phenomenal or metaphysical causes. 
Phenomenal cause is a category for a particular universe of 
discourse, "namely, the order of observable sensory phe-
nomena."1 Metaphysical cause, however, is the concept of an 
efficient power, and, as such, suggests activity and vo-
lition. It also suggests purpose, creativity, and reason, 
all of which point directly to some form of personality as 
the "cause" of causation. The alternative appears to be 
projecting phenomenal cause dogmatically, rather than de-
scriptively, as metaphysical cause--a projection which con-
tains within itself the seeds of its own destruction as a 
concept. Thus, personality begins to emerge as a basal 
category of the illuminating absent. 
8. Communication: this might well appear to be a 
sector of experience which is too confined to merit the red 
hat of a category. Yet, strangely enough, at this point 
Brightman and Sartre are in close agreement on two important 
points: (a) 11 The category of communication forbids that the 
mind of the sender be the same mind as the mind of the re-
ceiver;"2 (b) "Are you alone in a room? Your very feeling 
of 'no one there' ' is an interpersonal experience~ Does 
1 b d 164·. !....!....·' p. 
2Ib1d. , p. 109~ 
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someone enter? Even if you know not who, your whole shining 
present shines differently because a thou is there."1 
In short, the category of communication is the inter-
personal category, the social category, and if it is not a 
metaphysical category, then a vast range of experience re-
ceives no explanation--or worse, receives the d.enial of 
solipsism. It is this which positivism has failed to con-
sider. 
9. Substance: we reverse the position of Aristotle 
by considering the category of substance last. Much of 
modern philosophy has considered this category an impossible 
one--impossible, yet necessary if permanence is to give 
change meaning, if actuality is to provide potentiality, if 
cause and law are to account for any event at all. It is 
here, perhaps, that the strength of personalism is most ap-
parent·. While departing from the extremes of pa.npsychism, 
"the personalistic theory of substance may be summarized in 
the words 'substance is person. '" 2 With this, the experi-
ential category of personal identity merges with the meta-
physical category of substance--without which nothing can 
be--thus transcending the shining present and becoming the 
metaphysical category of personality. 
Brightman's accusations charged against reality are 
1 ~·- pp. 109-110. 
2 ll2.!,g. , p. 199-. 
168 
now complete. It is time for the bold hypothesis to begin. 
The categories are fingers pointing from the realm of ratio 
1 cognoscendi toward tha t from which they derive--being. 
D. Realms of Being . 
1. The realm of Essence : Dr. Brightman 's position 
with regard to the realm of essence appears to be one of 
careful compromise. In some sense it is granted that there 
is such a realm; in another , it is not granted. In order to 
make these senses clear, let us examine the contents of the 
realm of essences. But first, let us examine this word 
"content." 
There is a legitimate abs traction performed by science 
(including the sciences of mathematics and logic) whereby 
the contents of experience are dealt with in isolation from 
experience as such. The abstraction only loses its legiti-
macy w·hen that very abstraction is used as a basis for meta-
physical speculation. It would appear tha t valid specu-
lation must return to the concrete "seamless robe of experi-
ence" for its basis~ It is in this sense that essences ex-
ist--as the facts of experience. Do they exist in any other 
way? 
There is a sense in \·rhich "essentialists" such as 
1 This phrase is intended to convey the logical (but 
not chronological) dependence of the categories on the 
shining present·. In this "pointing of the fingers, 11 room is 
left for the pre- or non-categorial realm of essences . Cf . 
Brightman, Person and Reality, pp. 219-220, 230 n . 
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Perry and Santayana are correct, although for Brightman 
their conclusions are not correct, and this is in the obser-
vation that the contents of experience, as essences, belong 
to that portion of the shining present which Brightman has 
named the Given. Thus, while their existence is only as 
consciousness, the responsibility for their nature and 
presence may well lie beyond the given consciousness. 
Consequently, as empirical facts, all essences have at 
least psychological existence. • • • The shining present 
is given; and essences--sense data, paine, pleasures, 
spatial or temporal structures, awareness of number or 
obligation--are actually given in it •••• Thus 
essences do not exist and !ssences do exist depending on 
the context of discussion~ 
But essences do not, and cannot lie beyond all consciousness. 
For personalism, essences of all sorts are experiences 
of persons. They belong to the unity of consciousness 
and have no other existence or function of any sort, ex-
cept as indicating that selves are interrelated with 
each other. Their being is personal and interpersonal.2 
They constitute the Given which all activity must use 
and control. • • • If they are eternal, they presuppose 
an eternal shining present of which they are content.3 
In the final analysis, then, essences are the actu-
alities of some shining present, and, as such, are aspects 
of personal wholes. Insofar as they denote possibility 
rather than actuality, they are only possibles because they 
are actuals in an enduring, purposing person. 
1Brightman, Person and Reality, pp. 233-234. 
2 1.]?1g., p. 226. 
3Ibid., p. 227. 
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Thus essences involve the existence of an eternal Person 
--an efficient and final cause, an exparient of unbegun 
and unending duration, whose use and control of the 
essences is evinced in the explicitly and implicitly 
rational structure of experience.l 
2. The Realm of Nature: in the realm of essence we 
met a certain refractoriness because of which Brightman 
found it necessary to assign a givenness to at least some of 
the contents of the shining present. This refractoriness 
constitutes the basis for objective reference. The realm of 
nature is that illuminating absent which, as a hypothesis, 
gives evidence of its objectivity in and to the observing 
and thinking mind. What is it, then, that comprises the 
realm of nature? 
a) The sensory processes in the shining present, spe-
cifically the experiences of space and motion, 
• • • are the only evidence we have for the whole 
system of Nature and all the natural laws developed 
by scientific thinking~ 
b) Nature is not all that there is because experience 
contains more than sensory experience. 
c) Nature is found revealed in the realm of phenomena. 
d) Nature's laws are discovered by scientific methods 
of observation· and experiment. 
e) It is the realm of what is called matter, but has 
been found to be energy, or force, or activity~ 
It may be noted that no time is lost in limiting nature in 
scope and in getting beyond it~ 
f) This force or activity is most empirically viewed 
as the energizing of a will other than human~ 
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g) Nature elicits mystical satisfactions, but it also 
manifests cruelty and suffering. 
1 h) Nature is in some sense a created order. 
Let us now set about finding out what is not w1 thin 
the realm of nature. 
a) From (a) and (b) above it appears that values and 
obligations are not contained in the realm of 
nature·. 
b) The metaphysical source of sensory experience is 
not itself contained within the realm of nature--
but from this we may not conclude that therefore 
there is a realm of nature separate from its source. 
c) The human experient is only a part of nature 
insofar as part of what he narmally calls 11 h1mselfu 
is part of his experience of space and motion. The 
experient as such does not fall within nature. 
This argues for a uspecial 11 creation of persons·. 
d) The rational Given can be part of nature only 
insofar as it can be discovered in given rational 
patterns of experience. It may be that the source 
of nature is at work applying rational norms to the 
nonrational Given, and that the results of this 
effort are available in our experience as the 
rational laws of nature~ 
e) That which applies to persons: activity, purpose, 
freedom, duration, does not belong in nature. 
Nature, however, may reflect all of these~ 
Such considerations lead to the personalistic conclusion 
that the Nature, the illuminating absent indicated by 
the shining present, is the experience of an ordering, 
creative Mind other than any human m1nd~2 
3~ The Realm of Persons: it has been noted that the 
category of personal identity looms large among categories 
1The material for this outline is to be found in 
Brightman, Person and Reality, p. 247. 
2 ~., pp. 247-248. 
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as the presupposition of all experience; that all other 
categories stem from, or draw more coherent meaning from 
their connection with personal experience; that essences are 
"rarefied abstractions from the concrete process of personal 
experience ;n 1and that Nature takes on meaning when it is 
viewed as a created order--as the energizing of a will other 
than human. The implication is that the realm of persons is 
both fundamental and pervasive. Let us define persona.li ty. 
A personality is a complex but self-identifying, active, 
selective, feeling, sensing, developing experience, 
which remembers its past (in part), plans for its future, 
interacts with its subconscious processes, its bodily 
organism, and its natural and social environment and is 
able to judge and guide itself and its objects by 
rational and ideal standards~2 . 
The whole person is the being which each person con-
ceptualizes as existent on the basis of memories and 
anticipations within shining presents, but which is 
never present in any one shining present.3 
Now, with these definitions, let us attempt a dangerous de-
parture from Brightman's own exposition4and classify person-
ality in some of its relationships~ 
a) Personality and its past and future stand, perhaps, 
in the most intimate relationship of all. This is what is 
meant by th~ whole person. It is obvious, without further 
1~ •• p. 255~ 
2 ~-· p. 268. 
3Ibid. , p. 272·. 
4strictly speaking, such a departure is forced by Dr~ 
Brightman's death before this portion of Person and Reality 
reached final form ·. 
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argument, that the actuality of the person--its shining 
present--is the central point from which the vectors of 
memory and anticipation take their rise. It is not quite so 
obvious that past and future derive in essendi from memory 
and anticipation. It may be that past and future will re-
quire, for their complete relationship to personality, 
further investigation of nature and its source;1yet even so, 
this much must be granted: that, even on the most realistic 
premises available, there is a meaning to my past and my 
future (or its past and its future) which presupposes a 
center of discourse. Even what is given must be ac-
knowledged, and this requires personality~ 
b) Personality and nature (including its bodily organ-
ism) again appear to stand in a dual sat of rala tionships·. 
First, nature is a hypothesis based on the contents of the 
shining present, and, as such presupposes personality". 
Second, it may be that nature can best be accounted for as 
the "experience of an ordering, creative Mind other than any 
human mind. 11 If this hypothesis lends coherence to our ex-
perience, then it is possible that nature is "bracketed at 
both ends 11 by personality·. If matter is best understood as 
energy, and energy as volitional, purposive activity; if 
cause is best interpreted as such; then such a possibility 
would seem to go far toward providing such coherence~ 
laeference hera is to Dr. Brightman's deep approval of 
evolution·. 
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c) Personality and its social environment requires 
justification from a particular aspect of objective refer-
ence. The plain fact is that much of the shining present is 
rendered meaningless unless intercommunication between 
persons is a fact~ 1 But once again, intercommunication be-
tween persons obviously requires persons to communicate~ 
That much of this communication proceeds via the realm of 
nature need not obscure the hypothesis that it is nonethe-
less communication--however inaccurate and mistaken such 
communication may be. Indeed, such a hypothesis, instead of 
arguing against personal intercommunication, may speak well 
of nature as a medium of communication--cosmic or otherwise~ 
d) Personality and rational and ideal standards may 
indicate first, that mind is at work trying to understand 
its experience, and second, that rational purpose is at work 
trying to shape and reshape its experience. It may also 
suggest that Mind and Purpose are the metaphysical sources 
of experience. Yet, before this possibility is more strong-
ly asserted, the realm of values must be mentioned. Before 
turning our attention to this realm, we might paraphrase 
Bradley by suggesting that if it is possible that person-
ality is the key to reality, and if such a hypothesis 
renders experience more coherent than alternative hypotheses, 
1rn this connection, the argument of W. E·. Hocking, 
that social experience is prior to "natural" experience, is 
relevant. See Tfpes of ·Philosophy (3rd rev. ed.; New York: 
Charles Scribners Sons, l959), pp~ 189-190~ 
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then at least it should be given serious consideration. 
4·. The Realm of Values :1 it would be difficult to 
support the contention that persons do not value. That a 
great deal of what they value may be classified as belonging 
to other realms, such as nature or persons, need not cancel 
the fact that the valuing itself, seen as an aspect of the 
shining present, carries with it its own objective reference 
--a claim that suggests a distinct realm~ It is important, 
for Brightman, that one distinction be maintained with con-
siderable clarity, and that is the distinction between 
"nature end values-." It can best be made from the point of 
view of the shining present~ 
"There appears to be no more doubt that we feel values 
than that we perceive sensory patterns;"2with this statement 
both the certainty of value-feelings is established end the 
distinction between values and sensory patterns (nature) is 
effected. 3 Let us now define value-. 
In the most elementary sense, value means whatever is 
actually liked, prized, esteemed, desired, approved, or 
enjoyed by anyone at any time. It is the actual 
1Treatment of this subsection will be somewhat more 
lengthy than that of previous realms. It will stand as a 
foundation to the section on moral philosophy-. 
2 Brightman, Person and Reali t;v;, p·. 287·. 
3The present author sees this as a key point in the 
interpretation of Brightman •s arguments in theory of value·. 
The distinct, but parallel, treatment of value-feelings and 
sensory perceptions will permit analogies between theory of 
value and science, thus strengthening the position of axi-
ology-. 
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experience of enjoying a desired object or activity. 
Hence value is an existing realization of desire.l 
It may be added to this that as valuing is present and ex-
istent within the shining present, and as value is an exist-
ing realization of desire, so also is that which is valued 
conscious experience, whether present or anticipated~ 2 It 
appears that when one speaks of value, one is intimately 
concerned with what is·. "What ought to be, but ian 't, is 
valueless, except as a guidepost."3 A value is the satis-
faction of a want, and a want is a present, sometimes 
burningly present, thing. That it refers beyond itself to 
some object, perhaps not present, only signifies that the 
value-situation is incomplete. For example, to want a 
friend is doubtless to be desirous of what one does not have; 
but to want a friend is to value friendship--a recognition 
of its existence. To value a friend, on the other hand, is 
to have that which one values~ 
The presence of a value-claim forces analysis of its 
claim with reference to other claims or to the general 
context of experience~ It is on this analytic basis that 
the value-claim in question is adjudged true or false, that 
is, compatible or incompatible, superior or subordinate 
(forcing alteration of it or others). It is 1n the light of 
1 Brightman, Person and Reality, p. 283. 
2 See Brightman, Introduction, p. 146. 
3 1J2!9:., p. 151. 
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this analysis that the criterion of value as coherence 
arises·. Here, also, one must judge, on the basis of the 
truth or falsity of the value-claim, whether it "ought to be" 
or ought not to be~ 
The analytic stage of value-judgment, a stage accepted 
by all but the most 11 emot1vistic 11 of positivists, presup-
poses the ability to reflect cognitively about value-claims. 
Thus arises the concept or definition of values, in short, 
ideals. Here some care is needed, lest the cognitive de-
scription of values dissociate itself from the value-feeling. 
Such a dissociation marks the beginning of a "science of 
values" reflecting the cognitive, but not the conative, 
aspects of valuation. The point is that Brightman has been 
careful to show that value begins with a "want." While a 
definition of the want is requisite for any coherent order-
ing of wants, the cognition which orders must be regarded as 
a means only, and not as an end·. It is for this reason that 
ideals must be carefully distinguished from norms. 
A norm is not precisely a step above ideals. Meta-
phorically, a norm is an ideal which is 11 characterized by 
'requiredne as. '" 1 
Those ideals which have roots and fruits in a coherent 
organization and on-going of actual value experience are 
normative ideals, or norms~2 
1Brightman, Person and Reality, p~ 288·. 
2~. 
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Ideals reflect the cognitive aspects of coherence and thus 
lay claim only to "truth-value about values."1 Norms, while 
participating in these cognitive aspects operate on the 
parallel track of value-coherence and thus, instead of lead-
ing to cognitive truth about value-organization, lead 
further to true values or values which ought to be realized·. 
Brightman has neither rejected nor gone beyond reason; he 
has incorporated it into value-theory so that, on the human 
level, science is the coherent composite of what we should 
believe to be true about our sensory experience, and theory 
of value is the coherent composite of what we should believe 
to be true (and thus binding) about our conduct (binding be-
cause it concerns our conduct)~ In this way we may see that 
the very conduct of the scientist, not as a father or alder-
man, but precisely as scientist, is also exposed to value-
norma. 
Yet the nagging question remains, "true for whom?n To 
answer this question, a return must be made to the original 
value experience. The statement, "I want ••• ," is not 
only a value-claim, but is also a statement marking ob-
jective reference·. It is true that the emotion is a private 
want, but it is just as true that any sensory experience is 
equally private. But verification proceeds along the same 
1 This phrase is the present au~hor's attempt to pre-
vent clogging of such statements as 'truth-value," 11 true 
value," and the "value of truth. 11 
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lines in each case, that is, by coherence, and the complex 
of coherence requires definition, comparison, and justifi-
cation--all of which operate in a rational-social milieu~ 
We may suggest, then, that value experience (i) has the same 
objective reference as does sensory experience, (ii) has the 
same "publicity quotient. 11 It may be that the hypothesis 
which earlier suggested that nature can best be explained by 
viewing it as the activity of a Cosmic Person is likewise 
implied here. If truth can be seen as referring to a state 
of affaire obtaining in a real world, then it would seem to 
:f'ollow that truth, as it pertains to values, should also 
refer to a real world. If truth does not refer to such, but 
only to the ordering of the shining present, then the 
shining present itself is given no explanation~ 
With this, we entertain the hypothesis that norms of 
conduct are discovered because the universe is such that 
they are there to be discovered. 
E~ God and Metaphysics. 
A vast portion of the shining present has been shown 
to exhibit objective reference. It would doubtless be 
tempting to suggest, without critical appraisal, that this 
is certainly true also of religious experience. Moreover, 
it is true. The "sense or dependence" described by 
180 
Schleiermacher1seems an irreducible aspect of the religious 
experience. However, a closer scrutiny of this objective 
reference reveals that the God presumed by religion (however 
defined) to be the objective is never himsel f a datum for 
the religious experient. Rather, then, than simply adding 
the weight of religious feeling to the burgeoning hypothesis 
of the Cosmic Experient, ~ ~' it will be wise to ask the 
nature of religious objective reference. The result appears 
to be that while coherence requires that an account be given 
of the religious experience, it is to be included as a part 
of metaphysics. A later section will continue the flight of 
the arrow of intelligibility by returning once again from 
metaphysics to rational theology~ With this, the metaphysi-
cal hypothesis may be stated~ It is to be noted that the 
prime function of the hypothesis is to bring together all 
the categories and all the realms of being into one coherent 
whole·. 
The idea of God, metaphysically speaking, • • • symbol-
izes a unity or harmony between existence and value; co-
herence between the structure and function of things; an 
end for human and for cosmic endeavor, individual and 
social; a synthesis of mechanism end purpose.2 
This is what God is for metaphysics. Let us note that the 
objective reference of the religious experience, upon analy-
sis, should come very close to repeating this statement, 
1 See E. s. Brishtman, The Problem of God (New York: 
Abingdon Press, 1930}, p. 156 •. 
2 Brightman, Person and Reality, p·. 309. 
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regardless of specific doctrines. But the reference forces 
the prime metaphysical question: 11Does God exist? 11 Un-
fortunately, the harmony between existence and value does 
not include an easy answer. 
Brightman's argument 1n favor of the theistic hypothe-
sis appears to have two phases. The first we may call the 
methodological phase, and the second can be called the em-
pirical phase. The methodological argument intends to show 
the metaphysical inadequacy of descriptive method, and to 
establish the metaphysical task as accounting for experience 
rather than simply giving an account of experience. It is 
here that the religious experience makes its most important 
contribution; for religiosity sees data as significant and 
supports the metaphysical attitude of holism in the face of 
the scieDtific tendency toward atomism. Religious experi-
ence cannot establish the existence of God alone, but 
neither can the scientific method of description ignore the 
religious experience. The result is a kind of dialectic 
which, while it does not 1n itself establish the existence 
of God, does show the validity of the metaphysical quest; 
and metaphysics seeks a coherent explanation of experience. 
The empirical argument charges that while there are 
certainly similarities between science and metaphysics, 1the 
greater context of metaphysics forces it to consider as 
1 See ibid., pp. 310-311. 
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evidence elements of experience explicitly excluded from the 
data of science. For example: 
(1) the existence of experients, which is, to say the 
least, not clearly explained by supposing metaphysical 
reality to be ultimately spatiotemporal; (2) the tenden-
cy in nature toward telic processes; (3) the presence of 
values in experience; and, (4) the relations of dis-
values to values.l 
Investigation of the realms of Nature, Persons, and 
Values has suggested that the personalistic hypothesis is 
better able to account for (1), (2), and (3) than non-the-
istic hypotheses. (4) poses a problem for theism. However, 
it should be noted that evil is a problem--speculative as 
well as practical. Theism tackles the problem instead of 
evading it. The solution offered by personalistic theism 
will be presented shortly; for the moment, suffice to say 
that an attempted solution is far better than no attempt at 
all. 
F. Conclusions of Metaphysics. 
The outlines of Dr. Brightman's metaphysical vision 
are before us. In drawing them together let us summarize 
the suggestions offered by investigation of the realms of 
being. 
1. The realm of essences suggested that all essences 
are the experience of some shining present. Those essences 
which cannot be claimed as the private creation of any 
1 ~., p. 316". 
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finite person point to the existence of a Cosmic Person·. 
Hypothesis suggests that he is the source, and we are the 
partakers. 
2. The realm of nature proves unsatisfactory, either 
when interpreted to be ultimately of tne order that it ap-
pears phenomenally, or when assumed as causa sui~ Matter is 
better interpreted as energy, or better, force, or better, 
activity--purposive, rational activity. Nature as a whole 
is far more understandable if viewed as the communication of 
the experience of an ordering, creative Mind other than any 
human mind·. 
3. Personality cannot be explained without miracle as 
having "arrived" accidentally out of the non-personal. 
While persons are not the same as nature, it would appear 
that if Creative Mind is the best explanation for nature, it 
is far and away the best explanation of finite creative 
minds·. 
4. The realm of values can only be explained with 
reference to persons, for only persons value. But it is the 
realm of rational norms of value--of obligations incumbant 
on me as a person--which strongly implies the existence of a 
rational, ordering, creative, but above all, of a valuing 
mind, whose ideals I may understand partially, may fail to 
understand, or may, understanding, refuse to appropriate, 
but which I can never abrogate or turn aside. This is re-
fractoriness at its most stubborn·. 
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The personalistic hypothesis is that God exists·. The 
nature and functions of God will concern us again, follO\'ling 
the section on moral philosophy". 
6. Moral Philosophy". 
A. Introduction. 
The realm of value has indicated the important place 
held by values, ideals, and norms in metaphysics . The realm 
of persons has indicated the importance of volition and 
reason, synthesizing into purposive activity . The basis of 
Dr . Brightman's moral philoso phy has thus been provided·. If 
l'le define morality as behavior which is autonomous and which 
is performed with cognizance of (but not necessarily in ac-
cord with) rational standards of conduct and the imperative 
claim of such standards upon that behavior, we may isolate 
three salient elements of moral philosophy: freedom , reason, 
and obligation. These , together with value and purpose may 
provide keystones for an exposition of Dr . Brightman 's moral 
philosophy". 
No attempt will be made to reproduce Brightman's moral 
philosophy in rigorous isolation either from the last 
section on metaphysics or the next section on philosophy of 
religion and theology". At the same time, it must be re-
garded as alien to Bri ghtman ' s thought (and to the princi-
ples of empiricism) to argue to God through metaphysics and 
then to derive moral philosophy from the God so conceived·. 
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The arrow of intelligibility does not move in so Cartesian 
an arc. As a consequence, the present section should be 
seen as part of a broadly conceived metaphysic rather than 
as either separate from or resultant upon metaphysical con-
clusions.1 
1·. Freedom and purpose : in terms of the above defi-
nition, freedom of choice is the sine qua~ of ethical be-
havior·. From the point of view of experience, this much at 
least appears to be true: that men "make moral choices, re-
gard themselves and others as responsible, recognize dis-
tinctions between better and worse, and, in short, act as if 
they were free~" 2 What metaphysical justification is there 
for such experienced events? 
The major argument against freedom of choice stems 
from the scientific-dogmatic notion of mechanical causation. 
But mechanical causation first, is verifiable only with re-
gard to certain areas of experience and not with regard to 
subjective events3 (except by hypothesis) nor to experience 
as a whole . Further, even in the areas where it is appli-
cable, mechanical causation is unable to account for any 
novelty whatever~ 4 An alternative hypothesis which is able 
1E. s. Brightman, Moral Laws (New York: Abingdon 
Press, 1933), p. 285. 
2 Ibid., p. 78·. 
3Ibid., pp. 278-279·. 
4 1..121£. ' pp. 280-281". 
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to account for subjective experience of freedom, and "ob-
jective" experience of novelty, without departing from the 
scientifically needed concept of causation is worthy of con-
sideration. 
Personalism, in arguing that mechanical causation can 
best be understood metaphysically as dependent upon creative 
purpose, has hypothetically shaped the universe so that in-
stead of the miracle of purposive behavior emerging from 
non-purpose, the much more understandable event of mechani-
cal causation as itself "caused" by purpose is suggested--a 
suggestion which does not limit the scientific requirement 
of a predictable (instead of random) universe, while at the 
same time it permits personality the spontaneous activity 
requisite for freedom~ 
Finally, mechanism, carried to its dogmatic end, pre-
cludes rational thought. For rational thought means that 
11 the individual can impose on himself the ideal of logic -or 
scientific method and hold it through thick and thin. "1 The 
vary argument of the mechanist is rendered meaningless as an 
argument by the position he is trying to maintain~ 
However, the 11 reductionu of mechanical cause to its 
metaphysical root in purpose does not account for specifi-
cally human experiences of both freedom and determination by 
external events. The conflict between persons can account 
1rbid . 282·. _., p  
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for part of my experience of being forced into certain po-
sitions against my will, but it accounts neither for natural 
limitations oppressing me nor for a perverseness seemingly 
centered in my very will by means of which "the evil that I 
would not, that I do~" 
The personalist.ic thesis is that f1ni te personalities 
are created with limited freedom. That they are free is ex-
plained by the "substantive" nature of personality, itself, 
whereby it partakes of the same creative purposiveness 
characteristic of the Cosmic Person. In this sense freedom 
is defended by metaphysics . On the other hand, it is em-
pirically verifiable that much of the meaning of man's 
freedom is contained within the function of selection among 
possibles, rather than creation. Man, in short, stands 1n 
an intimate relationship to nature and to the Given in his 
experience. That same refractoriness which indicated ob-
jective reference, indicates also that man is partially a 
recipient and only partially a free agent~ He selects from 
possibles, each with its necessary set of consequents, and 
sets in motion (for this is wherein his freedom lies) the 
causal processes by means of which the end is to be achieved. 
Man's freedom is his active self~ Might it not be suggested 
that his loss of, or refusal to accept, this freedom means 
loss of self? 
2. Values: enough may have been said already about 
value-experience to indicate its central place in moral 
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philosophy. It may be granted that value experience exists. 
It has already been suggested that value means whatever is 
desired or approved, and that value is an existing reali-
zation of desire. Let us link this experience with purpose 
and with ends. Experienced value "may be called a realized 
ideal; for an ideal is a concept of a plan of action or type 
of experience which, when realized, is satisfactory. ul Thus, 
the practical effort of man is directed toward realization 
of ends or value experiences. It seems safe to guess that 
there is no other direction for the practical effort of man~ 
3. Obligations: "One might enjoy values, as does the 
esthete, without regarding them from a moral standpoint; but 
when one feels obligation, one is distinctly in a moral 
situation, even though the feeling of obligation be unjusti-
fied. Obligation addressee itself more directly to the will 
than does value. 112 It would appear that obligation is a fact 
of experience; whether it appears in all experients, or 
whether it appears similarly in all experiente is not pre-
cisely relevant to the incontrovertable fact that it does 
appear. In defining the experience of obligation, Brightman 
is careful to point out its close relationship with value~ 
Obligation is the unique feeling, not identical either 
with desire or with social prescriptions, .which arises 
when I consider that which I take to be the highest 
1 ~. , p. 63. 
2 ~. , p. 64·. 
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value for me, or, as we ordinarily say, "the best thing 
for me1to do, " and which leads me to say, "I ought to do this." 
It must be noted, however, that while the value-ex-
perience forms the content of the ought-experience, the two 
are not identical·. If they were, then the ought-experience 
would not be unique, but would rather be a form of the value-
experience. The importance of this must be recognized. Tra-
ditionally, idealism has argued that the ought cannot be de-
rived from the is, meaning by this that no hypothetical im-
perative can produce a categorical imperative. But tra-
dition has also defined the is as present value-experience. 
For Brightman, there is a present fact of ought-experience, 
a present fact which nonetheless does not reduce simply to a 
hypothetical imperative·. Now the present ought-experience 
is not itself cognitive in nature--it is an uncritical, 
frequently mistaken, easily influenced, feeling of obli-
gation to choose what I take to be the highest value for me~ 
It is present, and is the present basis of moral behavior, 
but it requires the assistance of reason in order to de-
termine what is really the highest value for me. 2 
4. Rational values: Brightman defines an ideal as a 
definition of a value, or as a concept of a value. This, in 
itself, does not mean that all ideals are rational, for 
1 ~., p. 65. 
2~·., P• 113~ 
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while a concept is a "thought-event," it is entirely possi-
ble to hold conflicting or inconsistent concepts at the same 
time. A rational value, thus, might be defined as a value, 
the conceptualization of which is not inconsistent with 
other concepts~ It is the nature of uncritical valuing to 
desire irrespective of conflicts; similarly, if we look to 
the motive-force of desire, it is the nature of the uncriti-
cal will to attempt the impossible--to will both A and not-A, 
if it values both~ It is the task of reason to conceptual-
ize desires and the consequences of their realization in 
order to check and regulate the will--in short, 1n order to 
make effective willing possible at all~ Since willing that 
opposites should be the case is a practical (if not pre-
cisely logical) denial of willing, it appears possible to 
formulate a law such that, if one is to will, he ought to 
will logically, that is, he ought to seek rational values~ 
This is Brightman's Logical Law.1 With this, the cognitive 
function of reason in the moral enterprise is made clear. 
Warning should be given, however, that consistent ideals are 
not !!.Q. ipso norms or true ideals·. They will become norms 
only when the widest possible context of consistency is con-
sidered, namely, the universe·. 
B. The Moral Laws. 
With brief exposition of the functions of value, 
1
see ibid., p. 98. 
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obligation, and reason in morality the way is prepared for 
treatment of the moral laws. The Logical Law has already 
been mentioned. In order the better to follow Dr. 
Brightman's own system, let us consider the logical law as 
(1). 
2. The Law of Autonomy : "Self-imposed ideals are im-
1 perative . tt Bluntly stated, this law appears to be a tau-
tology, for "self-imposed" implies an imperative. However, 
experience gives ample evidence that we frequently choose 1n 
accordance, not with our own ideals, rationally conceived, 
but with ideals imposed on us from without, or with ideals 
chosen impulsively. Either is a rejection of rationality 
and thus of morality. 
More deeply, however, the Law of Autonomy implies not 
only rationality, but responsibility". "Look what you made 
me do!" is a typical statement of evasion of responsibility~ 
The responsible individual is willing to stand up and accept 
himself as the author of his deeds. He, and not another 
person or thing, will answer for his behavior. These two 
aspects of the Law of Autonomy exemplify the teamwork of 
reason and will in framing and carrying out any moral 
program. They also serve to distinguish clearly between 
1 Ibid., p. 106~ 
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morality as seen truly and morality as seen conventionally. 1 
3. The Axiological Law: consistency and strength, 
however, prove insufficient, for the coherence and harmony 
of the values chosen are needed as the teleological guide to 
the formal principles of morality~ The proof of the Axio-
logical Law is that the choice of incompatible values in-
volves contradictory choices and thus violates the Logical 
Law. Further, selection of one involves the rejection of the 
other, thus violating the Law of Autonomy. 
Broadly speaking, this law requires the moral indi-
vidual to so frame his life-pattern that he does not cancel 
or exclude some of his values by others·. Put somewhat apho-
ristically it means to will consistently ••• coherent 
values. 
4. The Law of Consequences: events cause other 
events; all events have consequences. This chain of conse-
quences stretches, perhaps to infinity, lending, if nothing 
else, an aura of seriousness to any course of action chosen~ 
The question implicitly raised by the Law of Consequences is: 
"How great is my responsibility, in choosing to act in a 
certain manner, for choosing also the consequences of that 
act?u I am not required to value the consequences, but, to 
some extent, at least, I am required to approve, or at least 
1There is no reason to assume that the law of autonomy 
is evaded if the moral principles of another person, or of 
God are freely appropriated·. 
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accept them. Plainly speaking, the Law of Consequences re-
quires me both to consider foreseeable consequences and to 
sharpen my foresight constantly in order to see farther and 
farther. The moral individual, hence, cannot be guided by 
good intentions alone. The teleologist insists that to will 
an act must also mean to will foreseeable consequences. Not 
to do so is to violate the Law of Autonomy". 1 
5. The Law of the Best Possible: the practical 
application of the Axiological Law will inevitable lead to 
difficult choices. The Law of the Best Possible means per-
haps two things: "Choose always the best system of values 
and not an inferior system, but choose also within the 
limits of possibility." 2 
The concept of a "best possible" derives its meaning 
from the fact that we find some ends to be better than 
others. We usually prefer health to illness, harmony 
to discordant noise, kindness to unkindness. Yet each 
of these preferences is set in relation to our whole 
system of preferences, so that, on account of our judgment in the light of that whole, we sometimes prefer 
illness to health, if the illness is a necessary result 
of doing a duty or achievin~ an end which we value more 
than life. The ideal of a best possible" is the 
outcome of a series of such experiences--moral experi-
ments in the laboratory of living--seen as a connected 
1Acceptance of this law need not imply that intentions 
are unimportant while consequences are all-important. It 
appears to be Dr. Brightman's intention to synthesize this 
utilitarian position with more formalistic positions into a 
teleological system where the person is both the agent and 
the end. 
2This statement is not intended to conflict with the 
ideal of perfection, but only to suggest that too high an 
ideal often is an excuse for not attempting to realize any-
thing at all. 
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whole, organized and criticized.1 
The Law of the Best Possible contains one particularly 
important application. Since it counsels a harmony of 
concrete events it provides balance between, say, the Logi-
cal Law and the Law of Consequences as each might be applied 
to the problem of telling a lie or saving a life. The La,., 
of the Best Possible forces us to "confront the whole range 
of moral obligation112and neither confine ourselves to the 
consistency of one law (telling the truth) nor consider only 
consequences without reference to laws. 
6. The Law of Specification: 11 To disregard the Law 
of Specification in service to the Law of the Best Possible 
is voluntarily to leave a concrete problem unsolved. 113 This 
law does not mean that when one is in Rome he should do as 
Romans do, but it does mean that special problems and tasks 
require special aptitudes and skills, and that prolonged 
fixation on the Law of the Beet Possible without regard for 
getting the present job done can frequently mean a violation 
of precisely the Law of the Best Possible. Experience is 
concrete, time is both inexorable and irreversible, and 
consequences follow from failure to act or inept action as 
irrevocably as from precise and capable action. The Law of 
1 Brightman, Moral Laws, p. 159. 
2 ~·· p. 168. 
3~., p. 173. 
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Specification can thus mean that one is permitted no holi-
days from the moral enterprise~ The person who is vaguely 
"good" but good to no one and good for nothing is really "no 
good." Thus intertwine the pragmatic and social principles 
in the Law of Specification·. 
7~ The Law of the Most Inclusive End: "All persons 
ought to choose a coherent life in which the widest possible 
range of value is realized~" 1 Brightman intends this law to 
be a synthesis of the pluralism of the Law of Specification 
and the monism of the Axiological Law. In effect, this law 
states that it is possible to choose a life which is co-
herent with a narrow range of specific situations and values 
and that it is better to select from among the possibilities 
a life which shall be coherent, at the widest range. In 
short, it is the maxim pertaining to the richest possible 
coherent life. Thus there is assimilated into the moral 
task an "element of individual imagination and aesthetic 
creation,"2an element, as it were, of adventure, which 
points dimly to the personalistic laws, but does not yet 
contain them, suggesting that the moral laws are moving 
toward the concept of a coherent life which is valuable in 
itself·. 
Not to act in accordance with the Law of the Most 
1 ~., p. 183. 
2 ll2!.,g. ' p. 184. 
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Inclusive End is voluntarily to limit possibilities for 
growth and value realization, to prefer a thinly coherent 
life to a richly coherent one. Yet the Law does insist on 
coherence. Because it does, it finds a synthesis between 
two extreme positions, called by Brightman the positions of 
"either/or and both-and~ 111 While granting that there are 
moral distinctions and that it is unwise to be willing to 
taste every drink once, it holds that life is a complex af-
fair and that no man is able either to select with assurance 
or lead a life of such simplicity or purity that he constant-
ly wills one thing only". The truly civilized life is the 
life lived according to the Law of the Most Inclusive End~ 2 
9. 3 The Law of Individualism: we enter, now, the 
"Personalistic Laws." 
The Formal Laws dealt solely with the will as a sub-jective fact. The Axiological Laws dealt with the 
values which the will ought to choose. The Personal-
istic Laws are more comprahensiv~; they deal with the 
personality as a concrete whole~4 
1Ibsen's characters, Brand and Peer Gynt, in those re-
spective plays, are vivid portrayals of either/or and both-
and. The Law of the Most Inclusive End attempts a synthesis. 
This dissertation will attempt the same on somewhat differ-
ent grounds in the final chapter~ 
2Brightman, Moral Laws, p~ 190~ 
3The eighth law: The Law of Ideal Control, has been 
deleted out of deference to a note, presumably written by Dr. 
Brightman, at the end of one library copy of Moral Laws. 
Further thought apparently had convinced him that this law 
was sufficiently contained in other laws~ 
4Brightman, Moral Laws, p. 204. 
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"The Law of Individualism, for instance, deals with a 
person's obligation to himself as a total personality;"1for 
it is the individual person who is the moral unit. Without 
the moral unit, and attention paid to its development, there 
can be no morality. This is the partial truth of ethical 
egoism. uThe moral individual is one who grasps his complex 
experience as a whole and guides it toward the best of which 
it is capable. 112 Rejection of this law, either on practical 
grounds of a desire for irresponsibility (a quaint but all-
too-prevalent form of "naturalism"), or on the theoretical 
ground that the universal is superior to the individual, is 
at the same time a rejection of autonomous personality, and 
hence, morality, itself~ 
However, there are limits on individualism. Most 
acutely, external circumstances may interfere to force a 
moral decision which is detrimental to the individual--as 
when a sacrifice must be made. The Law of Altruism effects 
such a balance; however, there would appear to be little 
question that the ability to sacrifice one's own continuing 
development wisely for others is the mark of a deeply moral 
individual and deeply individual moral person~ 
10. The Law of Altruism: this law simply recognizes 
the universal applicability of the Law of Individualism, 
1~. 
2~., p. 207. 
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that each person ought to respect all other persons as ends 
in themselves, and the hint of the Law of the Most Inclusive 
End, that a rich, coherent personality is itself a value, 
and draws the social and individual conclusion that cooper-
ation and shared values are only possible under such circum-
stances. It rests on the knowledge that, while the indi-
vidual is the moral unit, the acts of the individual are 
public. Perhaps we could suggest that, by means of this law 
and the Law of Individualism, morality is seen to be "self-
centered" and self-motivated, but directed outward into a 
social and natural context. It is interesting to note that 
three normally oppOsed theories here receive their proper 
synthesis: that Individualism implies Universalism, that 
Universalism implies Altruism, and that Altruism implies 
both Universalism and Individualism~ The reason for the Law 
of Altruism is that each individual (universally) is an end 
in himself·. If he is not--if he is an end for himself, but 
only a means (a thing) for me, then there is no such aggre-
gate as society, no possibility of love and cooperation, but 
only the shadow of these in mutual use and abuse of each 
other. The facade may be the same, as when animals exhibit 
gregariousness--but only to keep themselves warm. It is 
quite true that a community lives by means of interchange of 
goods and services--by mutual use of each other--but the Law 
of Altruism does not deny that this is so, or that it is 
good. It only denies that this is an adequate basis for 
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social life. 
11. The Law of the Ideal of Personality': this is the 
climax of the System of Moral Laws. "All persons ought to 
judge and guide all of their acts by their ideal conception 
(in harmony with the other Laws) of what the whole person-
ality ought to become both individually and socially~"1 
It would appear that this law is both needlessly 
narrow and impossibly self-centered. Quite the contrary, 
however. It does recognize that the moral agent is, and 
must be, a person, and that the ultimate end of all moral 
activity is persons. But it goes beyond this somewhat banal 
admission to recognize the dynamic dialectic between the 
growing self as both agent and goal of moral action and the 
necessary relationship which obtains between this self and 
other selves. Let us suggest that, for Brightman, while 
the moral self is an end in itself, it is also a means to 
the growth of other selves; and that while other selves are 
means to the moral growth of the self, they are also ends in 
themselves. Without both poles of this dialectic (each of 
which is recognized by egoism and altruism separately), 
there is neither moral progress nor reason for there to be 
any. 
The Ideal of Personality poses its own need for expla-
nation. If personality is an end in itself, then it would 
1 lJ219:• , P• 242. 
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appear that the present, empirical personality is what 
should be the object of attention. However, there is an 
ambiguity in the word, "end," which should be clarified. 
For a person is not only an end in himself, but the very 
self which he is is a seeker after ends. That is to say 
that the self is a purposing, striving event, and to take 
cognizance of the person as an end in himself requires us 
also to consider that toward which it is striving. Thus, 
it is not precisely the self "as is" which is the end 
(although it would be difficult to ignore the present self 
in any moral system), nor is it even the self as it would 
prefer to be which is the end--as seems to be the case in 
Perry's system--but rather it is the self as it ought to 
prefer itself to be which becomes the true end of moral 
action~ Actual selves must be considered, and actual 
preferences must also be considered, but proper preferences, 
the rational ideal (of the most coherent personality) is the 
goal of morality~ 
c·. Conclusion: The Republic of Values·. 
In this subsection, the concern is with only two other 
kinds of values than moral (character) values: aesthetic 
values and religious values. We shall attempt to set forth 
Dr. Brightman's position with respect to the relationship 
between moral values and each of these. By character values 
is meant those values which pertain to the development of 
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personality, and, with personality, the ability to realize 
and enjoy increasing coherence and ever greater dimensions 
and variety of all values. In short, character values per-
tain to goodness, and goodness is the final aim of all of 
the Moral Laws·. 
It would appear that much of our problem is already 
solved. Such might fairly be the case if it were not for 
two intermittant but ever-threatening claims to the contrary. 
It may generally be recognized that all values interpene-
1 trate, and, even if they did not, that all values are such 
only for persons--persons with lower or higher levels of 
character; but still the two claims persist: first, that 
aesthetic values are either independent of moral values (art 
for the sake of art) or are superior to moral values; second, 
that moral values draw whatever mandate they have for con-
trol of our behavior from a source higher than morality, it-
self, and that religious values are the true means of ap-
proach to this source. In short, this second proposition 
states that morality derives from religion. It is plainly 
stated by Augustine when he asserts that "the virtues of the 
pagans are but splendid vices." 2 
1. Esthetic Values and Moral Autonomy: let us set 
aside the possibility that coherence and hannony in art and 
1 See Brightman, Introduction, pp. 149-150. 
2Augustine, The City of God, trans. John Healey 
(London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1947), Vol. II, p. 265~ 
202 
morality may be the same coherence at bottom (or top), and 
let us concentrate on the conflicts between art and morality, 
as when a person forsakes morality in favor of the aesthetic 
attitude and the "arty" life, or when a beautiful work of 
art has morally degrading effects on a community. A series 
of points may help·. 
a) Didactic art is very seldom great art. There seems 
to be the possibility that each is autonomous. 
b) Yet, each complements the other. Them~ with no 
possibility of realizing aesthetic values is an incomplete 
man. This is also true, but to a far greater degree, of the 
man who lacks moral values. 
c) Yet each is autonomous. For the rules which make a 
thing good and the rules which make a thing beautiful are 
distinct. The very precincts of the beautiful differ from 
those of the good~ 
The painting is separated from surrounding space by a 
frame, the stage by footlights and semi-darkness, ~ ••. 
In contrast with the aesthetic, moral experience is 
always organically related to all that is going on in 
the relevant environment.l 
In the event of any conflict it must be borne in mind 
that there is to be no moral judgment passed on aesthetic 
values, nor aesthetic judgment passed on moral values~ 
d) Yet the two do effect each other. 
1Brightman, Moral Laws, p. 260. 
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Both exist in the same mind, both deal with the same 
world, both stir the deepest emotions, and both are 
social phenomena.l 
e) And since this is the case, since it is true that 
however separated the picture may be by its frame or by its 
laws of beauty, it still is in the parlor, stirring the 
emotions of my daughter, whatever autonomy it has in the 
esthetic realm, it has invaded the world of the practical, 
and must be judged as good or bad by moral laws. 2 The con-
clusion is not that art is inferior to morality, but that 
when a work of art, or an artistic temperament, becomes part 
of the world of morality, then it must be judged by those 
3 st.andards. 
2·. Religion and moral values: the question here is 
whether morality is autonomous or whether "law implies a 
lawgiver." For his present purpose, Brightman defines re-
ligion as "co-operation between man and his God, expressed 
both in worship and in the conduct of lire·. 114 11 In the con-
duct of life" serves notice that the issue is squarely 
joined, with the question at once emerging, "what is God's 
1Ibid. 
2But it is not to be judged beautiful or ugly by moral 
laws·. 
3rt is possible, however, that a moral judgment may be 
passed to this effect: "The painting is beautiful enough 
that it must remain even though there are some morally dele-
terious effects~ 11 But this, too, is a moral judgment--a judgment on the importance of Esthetic values in life~ 
4Brightman, Moral Laws, p. 264. 
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relationship to the Moral Laws?" "Are Moral Laws autonomous 
or theonomous?" 
a) Moral law is more fundamental than religion in at 
least one sense. We have some notion of goodness, and re-
ligion is based on the assumption that God is good. Unless 
we had some notion, first, of what goodness is, we could not 
have predicated it of God·. Further, our knowledge of 
goodness stems largely from moral conduct·. 
b) The great religious figures have had a history of 
challenging the existing religious practices in the name of 
morality. 
c) Yet it is also true that religion has had a pro-
found effect on morality, so much so that the collapse of 
religion is often accompanied by a similar collapse of 
morality. 
d) The solution may well be a synthesis of the two ap-
parent contradictions immediately above. The clue to the 
synthesis is that both morality and religion are predicated 
on hypotheses about what is most real·. 
e) Both also grow out of life and human experience. 
But it is here, as it was with aesthetic values, that mo-
rality most clearly expresses its autonomy. 
As far as the moral life itself is concerned, autonomy 
is the last word. The moral laws are valid because they 
are a reasoned account of the nature and implications of 
moral experience, not because they are commanded by an 
eternal lawgiver or communicated on a Mount Sinai. Moral 
law is autonomous and independent of religion and of the 
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existence of God so far as the obligatory nature of its 
principles is concerned.l 
From this it would seem that the problem is resolved 
in favor of the thesis rather than any synthesis. This is 
not the whole story, however; and yet, while we are here, it 
would seem to be appropriate to be reminded that, since so 
much evil, blasphemy, and neurosis has been blessed by the 
name of religion, there may well be a needed corrective pro-
vided to the religious experience as such (apart from moral 
pronouncements in the name of religion) by recognizing the 
autonomy of the moral laws and their sovereignty over the 
realm of the practical. 
However, we have granted that in some sense moral phi-
losophy is part of metaphysics. In that it is, it is 
founded on, and contributes to, metaphysical concepts of the 
nature of reality. And it is the hypothesis of personalism 
that the focus of reality is the creative thought and person-
ality of God. In this respect, God is the source of the 
Moral Laws, and, since God is the object of religious experi-
ence, it appears to follow that autonomy depends on theonomy, 
or, the moral law depends on God~ . 
It seems obvious that we are embroiled once again in a 
false paradox grounded in the attempt to pit ratio essendi 
against ratio cognoscend1~ If it is true that God is the 
giver of the Moral Law, it is even more true (more certain) 
1 IE!£., pp. 268-269~ 
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that our God- hypothesis was reached by the guide of the 
Moral Laws (as part of metaphysics) ·. The autonomy of mathe-
matics is just as :pure and tru.e (and unquestionable) "\vhen it 
is used as data for metaphysics as when it is kept in iso-
lation·. So it is with morality". 
The main question, however, has not yet been raised·. 
In what 'l,·vay is God to be considered as the source of the 
Moral Laws? Is it his arbitrary will which decrees that 
this shall be right end that shall be wrong? Or is such 
arbitrariness impossible for God? This question requires us 
to leave the section on moral philosophy and enter that of 
philosophical theology. 
T. Philosophical Theology. 
A. Introduction and Explanation·. 
The term normally used to describe \'lhat \'le are about 
to do is "natural theology." It is distinct from "revealed 
theology" in that it attempts to move inductively from ex-
perience to hypotheses about the nature of God, rather than 
deductively from knowledge tha t is either revealed or is 
assumed as !!: priori·. Yet na tural theology hardly seems fit 
to describe the system of Dr. Brightman. In the first place , 
most of the induction has already been presented as meta-
physics ; in the second pl ace nature is seen as important, 
but subordinate to persons , values, and reason. The al-
ternative term, philosophy of religion, is deemed inexact 
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because our concentration is to be on the hypothetical de-
scription of God, in short, on theology~ 
B. God as a Metaphysical Hypothesis. 
The material presented so far would seem to justify 
the following tentative conclusions regarding the nature of 
God. 
1. God exists: by this is not meant simply that the 
God-concept reached by the personalistic system would nulli-
fy the whole system if it were not true. At this advanced 
stage, such an assertion would be superfluous. What is 
meant here is that God, if he exists, exists within the 
categories of all possible being or not at all. God is a 
concrete, living reality". 
a) God endures~ It has been suggested earlier that 
anything that is either endures or not; if it does not en-
dure, then it cannot be said to be anything at all, and if 
it does endure, then it is "timeful." However, this perhaps 
can be granted of all finite beings; can it be predicated 
also of that which is the source of all things? The 
question to which we address ourselves, then, is whether 
God, as the source of all things that exist, is "within" 
time or whether he is the nontemporal source of time, but 
himself is not bound by this category. 
The hypothesis of God is based on evidence from ex-
perience, itself entirely temporal in nature. It would be 
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strange, indeed, if the evidence by means of which we are 
able to draw a coherent conclusion should point to a God--
but a God which has as his nature characteristics utterly 
unlike those of the evidence~ 
Further, close scrutiny will show that the hypothesis 
that God is the creator of temporality, but is himself be-
yond time, implies that time is ultimately unreal. For, if 
God is beyond time, then all which is to become actual in 
the future is already actual for God. Time, on this hy-
pothesis, does not become the "real" creation of a being be-
yond time, but becomes instead a disease of finitude. The 
alternatives, consequently, become temporalism or absolutism. 
The resolution of the problem of temporalism versus 
absolutism rests on the ability of each hypothesis to solve 
its own internal difficulties and to present a more coherent 
account of experience than the other. Because of this, it 
is necessary to proceed with the characteristics of God, only 
keeping in mind that the salient problem, henceforth in this 
section will be the problem of absolutism. 
b) God is the source of and principle behind change 
and identity. At this point, it would appear that absolut-
ism is the only answer, for it would seem that that which 
stands as the governing principle of change and identity 
must itself be the most stable and unchangeable of all 
things. Yet, as with time, it is precisely here that abso-
lutism reveals its weakness while claiming its strength. In 
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the effort to lock securely together change and the perma-
nent ground of change, absolutism finds itself with no real 
time to change in, no future for growth, no room for possi-
bility'. The dilemma facing absolutism is that in order to 
defend its position, it must deny the very facts of experi-
ence which prompted the quest in the first place. This is 
done in service of identity. 
Yet temporalism is able to provide a workable hypothe-
sis of identity without denying change. 
The creative purpose of God is the controlling force 
in the entire process, the source of its meaningful 
novelties, the principle of its movement. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
We may define the eternal as what is true at all times. 
As regards purpose, the eternal is what is purposed at 
all times. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • It is a meaningful extension of experience to conceive 
a purpose that unfailingly directs the universe at all 
times; to think of the eternal as utterly timeless in 
all respects and as wholly other than temporal process 
• • • is useless for the understanding of religious or 
any other experience. All our conceptions, including 
that of the eternal, derive their meaning from their 
reference to purpose.l 
Thus, it would appear that meaning can be extracted 
from the concept of eternity far better if it is seen as a 
function of time, rather than ~ versa. With this concept, 
of the eternal as the omni-temporal, God may be conceptual-
ized as neither "too small nor too large." 2 
1Brightman, Philosophy of Religion, pp. 384-386". 
2
see Brightman, Problem of God, chaps. III, 11 The 
Expansion of God," and IV "The Contraction of God." 
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2. God is a valuer, the source of values, and the 
conserver of values. The definition of value as "whatever 
is liked, prized, esteemed, desired, approved, or enjoyed by 
1 
anyone at any time," indicates the close relationship be-
tween value and purpose. Thus, if God is conceived of as 
the existent, timeful, creative purpose, it seems meaningful 
also to conceive of him as a valuer, meaningless not to con-
ceive him as such. Further, the analytic stage of value-
judgment in human experience suggests that the application 
of cognition to values results in ideals. It would appear 
that there is no good reason not to project the hypothesis 
that the God that values and the God that is the principle 
of change and identity in the world are the same God--a God 
who creates and conserves in terms of his own ideals, and 
thus may be conceived of as the efficient principle of the 
value-norms discovered in the experience of man, as well as 
of the telic traces discovered, but not originated, by man 
in nature. 
3. God exists as personality: by this is meant that 
2 the requirements of personality are met by God. It may be 
true that his relation to nature is different from ours, 
that the personality of God is infinitely richer, deeper, 
and more continuous than ours, but these things may be true 
1see above, pp. 177-178. 
2
see b 174 a ove, p. • 
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without forcing the fundamental difference in kind between 
God and man required by absolutism. In one respect, how-
ever, it must be conceded that the God of absolutism is also 
the God of theism, namely, in that while we are not the 
ground of our own being, God is the grotmd of both his own 
being and ours. In this sense, at least, God's personality 
is "other" than ours. Yet even here it may be noted that 
such a God-concept is the result of an hypothesis based on 
an examination of experience. It is the refractoriness of 
our Given, taken in conjunction with its content (rational 
and nonrational), which prompts the theistic hypothesis. 
c. The Structure of God's Personality~ 
The structure of God's personality is not different 
from that of our own. We move, at this point, from hypothe-
ses about the nature of God as we are directly affected by 
him to a hypothesis about the nature of God 11 in itself." 
With this move, it would appear that we are on extremely 
insecure ground. However, the case may not be quite this 
bad, for coherence attempts to give an account of our ex-
perience, and the nature of God, even "in itself" will be an 
hypothesis calculated to render aspects of our experience 
not yet covered understandable. Specifically, we seek a 
theory which will justify the rationalistic aspects of Dr~ 
Brightman's methodology, and which will give a meaningful 
account of evil. We may begin with an assertion that argues 
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against both absolutism and "deistic supernaturalism·. 11 
If God be a person, it is self-evident that his ex-
perience is incomparably vaster than man's. It is 
certain (sic) that he has powers unknown to man, and 
goodness utterly transcending man's. It is highly 
probable that he has indefinitely many types of experi-
ence unknown to us, which are barely hinted at by such 
facts as the ultraviolet and infrared rays, invisible to 
man. But it is one thing to say that personality which 
is in part known includes kinds of experience of which 
we do not yet know; and it is quite another thing to say 
that there is an entity of some sort which is lacking in 
all consciousness and experience and rational personal 
identity, and yet is higher than personality.! 
1. God is active will. Enough has been said about 
indications of purposive activity in the world to justify 
the hypothesis that if there is any God, that God is at work 
bringing his will to bear on reality and existence. The 
point, however, is not that God is active will; it is that 
the method of empirical coherence, which constructed the hy-
pothesis in the first place, is not likely to turn against 
itself and find that will completely inscrutable. Evidence 
pointing to the will of God is before us, in ourselves and 
in nature, and if we are not able to make any hypotheses 
whatever about the directions in which the will of God aims 
by an appraisal of ourselves and of nature, then either em-
piricism is an improper method, or God is playing a ghastly 
trick on mankind. Since neither of these can be assumed out 
of hand any more than their opposite, and since the evidence 
means that their opposite is not assumed out of hand, it 
1Brightman, Philosophy of Religion, p. 237. 
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seems safe to present as a strong hypothesis that the will 
of God is not different in kind from the best will of man. 
In short, the will of God is directed toward the production 
of ever-greater and higher values-- values which are men and 
the best that men can value~ 
2. God thinks and acts in accordance with rational 
norms : it will be remembered that the human mind found it-
self able to understand its experiences with some success 
because its experience was in part rational . If the hypothe-
sis that God is the source of the Given elements of our ex-
perience is sound, it seems plausable to conclude that, 
insofar as experience is rational, it is the product of a 
rational creative mind. Unless this is the case, reason, 
itself must be found to be irrational. And further, since 
there can be only one type of rationality {for if there were 
more than one rational system, contradiction, and hence, ir-
rationality would be the result), the argument that man can 
best lmow God through reason and can best know and do God 1 s 
will through rational action seems a strong one . 11My ways 
are not your ways and my thoughts are not your thoughts" can 
be profoundly true without concluding that therefore the ways 
of God and man are mutually exclusive . 
Yet the problem is only halfway met as yet . The re-
lationship between the will of God and the rational norms of 
thought and behavior that constitute the mind of God re-
quires exploration. Man cannot change the laws of reason, 
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but he can refuse to comply with them. Is it possible that 
God can do the same? More perplexing still, might it not be 
possible that the source of all things might be able to 
change the very laws of reason in service of his will? The 
first question asks whether or not God can act incoherently, 
and thus, evilly. The second question asks which is superi-
or, God's will or God's reason . Both questions lead in the 
direction of the problem of evil. Let us deal with the 
second question first . 
Brightman answers the second question with a stout 
negative. 11Neither absolutist nor finitist supposes that 
the laws of reason were created by an arbitrary fiat of 
will; reason is an eternal and uncreated attribute of God, 
not dependent on his will-. 111 11 To assert that divine activity 
created reason would be to assert that the activity was in-
trinsically irrational and that reason needed to be created; 
on the contrary, reason must be coeternal with the will of 
God·. "2 
The first question may profitably ignore the implied 
problem of whether God's will is good or not . Religious 
faith is that it is. The philosophical question does not 
entertain the possibility that diabolism, rather than theism , 
is the proper God-concept. But it does ask whether God 
1 Illi·· p. 303. 
2 Brightman, Person end Reali tx, p. 338-. 
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chooses to act in accordance with rational norms (in ac-
cordance with his concepts of what is good) or whether such 
a choice is precluded by the very structure of God's cre-
ative mind. And with this phrasing of the problem, it be-
comes apparent that the answer to it, too, is given above~ 
For if reason is an eternal uncreated attribute of God, then 
God's ability to choose to act rationally must admit the 
formal possibility, at least , of his choosing to act other-
wise- -a possibility which would mean that an eternal attri-
bute of God (his mind) was, as it were, separate from 
another eternal attribute of God (his will) . But since 
God 1 s will is unfailingly good, and since "good" means "in 
accordance with rationality," the unflagging loyalty of God 
to the rational norms that constitute his mind permits no 
alternative possibility~ Human faith is in God's ever-
lasting goodness, but once this is assumed, there appears to 
be no possibility of God's choosing another path to the good 
than that of reason. Thus we may conclude, with some as-
surance, that the steadfastness of God's pursuit of the good 
provides us, also, with our surest guide to God and the good. 
"Not by divesting ourselves of reason and the highest human 
values do we find God, but by rigorous loyalty to them."1 
The hypothetical dilemma of a possible choice between God 
and the good is thus precluded, both at the cosmic level and 
1Brightman, Philosophy of Religion, p. 257". 
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the human level~ 
D. God and the Problem of Evil~ 
1. The possibility, posed by Perry, of the abrogation 
of the laws of morality by God, is seen to be a meaningless 
supposition. With this, the question asked at the end of 
the last section: "In what way is God to be considered as 
the source o-r the moral law?" is given an implicit answer. 
God is to be seen as the personification, rather than the 
founder, of the moral law~ The relation is one of logical 
antecedence and consequence, rather than causal efficacy; 
because God is, the moral law is, and because God is ef-
ficient cause of the world, the moral law is binding in that 
world. 
2. However, there is evil and irrationality in the 
world as well as good. With this we enter what is doubtless 
the best-known portion of Brightman's systematic thought. 
Human experience was found, on analysis, to contain the 
factor called by Brightman the "nonrational Given. 11 If God 
is a person, it would be analogically appropriate if the 
same factor were found in the personality of God. Unfortu-
nately, the analogue is imperfect, since it was the very re-
fractory nature of the Given which referred us beyond the 
shining present of our experience to an illuminating absent 
as its metaphysical source. This source was found to be 
God~ It would be a surprising play of mirrors if the same 
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situation were to be found applicable to God~ 
However, while the analogue is imperfect, with regard 
to objective reference beyond God, the nonrational Given (re-
fractoriness and all) provides a hitherto unexplored portion 
of the shining present of God. In our experience we may 
have important evidence for theistic finitism. Our ex-
perience of activity would be evidence for the cosmic 
will of God, our experience of 11 fonn 11 would be evidence 
for hie uncreated eternal reason, ~ ~ experience Qf 
brute fact would be evidence for his uncreated non-
rationar-content . r- --- --- ---
3. The theological problem of evil poses the trilemma 
of the goodness and the power of God and .the presence of 
evil in the world. The goodness of God seems unquestionable 
--although our understanding of the nature of that goodness 
may well be questioned·. Thus, either God is unable to pre-
vent evil, or there is no evil~ In A Philosophy of Religion 
Brightman takes pains to dissect generic evil and provide 
2 accounts for some types . It is certain that some of what we 
call evil is accounted for by our finite perspective; it is 
also quite probable that some genuine evil is the responsi-
bility of man alone~ 3 In these, Brightman is simply granting 
the wisdom of traditional thought on the problem of evil~ 
It is surd evil, "purposeless waste and ::f'utility, 114 
1 Brightman, Person and Reality, p. 338. I talics mine~ 
2 See Brightman, Philosophy of Religion, chap. VIII. 
3see ~·, p·. 303·. 
4 Ibid., P• 317. 
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which cries out for an explanation that does not, at the 
same time, attempt to "explain away" what must, in all 
honesty, be regarded as real . 
The hypothesis that God is finite brushes aside ••• 
cobwebs, and shows that the whole difficulty arises 
from supposing that, if there is a God, he must be om-
nipotent and infinite in all respects • • •• If we sup-
pose God to be finite, but his will for good infinite, 
we have a reasonable explanation of the place of surd 
evils in the scheme of things.l 
The difficulty at this point is in avoiding a dualism be-
tween surd evil and the infinitely good will of God. Some 
residual dualism may be unavoidable--unless good and evil 
are to become identical after all . Yet, if the nonrational 
given is understood as content of God's shining present, but 
content with which he strives, then, while good and evil are 
separate, neither is separated from God. Thus, while we 
need not argue that the nonrational given, as a whole, is 
evil--but rather that it is brute fact--it is the bruteness 
of the brute fact, its uncreatedness as well as its re-
sistance to form, which constitutes the meaninglessness, and 
hence, the evil, of evil . With this, we must be content; 
the method of metaphysical (teleological) explanation need 
not ask "why?" the structure of God's personality is what it 
is . With this the religious consciousness, the philosophi-
cal consciousness, and the moral consciousness, each seeking 
something different in the problem of evil, may be satisfied. 
1 Ibid., pp. 318-319. 
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E. God and Immortality. 
1. The question of immortality as such must be es-
chewed here. Let it suffice to say that while sensational-
istic empiricism may amass evidence against personal immor-
tality, the personalistic radical empiricism, and the ideal-
istic hypothesis founded upon it, while it must take all 
evidence into consideration, does not regard the evident de-
terioration of the physical body as conclusive. On the 
contrary, if the personalistic hypothesis of God is a more 
coherent account of our experience than are contending hy-
pothesis, then it may be that the nature of God provides as 
strong an argument in favor of immortality~ 
2. Dr. Brightman's hypothesis of the nature of immor-
tality, however, must be understood as integral with the 
nature of God, and with the nature of human morality, and 
not as the traditional ufish fry" of the blessed. To regard 
it as the latter is, as Kant understood clearly, 1to pass be-
yond morality and thereby to render the moral enterprise, 
i teelf, suspect·. 
The law of spiritual continuity points rather toward 
the future life as continuous with this life, preserving 
memories of it, devoted to its ideal values, yet solving 
the problems of existence on ever higher and more cre-
ative levels. If the Given is always in the universe, 
creative development may enable the spirit to mold its 
clay (as we may call it figuratively) into lovlier forme. 
We may suppose that many problems of the Given may be 
1Th1s is not to imply, however, that Brightman's God 
is even similar to the coneummatum bonum of the Critique of 
Practical Reason. 
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permanently solved, as many diseases in this world have 
been almost banished by the advances of science. Yet 
there will always be more to do·. The immortal universe 
of persons is not striving toward a completed state of 
finished perfection. Its perfection is rather its 
eternal perfectibility.! 
One might suggest that Perry 'a "Hope for Immortality'' as 
t•more of the same, 112is not essentially different from the 
hypothesis of Dr. Brightman. Unfortunately, Perry's hope 
has no ground whatever in his system~ 
3. Yet the moral enterprise is in jeopardy after all, 
if this is the sum of Dr. Brightman 1 s hypothesis of immor-
tality. Either the law of spiritual continuity must be 
amended to provide a hell for the morally perverse, or the 
significance of the moral struggle is lost in the knowledge 
that, if there is any immortality at all, it is granted to 
all human beings, regardless of worth or potential worth~ 
Brightman's answer to this is the theory of conditional 
immortality. It should be noted, however, that the theory 
of conditional immortality is not intended as a substitute 
for hell--the contrivance of those who believe in a "cruel, 
vengeful, and unrelenting God. 113 One does not lose immor-
tality for being bad--as an eternal punishment for folly 
committed in the relative infancy of our life-spans·. On the 
contrary, conditional immortality is mora the mark of God's 
1Brightman, Philosophy of Religion, p. 405. 
2Perry, Hope for Immortality, p~ 24. 
3Br1ghtman, Philosophy of Religion, p. 407. 
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mercy than of his stern justice. 
It may be that some conscious beings born of human 
parents [the intrusion of the nonrational Given?] --some 
imbeciles, for example--may be hopelessly unable to ap-
preciate ideal values. It would be more just to let 
them enjoy what they can while they live, and then to 
let them die when their time comes, rather than to pre-
serve them as aimless immortals •••• Again, it is con-
ceivable that some human individuals, once responsive to 
the divine impulse, may become so vicious that even God 
may despair of arousing them to any higher aspirations~l 
Thus, the criterion for immortality is potentiality for 
spiritual developnent. While tmmortality thus conceived 
does not, on the surface, contribute to the solution of the 
problem of evil as it might, for example, for Calvin, it 
does permit the exclusion from existence of those who commit 
themselves to the production of evil, in whatever stage of 
their career--mortal or immortal--provided that it is suf-
ficiently vicious to causa God to despair. Human judgment 
of the nature or degree of evil required for this despair can 
only be a guess, and a dangerous one at that. 
8. Conclusion. 
What is man's predicament? The system under obser-
vation would seem to suggest that man finds himself to be a 
dynamic creature in an ongoing and outgoing relationship 
i'lith a world that is often brutal, but sometimes friendly to 
his values and ideals. It is a world that he must take as 
he finds it (as data) and then may try to understand and 
1 Ibid., p. 408. 
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perhaps change. In the :finding, understanding, and changing, 
he finds also hie own self, understands, insofar as he can, 
his self, and develops his sel:fhood. His equipnent for this 
project consists in a natural self with its natural graces 
and limitations, a mind, and a moral \'lill . His hope is the 
ultimate realities are such that his mind and his moral will 
are a real reflection of what is, and what may continue to 
develop as, the very processes of reality, itself--a process 
to which he may dedicate himself with some theoretical as-
surance that it is not an empty vision. The philosophy of 
Dr. Brightman seems to indicate grounds for such assurance~ 
Let us continue this investigation by a brief appraisal 
of this philosophy . 
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CHAPTER IV 
APPRAISAL OF THE THOUGHT OF 
EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN 
1. Introduction. 
It would appear to be beyond doubt that Dr. Brightman's 
systematic thought has produced a strong case for the person 
as the key to reality. The analysis of experience has re-
vealed the person as its meaning, its unity, and its center; 
the epistemic situation indicates the person as the recipi-
ent and interpreter of signals not originated by him, but 
which he is able (in part) to understand and act upon with 
significant success. The hypothesis thus engendered of an 
illuminating absent appears to receive its most coherent 
characterization when the absent is seen to be ultimately 
grounded in personality, whether first-personal (my past), 
social (the acts of other persons), or cosmic (the overarch-
1ng ground of these two as well as the source of "nature" 
and ideals). If experience is to be explained at all, and 
not merely described, then it would indeed appear that 
personality is "too good" an explanation "not to be true."1 
The present author gives general concurrence to the 
abstract of conclusions presented above, and, because of 
1Brightman, Person and Reality, p. 360. 
this, claims at least a modicum of 11 internali ty" for the 
criticism that follows. On the other hand, it is sometimes 
the case, even in philosophical discussion, that disa-
greement is on a point so fundamental as to render the dis-
tinction between 11 internal 11 and "external11 criticism 
meaningless. This will happen, and, when it does, it is at 
this point that criticism may take on the aspect of recon-
struction. 
Because of the aforementioned "general concurrence," 
this chapter will not offer an exhaustive critical account 
of Dr. Brightman's thought. Instead, it will confine it-
self to three areas: 
A. Empiricism and the datum self·. 
B. The autonomy of the moral consciousness~ 
c. The cosmic person·. 
Of these, the first and last should be considered as most 
germane to the total purpose of this dissertation; the 
second area is included because, while this dissertation is 
a preface, it is a preface to moral philosophy~ 
The general theme of criticism revolves about Dr. 
Brightman's empiricism. Recognition is given to the role of 
empiricism in protecting philosophy from substantialism in 
its psychology and from its macroscopic counterpart, abso-
lutism. However, it is felt that Dr. Brightman's empiricism 
sometimes discovers too little and sometimes discovers too 
much. More constructively, it is felt that the limitations 
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of empiricism may not indicate, necessarily, the dread coils 
of substantialism--but for this we must first examine axis-
tentialism. 
2. Critical Comments. 
A. Empiricism and the Datum Self. 
1. The method of radical empiricism: its relation to 
activity. Let us begin by permitting Dr. Brightman to re-
peat a distinction he makes in his analysis of the shining 
present. 
To summarize, then, every shining present is a whole of 
experience which may be described as a control of the 
Given. The control is some form of experienced activity, 
initiative, or purpose; the Given is rational and non-
rational. This analysis, while essentially empirical, 
is set forth as a generic postulate applying to all 
human experience at all times.l 
In an attempt to make the problem clear, a statement 
by Professor Bertocci may be added. "Knowing is a dynamic 
process which activates the person. Each person is a unitas 
multiplex of sensing, remembering, reasoning, feeling, will-
n2 ing, oughting, and evaluating, • • • 
Now, to return to Dr. Brightman: 
Every experient acts. There is no experience entirely 
devoid of activity; the Given is either accepted or ig-
nored, interpreted or swallowed whole, modified or 
1 Ibid., p. 56. 
2These are the opening lines of a paper entitled "The 
Nature of Cognition: Minimum requirements for a Personal-
istic Epistemology" by Peter A. Bertocci, read to the Ameri-
can Metaphysical Society on March 19, 1954. 
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repeated. It is always "controlled" to soma extant • 
• • • All experience includes soma sort of activity, 1n 
addition to Givan factors which are mora or lass amena-
ble to activity, yet are not produced by the activity of 
the axpariant and cannot be destroyed by activity.l 
Finally, in a footnote to this text: 
Such terms as "axpariant," "self," "parson," and the 
like • • • designata, primarily, the shining present as 
a diversified unity of consciousness, as a constant of 
every shining presant.2 
Let us make clear what is not the point at issue. 
First, it is granted that Brightman's initial analysis of 
experience into what appears as activity or control and what 
appears as the Given is an analysis that does justice to ex-
perienced facts. Second, it may well be that knowing is a 
dynamic process which activates the person. This essentially 
pragmatic contribution to personalism may indeed stand as an 
important bastion against realistic claims for the priority 
of cognition over conation--an important plank in the 
platform of the descriptive method. Third, it is granted 
that this attempt to guarantee the dynamics of knowing 
against an obsolete faculty psychology is both admirable and 
justified. What, than, is the point at issue? It is: "Can 
Brightman's empiricism, simply by stating that it has dona 
so, escape the burden imposed upon it by the eighteenth 
century--that passivity is characteristic of some phase of 
the knowing process when it is the knower, itself, which is 
1Brightman, Person and Reality, p. 60. 
2 
.!ill•, p. 59 n. 
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the object of knowledge?" Let us pursue this problem. 
If it were not the knower, itself, which is the point 
at issue, counter-criticism could reply that the insistence 
that a thing must first be before it can be known is nothing 
but a realistic alternative to empiricism. Yet, when the 
object of knowledge is the reflexive activity (including the 
activity of knowing) of the knmver, itself, it would appear 
that criticism may be more of an internal sort. Thus, if 
knowing is a dynamic process, and if all experience includes 
some sort of activity, then it would also appear that one 
has the duty of examining whatever it may be in (or sublimi-
nal to--or even outside of) personality that initiates this 
dynamic process. However, it would also appear that this is 
an impossible task, since investigation cannot begin until 
knowing begins, and knowing has as its precondition the dy-
nam.ic which makes knowing possible·. 
If this criticism has any force, then a dilemma is 
proposed: if personality (viewed by means of an essentially 
empirical analysis) is rooted in conscious experience, then 
it seems likely that "activity" will reduce to something 
like "felt activity" or "experience of activity,"1which is 
1The reader is invited to share the supposition that 
Brightman has drawn heavily from James at this point. How-
ever, it should be pointed out that James, himself, seems 
averse to raising this particular epistemological issue. 
When the problem of knowledge is raised, James is already 
secure, within experience, in the relationship between the 
biological organism and its environment. It is unlikely 
that Brightman would care to follow him that far. His 
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not, epistemologically, identical with activity; if, on the 
other hand, activity is set forth as a generic postulate ap-
plying to all human experience at all times, then such a 
postulate is not simply a generalization of experience, but 
is, instead, a postulation of a state of affairs beyond the 
reach of empiricism and thus requiring some sort of real-
istic premise. In either case it would appear that empiri-
cism is limited in that it is unable to provide its own 
starting-point without at the same time admitting to its 
passivity. 
Perhaps the point is labored. Knowing is doubtless a 
dynamic process, and, seen from the standpoint of growth, 
the person is the unitas multiplex thus activated. The only 
point that has been added to personalism thus far is the 
notification that radical empiricism1may have to begin, so 
to speak, already one rung up the ladder. It is true that, 
if this criticism has any strength, a certain concession may 
security, on the other hand, appears to lie in his meta-
physics, where personality is rooted in God, its special 
creator. It is doubtless clear, however, that if Brightman 
were to attempt to account for the activity of the self by 
invoking the creative fiat of God, such an accounting would 
be either beyond the reach of empiricism or (if viewed 
through the perspective of his total system) begging the 
question. Relevant material on James may be found in his 
Pluralistic Universe (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 
1909), pp. 380, 376-377, "The Experience of Activity." 
1 The present writer is aware that this is not what is 
meant by Brightman when he makes use of the term, "radical 
empiricism," at least not wholly. It may still be granted 
that empiricism is radical in including data from all 
sources--not solely that from the senses. 
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have to be made to realism--that in the knower, at least, 
some sort of being precedes knowing. The effect may appear 
disastrous to an age gripped by the respectability of em-
piricism; but beyond this, it is difficult to sea how the 
person has been invalidated as the key to reality. 
2. The Givan: its relation to substantialism~ With 
the distinction made above, it becomes possible to analyze 
the term, 11 self-experience," into two components. Logical 
priority belongs to the active factor, "self-experiencing." 
Consequent upon this is "self-experience." Separated from 
each other they are philosophical abstractions, the first 
active, but unknowable, the second knowable, but passive. 
It would appear, then, that Brightman is correct in recog-
nizing their inseparability; incorrect in assuming their 
identity. It is the incorrectness which, paradoxically, is 
given the Hurculean task of replacing substantialism. For 
it is their identification which makes possible the datum 
self as the beginning-point of Brightman's thought structure. 
Dr. Brightman's assertion that "the self is conscious 
experience seems to be intended to convey the two notions 
that: a) there are no "floating adjectives," no experience 
without a self, b) there is no self without experience. 
"Wherever there is awareness or feeling of any kind, there 
is a shining present."1 This combination, where "I am it and 
1 Brightman, Person and Reality, p. 46. 
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it is I, 11 would appear to accomplish, at a single stroke, a 
double amputation. First, 11 experience11 is relieved, for the 
moment, of the task of justifying its presence by an appeal 
to an extra-experiential source. By the time the question 
recurs, there will be a self of sufficient stature to in-
terpret signs, signals, and messages, and thus to support 
the epistemic situation~ With this, the problem of probing 
for a substance underlying experience is averted. Second, 
selfhood is equally relieved of the task of locating its 
substantial support, since its center is as the unity of ex-
perience. Thus, ~ est percipi and ~ ~ percipere 
find their support in each other and need not seek it 
elsewhere. With the self thus spontaneously generated it 
then can take note of objective reference and its meaning·. 
At this point a difficulty seems to arise. With sub-
stantialism so rigorously avoided in the early description 
of the shining present, all that is found to comprise the 
datum self--sensing, remembering, reasoning, feeling, 
willing, oughting, and evaluating--is found as data. Even 
the unity of experience is a discovered unity, with the re-
sult that the self, that very self which was so laboriously 
saved from all substantial support, is found to be given. 
This criticism may possibly be charged with a complete 
misunderstanding of Dr. Brightman's epistemology. However, 
it is not precisely a criticism of his epistemology at all; 
it is readily granted that, once the self is derived from 
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experience, it experiences itself as in responsive inter-
action with its environment (whatever ''environment 11 may be). 
The criticism is of his psychology of the experient, and 
simply argues that what is found empirically must be given·. 
And, if the finder finds himself--then he, too, is given. 
However, if one does wish to translate this problem into 
epistemology, then the assertion simply means that objective 
reference, as data of experience , points beyond the immedi-
acy of the shining present, not only backward into my past, 
not only outward into the realms of nature and other persons, 
but also 11 inward11 to another illuminating absent--my deepest 
selr. 1 
3. Let us conclude this section by recalling aspects 
of Dr . Brightman's treatment of the shining present that re-
main, unaffected by the critical passages above. 
a) The self is (whatever else it may also be) a unity-
experience . 
b) There is no selfhood without consciousness, and no 
consciousness without selfhood. 
c) The 11 dualism within experience" of facts of 
1It may be urged that the present writer is locating a 
multiplicity of 11 givens 11 at a bewildering variety of levels . 
It seems to be equally true, however, that givens appear 
only as the limiting concept of each direction probed by em-
~iricism . This is the case, for example, with the above 
deepest self. 11 In lieu of further exposition of the nature 
and definition of this self at this time, the writer asks 
forebearance until the concept can be worked out gradually . 
He promises some degree of satisfaction in the final chapter. 
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experience and propositions concerning them remains as the 
valid foundation of a criterion of truth, as well as giving 
indication of a mind at "~:IOrk trying (with partial success) 
to understand its experience. 
d) All experience is data for philosophy . 
e) There is immediate experience of duration. 
f) There is no good reason to assume that experience 
is not essentially "honest." 
g) The growth of the self coincides with its success 
in understanding and coping with experience--greater co-
herence in understanding means a more coherent self·. 
h) Objective reference is a fact; ac counting for ex-
perience, its patterns, structures, and content, is a valid 
philosophical endeavor~ 
With this we may pass to the next section. 
B. The Autonomy of the Moral Consciousness. 
1. Gene rally speaking, it is difficult to find much 
to criticize in Dr. Brightman's development of moral phi-
losophy. Naturalism would doubtless find its analysis of 
obligation to bear different fruit; but once the experience 
of obligation is granted as different in kind from the value 
experience and irreducible to it, ethics has emerged from 
psychology , and the way is open for Dr. Brightman's admira-
ble synthesis of duty and value, reason and feeling , deon-
tology and teleology, and egoism, altruism , and universalism. 
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The moral laws give toughness, resilience, richness, and 
direction to human life. Metaphysical and moral arguments 
aside , it would appear that the presence or absence of a God 
\vould make as little difference in the propriety of the laws 
as it would in the validity of the laws of mathematics . 
This, it is conceived, is what is meant by autonomy. 
2. Yet there is another autonomy which must be pro-
tected with some care. The autonomy of the moral laws--
their validity in the face of theism or non-theism--makes it 
all the more important to maintain a careful distinction be-
t,.,reen values and obligations. For values appear to be part 
of man's natural equipment; his wishes, wants, or desires 
seem as much a part of his Given as does his physical body, 
and perhaps under his control no more than his physique--
perhaps even less, since he can do much to develop or de-
stroy his body by means of his wishes or desires, while his 
desires, themselves, appear to move, grow, change, or di-
minish according to rules of their own, not his. It is en-
couraging to note that for Brightman obligation addresses 
itself more to the will than to the emotions, since this 
does imply some measure of control over the emotional life. 
This is why it is of considerable importance that obligation 
be analyzed without regard to values·. 
With this in mind, let us appraise the quotation from 
the last chapter, which states that 
obligation is the unique feeling, not identical either 
234 
with desire or with social prescriptions, which arises 
when I consider that which I take to be the highest 
value for me, or, as we ordinarily say, 11 the best thing 
for me to do," and which leads me to say, 11 I ought to do 
this."l 
It may be noted, in this quotation, that obligation arises 
when I consider that which I take to be the highest value 
for me; it leads me to say, 11 I ought to do this. 11 Taken 
thus bluntly, it would appear that obligation performs the 
same office as prudence, since it makes obligatory that 
which is my highest value, or, my greatest desire. Yet, 
since this would relegate obligation to merely supernumerary 
status--lending the stamp of authority to whatever I con-
ceive as my highest value--it cannot be the meaning of obli-
gation. For while the all-too-frequently experienced fact 
that obligation sometimes works against desire may be ex-
plained by pointing to the also frequent disjunction between 
desires of the moment and my highest desire, it may also be 
that there is a discrepancy between what my highest desire 
is and what my highest desire ought to be. A further diffi-
culty is encountered along this line of reasoning when it is 
recalled that the feeling of obligation is noncognitive in 
nature, and therefore, while obviously it cannot make dis-
tinctions without the aid of reason, it equally obviously 
cannot be reason. 
The upshot, so far, is that if care is not taken to 
1 See above, chap. III, pp. 189-190. 
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keep obligation "pure 11 and distinct from both desire and 
reason, it tends to merge with either of these--to melt into 
them with no residue . On the other hand, it is possible 
that the very attempt to keep the feeling of obligation free 
of such a merger leaves it virtually vacant of meaning . Let 
us illustrate this~ 
A re-examination of the quotation under discussion 
suggests tha t there may very likely be a difference in mean-
ing between "highest value for me" and "the best thing for 
me to do . " Brightman appears to grant this when he asserts 
t hat the difference is precisely that made by the feeling of 
obligation. If we were to translate these two phrases into 
two with approximately the same meaning but with the 
somewhat confusing terms "value" and "best" removed, the 
difference might be more apparent. For, "highest value for 
me 11 let us substitute 11 that which I prize most highly," and 
for "the best thing for me to do" let us try "that which I 
ought to do." Now it seems easier, perhaps, to see that 
there is really no connection between the two statements·. 
The first is a value-statement, and the second is an obli-
gation-statement. Now, while it may be evident to common 
sense that moral philosophy deals with my greatest good, it 
is by no means as evident that it is my duty (the best thing 
for me to do) to seek my greatest good. The point is that 
if there is obligation to seek the greatest good, it is (re-
dundantly) because there is a moral imperative to seek the 
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greatest good, not because the greatest good is good. 
Thus, it appears to be a poss~bility that not only are 
the value-experience and the ought-experience distinct in 
natura (which Brightman argues also), but also that their 
intersection is not a foregone conclusion. Ambiguity in the 
terms "greatest good" and "best thing for me to do 11 may have 
caused the confusion. If this is true, it may be that doubt 
is cast on the validity of the empirical derivation of the 
ought; with this, the suggestion may be made that there may 
be a surreptitious intuitionism hidden within that empirical 
derivation. Let us carry this question through one more 
implication~ 
The statement of the Law of Autonomy is that "self-im-
posed ideals are imperative~ 11 First, it is proposed that we 
set aside what seems to be a tautology, since "self-imposed" 
may very well mean 11 impera ti ve." Aside from this, however, 
if an ideal is a definition of a value, and if values, them-
selves, are not qualified by any imperativeness, it is diffi-
cult to see how imperativeness creeps into an ideal·. On the 
other hand, the description of a norm is that it differs 
from an ideal by the addition of "requiredness." Now a norm 
is also described as a "true ideal." If a norm is a true 
ideal that is qualified by imperativeness (and is therefore 
binding), it would appear to be true because it mirrors a 
characteristic of the universe; but it is binding, not be-
cause it is true, but because it makes an appeal to the sense 
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of obligation. 1 Because of this, it might be said that there 
is a parallel between norms and ideals, so that an ideal is 
a definition of a value while a norm is a definition of an 
obligation, but we cannot say that there is an obligation to 
seek values--not without reversing the dependency-relation-
ship between the Logical Laws and the Axiological Laws·. 
3. Yet, whatever the status of obligation, it remains 
true tha t the feeling of obligation is (for most people at 
least some of the time) a present datum of experience which 
must be allowed its voice·. Admittedly, the "voice" with 
which it speaks is often very still and small indeed--a 
voice which, as Butler writes , speaks with authority, but 
with no power·. It is true, and important, that reason is 
requisite in order that the voice may be able not only to 
tell us that we are obligated, but also to what and to what 
action. But, even more important, the voice of obligation 
must address itself to the will, in order that a source of 
power may be tapped that can give consent to the "I ought" 
and reply, "I will." Is it possible that these are two 
steps, rather than one? 
It seems apparent that the moral endeavor of any indi-
vidual begins at the intersection of these two voices--
1To be perfectly blunt about it, the charge against Dr. 
Brightman is that he has not successfully escaped John 
Stuart Mill's notorious dilemma. Once again, this need not 
reflect on the philosophy of self-perfectionism, but only on 
its empirical method. 
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conscience saying, 11 I ought, 11 and volition saying, 11 I will·. 11 
Further, it would appear that these two voices are not 
identical, and that, of the two, the voice of volition, 
while it is cast here as giving a 11 reply, 11 is probably the 
more basic to human endeavor of the two. It is more basic 
because, while obligation can have no meaning without the 
condition of volition (Brightman and Kant are in agreement 
here), human will can, and frequently does, act in the 
absence of, or even against, obligation. 
Much the same position is accorded to reason as is 
taken by obligation. Reason is impotent to stir activity, 
while human will can act (albeit erratically) in the absence 
of or against reason. Now let us move, after what is per-
haps an obscure introduction, to the point. 
It is possible that freedom attaches to the will in 
spite of modern philosophical attempts to treat this ap-
proach as archaic, and it is also possible, if will is re-
garded as basic to human endeavor, that there is a twofold 
application of freedom both to reason and obligation·. For 
example, with regard to obligation, there may be the freedom 
to consent to or to reject the specific statements of the 
voice of obligation and, more deeply, there may be freedom 
to accept or reject the presence of obligation at all. 
Similarly, with regard to reason, there may be freedom to 
will according to this reason or that, and there may be 
freedom to accept or reject the fact of reasoning as such~ 
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This may appear to be nonsensical in the extreme; for, it 
may be argued, a will which does not will ends (because it 
cannot see ends to will) and which is thus completely undi-
rected, cannot will at all·. Doubtless this is true. How-
ever (and this must be considered to be important), to will 
to accept reason as a guide is to will an end, but, since 
reason is what is willed, it cannot properly be called a 
reasoned will. The case is similar with obligation; it is 
only when one chooses to accept the generic ought that one 
chooses at the same time to become bound by obligation at 
all·. Only then may specific obligations be considered. 
If this analysis has meaning, there is a possibility 
that freedom reaches deeper into the self than purpose. For 
Dr. Brightman, the main argument in favor of freedom (aside 
from its appearance as a fact of experience) is that purpose 
provides a more coherent explanation of our experience than 
does mechanical causation, and that an act done purposively 
is free, while an "act" done mechanically is not free. This 
is doubtless true as far as it goes . Brightman then pro-
poses, as a major point in his argument, the objection that 
"w1 thout freedom we are not even free to think, to say 
nothing of making other moral choices. "1 Now, if one is 
"free to think," it would appear that the beginning-point of 
freedom is back beyond the point where willing can be called 
1Brightman, Moral Laws, p. 282. 
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purposive, since "free to think" has meaning only if one is 
also free not to think. 
It may well be that freedom is only expressed con-
structively by rational, purposive will, and this, quite 
possibly, is what Dr. Brightman intends. It is significant, 
however, tha t he has given explicit support to the notion of 
Hans Driesch, that "free will is the act of saying 'yes' or 
'no 1 to a given content. 111 Although it may be that this act 
of appropriation or rejection raises some question about the 
given-ness of the content, it does appear that the sug-
gestion can be made--more as clarification of Dr. Brightman's 
thought than as reconstruction--that human (and perhaps 
cosmic) personality is purposive because it is free, not 
free because it is purposive. If final causation is too 
strongly urged as the counter-thesis to mechanism, it is 
2 possible, as Bergson argues in Creative Evolution, that the 
concept of freedom could be destroyed thereby as effectively 
as it is in mechanical causation. 
By this it is meant that mankind should perhaps be 
considered as free to choose its purposes, as well as free 
to choose in service of those purposes. It may even be 
possible that the first type of freedom ha s an aspect of 
absoluteness about it, albeit it may be devoid of creativity, 
1 Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
2 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur 
Mitchell (New York: Random House, Inc., 1944), pp. 45-50. 
241 
and that the second type, while limited to selection among 
possibilities within its experience, contains the germ of 
creativity. Possibly, to move but one step further, the 
fact that these two are not precisely a single act for us, 
possibly this marks the difference between finite and infi-
nite personality. With this we may leave this point tempo-
rarily. 
4. Two elements of Dr. Brightman's moral philosophy 
have been selected for inspection: obligation and freedom. 
Both of these elements are almost certainly found within the 
shining present of any normal person. Empirically, one may 
take these facts of experience and develop their impli-
cations for human behavior. Dr. Brightman has done this, 
has done it well, and in so doing has found that both reason 
and valuation must make their contribution if the moral 
enterprise is to be made meaningful. There is nothing wrong 
with this, so long as reason and valuation do not usurp the 
position of freedom and obligation·. It is this usurpation 
that needs to be guarded against, and it is for this reason 
that the foregoing analysis has been made. In a sense it 
does not seem implausible to suggest that a sense of obli-
gation and freedom are the form of morality, while reason 
and value are its content. Let us take one last glance at 
the form, to see whether or not it provides the minimal re-
quirements for morality. 
Both freedom and obligation are facts of experience. 
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Further, in the absence of either there would seem to be no 
possibility of moral consciousness. However, the presence 
of both might be seen, even in the absence of valuation and 
reason, as sufficient to define a moral situation (although 
no moral situation, even though recognizable, would be 
deemed complete without reason and valuation). Now, there 
appears to be a certain polarity to freedom and obligation, 
so that, while autonomy is not violated, the validation of 
obligation \vould seem to require a state of affairs obtain-
ing in the universe at large, while the validation of 
freedom requires a state of affairs within the personality 
as distinct from the rest of the universe, but able to act 
on it~ Thus, while each is required in the individual in 
order to make morality possible, each is connected "at the 
other end 11 to opposi tea which likewise make the moral situ-
ation possible, namely, a universe which requires something 
of the individual, and an individual in some sense not a 
part of that universe, but capable of choosing to become a 
part. It is this choice which makes morality, not only 
possible, but also--and now we return for the content--a 
developing task. Thus, morality may be seen as capable of 
both growth and culm.ination at the same time; for while it 
is true that one swallow does not make a summer, it is also 
true (if the metaphor can stand the strain) that even a 
single swallow is a 11 stmJmer-event, 11 or else we are likely to 
have no summer at all, no matter how many swallows there are 
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with us. It is the individual, choosing to be moral, who 
grows in moral capability; it is this choice that the 
present writer is concerned about, while it is the growth 
that concerns Dr. Brightman and, quite plainly, Aristotle·. 
But both would seem to be necessary. 
c. The Cosmic Person·. 
1. The exposition of the "realms of being 11 showed 
this to be the point in Dr. Brightman's metaphysics at which 
the hypothesis of God begins to receive explicit form. 
Essences are real, but only as belonging to a unity of 
consciousness; Nature is beet explained as the energizing of 
a Cosmic will as it grapples with brute content in the pro-
duction of form and values; the realm of persons points 
first to the reality of persons, second to their activity , 
third to their interactivity, and fourth to the limitations 
imposed upon them by nature. While none of these makes, in 
so many words , the hypothesis of the Cosmic Person, charac-
teristics of personality as such do strongly suggest that 
such an hypothesis is more coherent than other alternatives. 
Finally, the realm of values, with its own objective refer-
ence, points to norms of value that are objective to finite 
persons, but which receive their best explanation as ration-
al imperatives whose "home is wherever reason dwells. 111 Each 
of the realms is derived ratio cognoscendi from experience; 
1 Brightman, Person and Reality, p. 294. 
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each receives as its explanation ratio essendi, God. Thus 
we arrive at the departure-point of a new problem. 
2. The hypothesis of God: an explanation of experi -
ence . It may be true that there are truths implicit even in 
conflicting methodologies. Let us recall, for a moment, the 
method of description as it stands in opposition to the 
method of "teleological explanation." Description, it will 
be remembered, attempts to give an account of experience, 
while teleological explanation attempts to account for ex-
perience . . Both the yonng Theatetus and the aged Socrates 
sitting on his prison cot attest to this distinction. Now, 
while it need not be forecast in the criterion of empirical 
coherence, it does appear to be the case that the creative 
purpose of the Cosmic Person stands, in Brightman's person-
alism, as the principle of explanation of experience, itself. 
This, so far as the present writer is concerned, is a 
perfectly respectable application of the method--the hy-
pothesis which a philosopher may be permitted, as long as it 
"makes sense. 11 There seems to be no compelling philosophi-
cal reason why thing s should not be viewed as species of 
thought, mechanical causes as species of purposes, if this 
is the best explanation; nor seems there to be any reason 
why the generic thoughts and purposes should not be con-
ceived as a unity of consciousness. This is the method of 
teleological explanation at work~ 
However, there does appear to be a point at which 
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explanation must give way to description or else be caught 
up in a kind of indefinite regression of principles of 
explanation, each explaining the one in front, but each 
standing in need of explanation, itself. Perhaps because it 
wishes to eschew this regress, thought rests content when it 
has found a principle of explanation which can be de-
scriptively understood as purposive volition. It is true 
that thought may still seek reasons, even after it has found 
the root of an event to be in a purposive volition, but when 
it seeks such reasons, it seeks them as intrinsic to the 
will, rather than as outside of and underlying it--as a de-
tective, resting content in the fact that he has found the 
criminal he has sought, may wonder (even idly) "why he did 
it." 
Dr. Brightman offers God as the principle of expla-
nation of experience. This would appear to be the end for 
speculation unless God functions somewhat as does Plato's 
demiurge. Ratio cognoscendi, experience is such that it 
points to God as its source. This leads to the metaphysical 
hypothesis that God, ratio essendi, is the kind of being who 
produced a universe of this type; and this, as has been 
mentioned, appears to be about as far as explanation can go. 
It may not be as far as thought can go, but when thought 
moves beyond this point, it either declares that God is not 
the ultimate principle, or it moves by virtue of something 
that would have to be called "descriptive speculation." Any 
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ultimate principle of explanation must itself defy expla-
nation, or give up the claim to ultimacy~ 
The meaning of this lengthy introduction to our 
problem is that when a philosopher entertains notions about 
the psychology of God's personality, he is quite entitled to 
do so in the interest of finding what, in this personality, 
accounts for certain areas of experience. He may, for ex-
ample, suggest that, because God has a rational mind, ration-
ality in our experience receives an explanation. But, when 
the philosopher then turns to a speculative probe of the 
rational mind of God--as to how it is or must be rational--
his investigation now proceeds under different banners than 
did the accounting for experience. \f.hile keeping in mind 
that we are moving toward the charge that Dr. Brightman is a 
rationalist first and a theist only second, let us attempt 
an illustration in another area~ 
Dr. Brightman claims, by no means improperly, that 
since empirical coherence arrives at the God-hypothesis from 
data and their meaning drawn from experience, it would be 
ridiculous to then posit the kind of God which would render 
experience, itself, contradictory, meaningless, or illusory. 
This is the trap in which absolutists such as Bradley find 
themselves embedded. 1 However, just because the God-
1one finds it strange that Bradley, while apparently 
loyal to Hegel, should return to the concept of an Absolute 
so strikingly similar to the Schellingian "night in which 
all cows are black. 11 
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hypothesis must explain that which it explains, we are not 
given a warrant to include God's nature in itself as de-
termined by those very principles of which it purports to be 
the ground. We are permitted to say, hypothetically, that 
God must be such as is capable of producing a universe such 
as this one is ; and this is the basis for entering into a 
descriptive enquiry into the nature of such a personality~ 
But what God is need not be identical with what he does . It 
is doubtless true that because God is what he is, tempo-
rality is a category of all possible being . But this 
neither states that God is 11 subordinaten to the category of 
time nor that God is 11 beyond 11 time·. 1 To argue the first is 
to suggest that God is explained by the very experience 
which the God-hypothesis was invoked to explain; to argue 
the latter is to suggest that either God is completely un-
knowable--the burial-point of philosophy, or that the abode 
of God is reality while the abode of man, and hence, phi-
losophy, is phenomenon only . 
It is by no means certain that Dr. Brightman would 
even take issue with what has been said thus far . He is 
quite willing to grant that God ' s experience 11 is incomparably 
1 The present writer takes responsibility for the 
counter- argument here, but would take this opportunity to 
acknowledge debts both to Bowne and Knudson at this point·. 
Because of this it is good to be reminded of the various 
posi tiona on this topic within Personalism·. 
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vaster than man's, "1and that "it is certain that he has 
powers unknown to man. "2 He suggests that one of the sig.!. 
nificant differences between God and man is that God is 
genuinely creative, while man's creativity consists 1n se-
lection from among possibles and manipulation of what is 
given to him. He allows that, while God is not "all that 
there is, "3he stands in a far different relation to nature 
than we do. More significantly yet, the very notion that 
time is a durational quality of God may well mean almost ex-
actly what has been suggested above--that "because God is 
what he is, there is time." 
Since Brightman has granted so much in God that is 
different from what is 1n man, it is curious that he would 
make so much a point of the finitude of God. The suggestion 
can be made at this point that at least three good reasons 
are present for insisting on the finitude of God--reasons 
which may loom large enough to overpower the methodological 
criticisms of the last few pages. Let us list these reasons 
and then use them as subheadings for the remainder of this 
chapter: 
3. The recapture of rationalism from absolutism. 
4. The problem of evil. 
1 See above, chap. III, p. 213~ 
2Ibid. 
3Brightman, Philosophy of Religion, p. 218. See also 
p. 219. 
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5·. The vision of a moral-valuational universe·. 
Each of these, in a slightly different, but by no means un-
related, way requires a finite God·. Let us appraise them. 
3. The recapture of rationalism from absolutism: 
"Wherever reason dwells," there may well dwell the source of 
thought, of creative valuation, and of directional activity". 
There, also, one is likely to discover an absolute--and 
absolutes are brooding, voracious, suffocating, unbending 
things·. The Absolute sits, beyond time, beyond experience, 
beyond the reach of philosophy·. There is little here for 
thought, or morality, or religion, since these deal with the 
experiences of men; and thus, for men, the Absolute is a 
vacancy. 
We have seen that, for Dr. Brightman, coherent experi-
ence, coherently appraised strongly suggests that God is a 
person, conscious, thoughtful, actively creative, valuing and 
evaluating. None of these (save perhaps valuing) identifies 
God with the Absolute. 
Yet the hypothesis that God is a person does present a 
problem; for if God is all of these, then, if thought and 
creative activity are to have distinct meanings, it would 
appear that even in God thought and will must remain dis-
tinct~ But if this is so, then the relationship between 
them must be examined, evan as Cartesians and Spinozists 
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1 
examined it three hundred years ago. The problem of the re-
lationship may be partially expressed in the question, 
"Given the hypothesis that God is both actively creative and 
thoughtful, does God's will act to create the laws of reason, 
or must creative activity function within the 'given' 
framework of the laws of reason?" 
Dr. Brightman's answer to this question is clear. 
"Neither absolutist nor finitist supposes that the laws of 
reason were created by an arbitrary fiat of will; reason is 
2 
an uncreated attribute of God, not dependent on his will. 11 
God, then, does not create reason. Next, though rational 
norms are uncreated by God, is it possible that God chooses 
whether or not he will create in accordance with them? Here 
again, Dr. Brightman's reply seems clear. For him, it would 
appear that God must create 1n accordance with the "eternal 
necessities of reason. 113 In short, while there are irration-
alities present within the world as created by God, these 
irrational elements are not the product of God's will acting 
against reason. If God is to act, then, he must act in 
1 The problem is somewhat more complex than allusion to 
Cartesians and Spinozists might indicate. Reason and cre-
ative will do not, for Brightman exhaust the personality of 
God. A third factor, the nonrational Given, comprises the 
uncreated nonrational content upon which God brings his will 
to bear. The status of this brute fact present to God will 
be raised shortly. 
2 See above, chap. III, p. 215. 
3E. s. Brightman, The Finding of God (New York: 
Abingdon Press, 1931), p. 172. 
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accordance with the laws of reason. Criticism at this 
point may profitably take the path of approval of a point 
made by Dr. Bertocci. 
It is not so plain • • • why the eternal nature of 
God contains 11 the eternal necessities of reason" which 
prohibit contradiction. If this means, as we suppose 
it does, that God must willy-nilly submit to them or 
that the laws of reason reflect God's uncreated nature 
from which there cannot be any divergence, we see no 
empirical evidence for the assertion or against it~ 
• • • We see no reason for holding that he must be 
reasonable whether he wants to or not. • • • There is 
as much reason to suppose that they are self-imposed 
norms of the divine nature (which might well have al-
lowed other alternatives as well) as to suppose that 
they represent immutable necessities or a logical prius 
to any activity.l 
It may be suggested at this point that Dr. Brightman 
seems to indicate, by retention of this hypothesis, a 
strong tendency toward a rationalism which, while it should 
not be confused with any non-temporalistic rationalism, 
seems to carry with it two implications: first, it passes 
beyond the limits of empiricism (beyond description of that 
which it takes as the metaphysical explanation of experi-
ence); and second, it focusses both speculative and moral-
speculative attention away from God (God's will) and on the 
immutable laws of reason. With this tendency perhaps it is 
unnecessary to put one final question: "Could God possibly, 
confronted by the alternatives, to create in accordance 
with the norms of reason or not to create at all, choose 
the latter?" If the answer is in the negative, then it 
1 Bertocci, Empirical Argument, p. 279. 
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would appear that Dr. Brightman has captured rationalism 
from absolutism, for the will of God is then reduced to 
definite subordinacy to reason. If the answer is affirma-
tive, then it is possible that here is a concession to 
possible divine revolt against the rational norms, a con-
cession that, if pressed, could cast doubt on their ne-
cessity, if not on their immutability. 
We suggest, then, that Dr. Brightman has, in service 
of a rational order of experience, either finitized God 
into a slave demiurge or has depersonalized God into a set 
of rational norms, depending on what he chooses to call by 
the name of "God·." But no matter what the name, the laws 
of reason have emerged as the final principle of expla-
nation of reality~ 1 If this estimate is correct, then that 
which began as an empirical hypothesis has become a canon 
of experience. God is finite because the universe must be 
a rational order. One wonders whether he need have gone so 
far. 
This is not to say that Brightman has been captured, 
in turn, by absolutism. The unfolding of the world-process 
1 It is not to be supposed that this statement implies 
to Brightman the absolutistic assertion that "whatever is 
must be. 11 While it seems to remain true that the person-
ality of God is explained by appeal to rationalism, the 
brute content of the nonrational Given is still to be con-
tended with. "However necessary the truths of formal logic 
and mathematics may be, I know nothi~ about what must 
necessarily be in the concrete world~ (Brightman, The 
Finding of God, p·. 174·.) 
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is still a respectable hypothesis--and one which, better 
than absolutism, is able to assimilate both durational and 
irrational facts of experience. If it is not precisely 
necessary to subordinate the will of God to the necessities 
of reason in order to speak in terms of a rational universe, 
it may yet be necessary in order to account for the salient 
irrationalities present in experience--irrational content 
which, in part, is judged by men as evil. To this we may 
now turn. 
4. 1 The problem of evil: in answering objections 
that he has done little more than hypostatize elements of 
experience as their principles of explanation, Dr. 
Brightman has replied that 
finitism may be so close to the facts as to be a mere 
recapitulation of them •••• The finitist's reply is 
that he would rather have the facts unadorned than have 
an explanation that confuses good and evil.2 
With this, the issue is squarely joined, and the question 
1 Separation of this from the previous subsection may, 
in part, be misleading. Certainly the problem of evil de-
serves some separation. However, since the problem of evil 
is a specific treatment of a larger area, the place of the 
Given in the total personality of God, there is just as 
certainly an intimate connection between the two sections·. 
To generalize but one step further, the total question may 
be that of the relation of God's "nature" to his will. 
This generalized problem will not be treated in this 
chapter; however, the reader should be informed that close 
attention has been given to comments by E. E. Aubrey and 
Albert C. Knudson on this topic. See E. S. Brightman, "The 
Given and Its Critics," Religion in Life, I (1 932) , 134-145. 
See also Albert c. Knudson, The Doctrine of God (New York: 
Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1930), p. 274. 
2 Brightman, Philosophy of Religion, p. 330. 
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before us is whether or not a finite God provides the best 
solution to the problem of evil. 
An initial difficulty may be solved without further 
ado. The critical comments about to be made are not made 
precisely from the point of view of absolutism . The writer 
is in accord with Dr. Brightman on the hypothesis that 
human reality is not contained within God . In this sense 
agreement may be reached at the outset that God is finite 
in that human persons, in some sense, are external to God 
and can, in some sense, act to thwart God's purposes (even 
if such thwarting accomplishes nothing but the destruction 
of the human person--for the development of human persons 
can readily be assumed to be part of God's overall purpose). 
Further, it may be suggested that, in the opinion of 
the present writer, Brightman is also correct in his 
judgment that: 
a) Evil is a reality (insofar as the evil under in-
vestigation is "surd, 11 meaningless evil). 
b) God is entirely good and is not to be held re-
sponsible for willing the presence of evil (again, it is 
surd evil which is under investigation). 
c) Much that we normally call evil can legitimately 
be accounted for and therefore need not enter the present 
discussion. 
d) The "tenaciousness" of God in combatting evil may 
be considered as infinite·. 
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e) Criticism is to be within the general area of em-
pirical coherence, and, the theistic hypothesis is, in 
general, accepted. It is hoped that this series will 
render the critic ism at least somewhat "in tarnal." 
It would appear that the agreements above have 
canceled the possibility of criticism. If evil is real and 
God is infinitely Good, then it would appear that God and 
1 
evil, both real, are mutually exclusive of each other. If 
this is not sufficient, appeal may be made to the admission 
that moral evil can readily be accounted for; leaving the 
evil to be investigated as that which apparently emanates 
from the will of neither God nor man. Thus "exteriorized," 
surd evil, as it is apprehended by man, is to be understood 
as "natural evil·." 
Obviously sin is a real evil. But the maladjustments in 
physical nature are real evils, too; most great re-
ligious leaders have either been (like Jesus) healers of 
disease or (like Buddha) teachers of some way of escape 
from the evil effects of disease.2 
Hence, it may be suggested that things like imbecility, 
syphilis, and tornadoes are the evils which seem to be 
meaningless, and thus emanating (if indeed they are meaning-
less) from a source other than the will of God or man. 
1In this discussion, unless otherwise noted, "God" 
will mean that portion of the total divine personality 
which is God's creative will. It is hoped that this usage 
is acceptable, on the grounds that Brightman's distinction 
between the two is not the point at issue. 
2 Brightman, Philosophy of Religion, p. 282. 
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At this point a cursory analysis of evil is indicated, 
in order, if possible, to locate that in evil which consti-
tutes its "evilness . 11 Tornadoes, for example, may consti-
tute an evil . However, they may be an evil because the 
world would be better off without them, or they may be an 
evil but one necessary to a worl d such as ours which, on 
the whole, may be judged as good. It is in the second 
sense that we judge the surgeon's knife to be good even 
though it may bring pain as it cuts out an infected part. 
The evil of the pain is judged to be a necessary evil, if 
we are to have the attendant good. We may hope that 
sometime the world will progress to the point where pain of 
this sort is not necessary; but for now it is meaningful 
and thus does not seem to be of the nature of a surd. On 
the other hand, if our judgment is that the world would be 
better off without tornadoes, or syphiletic idiots, we ap-
parently are judging that these events are surd evils . It 
does not seem to common sense quite proper to ask why the 
universe must be such that there is pain, or why pain must 
hurt . We understand that there is a kind of logical law 
about the world that dictates that the water that will 
quench thirst, run generators, grow crops, and float barges 
must be the same kind of water as that which floods cities 
and drowns air-breathing organisms . But since we see no 
purpose to the tornado or the idiot , we judge these as evil. 
Because of this we generally agree with Job--that it is not 
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the hurting that is evil, but it is the meaninglessness of 
it all; it is in vain. 
It is at least a possible notion, then, that the 
evilness which makes things evil is the meaninglessness 
that surrounds them . This interpretation would seem to be 
close to Brightman's insofar as the source of surd evil is 
the nonrational Given and its nature is as brute content. 
On the other hand, to continue the analysis, it is 
doubtless our valuing-consciousness that labels an event 
evil or good in the first place. Thus, when the analysis 
is complete, four divisions appear to be before us: good 
which we understand, good which we do not understand ("surd 
good?") but accept, evil which we understand, and evil 
which we do not understand. It is this latter group that 
appears to be classified as surd evil. 
Now we may suppose that God is faced with the same 
four divisions . However, there are some slight dis-
tinctions . Since our \'IOrld of nature has been hypothesized 
as the energizing of God 1 s will, it \'lould appear that while 
we are faced with all four groups as already existing, the 
very nature of creativity would suggest that, for God, only 
those goods and evils which he faces as existent are those 
which have been created in accordance with the rational 
norms of his thought. That is to say that while much may 
enter the world of which God does not approve, nothing 
enters which he does not create--and therefore understand 
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as meaningful. 
However, if this is the case, the category of surd 
evil would appear to be vacated; for, while it is granted 
that good and evil are value-judgments, it would appear 
that surdity is not precisely a judgment of value, but is 
rather a judgment in terms of meaningfulness or lack of 
meaning. And, while Brightman's thesis of God coping with 
nonrational content remains intact, that which was de-
veloped as a hypothesis for accounting for evil of a par-
ticular sort has proven inadequate. 
Now let us 11 return to earth" to see what has happened 
to human judgments. First, it must be granted that it is 
human value-judgments which name an event as good or evil. 
Second, however, our judgment of the surdity of some of 
that which we judge as evil must now take cognizance of the 
notion that God permits nothing to exist that is not at 
least a "necessary evil," at least not in the world of 
nature. It would appear, then, that our judgment of surdi-
ty is little more than a confession that we are not aware 
of what God had in mind when he permitted this event to 
hap:pen. To say that God "couldn't help it" bodes ill for 
the hypothesis that it is God's creativity that produces a 
world, not simply his permissiveness. 
The result of this somewhat meandering discussion 
seems to be that, while in some sense evil remains as a re-
ality, its reality is according to God's judgment, not ours. 
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Our task, then , is not the specul ative task of accounting 
for evil at all , but the much more concrete (and possibly 
more difficult) task of attempting to search out that mean-
ing by means of which God has chosen to create that which 
is not intrinsically valuable in his eyes . If this is our 
task, then it would seem almost presumptuous to take as our 
beginning-point in a discussion of' evil those judgments of 
uselessness by which we arrived at the notion of surd evil 
in the first place . 
Let us continue this discussion in a more constructive 
vein. Dr. Brightman has, himself, suggested a concept that 
may be of some help in this connection. This is the concept 
of multiple meanings . vli th this it may be possible to 
throw further light on the admittedly obscure distinction 
between evil and meaninglessness . 
An evil man slays an innocent person. The evil man 
means by this murder hatred, revenge , or robbery or 
whatever else it may be . His evil meaning is real; 
he is responsible for it and its consequences , for he 
knew what they would be and he intended them . Yet , by 
this same physical event , God meant his purpose of law 
and patience and love . Let us not blink the fact that 
if God be immanent in all nature, every motion of the 
murderer's hand, and of his weapon , and all its deadly 
effect , down to the subtlest tremor of the most minute 
electron, all was the deed of God ' s "''Till , whose purpose 
is supreme value . By one and the same event , man means 
evil , God means good.l 
It may be presumed that Dr. Brightman would concur in 
the speculated implication that , if the murderer is 
1Brightman, Introduction, pp. 177-178. 
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responsible for his act, so also is God responsible for his 
act--that of producing the world of nature. God, too, knew 
the consequences and intended them . Yet, if this is so, 
and if it is also the case that the problem of evil is 
being approached empirically, then it would seem to follow 
that those events upon which man has based his hypothesis 
of a surd evil--syphilis , and even the event of murder--
have been intended by God. With this, the human basis for 
judgment of surd evil disappears . 
Now it may quite well be true that evil is real and 
that God is striving to control it; however, it would also 
seem that the human task is not primarily to help God stamp 
out syphilis, but to align his meanings with those of God·. 
Ideally, man should strive to see evil hypothetically 
"through the eyes of God," if he is to see it aright, and 
to do this he should see as his primary moral task, not the 
production of values (for they are in his own terms), not 
the creation of a better world, but the meaning of the 
world as it is . In this it may be that both finitism and 
absolutism may find a common cause . 
There is no reason to conclude that the Moral Laws do 
not stand as the guideposts toward a coherent personality, 
or that God does not will that finite persons develop in 
this direction. Nor need we assume that there is no reason 
for practical activity as a sign of intent coherently con-
ceived and coherently wrought. The good man does not 
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murder. But the all-important point is that it is not the 
event of murder or syphilis that defines the moral situation 
or the problem of evil humanly conceived; it is the 'dll of 
man--a will that now can- only with difficulty be understood 
as belonging to the realm of nature. 
5. The vision of a moral-valuational universe: our 
attention may now be turned to the problem of evil as it 
defines the moral task and the doctrine of meliorism. 
Briefly stated the doctrine is that "existence is partially 
controlled by value; in some sense both good and evil are 
real, but good is dominant in that the state of affairs in 
the universe is always susceptible of improvement. 111 Ex-
pressed theistically, it is suggested that God never lets 
the Givan "run wild"; 2tha t though God may suffer "tam porary 
defeat, 113his will always "finds new avenues of advance, and 
forever moves on in the cosmic creation of new values. 114 
The question to be asked is whether or not the ex-
pression of meliorism, conceived theistically, goes beyond 
the tenets of meliorism, promising not only that God is a 
powerful ally, engaged in the same end.eavor that we are, 
but also that God will succeed in the improvement of the 
1 Brightman, Philosophy of Religion, pp. 276-277. 
2 1J21.g.' p. 338. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
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universe. The contention is that the first statement of 
meliorism is a legitimate hypothesis based on experience, 
that the second is an expression of religious hope, and 
that if both are rendered as philosophical suppositions, 
they are inconsistent·. 
The statement tha t the world is susceptible of im-
provernent is designed to combat a quietistic optimism as 
well as neutralism and pessimism·. 1 In order, however, for 
quietism to be successfully combatted, meliorism would seem 
to have to include the threatening possibility that if 
certain conditions are not met, the world will not improve~ 
Without this element of contingency, morality is not well-
served by meliorism. The conditions may be various: the 
ignorance, impotence, or perversity of God or man may serve 
as a summary of them. Human faith is that God will never 
flag in his application of divine power and knowledge to 
the bringing of fonn out of chaos. However, either God can 
fail, or success is assured. If God can fail, then, while 
meliorism is true the outcome is in doubt, and the moral 
task, heightened by a cosmic seriousness, stands opposed to 
the abyss of nihilism. 2 If success is assured, then, of 
1 See ibid., p. 276. 
2 This phrase apparently "weasels" between the notion 
that God cannot fail, and the hypothesis that he will not 
fail. Yet even this is fuel for discussion, since, when 
one has "moved beyond God" to an account of the principles 
by which God must act, both come pretty much to the same 
thing. 
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course, meliorism melts into optimism. 
This is not to say that Dr. Brightman's optimism is 
identical with absolutistic optimism. Brightman has 
leavened the absolutistic loaf with real duration, giving a 
processual perfectibility to what otherwise is static per-
fection. Thus, he has outflanked the absolutist's dilemma 
of a perfect world where evil receives no explanation. Yet 
there may be a question of whether the introduction of 
process is entirely successful. Evil has, on Dr. 
Brightman's hypothesis, received a real explanation; and 
there is something favorable to religious experience 11 in 
the magnificent cosmic struggle of God against the 1 fire of 
anger, 1 1 bi tter torment, 1 1 the abyss, 1 and the 1 demonic. 1 " 1 
Perhaps this is all that has been intended and all t hat is 
needed. Yet one wonders what all this has to do with man. 
Where does he stand in the process? Unfortunately, the 
implication is that he stands in the gallery watching the 
awe-inspiring contest. He may join the battle if he wishes, 
and do his bit to produce value; but whether he joins or 
not, it is essentially God 1 s battle, and, if God wins--all 
is won. If God loses (if he can lose)--all is lost. 2 Where, 
1 Ibid., p. 328. 
2 The main cause of the apparent dilemma seems not 
necessarily to be the projection of the problem of evil 
into the cosmos; for the problem does seem essentially to 
be theological. The writer's feeling is that Brightman's 
attempt to correlate a philosophy of values and morality 
gives a credibility to a task in which the outcome is 
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then, is man's moral task? Recognition of the reality of 
evil provides God with a task, and with the morality co-
ordinate with that task~ But it does not appear to provide 
human personality with the antagonist requisite for such a 
moral task. The world will roll along , perhaps sometimes 
hesitantly, but always in the general direction of infinite 
perfection. The obligation for me to help seems morally 
vacant . Dr. Brightman's answer to this is that 
if man meets those ills that he cannot understand with 
the best there is in him, he is capable , within limits, 
of spiritual progress . If the race were to bear its 
due share of responsibility , faithfully striving for 
the possible best, the cosmic enterprise would be more 
successful . l 
V'lhat is meant by "more successful"? Does it mean 
that without the r ace accepting its due share of responsi-
bility there will be less success? Or that success will be 
slower (since we move toward an infinite goal)? Or does it 
mean that without man accepting his responsibility 
something will be lost to the universe regardless of the 
speed or quantity of success achieved by God at any given 
moment? If the first is what is meant, then God may be 
forever limited in some portion of his fight to control the 
Given because man did not help as he was supposed to . But 
assured, but in which the production of values promises 
teleologically a total gain nonetheless . Yet the gain is 
at the expense of morality; the only area in which the 
outcome is in real doubt is--me . 
1 Brightman, Introduction, pp. 256-257. 
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this means that God must give up part of his task and admit 
that that aspect of the Given cannot, after all , be con-
trolled. If the second is what is meant, then perhaps it 
is better for man to enjoy ''~hat is good nm'l , rather than 
committing himself to what must be by definition the un-
pleasant struggle (because it means turning toward evil and 
struggling to make it into good); for if the world process 
is slow, yet it is upward , and when there is an infinite 
goal to be reached--why hurry? But it is undoubtedly the 
third possibility that comes closest to the truth. However, 
if this is so, then what could it be that can be irrevoca-
bly lost and yet be distinguishable from God's "objective" 
success? 
Does it not appear to be that the only thing left to 
be lost is that which is the most important thing of all: 
not tornadoes or syphilis or imbecility, but that part of 
human reality which precisely is not nature? Could it not 
be man himself which is at stake? Here it may be possible 
for God to fail; and here also might man find his true 
moral-religious task--helping God to put the world in order 
by choosing to place himself within the world of God ' s 
meanings rather than that of his own. Finally, while it 
possibly is not our place to speculate overseriously on the 
nature of immortality, could it not be this decision which 
is the condition of "conditional immortality"? 
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3. Conclusion. 
The conclusion to this chapter is really to be found 
in the substance of Chapter IX below. One summary comment, 
however, may be in order. Throughout this critical ap-
praisal the writer has followed one general theme. It is 
that while man is bound to his own experience and to his 
own finite capacities for understanding and developing 
within that experience, he finds that he both must and 
cannot establish guarantees that his finite experience and 
capacities are mirrors of the universe. The final 
statement of the preceding section echoes this dilemma. 
Man must choose God's universe if he is to find any uni-
verse at all, yet the universe in which he must live, move 
and work out hie destiny is his own--conditioned by his own 
point of view. Dr. Brightman has resolved, in part, this 
dilemma according to his own philosophical insights. He 
has correlated God's universe with the only universe that 
man can know. The present writer chooses to maintain, and 
work within, the dilemma as a more fitting expression of 
the apparently conflicting religious expressions that while 
"this is my father's world," God's ways are not mine, and 
are past knowing by me. Thus he finds himself on the 
borderline of irrationalism when he accepts the proposition 
that there is a difference between one who dwells in the 
world and one who creates it. 
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With this conclusion a turning-point in this study is 
reached. The discussion of human existence to follow will 
approach man from another point of view. In the final 
chapter, however, a synthesis will be attempted. Let us 
then turn to an examination of the philosophy of Jean-Paul 
Sartre: atheist and existentialist. 
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CHAPrER V 
EXPOSITION OF THE THOUGHT OF 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE 
1. Introduction. 
Exposition of Sartre's philosophy poses difficulties 
beyond those normally encountered in the translation of a 
foreign language into English. Even after translation key 
terms and explanations remain "untranslated" into the 
common currency of philosophical usage. While it may well 
be true that even philosophical usage changes under the 
pressure of novel ideas and arrangements, it is still de-
sirable that some standard of exchange be maintained, lest 
there be no philosophical community at all. Because of 
this desirability, an important chore of this chapter will 
be to render the Sartrean nomenclature into terms common to 
the other philosophers under investigation here. Only 
partial success is to be expected. 
Such a chore will, however, by no means reduce this 
chapter to lexical status. A man's terminology and his 
methodology are intimately intertwined, as are his vision 
and the words used to describe it. We shall find, thus, 
that definition involves exposition to a considerable de-
gree. It is hoped that the defining does no injustice to 
the thought expounded. 
A beginning will be made in a discussion of phenome-
nological method as understood by Sartra. From there we 
shall be lad to an investigation of his epistemology, his 
ontology and npsycho-ontology, 11 and, finally, of human re-
ality as it stands confronted by the "catagoraal obli-
gations" of the concrete world within which it finds itself 
and with which it attempts to deal, intellectually and 
practically. With this last topic, we shall find that the 
beginning in phenomenology has resulted in an attitude other 
than the "scientific" one claimed by that method--the atti-
tude of existentialism. It is here that the Sartraan phi-
losophy will bear whatever fruit it has to bear for our in-
vestigation. 
2. Phenomenological Method. 
A. Empirical Elements. 
Traditionally, empiricism is sat over against ration-
alism as the method in philosophy which takas as its point 
of departure the data of perceived experience. Depending 
upon the meaning attached to the term, "perceived, 11 a 
broadly conceived empiricism may narrow in the direction of 
sensationalism or away from it. Phenomenology would appear 
to be a specific method within such a broadly defined em-
piricism; for the meaning, for Sartra, seems to be that it 
is a method "which wants to describe all that manifests 
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itself as it manifests itself."1 Lexically, "phenomenology" 
indicates that the system will be a theory or a rationale 
of immediate experience. So defined, however, phenome-
nology loses its specificity and becomes identical with em-
piricism. Thus, while the genus has been suggested, the 
differentia remain to be disclosed. 
B. Phenomenology as Descriptive. 
This means that "teleological explanation" is in no 
sense a part of phenomenological method~ Perhaps for 
Sartre even more than for Perry the characterization of his 
method as descriptive carries the clue to the whole system. 
Note the following passage: 
In thus replacing a variety of oppositions by a single 
dualism on which they are all based [the dualism be-
tween consciousness and its object] , have we gained or 
lost? ••• For the moment, the first consequence of 
"the theory of the phenomenon" is that the appearance 
does not refer to being as Kant's phenomenon refers to 
the noumenon. Since there is nothing behind the ap-
pearance, and since it indicates only itself (and the 
total series of appearances), it cannot be supported by 
any being other than its own.2 
While noting the descriptive nature of phenomenology, 
however, it is difficult to avoid noticing also two other 
statements which are germane to phenomenological method-
ology. First, while purportedly dealing with immediate 
1Wilfred Desan, Tragic Finale (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1954), p. 5. Cf. also Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. xlviii-1. 
2 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. xlviii. 
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experience, phenomenology recognizes at the outset a sepa-
ration of consciousness from its object. Second, with the 
same purport--pertaining to immediate experience--phenome-
nology considers the total series of appearances. Let us 
consider these statements. 
1. Phenomenology is dualistic. It was perhaps 
Husserl's attempt to fix the data of phenomenology by 
placing it in "parenthesis" apart from consideration either 
of the source of the data or the subject to which the data 
appear which gave phenomenology its specific character 
within empiricism. However, while data need not "point" to 
their source in some extra-experiential realm, it is more 
difficult to bracket out of consideration that which ap-
pears to be the constant companion of data, namely, a 
subject for which they are data. This difficulty led 
Husserl1to assume a "transcendental ego" which "had" the 
experiences bracketed for investigation. For Sartre, this 
is a betrayal of phenomenology and a return to Kant. Yet 
experience does testify to this dualism. Sartre's reply to 
Husserl is that while such a dualism is perhaps impossible 
to avoid, it is a dualism within ex:r:erience and thus is 
within the brackets which protect the phenomenal specimen. 
Thus the I \'lhich thinks or sees or closes the door is also 
1 See Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, 
trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: 
The Noonday Press, 1957), chapter I. 
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data, with the same claim to being as any other phenomenon, 
that is, the being of itself as phenomenon. 
But if the I were a necessary structure of conscious-
ness, this opaque I would at once be raised to the rank 
of an absolute. We would then be in the presence of a 
monad. And this, indeed, is unfortunately the orien-
tation of the new thought of Husserl. • •• All the re-
sults of phenomenology begin to crumble if the I is not, 
by the same title as the "rorld, a relative existent: 
that is to say, an object for consciousness.l 
Yet the problem seems not to be solved; for it ap-
pears that the transcendental chore taken from the ego has 
been bestowed on consciousness--implying that ~hile the I 
may be discovered as part of the world of data, it is dis-
covered by a consciousness which is not part of such a 
world. It is up to Sartre to safeguard the 11 seamless robe 
of experience" by showing that consciousness can perform 
its office while at the same time remaining free of the 
"opacity" of extra-phenomenal substantiality. He will have 
his chance shortly. Meanwhile, the intent of phenomeno-
logical methodology has been shown. 
2. Phenomenology considers the total series of ap-
pearances. It was John Stuart Mill who exchanged the 
notion of a realm of 11 reality 11 for one of "all possible ex-
periences," 2thus completing the trend begun by Kant. 
Sartre appears to be following Mill in granting that there 
1 1£!!!., p. 42. 
2 See A. E. Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics (London, 
Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1903), pp. 24-25 •. 
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is no baing behind phenomenon but only the baing of the 
phenomenon, and than in granting that while it is the ap-
pearance which is the essence of a phenomenon, something is 
prior to its appearance. Whether this something is the 
unifying force of c onsciousness or whether it is something 
other than consciousness is a matter for investigation 
under a heading other than that of methodology. What has 
bean suggested is that the phenomenological method is not 
to be considered as confined to atomic description of ap-
.pearances. Since it is phenomenology, or the rationale of 
phenomena, description is permitted to move beyond mere 
analysis of what appears, and thus encounters, without 
methodological treason, ontology. We must now turn to an 
epistemological preface to these ontological considerations. 
Suffice to say, to return to the topic of empiricism, that 
while phenomenology does deal in experience, it does not 
consider itself to be confined by this label. Sartra, too, 
feels himself entitled to an assumption or two "so long as 
it makes sanae." Speculation is an integral part of phe-
nomenological method~ 
3. Epistamolosy. 
A. Introduction. 
We return, now, to the dualism mentioned above, be-
tween Qonsciousness and its object. Before expounding this 
relationship, however, let us be reminded of where we stand~ 
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Sartre has presented us with a phenomenal entity which we 
may call the ego. For Sartre, this is the reflective ego, 
or that which is found along with the rest of the data of 
experience. With no great strain on terminology it could 
be called Sartre's "datum self." It is in this relation-
ship--between the datum ego and other experiential data--
that the distinction between "physical objects" and 
"psychical objects" is to be made. Presumably, although 
Sartre seems to show little interest in this area of phi-
losophy, this is also where the relationship between 
thought and thing and the consequent emergence of a cri-
terion of truth must take place. However, both of these 
types of data fall on the "object" side of the dualism be-
tween consciousness and its object. If, for example, one 
1 is counting his cigarettes, there is the physical object of 
the properties of the cigarett.es (specifically, in this ex-
ample, their number) and there may also be the psychical 
object of reflected knowledge that one is counting. Now, 
while Sartre asserts that the number is a property of the 
cigarettes (as phenomenon), the psychical event of the 
counting becomes empirical evidence of a mind at work try-
ing to understand its experience. Thus, and here we must 
interpolate for a moment, the event of a miscount refers to 
the psychical event (brings to reflective consciousness the 
1cr. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. liii. 
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fact that it is I who was counting) even though a correct 
count refers to the physical event (the cigarettes, them-
selves). Within this area lies the possibility of a theory 
of truth and error. However, the problem at hand is not 
the relationship between the reflective ego and its data, 
but the deeper relationship between what may be called the 
primary consciousness and that of which it is conscious. 
B. Subjectivism. 
11All consciousness is consciousness of something."1 
"To be conscious of something is to be confronted with a 
concrete and full presence which is not consciousness. 112 
This is the testimony of experience. Further, it has been 
argued that the data we have spoken of above are precisely 
data for consciousness. 3 Thus we seem to be presented with 
two sets of entities, each with its own claim to inde-
pendent being: data and that which apprehends the data, 
consciousness. However, it has been the task of philosophy 
for some time to avoid, if possible, this dualism. The 
first step may be to refuse to grant being to the data and 
(in lieu of extending the problem by posing a problematic 
metaphysical being as the substance of the data) suggesting 
that it is the being of consciousness which constitutes 
1 Ibid., p. lx. 
2Ibid. Italics in the original. 
3
sartre, Transcendence of the Ego, p. 42. 
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also the being of the data . This is subjectivism . It 
poses as the totality of the epistemic situation conscious-
ness and states of consciousness·. 
Yet it does appear that consciousness expects to be 
confronted by data; it looks forward and is either satis-
fied or disappointed. Even the being of an appearance 
seems to transcend the subjectivism of states of conscious-
ness . It was perhaps in order to account for this apparent 
autonomy of objects for consciousness that Berkeley intro-
duced God as the active percipere of his system. For Sartre, 
at any rate, 
It is true that things give themselves in profile; that 
is, simply by appearances . But each of them is already 
in itself alone a transcendent being, not a subjective 
material of impressions· •••• It is futile by a sleight 
of hand to attempt to found the reality of the object on 
the subjective plenitude of impressions ••• the ob-
jective will never come out of the subjective, nor the1 transcendent from immanence, nor being from non-being . 
~nat , then , of realism? 
c. Realism . 
Sartre ' s position appears to be essentially realistic . 
However, to be realistic does not imply that there is no 
such thing as consciousness, but only that consciousness can 
best be understood as a resultant of relationships among 
objects themselves anterior to consciousness. In the hands 
of a metaphysician such as Perry the position is not 
1sartre, Being and Nothingness , p. lxi . 
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difficult to understand. The phenomenologist, however, must 
make his point among appearances only, and consequently he 
must approach consciousness more gingerly than the tradition-
al realist. For Sartre, the solution to the problem of the 
nature of consciousness involves a study of both knowing and 
being-- an involvement that is not unlike that of the pragma-
tist . Let us first glance at the being of consciousness . 
1 . If it is true that objects of consciousness are a 
plenitude, a fullness confronted by consciousness , then it 
would also appear to be the case that any constitutive ac-
tivity must come from the direction of these objects. Thus, 
consciousness is constituted by its objects. However, phe-
nomenology argues that the only being of phenomena is their 
being for consciousness . The essence of an appearance is to 
appear. It would seem , then , that the being of the objects 
"passes over," so to speak, into consciousness. But this 
means that consciousness must be , in some way, constitutive 
of its objects . 1 Let us try to explain this apparent re-
version to subjectivism . 
If there were no consciousness, there would be no 
objects . This is the main platform of phenomenology. Yet, 
consciousness, in itself, is nothing . Let us suggest, by 
using non-Sartrean terms, what seems to be happening·. 
1sartre , Transcendence of the Ego, p. 36 . "For our 
part we readil?t acknowledge the existence of a constituting 
consciousness . ' 
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Objects are the 11 content 11 of that which is conscious of them; 
consciousness is the form. The burden of being is on the 
content, but the burden of determination is on consciousness. 
Separate, each is an abstraction (epistemologically only; for 
Sartre each has ontic being); together they produce the 
seamless robe of experience. 
Sartre indicates, in his own terms, that he feels this 
to be the case. 
Consciousness is born supported by a being which is not 
itself •••• To say that consciousness is consciousness 
of something means that for consciousness there is no 
being outside of that precise obligation to be ~ reveal-
ing intuition of something.! 
Thus, consciousness is constitutive by virtue of its determi-
native function as a "revealing intuition," while, at the 
same time that which is revealed "presents itself for de-
termination" and is not invented by consciousness. The 
question immediately intrudes: "What can be the character-
istics of that which presents itself for determination be-
fore the presentation occurs?" But with this question we 
signify that the border of ontology has been reached. An 
important concept to be carried over into ontology will be 
the beginning notion of consciousness as a vacancy. 
Meanwhile , we must return, for a moment, to consciousness 
and knowing. 
2·. The problem at this point is to remain within the 
1 Sartre , Being and Nothingness, p. lxi. The italics 
are mine . 
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phenomenal methodology while at the same time allowing 
consciousness its constitutive function--without which it 
merges with the reflective ego and becomes one datum among 
many. 
How, then, is consciousness conscious of its objects? 
According to Sartre, this problem has received its solution 
with the bringing together of the objects and consciousness; 
the real problem of knowledge is that of consciousness of 
self. For, in order for it to know itself, it must first be 
and yet if it is before it is known the opaqueness of sub-
stantialism is presented in the indefinite regress of the 
being of the knower at each more primitive level. It is in 
answer to this difficulty that Sartre takes a position quite 
pragmatic (and personalistic) in nature·. 
The existence of consciousness is an absolute because 
consciousness is consciousness of itself.l 
Thus, when I am counting, I am conscious of counting. But 
being conscious of counting is not the same as being re-
flectively conscious of counting~ To be conscious of a 
mountain is to be conscious of seeing a mountain, but it is 
not the same as being conscious of oneself seeing a mountain. 
This latter activity is reflective; the former is "prere-
flective" or, as Sartre sometimes says, "non-thetic." 
This is to s ay t hat the type of existence of conscious-
ness is to be conscious of itself. And consciousness is 
aware of itself insofar as it is aware of an object. 
1 Sartre, Transcendence of the Es o, p. 40. 
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All is therefore clear and lucid in consciousness: the 
object with its characteristic opacity is before 
·consciousness, but consciousness is purely and simpli 
consciousness of being consciousness of that object. 
A pure consciousness is an absolute quite simply because 
it is consciousness of itself. It remains therefore a 
"phenomenon" in the very special sense in which "to be" 
and "to appear" are one. It is all lightness, all 
translucence.2 
3. The relationship between consciousness and the 
object for consciousness may now be suggested. Since it is 
in the knowing that consciousness generates its being, and, 
since it knows itself only as knowing the object, the re-
lationship of subject and object is not precisely that of 
two entities mysteriously existing independently of each 
other and then entering into a relationship.3 Because it is 
not this, the "of" in the phrase "conscious of the chair" 
seems to be a misplaced divider. For Sartre, the non-thetic 
consciousness is so closely dependent on its object and the 
knowing of it for its own existence as consciousness that 
the 11of 11 is better rendered in parentheses. This is sup-
posed to have the effect of illustrating the dependency 
which consciousness has on its object for its very existence. 
Thus the prereflective consciousness is (of) the mountain. 
1Ibid. 
2 Ibid., p. 42. 
3It is difficult for the phenomenologist to talk about 
"reality, 11 difficult for the metaphysician not to. Until 
such time as the difficulty becomes apwarent, let us treat 
these two words, "reality" and "being, 1 as synonyms. 
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The direction, it may be surmised is away from subjectivism 
toward realism. Let us be alert for a reversal of this di-
rection as we move, now, from epistemology into ontology. 
4. Ontology and Psycho-ontology. 
A. Introduction. 
We have isolated the sector in which the search is to 
proceed for being. 1 First, Sartre has insisted that being 
cannot be 11 behind 11 appearance as its noumenon. Second, he 
has shown, to his own satisfaction at least, that it cannot 
inhere in consciousness. We seek then the being of the phe-
nomenon. However, one other factor must be recalled. Since 
it is consciousness that contributes determination to ap-
pearance, the being which we seek must necessarily be beyond, 
or anterior to, determination. 
B. The Transphenomenal. 
Let us begin with Barnes• definition. 
Transphenomenality refers to the fact that Being, al-
though coextensive with its appearance is not limited to 
it, that Being "surpasses the knowledge which we have of 
it and provides the basis for such knowledge."2 
Thus, the table that I see is not supported by any deeper 
reality. The reality of its appearance is all the reality 
there is to the table. Nonetheless, what I see of the table 
1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 3. 
2 112!£., p. 634. 
282 
is not all there is to the table. "It would require an 
infinite process to inventory the total contents of a 
thing. "1 
1. What, then, is the table? Apparently , for Sartre, 
the table is the infinite number of possibilities of its 
apprehension; it is the infinite number of points of view, 
and yet it is more than all of these, for it is itself, in 
space, by the window. It is there when nobody is conscious 
of it, and it remains there, unchanged, when consciousness 
seizes it. Yet, if it is true that it is consciousness that 
contributes determinateness to the object, there is a 
contradiction. In some sense, then, it must remain true 
that it is consciousness which fixes the table for knowledge . 
I've might put it this way : because consciousness is trans-
phenomenal the very fact of a series of appearances is 
possible. This does not mean that consciousness, itself, is 
more than we can know of it; if this were true the spector 
(opaqueness) of substantiality \'lould then enter conscious-
ness. What it means is that the being conscious (of) which 
is the total being of consciousness, itself, is nonetheless 
that which renders the infinite series of appearances possi-
ble. Yet this is close to subjectivism. 
2. However, let us keep in mind that consciousness 
owes, in turn, all of its being to its objects. It is 
1 Ibid., p. li. 
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totally occupied with that (of) which it is conscious . 
Alone, it is nothing . With this, we find that the dependen-
cy of the object on consciousness now reverts, to the de-
pendency, in turn , of consciousness on its objects . There 
is no being in consciousness , 1but yet consciousness is re-
quired in order that the being of the appearance can mani-
fest itself in the appearance . If we seek being, then, we 
must seek it in the transphenomenality of the object. 
c. Being·. 
Sartre has placed the epistemic burden on the object . 
I t is only in being "present ton 2the object that conscious-
ness is anything at all . It is now his task to show that 
the ontological burden is 1n the same place . The "category" 
of the transphenomenal suggests that there is "more to the 
phenomenon than meets the eye. 11 Yet this 11m ore" is elusive 
to description. In one sense the "more" remains an epistemic 
"more, " and does not exceed phenomena, although it does ex-
ceed any presently appearing phenomenon. However, in an-
other sense the "more" underlies phenomena in a way diffi-
cult to distinguish from a noumenal substrate . Yet this 
distinction must be kept clear. For Sartre, 
Being is the ever-present foundation of the existent; it 
l There is of course the being of the phenomenon of 
consciousness insofar as it is conscious of itself at the 
same time that it is conscious of its object . 
2 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 172. 
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is everywhere in it and nowhere . There is no bein~ 
which is not the being of a certain mode of being. 
Yet being, itself, is not a mode . But what is being? Per-
haps it is impossible to say without confusing being with 
the being of a certain mode . Could we say that the answer 
to the question "What is being?" is implied in the very 
question? That is, Being is the "is-ness" of whatever is; 
and if whatever is is only as phenomena, then being is the 
is-ness of the phenomenon (or of the transphenomenal). 
We must understand that this being is no other than the 
transphenomenal being of phenomena and not a noumenal 
being which is hidden behind them. It is the being of 
this table, of this package of tobacco, of the lamp, 
more generally the being of the world which is implied 
by consciousness. It requires simply that the being 
of that which appears does not exist only in so far as 
it appears. The transphenomenal being of what exists 
for consciousness is itself in i taelf·. 2 
We have, then, located the area for ontological "provision-
al" speculation. Without denying the premise of phenome-
nology, that the phenomenon points to nothing beyond itself 
as its substance, it must yet be granted that even phenomena 
have some sort of existence-status. Phenomena are. Now the 
investigation moves to the nature of the existence of the 
existent phenomena, and, by virtue of only a minor ab-
straction, the nature of being, considered apart from its 
modes of appearance. This is the realm of Being-in-itself. 
1Ibid., pp. lxii-lxiii. 
2 Ibid., p. lxii. 
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D. Being-in-itself. 
The search for Being has moved from modal appearances 
to consciousness and from consciousness to the being of the 
modal appearances. The movement has been by a dialectic of 
dependencies to what might loosely be called the "first 
principle" of reality--Being, itself. Yet this term is a 
double misnomer. Being is neither causally first nor is it 
a principle . It is not first because we cannot say, "First 
there is Being, and then there is something," and it is not 
a principle because it does not furnish the explanation of 
anything that is to follow. What, then, is Being-in-itself?1 
1. Being-in-itself is a fulness . It would be diffi-
cult to take serious issue with this assertion. It may be 
that the holes are "part" of a swiss cheese, so that without 
the holes it wouldn't really be swiss cheese; yet even so, 
the holes are not cheese, they are empty holes. So it is 
with Being . This, however, is a truism fraught with impli-
cations. For, if Being is a fulness, then it can contain no 
1 It is impossible to describe Being-in-itself without 
robbing it of its "in-itself-ness" and making of it "Being-
for-consciousness. 11 Yet this must be done if philosophy is 
to progress . Others, for example Bergson, have encountered 
the same difficulty of exposition. Sartre does, however, 
give himself an opening into a discussion of Being-in-itself 
by showi~ {Being and Nothingness, p. lxiii) a distinction 
between 11 the being of phenomenon" and 11 the phenomenon of 
being, 11 and then by asserti11.g that the latter "is immediately 
disclosed to consciousness." To speak bluntly, it appears 
that he is ri~ht. There does seem to be a consciousness of 
11 vi vidne ss," massiveness, 11 "Dasein, 11 which consciousness 
apprehends along with the determinate characteristics of the 
block of concrete, the table, or the mountain. 
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negativity , no dependency , and no lack. Within the expo-
sition of these "characteristics" of Being-in-itself Sartre 
must escape the threat of Spinozism~ 
2·. Being-in-itself contains no nega ti vi ty . Sartre 
subscribes to the Spinozistic-Hegelian formula that "all de-
termination is negation, " arriving , hence , at the conclusion 
that Being- in-itself is abso l utely indeterminate·. Since 
this is, for Sartre, the case , the requirements of meta-
physics cannot be met by Being-in- itself. It is neither one 
nor many , active nor passive; it simply is . 
3. Being-in-itself can neither be considered as de-
pendent nor as independent. In order for it to be dependent , 
a higher realm of Being must be posited upon which it can 
depend, and this, alas, is also Being-in- itself. But at the 
same time , it cannot be seen as independent, certainly not 
in the sense of causa sui·. "We need not conclude that being 
creates itself , which would suppose that it is prior to it-
self .• "l Thus, it is neither created nor an uncreated ne-
cessity". "Even if it had been created, being-in-itself 
would be inexplicable in terms of creation; for it assumes 
2 its being beyond the creation." 
We arrive, thus , at an extremely important concept in 
the Sartrean philosophy, important for both his phenomenol ogy 
1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness , p. lxiv. 
2I bid. 
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and his existentialism: that Being-in-itself is absolutely 
contingent. Perhaps Sartre's argument is less important 
than the notion arrived at by it; for the concept of abso-
lute contingency seems designed to combat any philosophical 
position, whether Platonic, Thomistic, or Spinozistic that 
begins with a substance which is its own necessity. The 
Sartrean "ontological argument" for being1will have to be 
called "empirico-ontological" rather than 11metaphysical. 11 
What Sartre apparently means to convey is (approximately) 
that being exhibits characteristics close to those of de-
pendency--that is, it founds its reason for being exterior 
to itself; but since there is nothing exterior to being, it 
is dependent, but dependent upon nothing. In short, Being-
in-itself is an absolute accident . All that we must beware 
of in this type of explanation is confusing "dependence upon 
nothing" with "independence ." 
4. Being can contain no lack. A lack is what one is 
not, and being is a fulness. What this means is that, even 
as being can have no reason for its own being, neither can 
it impart a reason for any of the modalities of being. Thus 
there is no potency, no possibility, no duration, and no 
process in being. Again, Being simply is·. 
Difficulty will be encountered shortly when the expo-
sition is attempted of the relationship between Being-in-
1 Ibid., pp. lx-lxi. 
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itself and consciousness. Epistemology has shown that there 
is some sort of dependency of consciousness on being. This 
dependency could lead us to infer that Being produces 
consciousness, with the resultant trace of teleology then 
left unexplained. One may only say that there is such a de-
pendency, so that, if there were no being, there would also 
be no consciousness; but one must hasten to add that the re-
lationship is neither causal nor teleological, but only 
logical and possibly chronological. Let us continue this 
discussion under the heading of Being-for-itself. 
E. Being-for-itself. 
We enter, now, the dyad composed of Being-in-itself 
and whatever can lie outside of it~ Since it has been held 
that nothing can lie outside of being, nothing will be the 
generic topic, nothing, and the great burden which Sartre 
places upon it of generating the world in which we live and 
move and have· QY£ being. 
1. Empirical considerations suggest that much in the 
knowing process is founded upon negation. Sartre chooses to 
examine three notions in particular: interrogation, de-
struction, and negative judgment1in order to establish the 
conclusion that it is consciousness which introduces ne-
gation in order to know; for to know is to make distinctions, 
and to make distinctions (definitions) is to show what a 
1 Cf. ibid., pp. 4-12. 
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thing is not. Thus, by virtue of the principle, "determi-
nation is negation," Sartre is able to show that the knowing 
mind is a result of a "negativising" consciousness ·. The act 
of negation Sartre calls 11nihilation·." 
2. If knowing 'is, or is involved in, the act of nihil-
ation, what kind of a thing is consciousness that it can 
bring about this nihilation? If it is recalled that the 
being of consciousness is "all translucency and lightness, 11 
and that its being is precisely and solely in its conscious-
ness (its essence is in its ·existence), then we may move 
forward to the statement that 11 Consciousness, in itself, is 
nothing." As an ontological statement this means that the 
being of consciousness, being nothing, must reside in (or 
as) a realm other than Being-in-itself·. Consciousness is 
the vacancy that Being is not ·. We arrive, thus, at the 
notion of "nothingness" as an ontological tenn. 
3~ What is the generation of this second term in the 
Sartrean dyad? One is tempted to reply, 11 there is no gener-
ation, since there is nothing to generate ." However, 
nothingness fulfills far too important a function for Sartre 
to be dealt with thus summarily'. Consequently, we must 
allow Sartre to pit himself against the Hegelian dyad of 
being and nothing, in order, if possible, to see the simi-
larities and differences·. 
For Hegel, it may be recalled, there is both a logical 
and a psychological (thought cannot stop, but must press on) 
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relationship between being and non-being , so that , as one 
focussed attention on being and performed the operation of 
emptying it of content, he found himself, as with an optical 
illusion, suddenly confronted, not by being, but by non-
being. Hegel's problem , of course, was then to secure them 
against the charge of identity . But this could only be done 
by showing that a logical process had taken place , so that 
non-being had somehow emerged from being and therefore could 
not be identical with it . This, however , established a de-
pendency of non-being on being (a dependency not unfriendly 
to the Hegelian dialectic, but derogatory to the principle 
of non-being) . For Sartre , this dependency is to be side-
stepped carefully~ There is a relationship, but it is a 
torturous one-. 
To oppose being to nothingness as thesis and antithesis , 
as Hegel does , is to suppose that they are logically 
contemporary. Thus simul taneously two opposites arise 
as the two limiting terms of a logical series . Here we 
must note carefully that opposites alone can enjoy this 
simultaneity •••• But non-being is not the opposite of 
being; it is its contradiction·. This implies that logi-
cally nothingness is subsequent to being since it is 
being, first posited, then denied. I t cannot be 
therefore that being and non-being are concepts with the 
same content since on the contrary non-being supposes an 
irreducible mental act~l 
Both are irreducible to each other, yet nothingness is subse-
quent to being . Nothingness lies coiled within being "like 
2 
a wonn . 11 One may say that there is nothingness because 
1 Ibid., P• 14. 
2Ibid·. , p. 26·. 
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there is being , but one cannot say that being causes nothing-
ness . 
4. While one may not ask why there is either being or 
nothingness, one is permitted to inquire what nothingness 
does . Here again we must beware of teleological conno-
tations. There is the temptation to say that nothingness is 
(or is not) in order that being may present itself to itself, 
receiving , in the process determinateness . Perhaps, however, 
it is safer simply to say that nothingness is (or is not) 
and through it being receives determinateness . Let us think, 
if we can of a face unseen (and therefore phenomenologically 
indeterminate) and a mirror that mirrors so perfectly that 
it is nothing in itself, but derives its whole being from 
that which it mirrors . Vlere it not for the mirror, the face 
would remain indeterminate , but, in the presence of the 
mirror, the face receives form, contour and color. The inde-
terminate face does not create the mirror, yet the mirror is 
subsequent to the face and , because it is there , there is a 
face . 
This is the function of nothingness . It is also , as 
we have noted, the function of consciousness . Consciousness 
is a nothing; but it is more than just a nothing, it is a 
nihilating nothing, and through its nihilation there is con-
structed a world. 
5. For whom or ''~hat is this world constructed, and 
out of what? It will be recalled that the phenomenal object 
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is for consciousness, and that con sc i ousne ss is nothing but 
its "intention" toward the object. The \'lhole path of the 
phenomenological-ontological derivation of the world seems 
directed to,..,ard shovving that while the world O\..,es its being 
the world to consciousness, consciousness owes its being 
only to its being a denial of being. The \'lorld is, thus , 
constructed out of being , but it is my world . It is what it 
is because I am what I am . I am responsible for there being 
a world. 
6. Who am I? How did I replace consciousness and 
nothingness in the programming of the world? Here the value 
of Sartre's "division" of the self into a reflective and a 
prereflecti ve stage may be seen·. It is consciousness which 
is responsible for the world and it is consciousness which 
is the prereflective self. I am not precisely responsible 
for the world , for I, as I reflect upon myself, a~ part of 
the world. Yet, since consciousness is conscious of being 
conscious (since this is what it is), there is a link be-
tween the prereflective self and the reflective self. This 
raises an immediate problem--small , but immediate. 
Sartre would seem to be indicating, by his treatment 
of consciousness as being-for-itself and as nothingness, 
that while the reflective ego is first-personal, the prere-
flective self is impersonal". If this were the case, then 
Sartre might have to admit that if the phenomenal object is 
finally constitutive of everything, then the influx of 
293 
appearance in all its impersonality must be the impersonal 
basis of self-identity. The dilemma appears to be between 
an analytic (Humean) discovery that there is, for example, 
"a hate here," and the more Cartesian assertion that "I 
hate." From the first personality cannot be derived satis-
factorily; from the second it can only be derived sub-
stantially. For Sartre, however, we might have to make a 
somewhat tenuous distinction between individuation and first-
personality. 11 It is consciousness in its fundamental self-
ness which under certain conditions allows the appearance of 
the ego as the transcendent phenomenon of that selfness."1 
"Hatred is me" might be the rendering of the phrase for the 
prereflective self. 
Thus, I am now in the world. I didn't ask to be here, 
yet I am here, and further, the world in which I find myself 
is· my own responsibility. With this, our investigation 
turns away from the ontological findings of phenomenological 
method toward that which is the concrete synthesis of being 
and nothingness. 
5. Existentialism. 
A. Introduction: Methodological Transition. 
Phenomenological method has suggested the foundations 
of the world of human experience, and the position of man 
1 ~., p. 103. 
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within that world. The resultant picture is a curious combi-
nation of subjectivism and realism. The dominant role 
played by consciousness tends toward subjectivism, while the 
intentional1nature of consciousness--its own dependency upon 
its objects--tends toward realism. Knowing, thus, is funda-
mental to the being of the world, and, at the same time, the 
being of the knower is dependent upon a primordial reality 
which is not engaged in any knowing process at all. 
Further, the primordial reality (Being-in-itself) is 
so far beyond determinateness that the only statements that 
may at all accurately apply to it are that 11 it is," and 11 its 
being contains or points to no reason, principle, or ne-
cessity of its being." Reality, thus, is a big, hulking 
accident . 
These phenomenological discoveries, neutral in them-
selves as any scientific discovery should be, set the mood 
and the mode of a slightly new departure in method. They 
set the mood by showing the roots of the concern of the self 
1 This term has not received any explanation. It 
properly belongs to Husserl and to logic, rather than to 
Sartre and existentialism . What it seems to mean is not the 
conation which the knower brings to the knowing situation--
which would reflect back onto the being of the knower. In-
stead it seems to refer to the logical dyad: extension-in-
tension. If this is its proper meaning , then, as with a 
definition, the intentionality of consciousness points 
(transparently) to those essential characteristics or proper-
ties which comprise the thing defined . In the case of 
consciousness, intentionality, then, will refer to the 
objects for consciousness since it is these which comprise 
consciousness, itself. Thus it indicates objectivity rather 
than subjectivity. 
295 
about its world while also sho~nng the absolute indifference 
of that which is in some sense the root of that concern, 
namely, Being-in- itself. They set the mode by showing that 
henceforth existential method will consist in the analysis 
of concrete situations--situations which include the human 
existent·. 
We may recall the example of the mother grouse given 
in Chapter II above . Reality includes her as an interested 
watcher rather than a merely cognitive spectator·. Because 
this is the point of departure of existentialism, it may 
properly be assumed that any truth will have to be the truth 
of a concrete situation which always must refer to the inter-
ested subject, in a situational matrix. Now, while this 
does not rule out cognitive satisfaction (or empirical co-
herence) as a test of truth, it does add this element: that 
the truth is an abstraction of the truth for me . It seems 
to be for this reason that Sartre chooses to make his points 
henceforth by selecting specific examples (or dramatic situ-
ations) and by offering them to his reader for edification. 
The reader, then, is expected to fondle the examples, wear 
them, and then to accept them as meaningful to himself . 
This appears to be the germ of the existential methodology . 
It is a dangerous method·. In the first place, com-
munity of thought is virtually a happenstance event-- and not 
easy to corroborate even when it may occur. In this sense 
the existentialist shares the burden of the mystic . But in 
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the second place, the method shows dangerous tendencies 
toward the very a priorism that raised such a large portion 
of the philosophical world against Hegel . To cull a general 
meaning from a specific event is almost inevitably to select 
one's examples for convenience and then to preclude an op-
posing generalization from perhaps equally legitimate spe-
cific events. This may be called the fallacy of tailoring 
facts to fit a theory, and Sartre is no less guilty of this 
than is Hegel . However, it is the method of investigation 
used by existentialism, and, if we all are in the position 
of the mother grouse , perhaps it is all we can do to point 
out the dangers--and then proceed~ 
B. The Existential Predicament and its Meanings·. 
I find myself in the world; and it is a curious world, 
indeed·. The world appears to be run by two conflicting 
principles, from two separate operating booths. For, in 
some ways the world is beyond reach of my will to adapt it 
to my desires--as it also seems that my desires, themselves, 
are beyond my reach to change or control--and in some ways 
it is malleable to my efforts . The world , in short, seems 
ruled by possibility and necessity, both at the same time, 
and by freedom and non-freedom. An ordinary appraisal of 
this situation might conclude that I am partly free, partly 
unfree; partly able , partly unable to change the courses of 
events; partly responsible, therefore, for events in the 
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world, partly free of responsibility. Perhaps it is only in 
this way that any reconciliation of these sets of opposites 
can be effected. Sartre, too , hopes for a reconciliation, 
but his arguments and examples suggest a reconciliation in a 
direction which, if successful , will lead to my total 
freedom and total responsibility for whatever situation or 
series of situations I find myself in. For example : 
1 . In what way is time real , or has it no reality at 
all except as a subjective event? "Present to" has been 
suggested as the actuality of Being-for-itself·. \Vi thout the 
For- itself as a revelation of Being, the In-itself is simply 
massive being without temporality". In support of this po-
sition, Sartre brings to light traditional difficulties in 
the notion of time as non-temporal instants externally re-
lated, and less traditional ambiguities in Bergson's real 
duration, 1concluding that 11before 11 and 11 after 11 do not depend 
upon time to give them meaning, but rather that the reverse 
is the case . In short , time is real , but it is real because 
there is consciousness which unites "before " and "after." 
The past is real and irrevocable, but it is only so because 
I "exist 11 it-- I live it and have lived it. The present is 
the realm of "existing 11 ; and, as "having existed" depends 
entirely on "existing, " so also does the past depend upon 
the present . 
1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 110. 
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"My" past is first of all mine; that is, it exists as 
the function of a certain being which I am . The past is 
not nothing; neither is it the present; but at its very 
source it is bound to a certain present and to a certain 
future , to both of which it belongs . That "myness" of 
which Claparede speaks is not a subjective nuance which 
comes to shatter the memory; it is an ontological re-
lation which unites the past to the present. My past 
never appears isolated in its "pastness 11 ; it would be 
absurd even to imagine that it could exist as such. It 
is originally the past of this present. 
This realistic-subjectivistic interpretation is not 
without meaning. If nothing more is accomplished, the past 
is connected with the present, not through present " traces " 
or evidence pointing to a previous present; for there is no 
connection established this way . 2 For Sartre, the connection 
is a real , but internal, connection spliced by the actuality 
of consciousness . 
It may be suggested , and then shelved for a moment, 
that the present appears to be the realm of actuality while 
the past is the realm of necessity'. 3 One may presume that, 
for Sartre, the future is schematically to be associated 
with possibility . For Sartre , the argument of determinism 
is a time-destroying argument; hence, if there is a future 
that possesses genuine futurity it possesses it as possi-
bility. The future, thus , is not a series of not-yet- played 
l i bid. 
2Brightman ' s dualism at this point affirms this lack 
of connection. 
3This point will be considered under the heading of 
11 facticity . 11 
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moments waiting out of sight in the wings for their ap-
pointed time. If this were the case they would not be 
future but present--because actual. That is to say they 
would be present without being "present to" consciousness. 
This, for Sartre, is not precisely a contradiction since it 
comes close to being a description of the transphenomenal. 
However, when the transphenomenal is viewed as the infinity 
of possible points of view of a thing (table), it becomes 
apparent that until the standing in and viewing from the 
possible viewpoints is undertaken, the transphenomenal, from 
the point of view of consciousness, is imaginary only. 
Hence, in order that the t .ransphenomenal may become actual 
phenomenon an actualizing movement into the future by the 
For-itself must take place. This requires the dependency of 
the various "possibles" upon the "realm for possibles" which 
is nothing other than the 11futurizing" activity of conscious-
ness. 
Thus, the ~esent touches the future, as it must, but 
it touches it through the projects of the For-itself. This, 
then, means not only that the For-itself finds possibility 
in the future, but, more extremely, that the "possibilizing 11 
of the For-itself makes the very future in which it finds 
its possibles.1 
Let us summarize the conclusions of this puzzling 
1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, cf. pp. 127-129. 
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section. First , there is time and it is real because 
consciousness is a temporalizing event . There is a present 
because there is actuality--that is, the play of conscious-
ness upon the world of its own phenomena. Let us say, then, 
that the concept of 11 the present 11 is logically consequent to 
the concept of actuality (or 11 presence 11 ). There is, simi-
larly, a past because there is a present of which it is its 
past . The concept of the past is logically consequent to 
the concept of necessity. Similarly again , there is a 
future because there is a present which has projects and 
which wills to carry them out . The concept of the future1is 
logically consequent to the concept of possibility . Finally, 
the notion of time is itself consequent to the concepts of 
present (or presence) , past and future, or "now, 11 11 before," 
and "after. " 
We may conclude by asking Sartre the nature of 
consciousness (the For-itself) that, being nothing in itself, 
it nonetheless can develop such an important function as 
1 Perhaps the most striking popular feature of Sartre's 
position ,.,i th regard to the future is the depressing atti-
tude he takes toward possibility . Possibility is cause for 
hope, and, even balanced by the possibility that one's hope 
may not be fulfilled, there is still a gambler's chance that 
it will . For Sartre, however , there is an "outer ring 11 of 
contingency around the universe which renders extremely 
perishable any hope man might have that that which may not 
come to pass yet may come to pass . For even if his hope is 
realized, even if his possibilizing should bear fruit, there 
is no reason to hope for permanency . The gambler ' s hope is , 
thus , a hopeless hope, and possibility is ringed round by a 
contingency which renders all man ' s projects, frustrated or 
realized, equally meaningless . 
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having projects and willing to carry them out~ Sartre ' s 
answer is that the For-itself projects because it is an 
emptiness--as a desire or a hunger is an emptiness . In 
short, it is precisely because consciousness is a nothing 
in itself that it moves . It moves to fill itself up--to 
give itself a past. In Sartre ' s own obscure words: 
We must not forget that in so far as it makes itself 
present to being • · •• the For-itself is a lack. The 
possible is that which the For-itself lacks in order to 
be itself or , if you prefer, the appearance of \'That I 
am-- at a distance~ l 
There is much to be desired in this brief exposition 
of temporality . Questions flood in to perplex the reader 
who feels that Sartre has simply been traitorous to the 
everyday experience of time and its seemingly juggernaut 
passage . The discussion immediately following , of the 
nature of 11 factici ty , " may partially fill this need·. 
2. The notion of 11 facticity" seems intended, by 
Sartre, to account for aspects of experience unaccounted for 
by the exposition of temporality". Specifically , present ex-
perience at least in part consists of elements of "brute 
fact 11 ; while " the past" even as it appears to be the residue 
of the confluence of brute fact and the activity of the ex-
perient in molding and shaping this brutal fact, appears 
such with the aura of "done-ness" surrounding it . Since 
what is done cannot be undone , the whole area of the past 
1 Sartre , Being and Nothingness, p. 125 
as 
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takes on the aspect of a "fact" presented to present 
consciousness . Thus it is called by Sartre 11 facticity ." 
Brute fact in the present , as that which is presented to 
consciousness , has also this aspect of done- ness about it. 
Facticity , hence , is a term peculiar to a phenomenological 
investigation and should not be taken as a sign of realism~ 
It signifies the nature of experience as experienced (in-
transigent, refractory) and gives no clues to its nature be-
fore it is experienced. Let us repeat Hazel Barnes ' defi-
ni tion·. 
Facticity: the For-itself ' s necessary connection with 
the In-itself, hence with the world and its Q.!'!Q past·. 
It is what allows us to say that the For-itself is , or 
exists . The facticity of freedom is the fact that 
freedom is not able not to be free ·.l 
Thus , facticity seems to be all of that in experience with 
which we must cope . But why , if consciousness is the only 
raison d 1 etre of there being a world, present or past , 
should there be any such aspect as facticity? The answer to 
this is central to Sartre's philosophy . Why is it that 
absolute freedom does not mean that I can shop around "as 
the soul s in Plato•s Repu.blic choose their condition~ 112 
My past is what I was; it is what I have to be . In a 
metaphor not unlike Bergson•s jet of steam , Sartre expresses 
the past as the For-itself becoming reattached to Being- in-
1 1£1£., p. 630 . Italics are mine . 
2 Ibid., P• 83 . 
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1 itself. If I killed a man two years ago, this event cannot 
be changed; I cannot either bring him to life again or make 
myself innocent of killing him. This is facticity. Nothing 
is said about having to kill him in the first place, yet now 
I have to be the person who did it. "Having to be" ex-
presses both the necessity and the responsibility (usually 
opposites) of facticity. For example, when I tell a friend 
that I "have to be" somewhere promptly at noon, he under-
stands that this is a "necessity" but that it is only such 
because I am a free agent. Because I am free to make myself 
into the type of person who honors his appointments, I 11must 11 
honor this one. Normally "having to be 11 is expressive of 
moral strength rather than of logical or causal necessity. 
Thus, when I have to be the person who killed a man two 
years ago, the necessity by which I have to be this person 
is such only through the activity of consciousness in "ap-
propriating 11 the deed as my own. A jury may convict me of 
killing this man, yet if I have refused to accept the 
facticity of having to be the murderer, I have jettisoned a 
portion of my past--I draw a blank for the period of time in 
which the murder occurred. In a moment we shall examine 
this curious possibility; for the time being, let us simply 
allow it in order to draw out an implication. 
Suppose a man to have such a blank spot 1n his past. 
1
see below, p. 306, quote. 
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That is, up to a point in his past he was an agent, and 
after a point he was an agent again; but during that period 
"something clicked, 11 "something possessed me," 11 I couldn 1 t 
help myself, 11 or 11 I don 1 t remember·. 11 Now, reasoning not 
from the point of view of a jury, but from the point of view 
of the person, himself, can he be said to have existed1 
during that interval in which the man was murdered? Even 
jurisprudence confesses to difficulties at this point, since 
it makes distinctions between premeditated and unpremedi-
tated murder and, significantly, considers itself unable to 
prosecute a man who is unaware (through feeblemindedness or 
amnesia) that the crime has been committed. 
This points to the impulsion to appropriate one's past 
no matter how distasteful it may be; for, not to have a past, 
not to have to be what one was, is, simply, not to be any-
thing. According to Sartre, the past is the measure of suc-
cess attained by the For-itself in its drive to fill itself 
up with being. As such, it is a sort of double-bladed tool; 
it is double-bladed because without a past, without a career, 
I am nothing, but the past which I have to be is also my 
movement toward Being-in-itself. One might say, paraboli-
cally, that life is a process of filling oneself up with 
1
"Existed 11 here has special meaning. With Leibniz we 
may suggest that to exist is to act; but we must go beyond 
Leibniz (or beyond the panpsychism of the Monadology) to 
suggest also that to exist means to be conscious of that act 
by which one exists. Thus, existence implies a subjective 
response. 
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death~ What Sartre has given is an account of the human 
phenomenon of aging· •. 
Thus the for-itself is sustained by a perpetual con-
tingency for which it assumes the responsibility and 
which it assimila tes without ever being able to suppress 
it. This perpetually evanescent contingency of the in-
itself which, without ever allowing itself to be appre-
hended, haunts the for-itself and reattaches it to being-
in-itself--this contingency is what we shall call the 
facticity of the for-itself. It is this facticity which 
permits us to say that the for-itself is, that it ex-
ists.l 
However, if I murdered a man, I did it, and presumably 
did not have to do it. Yet facticity includes factors over 
which I apparently have no control at all. My birth, po-
sition, status, environment, parentage are also facts which 
form my past and present, and here it is difficult for the 
realist in all of us to understand how this content of con-
tingency-facticity-necessity can be charged to my account. 
If hatred is me, then it is not easy to see how I could have 
been anything other than that hatred (or tha t tree which is 
also me be anything other than that tree). The pettish re-
crimination that "I didn't as k to be born," seems, for all 
its childishness, to express a truth. 
In order to understand Sartre's position, it is neces-
sary to approach an answer obliquely. The basic duality in 
Sartre's ontology splits Being in two, into Being-in-itself 
and Being-for-itself (or consciousness). Then the dialectic, 
designed to move from Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself 
1 Sartre, Being and No thingness, pp. 82-83. 
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to "the world," begins operation with the result that while 
Being- in-itself cannot be called responsible for producing 
the nothing which is Being- for- itself, the for-itself, by 
its very nature , is responsible for that world in which it 
"finds" itself·. Thus, to be conscious is to have been born 
into the world. On the other hand, to refuse to accept the 
responsibility for there being a world is precisely the at-
tempt to barter consciousness for thinghood. However, such 
a trade then results in a world without the consciousness by 
means of which there is a world--an absurdity which shows 
the tendency toward thinghood to be really a tendency toward 
the primordial Being of Being- in-itself. Thus, to accept 
the world is j& accept it in all its structuredness, .lust §:.§ 
if it~ totally given; and thus it is that facticity is 
the chosen necessity of my being in the world. 
Yet all this seems a far cry from freedom; perhaps it 
is nothing but a grim joke which makes me responsible for 
that which cannot be altered (for, although much in the 
world can be altered, one must first accept it "as it is" 
before such alteration can even begin) . It is in this sense 
that all that is presented as the world is in the past : and, 
with reference to the past all facticity is equally fac-
titious , the fact that I chose soup instead of a sandwich 
yesterday for lunch as well as the fact that I was born with 
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a club foot. Each is what I have to be. 1 
The only escape from facticity, paradoxically enough, 
is what might popularly be conceived as the most factitious 
event of all--my death (or the temporary refuge, under 
terror or torture for example, of fainting). My body, 2in-
cluding my emotions is part of the world, which, by becoming 
conscious, I accept. Thus it is that my facticity can only 
be avoided by a return to the in-itself, and this, in turn, 
can only be accomplished by my death-. My death is the final 
end, for Sartre, not because it is a dissolution of the body, 
but because it is, so to speak, a final return to the 11 thing-
hood11 of the in-itself. As long as I am conscious I am re-
sponsible for existing my world and my body, and no matter 
what forces operate on me they are forces within the world. 
When I lose consciousness, I give myself into the keeping of 
others (their world) to keep alive or to kill. This is not 
merely humanistic piety. By the terms of phenomenology the 
in-itself to which I return by surrendering my consciousness 
is phenomenon. As I leave my fate to others, to be re-
membered, enshrined, forgotten, or defiled, I leave my phe-
nomenality to them--it is all there is left when I lose 
c onsc iousne ss. 
1It is quite obvious that there is a difference be-
tween being born with a club foot and choosing soup yester-
day". The difference "\'Till be discussed under the heading of 11 freedom. 11 
2 See Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego, p. 99~ 
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3·. The notion of "bad faith" attempts to account for 
aspects of experience not accounted for by temporality or 
facticity. Specifically, it gives title and classification 
to a whole range of human experience--the experience of 
i r responsibility-through-non-freedom. Temporalization and 
facticity have been presented as indicating that conscious-
ness is totally responsible for there being a -v.rorld. Bad 
faith is the attempt to deny this. One may suspect that the 
condition of bad faith is, at least intermittently, a gener-
al human condition--the condition of trying to eat one's 
cake and have it, too. 
A provisional definition of bad faith is offered as 
1 
"willing irresponsibly not to be wha t one is." Then, since 
what one is is defined by the facticity of his world, we may 
continue more specifically by calling that wish bad faith 
which wishes irresponsibly that its world were otherwise~ 
Acting in bad faith will be construed as acting irresponsi-
bly as if the world were otherwise. Bad faith is not a 
11lie 11 told or acted toward another, or a failure to keep 
one's contracts with another; it is, instead, a lie told to 
Bad faith can only be meaningful on the premise that 
one must answer for his world. Otherwise, I have every 
right to reject my lot and to damn whatever allotters there 
111 Is 11 here refers to the factici ty of myself, my 
essence, rather than to the "nothing" which is the for-itself. 
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may be for my meager portion. However, while it can be 
meaningful only on this premise, that very premise renders 
bad faith futile. 1 It is futile for two reasons. First , 
1-1ishing and acting as if one 1 s world, or part of it, were 
otherwise does not make it otherwise~ Second (and more to 
the Sartrean point) , he who acts in bad faith must realize 
that he has not thereby evaded responsibility--for it is 
himself who acts in bad faith, and if he refuses to be re-
sponsible for his world, he is yet responsible for that re-
fusal. It is as with a murderer, who may succeed in reject-
ing his responsibility for the murder; yet now he is "the 
type of person who rejects the fact of his being a murderer, 11 
and he is responsible for being this type of person·. 
It would appear that the opposite of bad faith should 
be wishing to be, or acting like, what one is. This is 
labeled "sincerity" by Sartre. However , since it, too, is 
1A boy wishing to be, or acting like, a man (swagger, 
disrespect , demands for recognition), or a truck driver act-
ing like a professor (or a professor acting like a truck 
driver) are examples of bad faith. Sartre (Being and 
Nothingness , pp. 55-56) uses the example of a woman going to 
an assignation suppressing the knOi'lledge that her love is 
not all that will be expected of her. This is refusing to 
admit part of the structure of the world. Then, when re-
ality bursts upon her at the tryst, she is "taken by sur-
prise" and "victimized" either by her passion or by the 
passion of her lover. This attempt, to garner the best 
fruits of being a person and a thing at the same time well 
characterizes both the fact and the futility of bad faith. 
Sartre 's book, Baudelaire, trans. Martin Turrell (New 
York: Horizon Press, 1949) is a detailed expression of bad 
faith of this type·. "Baudelaire wanted to be something 
whose very nature was a contradiction--he wanted to be a 
freedom-thing" (p·. 69) ·. 
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wishing or acting irresponsibly it is simply another facet 
of bad faith. Let us illustrate. Note the surprising 
candor of those who will reveal their deepest deficiencies 
at the slightest hint of an audience. Note the lawyer who 
is able to don the robe of his profession (or the waiter who 
is able to don the white coat of his trade) and to don, at 
the same time, a compromising set of standards peculiar to 
1 that profession or trade. He is being sincere, in a manner 
of speaking, for this is what he is. Note the alcoholic, 
who takes the first step of admitting his condition at the 
drop of a hat; the henpecked husband who admits that he is 
"weak." All these are sincere self-revelations. They are 
all bad faith. 
They are bad faith in its reverse aspect because, 
while the persons involved are willing to be what they are, 
2 they will irresponsibly. Sincerity, for Sartre, is the act 
of blaming the universe for what one is·. Naturalism is pe-
culiarly subject to sincerity, for naturalism looks outside 
the individual for his causes~ It appears that the only 
1 Cf. Sartre, Being and Nothi~ess, pp. 5~60. For 
other Sartrean illustrations: a g~ speaker, a good 
listener, a homosexual, see to p~ 64. 
2 
"Sincerity" is closely connected with the social 
concept of "seriousness." The serious man views himself as 
an object, as a "tool of destiny." He thus absolutizes his 
importance and then rushes off to get done that which awaits 
his presence and capability before it will get done. The 
term, however, should not be used to imply that life is a 
frivolous business, even for Sartre. It is absurd, but not 
a gay round of levity. 
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escape from bad faith is to will to be what one is--re-
sponsibly.1 
4. It must be granted that little has been said about 
a term supposedly correlative with responsibility--freedom. 
Far from showing responsibility to be the way of freedom, 
Sartre appears to have cast a pall over responsibility which 
oppresses freedom and drives it away. However, it would 
seem that if irresponsible freedom is a contradiction, so 
must also responsible unfreedom be a contradiction·. 
It is difficult to see how I can be considered as act-
ing freely if I am taken by force and made to do something I 
did not wish to do. Even Sartre must agree that this could 
not be construed as free action. Thus it would appear that 
my freedom has been curtailed and that the phrase 11 absolute 
freedom 11 is a misnomer. Yet here a curious twist in meaning 
comes to light; for, insofar as I have been forced, it must 
be granted that it is not I who have acted. Nothing has 
been proven about the possibility of an unfree act since, as 
the illustration is cast, there is no action on my part at 
1It is hoped that bad faith, as Sartre understands the 
term, has been dealt with accurately. Philosophical 11 trans-
lation11 of this topic has been free on the grounds that 
Sartre leaves no choice. The reader is referred to Being 
and Nothingness, pp. 47-72 for Sartre's own words on bad 
faith. 
312 
1 
all. 
Yet there is a ready retort to this. First, one might 
accuse Sartre of simply defining the area of freedom so that 
it is coextensive with activity and leaving a real problem 
with a deceptively impressive solution. Second, one might 
argue that, while it seems to be true that the force applied 
to me is extraneous to the question of my freedom, it really 
is not, since I may well have had an intent in a direction 
other than that of the force, the interruption of which is 
as surely nonfreedom as could be any 11 forced action. 11 The 
sum of both these criticisms is that Sartre speaks of 
actions when he should be speaking of men. 
Bartra's reply is first to shrink the quantity of 
events in which men can claim nonfreedom. We may parallel 
this by asking a series of questions of the man who thinks 
he is "forced" to do something against his wishes. 
a) Was the force in the nature of threats, so that you 
did have the choice of alternatives? 
b) Did you submit to (possibly physical) force 
passively when it became evident that resistance was futile? 
c) Was the force applied such that you could not break 
free, no matter what the pain might have been, or no matter 
1 This has an important corollary in Bartra's social 
and political anarchism·. It means that no pressure, social, 
political or economic, can be said to force me to act. Cf. 
Maurice Natanson, "Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre 1 s Ontology," 
Nebraska. University Studies: New Series, VI (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1951), P• 48. 
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how permanent or serious the disfiguration? 
d) Were you careless in securing your home; did you 
enjoy carrying large sums of money with you; did you take 
the poorly lighted way home; did you enjoy "slumming"? 
e) Were you a partisan of some cause that your as-
sailants opposed? 
1 f) Did you faint from terror or pain? 
Common sense or common bravery will rebel at some of these 
questions . What kind of man would it be who would not sub-
mit himself to much to save his children from mutilation? 
Yet that is precisely the point; if there was such a circum-
stance , then I can be said to have acted. We are not de-
bating the point of where the limit might be to a man's ca-
pacity to remain inert; we are attempting to locate a strand 
of voluntary activity, and , it begins to appear that if one 
is willing to count the cost and pay the price in fatigue , 
mutilation , or the mutilation or death of one's children, 
the confines of nonfreedom shrink remarkably'. 
Still, there seems to be a hard core of nonfreedom 
left . The fact is that I must count the cost--that there 
are circumstances within which I must make my way; for ex-
ample : my club foot . It is facticity which appears to 
1sartre's book, The Emotions (New York: Philosophical 
Library , 1939) is an attempt to illustrate freedom with re-
gard to hysterical behavior , or emotional behavior in 
general . See also Sartre's short story, The Wall, trans . 
Lloyd Alexander (New York: New Directions, 1948) , and Being 
and Nothingness, pp. 435 , 491 , 506. 
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thwart freedom, in the final analysis. Sartre's second at-
tack on nonfreedom must then be a reminder of the play of 
freedom on facticity. Let us quote a long , but lucid, 
passage from Being and Nothingness so that Sartre can pre-
sent his own case. 
The decisive argument which is employed by common sense 
against freedom consists in reminding us of our impo-
tence. Far from being able to modify our situation at 
our whim, we seem to be unable to change ourselves. I 
am not 11 free 11 either to escape the lot of my class, of 
my nation, of my family, or even to build up my own 
power or my fortune or to conquer my most insignificant 
a ppetites or habits. I am a born worker, a Frenchman, 
an hereditary syphilitic, or a tubercular. The history 
of a life, whatever it may be, is the history of a 
failure. The coefficient of adversity of things is such 
that years of patience are necessary to obtain the 
feeblest result. Again it is necessary "to obey nature 
in order to command it"; that is, to insert my action 
into the network of determinism. • •• 
Many of the facts set forth by the determinists do not 
actually deserve to enter into our considerations. In 
particular the coefficient of adversity in things ~ 
not be ~ argument against 21!!: freedom, for it is .Qy J:!§,--
i.~., .Qy the preliminary positing of ~ end--that this 
coefficient of adversity arises. A particular crag, 
which manifests a profound resistance if I wish to dis-
place it, will be on the contrary a valuable aid if I 
want to climb upon it in order to look over the country-
side. In itself--if one can even imagine what the crag 
can be in itself--it is neutral; that is, it waits to be 
illuminated by an end in order to manifest itself as ad-
verse or helpful •••• Thus although brute things can 
from the start limit our freedom of action, it. is our 
freedom itself which must first constitute the framework, 
the technique, and the ends in relation to which they 
will manifest themselves as limi ts.l · 
We find, then, that for Sartre, while common sense is 
correct in sensing brute facts as a limitation on freedom, 
1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 482. Italics are 
mine. 
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the limitation is secondary and derived from the freedom to 
select ones purposes or "projects." Even so, however; even 
if it is "our freedom which constitutes the limits which it 
1 
will subsequently encounter," common sense may yet be cor-
rect in insisting that these limits still are not willed by 
freedom. They are a part of the projects, as a counterpoint 
is part of a melody or an epistrophe is part of a drama, but 
still there is in them a counter-action to freedom. Sartre 
has a significant reply to this persistence. 
Of course, even after all these observations, there re-
mains an unnamable and unthinkable residuum which be-
longs to the in-itself considered and which is responsi-
ble for the fact that in a world illuminated by our 
freedom, this particular crag will be more favorable for 
scaling and that one not~ But this residue is far from 
being originally a limit for freedom; in fact, it is 
thanks to this residue--that is, to the brute in-itself 
as such--that freedom arises as freedom. 2 
At this point freedom begins to take on "existential import" 
as it is linked with temporalization·. 
Indeed common sense will agree with us that the being 
who is said to be free is the one who can realize his 
projects •••• If conceiving is enough for realizing, 
then I am plunged in a world like that of a dream in 
which the possible is no longer in any way distinguished 
from the real·. I am condemned henceforth to see the 
world modified at the whim of the changes of my 
consciousness. • • • Once the distinction between the 
simple wish, the representation which I could choose~ 
and the choice is abolished, freedom disappears too~J 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid. 
3 Ibid., pp. 482-483·. 
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Sartre sums up: 
Consequently the resistance which freedom reveals in the 
existent, far from being a danger to freedom, results 
only in enabling it to arise as freedom. There can be a 
free for-itself only as engaged in a resisting world·. 
Outside of this engagement the notions of freedom, of 
determinism , of necessity lose all meaning.l 
And, finally, 
it is necessary to woint out to common sense that the 
formula "to be free' does not mean "to obtain what one 
has wished" but rather "by oneself to determine oneself 
to choose.n In other words success is not important to 
freedom •••• The technical and philosophical concept 
of freedom opposed to the empirical and popular concept, 
the only one which we are considering here, means only 
the autonomy of choice·.2 
Now, perhaps, we also may sum up. Human freedom re-
quires the concreteness of situations within which to mani-
fest itself--without facticity, no concreteness, and without 
concreteness, no freedom. Freedom works, thus, in two tempo-
ral directions. Toward the future, my projects are my own, 
along with the obstructions to their realization. Toward 
the past, I both signify my past--highlight it, as it were--
and suffer (let) my facticity, that same facticity which is 
the condition of my freedom. The emergent concept, then, is 
of more than a correlation between freedom and responsi-
bility; it is a concept of their identity, since to choose, 
to "nihilate," to temporalize , are terms common to both. 
1 Ibid., p. 483 . Note here the social implications, 
later to be developed in the concept of the "us-group." We 
may also carry forward a possible clue to the difference be-
tween man and God. Man works out his projects; God creates·. 
2 Ibid. , p·. 483. 
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"Freedom, choice, nihilation, temporalization are but one 
sole and selfsame thing."1 In our closing chapter a compari-
son must be made between the close association of freedom 
and purpose in Sartre and in Brightman. For the moment, 
however, let us end this topic with an "existential" epitaph. 
Man, as a nihilating-projecting-existing nothing has 
been milked of all the freedom it can produce. For the cap-
stone of freedom a return must be made to Being-in-itself~ 
A glance is sufficient to show, on Sartre's postulates, that 
no determining or imperative force emanates from the in-it-
self to render any action preferable to any other. In this 
accidental universe everything is permitted. The greatest 
and most terrifying freedom of all is not the knowledge that, 
whatever I am, or was, I must answer for·. The greatest 
freedom is the crushing knowledge that, on the contrary, 
there is no one to answer to~ I am held accountable for all 
things, but I am held accountable by and to nobody. Nothing, 
therefore, matters·. The absurdity of a totally responsible 
being in a totally irresponsible universe is the paradox of 
· human existence. Freedom, thus, crashes down on me like a 
thunderbolt, and, as it liberates it numbs. Perhaps the 
greatest hope for mankind lies in concealing this paradox 
from himself. Perhaps his hope is in his capacity for bad 
faith. But it is not the philosopher's job to build a 
1 
· Ibid., p. 435; see also Natanson , Nebraska Studies, 
p. 48.-
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system on that capacity~ 
6. Social Philosophy. 
A. Introduction and Transition. 
It is an abrupt step from the preceding exposition to 
a discussion of social philosophy. It is abrupt, in the 
first place, because the 11 penumbral image, 11 the outer mood, 
of the Sartrean philosophy is one of both primordial and 
existential loneliness. The primordial loneliness is that 
of Being-for-itself as it stands pitted against its adver-
sary, Being-in-itself. The existential loneliness is that 
of myself, condemned to freedom, adrift from substance, 
bearing the burden of the world, with no shoulder to lean on 
and no hope. From this must come a social philosophy . The 
step is abrupt, in the second place , because Sartre has 
given no inkling of the quantitative nature of Being-for-it-
self, or consciousness. It is true that there has been some 
attempt to show that consciousness is not impersonal. Yet 
impersonal or personal, it would seem that some investi-
gation of the nature of individuation would be in order. 
Perhaps Sartre is aware of difficulties present in a similar 
venture by Schopenhauer; perhaps, however, it is simply im-
possible to quantify or individuate that to which only nega-
tive characteristics seem to apply'. In any event , the very 
abruptness of the step into social philosophy gives notice 
of a point of departure into its problems that may be 
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peculiar to phenomen0logical- existential method. There is 
to be no attempt either to prove the existence of 11 other 
centers of consciousness," to infer their existence from 
evidence, or to assume a social aggregate at the outset as a 
datum . Consequently, ''~e may be warned that it is not "so-
ciety'' at all that Sartre is investigating, but simply an-
other facet of consciousness and its world . The experience 
(soon to be expounded) of "being looked at" and its impact 
on Being-for- itself is, then, the topic, and the empirical 
examination of this experience remains within the area de-
fined by phenomenological method·. Let us continue. 
B. The Other. 
That there is an egocentric predicament specially 
applicable to knowledge of subjects seems undeniable . For-
getting, for the moment , the ontological relationship be-
tween Being- in-itself and Being-for-itself, let us simply 
consider me in the concrete situation of the world. My 
subjectivity belongs only to me, and the creatures that move 
about in it-- that which I see walking toward me with its 
hand raised in greeting and that which moves down the street 
unmindful of my presence--are parts of my experience, sig-
nificant to me . They are alike inhabitants of my world·. 
Sartre deals swiftly with realism and its assumption of 
other persons , and with critical idealism and its inferences 
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1 from experience; summarily dealt with also is the "reef of 
solipsism, "2and intuition as a method for apprehending other 
persons directly". 3 What other possibilities remain? 
The Sartrean "proof" of the existence of other centers 
of consciousness appears to owe its beginning to Hegel. For 
example, one may note, in Phenomenology of Mind, the pe-
culiar dialectic of relation between lordship and bondage. 4 
Normally the idealistic philosopher approaches the question 
of the existence of others from his own experience, so that 
"the other" is constituted by my experience. He is thus my 
object. Hegel understood that master-slave is a relation-
ship of reciprocity--that the master depends upon the being 
of the slave just as much as the slave depends upon the 
master •. 
Thus Hegel's brilliant intuition is to make me depend 
upon the Other in my being. I am, he said, a being for-
itself which is for-itself only through another • .5 
This is, for Sartre, the first step, the recognition that 
"the Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and 
1 ibid.' 223ff. See pp. 
2 ibid.' 229. See p. 
3see ibid.' p. 223. 
4 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. 
Baillie (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1931), pp. 229-
240. 
5Ibid. , p. 23T. 
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1 
me. 11 This mediation does not, however, rely on a prior as-
sumption of the existence of another center of conscious-
ness; instead, it is internally recognized by virtue of 
emotional phenomena such as that of shame·. The phenome-
nological explanation of shame is that it is an act of self-
objectification. 11 I am put in the position of passing 
judgment on myself as on an object. "2 Now, if we put to-
gether the two notions--that of the hypothetical master and 
his slave, and that of me, not as hypothetical but as I am, 
we may appreciate the feeling, from within the subjective 
reality of myself, of being made an object. It seems to be 
this, for Sartre, that is the Other: the presence within my 
experience of that which makes of me an object·. Let us 
illustrate. 
I sit in the park, amiably surrounded by my envelope 
of experience, which includes among other phenomena 
creatures phenomenally present to me feeding pigeons, airing 
babies and so forth. If I can abstract myself from my enve-
lope at all, the comfortable feeling of being a detached 
spectator of real events wells in to fill its place. The 
world is full of me and those objects I apprehend. Then I 
discover with a shock that a pair of eyes is turned in my 
direction. It is not that I suddenly know that there is an 
1 Ibid., p. 222. 
2Ibid. 
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Other in the world; it is simply that I now have a new ex-
perience--that of being watched. But this experience of 
being watched performs an inestimable operation on me; for 
now I am able to apprehend myself through this experience as 
an object. I am "exteriorized·. 11 The inability of my ex-
perience heretofore confined within subjectivity to account 
for this new turn of events sends me scurrying for the 
nearest figleaf, for now I have a new perspective of myself. 
I am also a me, that is, the object of investigation. To 
put together a bad word, I see myself in my specimen-ness. 
Now let us return to theory. How does an operation 
such as this occur? It occurs, according to Sartre, by 
virtue of the essential nature of the for-itself. It will 
be remembered that the only way this can have meaning for 
Sartre apart from facticity is if 11 essential nature" be con-
ceived of as a lack, a negation. Now this is not revo-
lutionary~ Both realism and idealism hold that whatever the 
Other is, his prime immediate characteristic is that he is 
not me·. However, this is simply, for Sartre, a specifi-
cation of the general principle that all determination is 
negation. Thus, the mistake of traditional philosophies has 
been to speak of the negation which "posits" the existence 
of another person as of the same order as that which posits 
the table as "not a chair. 11 But the negation by which I af-
firm that 11 I am not Paul 11 is of a different order than that 
which affirms that the table is not the chair. It is an 
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1 internal negation: "a negation which posits the original 
distinction between the Other and myself as being such that 
it determines me by means of the other and determines the 
other by me ans of me ·. 112 
For Sartre, then, the internality of this particular 
relationship protects it from the a priorism of assuming 
there to be terms (specifically the other person) prior to 
any relationship, while the very essence of the relationship 
as a negation, protects the identification (melting ) of the 
Other and myself. Thus the constitutive negation of the 
Other as not me leads to the constitutive negation of me as 
not the Other, while t he very presence of such a negative 
experience discloses the "me" to myself. The argument seems 
to owe much to Robert Burns and his wished-for "Gift the 
Genie gie us," except tha t the gift is already given in the 
self-experience of the Other. 
So I sit in the park and am suddenly aware of myself 
as an object. No more is needed. The Other is present in 
1
"External" an d "internal" negations here appear to 
mean approximately the same as they do for the traditional 
philosophic problem of the nature of relations. An external 
relation does not enter into the terms which it relates as a 
constituent of those terms·. It, so to speak, hangs between 
them, and is thus in danger of becoming an entity, itself. 
An internal relation does enter into its terms as a constitu-
ent . Sartre's main problem will be to affirm the inter-
nality of the relationship between myself and the other 
while, at the same time, avoiding the 11melting together 11 of 
the terms that such internality seems to imply. 
2 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 232 . 
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my feeling that my subjectivity is being drained into objec-
tivity--someone else is filling his envelope of experience 
with me. This is not a proof; it is an experience; but it 
is the brand-new experience of myself being seen. What has 
1 happened is that my world has assumed a new structure, and 
this structure requires new adaptations on my part. 
c. The Social Relationship Between Myself and the Other. 
Now we may return to general terms and attempt to de-
scribe the social situation basically as a constant battle 
to retain my subjectivity while at the same time preserving 
the continuity of my experience by objectifying others~ It 
is because of the presence of the Other that I become 11 self-
conscious,11 that is, I blush, or preen, or in other ways be-
have as one who knows that he is in the presence of somebody 
and not alone. We must understand this 11 self-consciousness 11 
~y world has already in it, of course, the structures 
which I call human bodies, and with which I must cope in 
certain ways if I am to fulfill my projects. That these 
structures seem to contain the force which causes me to be 
an object, that is, an eye which looks at me and causes me 
to become self-conscious does not require anything in the 
way of connecting explication. It is the look, and not the 
eye which is the basis for the theory of the Other. This 
apparently sloppy argument is not insignificant. Let us ex-
tend Sartre, for a moment , to conjecture that because of the 
happenstance connection between an eye and a look, Sartre is 
able to speak in terms of myself and the other subjectivity 
without having either to infer (from the outside) another 
subject or having recourse to direct intuition of another 
subjectivity . The present i'lriter is of the opinion that if 
this strange relationship can be worked out clearly in expo-
sition it will prove to be a valuable tool for subsequent 
philoso phy . 
325 
as more epistemological in nature than it is psychological·. 
A merely psychological self-consciousness may not even be 
undesirable--that is to say that some people require the 
presence of others in order to be at their best; it is not 
always a blush that is the result of discovering oneself not 
alone . But this is not, apparently, what Sartre means; for 
in order to have any reaction to the presence of the Other, 
desirable or undesirable psychologically , there must first 
be the epistemologically oriented conflict of "inter-raid-
ing" subjecti vi ties. And if this is the case, my subjec-
tivity must, of necessity, shrink as I find myself "exteri-
orized." The gregarious person who is uncomfortable unless 
he is being looked at has already so exteriorized himself 
that he defines himself solely in terms of what the Other 
may see. The psychological state, thus, of gregariousness, 
is rather like a narcotics addict who has become little more 
than his habit, and cannot be comfortable in his previous 
condition. 
Why all this conflict as the basis of social activity 
and interactivity? Does it not speak only for the worst 
side of human nature? Existentialism seems, almost gener-
ally, to regard social life with a jaundiced eye. Sartre's 
illustrations of "the look" are of police spies or of looks 
that "catch" me. They seem far removed from our common ex-
perience . Is this simply evidence of a pervasive cynicism, 
or is there a deeper reason for sociality being seen as 
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based in conflict? Why can I not receive the Other's look 
with equanimity, secure in the knowledge that he can do me 
no harm, secure in my own ability to withdraw into myself , 
leaving him only an outer shell to appropriate? We do this; 
we call it repose, or self-control, or aloofness. In ex-
treme forms we may call it unresponsiveness, or maybe even 
schizophrenia. But we do do it. 
The point is that we cannot do it successfully because 
we do have an exterior side, a side which is essential to 
our concrete activity "in-situation." The blunt fact is 
that to rest secure in my own subjectivity, perhaps granting 
magnanimously that others, if others there be, can do the 
same, is to refuse to grant that my being is being-in-the-
world, and that to forsake the world is to lose my being. 
We may recall that the "existence" of the for-itself, its 
career, consists in what it can take from being for its own. 
This is what constitutes a life, and the life which has 
"done" nothing, which has produced and acted in no world is 
not a life at all but remains the primordial emptiness of 
the for-itself. 
Perhaps this can be put more simply by drawing the re-
lationship between what one is and what one does. Let us 
perform a perfunctory analysis ·. 
1. There is likely to be confusion in the usage of 
the term "existence." With regard to the ontological mean-
ing of Being-for-itself, to exist as for-itself means to be 
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the denial of being--to exist means to be what one is not 
and not to be what one is·. This is the only character-
ization possible at this stage--a difficulty which gives 
rise to one phase of the existentialist rubic: "Existence 
precedes essence. 11 
2. Human reality in the concrete situation is the 
for-itself as it progresses in its career. Its career is 
that of realizing its projects . In this sense, to exist, 
means to appropriate one's world to oneself, a task which 
inevitably means the progressive atrophy of the powerful 
void which is the for-itself. To exist, thus, is an act by 
which I give me to myself as a creature with a life and a 
past, but which life ·and past are nevertheless passive en-
crustations tending toward death (Being-in-itself) . It is 
as with a grenade, which is not a grenade until it explodes , 
but which, in the act of exploding destroys itself. 
3. Hence, being and doing, while by no means the same, 
both imply and negate each other. I am nothing until I have 
accomplished something in the world; yet the accomplishment 
and the I-act are not identical . It is for this reason that 
I must work out my own exterior side, and this requires 
others to apprehend it (or, more accurately, it requires 
others in order that my apprehension of myself as object may 
be mediated. At the same time I know that myself must be 
retained in its potency apart from the exteriority of my 
11 existence" or that very existence disappears for lack of a 
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"myself" to "exist" it. 
4. Thus being and doing, as concrete representatives 
respectively of Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself are 
condemned to a dialectical tension which can only be re-
solved by the absorption of Being-for-itself into the in-
itself. This progressive resolution is my life. 
5. Since both aspects of human reality are equally 
necessary, and since the Other is the sine qua nQn of the 
appearance of my exterior side, the Other is, consequently, 
a necessary party . He knows me as I do not know myself, and 
yet he fails to know me at all --until I am dead, and then I 
am nothing but what he knows of me. 
D. The We and the Us . 
With such a beginning, in the conflict between another 
person and myself , there seems to be little possibility of a 
mutual respect and mutual service. Service there is, for we 
cannot do without each other; but it is the service per-
formed for a warrior by the enemy-- he cannot grow unless he 
constantly pits himself against an adversary . Within this 
framework Sartre must found a social philosophy , and a 
social philosophy must deal in terms of community. 
Doubtless some one will want to point out to us that our 
description is incomplete since it leaves no place for 
certain concrete experiences in which we discover our-
selves not in conflict with the Other but in community 
with him.l 
1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 413. 
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For Sartre, there is a form of community which is an 
extension of the relationship between me and the Other. 
Such community a ppears with the entrance on the scene of a 
third party. 
I am engaged in conflict with the Other. The Third 
comes on the scene and embraces both of us with his 
look. • • • This means that I suddenly experience the 
existence of an objective situation-form. in the world 
of the Third in which the Other and I shall figure as 
equivalent structures in solidarity with each other.l 
It is this solidarity "against the third" which is the 
Sartrean basis for community. We unite, the Other and I, in 
common cause against "them" who objectify Y!!• There is no 
other basis. We may see, now, the stark social implications 
of the epistemological morass from which we have recently 
emerged. To be objectified is to be treated as an object--
as one whose total reason for being is to wait on another, 
to produce his goods, or to give him pleasure. This is the 
distinction between the classes and the basis of solidarity 
within a class. To unite against oppression, hence, is the 
only unification possible. 
7. Values. Ideals, and God·. 
A. Values. 
In this exposition a discussion of values will be con-
sidered only as a preface to a brief summary of Sartre's po-
sition on ideals·. The summary of ideals, in turn, will only 
1 Ibid., pp. 417-418~ 
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be included because it leads to the question of the nature 
and existence of God·. 
It may safely be assumed that in a system where "every-
thing is permitted" the universe as such is very likely to 
be seen as free of value-characteristics. This appears to 
be the nature of the universe considered as Being-in-i tself·. 
However, it will be recalled that the nature of the for-it-
self is to be nothing but its projects . Now, if we re-name 
projects and call them "purposes, 11 it \'i'ould appear that we 
have arrived at the seat of valuation in the Sartrean system. 
For him , first, "the for-itself in its being is failure be-
cause it is the foundation only of itself as nothingness."1 
How is it a "failure?" It is a failure because it define s 
itself as a lack. "In its coming into existence human re-
ality grasps itself as an incomplete being." 2 It is this 
lack which is felt as desire, and the incomplete being--that 
which is lacked--this must then be that upon which value is 
conferred. Thus, what is valuable is that which is "the 
particular totality which it lacks,"3and this, in turn, is 
its own existential selfhood. With some temerity it may be 
suggested, then, that valuation depends upon human reality 
and that the object of value is that projected self, filled 
1 Ibid., p. 89. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
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with being, and lacking--nothing. Barnes ' definition is 
helpful. 
In general value arises as the For-itself constitutes 
objects as desirable. More specifically value is the 
"beyond of all surpassings as the For-itself seeks to 
be united with its Self. It is what the For-itself 
lacks in order to be itself. [sic]l 
B. Ideals. 
The nature of what is considered to be valuable hints 
also at its ideal nature. vle are concerned, hera, not with 
a definition of 11 idaals 11 but with a brief summary of the 
ideality of values specifically conceived as the fullness of 
salfhood. In a line more reminiscent of Schopenhauer than 
of Nietzsche Sartre has shown the natura of the for-itself 
to be that of constantly surpassing itself, reaching out to 
fill itself with being. This "ontic greed" of the for-it-
self appears insatiable, since satiety, by definition means 
the destruction of the projection of the for-itself. 
Let us be aware of the distinction between 11 infini te 
perfectibility" and this order of appropriation of being. 
The career of the for-itself is founded on the impossibility 
of the task reaching a successful conclusion--as the task 
approaches conclusion the destruction of the for-itself ap-
proaches with precisely equal imminence. Thus an ideal, for 
Sartre, must appear to human reality rather like a flame to 
a moth; the realization of the ideal constitutes the 
1Ibid., p. 634. 
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immolation of that which made the ideal possible in the 
first place. If it can be said that man is an idealizing 
animal, then it can equally be said that his idealizing is 
his great useless passion·. 
c. God. 
The generalization of all ideals is the end of the 
dialectical tension between Being-in-itself and Being-for-
itself--in the quenching of the emptiness of the for-itself 
by the fullness of the in-itself~ This is Sartre's defi-
nition of God: Being-in-itself-for-itself. God, thus, is a 
contradiction in terms~ 
Total being, the concept of which would not be cleft by 
an hiatus and which would nevertheless not exclude the 
nihilating-nihilated being of the for-itself, that being 
whose existence would be a unitary synthesis of the in-
itself and of consciousness--this ideal being would be 
the in-itself founded by the for-itself and identical 
with the for-itself which founds it--i.e. the ens causa 
~· But precisely because we adopt the point-of view 
of this ideal baing in order to judge the real being 
••• we must establish that the real is an abortive 
effort to attain to the dignity of the self-cause~ 
Everything happens as if the world, man, and man-in-the-
world succeeded in realizing only a missing God·. Every-
thing happens therefore as if the in-itself and the for-
itself were presented in a state of disintegration in 
relation to an ideal synthesis ·.l 
God, then, is what man values, and God is the ideal of human 
reality. God, however, not only does not, but cannot exist. 
8. Conclusion. 
We have reached the end of a somewhat perilous 
1 Illi·' p. 623. 
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exposition. Let us conclude, not with a recapitulation, but 
simply by putting together the beginning of Sartre's ontolo-
gy and the end. Let us suppose, for a moment that the im-
possible were actual, that God existed as Alpha and Omega. 
Let us suppose that God created Being-in-itself and stands 
above it as its ground. Being-in-itself, then, would be 
crea ted being. How has anything been changed? 
A clear view of the phenomenon of being has often been 
obscured by a very common prejudice which we shall call 
"creationism . 11 Since people supposed that God had gi van 
being to the world, being always appeared tainted with a 
certain passivity". But a creation ~ nihilo can not ex-
plain the coming to pass of being; for if being is con-
ceived in a subjectivity, even a divine subjectivity, it 
remains a mode of intra-subjective being. Such subjec-
tivity can not have even the representation of an objec-
tivity, and consequently it can not even be affected 
with the will to create the objective. Furthermore 
being, if it is suddenly placed outside the subjective 
by the fulguration of which Leibniz s peaks , can only af-
firm itself as distinct from and opposed to its creator; 
otherwise it dissolves in him •••• If being exists as 
over against God, it is its own support; it does not 
preserve the least trace of divine creation. In a word, 
even if it had been crea ted, being-in-itself would be 
inexplicable in terms of creation; for it assumes its 
being beyond the creation.l 
Even if God impossibly existed, it is with being that man 
has to do~ And it is the utter contingency of being which 
marks man as a useless passion: the author of his own acts, 
and hence responsible for everything, yet able to accomplish 
nothing. 
1 Ibid., p. lxvi . 
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CHAPTER VI 
APPRAISAL OF THE THOUGHT OF 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE 
1. Introduction. 
Professor John Wild has observed that existentialism 
has had a "profound influence on many contemporary minds 
which have derived from it new inspiration and real hope for 
the revival and reconstruction of philosophy in our t1me. 111 
Similarly, w. E. Hocking, in concluding a section dealing 
with existentialism, has intimated that this type of phi-
losophy may well signal an altogether new era 1n philosophi-
cal thought. 2 Somewhat on the other hand, E. s. Brightman 
was less willing to grant either profundity or novelty when 
he allowed that "either existentialism is good personalism 
or it is nonsense."3 These voices, speaking from outside of 
an existentialist persuasion, indicate some of the general 
feelings of that portion of the philosophical community 
which has taken time to study with a. degree of seriousness 
the main works of existentialism~ Sa.rtre's Being and 
1John Wild, The Challenge of Existentialism (Blooming-
ton: Indiana. University Press, 1955), p. 26. 
2Hock1ng, Types of Philosophy, pp. 304-312. 
3This statement was made by Dr. Brightman in conver-
sation with the present writer·. 
Nothingness deserves a place among these main works, and 
these comments (and others, less informed or more partisan, 
or both) are germane to it. 
Dr. Brightman's comment is both perplexing and illumi-
nating. It voices, at least parabolically, an impression 
quite other than that held by Wild and Hocking; for it sug-
gests that Sartre either is saying nothing that has not been 
more systematically included in a previous philosophy, or is 
writing gibberish. It may be that the truth lies somewhere 
between these alternatives; certainly there is much that is 
obscure in Sartre's exposition, and possibly there is 
something new and even important there also. It is the task 
of this chapter to challenge certain Sartrean concepts in 
the hope that what is important, in the eyes of the present 
writer, may be distilled for use~ 
With this end in view several questions will be asked 
of Sartre. In part, these questions will reflect what may 
be a popular dissatisfaction with the Sartrean system·. The 
questions, listed immediately below, will be used as a topi-
cal outline. 
The general method of criticism may seem, on first ap-
praisal, to be so much on the "external" side as to consti-
tute a series of 11 sniper 11 engagements~ One of the reasons 
for this appearance is Sartre'e very positive approach, it-
self. When Sartre has allegedly 11 proven 11 a point, criticism 
may do well to confine itself to pointing out that the proof 
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is illicit or inconclusive. The other reason is that the 
present writer is in agreement with a great deal of what 
Sartre has to say, and is consequently concerned only with 
pointing out spots where the Sartrean conclusions are felt 
to be too sweeping for their supporting arguments or expla-
nations. Here, then, is our outline. 
A. Are there difficulties inherent in Sartre•s phe-
nomenological approach to an ontology? 
B. Has Sartre sufficiently demonstrated the absolute 
neutrality of Being-in-itself? 
c. Are the functions of Being-for-itself dispro-
portionate to its nature and capabilities? 
D. Is Sartre successful in removing all elements of 
"opacity" from human reality? 
E. Is his description of freedom sufficient to over-
come its collision with facticity? 
F. Is the Sartrean description of my relationship 
with the Other exhaustive? 
G. Is God the impossibility that Sartre has shown him 
to be? 
The first three topics are quite likely to bear on 
each other, as are the last four, and to suggest, in turn, 
two major areas of criticism. The first may be summed up as 
"phenomeno-ontological ;" the second as "existential." The 
usual :feeling about the first area may irreverently be 
characterized as the feeling that Sartre is trying hard "to 
pull something out o:f a hat." The usual feeling about his 
existentialism is that Sartre has cast the human predicament 
1n more somber tones than it really is. Before the labor of 
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criticism is begun, let us try to see these two areas from 
the point of view of what may have been Sartre's broad in-
tentions. 
It is possible that philosophy has labored over-dili-
gently in its search for a substantial ground, a causa sui, 
from which all the rest of what is may derive its being, its 
reason for being, and its nature. 
termed a philosophy of nihilism. 
Existentialism has been 
Apart from the socio-po-
li tical implications of the term, it is just possible that 
the introduction of the concept of "nothing" may relieve the 
burden on philosophy to explain growth, possibility, activi-
ty, and freedom in terms of a substance which is not 
equipped for such explanations. Perhaps this is what 
Hocking meant when he wrote of' a new era in philosophical 
thought. In any event, the sustained opposition of Sartre 
to Spinozism, Thomism, naturalism, and Freudian psychoanaly-
sis testifies to his attempt to find a new avenue for phi-
losophy. The attempt is to be commended. 
It is also possible that human reality has either been 
over-sanguine in its assumption of' its own destiny or over-
indulgent to itself in its own cynicism. There is a curious 
similarity between the case stated by the Story of' the 
Garden of Eden and that asserted by Protagoras (that man is 
the measure of all things). The somber tones of existential-
ism (curiously, through the curative of an overdose of intro-
spectiveness) attempt to correct both of these ego-centered 
338 
points of view. To correct the first it argues that man is 
not destined to replace the fallen angels; to correct the 
second it points out that the measure of all things is an 
ontological, not a human, yardstick. This combination gives 
existentialism a tone that, ghostlike, presides over every 
human situation, declaring that all, in the final analysis, 
is vanity. 
The view is as old as the words of the Preacher indi-
cate, and yet it has never found an official voice within 
technical philosophy. This, it is conceived, is what exis-
tentialism enjoins us to do--to continue gazing out toward 
where the stars end, and neither to shut one's eyes nor con-
jure up divine constellations. This, too, is to be com-
mended. 
This is a sketch of what one writer sees as the 
guiding motif of Sartre's phenomenology, ontology, and exis-
tentialism. Now it is time to appraise the system atic vehi-
cle of this motif. 
2. Critical Comments. 
A. Difficulties in the Phenomenological Approach~ 
The charge, here, is that there is really no con-
nection between the Sartrean phenomenological method and his 
ontology, and that an illusory connection has prejudiced the 
account of Being . 
Sartre has asked us to join him in an unusual analysis~ 
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The condition pertaining to the analysis is empirical--that 
we shall consider as data for analysis only that which mani-
fests itself, as it manifests itself. We are prohibited 
from admitting any extra-empirical material, whether it be a 
subject which receives the data or a non-empirical source of 
data. Thus we are directed to work within a set of brackets. 
Having staked out the area within which analysis will pro-
ceed, we are now to perform a fairly delicate surgical oper-
ation--that of laying out as specimens factors within the 
phenomenal data, 1n order, if possible, to isolate being. 
Let us list the specimens. 
1. There is the phenomenon or datum: the tree, the 
table, my body, myself as I find me to be. 
2. There is the phenomenon of the being of the tree 
or the table. Sartre does not like for us to say that the 
phenomenon of the being of the tree is 11 contained within 11 
the phenomenon of the tree, and yet this may be as close as 
abbreviated language can come. As "contained with1n11 the 
phenomenon of the tree is the phenomenon of the color of the 
tree--its green-ness, so also is "contained within" the phe-
nomenon of the tree the phenomenon of the being of the tree--
its 11 is-ness." 
3. There is the being 2,! !!!!. phenomenon of the tree 
or table. This is not to be confused with the phenomenon of 
the being of the tree~ The being of the phenomenon is a 
realistic assumption, not an appearance. It is an easy 
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assumption to make, far more easy than an assumption con-
cerning noumenal being, but it is an assumption all the same. 
It assumes the objective being of the phenomenon as phenome-
non. Take, for example, an hallucination. The pink ele-
phant that I "see" is not a real pink elephant, but it is a 
real hallucination. The hallucination has being. Shortly 
Sartre 'e "ontological proof of be1ng11 will be considered; 
for the present we are only laying out our specimens, eo to 
speak, to dry. 
As a generalization of this item, we may include also 
the being Q! ]b! phenomenon £! being. When sufficiently 
isolated and reunited with its obvious ontic implications, 
this will become Being-in-itself. 
4. There is the phenomenon of "consciousness (of) the 
tree. 11 At this point relationships become intricate. Per-
haps we can illustrate by a kind of rubric. It will 
doubtless be understood that tbs phenomenon of the tree and 
the phenomenon of the being of the tree can be distinguished 
but can, of course, never be separated. On the other hand 
we might say that the phenomenon of consciousness (of) the 
tree can never be distinguished from the phenomenon of the 
tree, but it must always be separate. It cannot be dis-
tinguished because it vanishes when seen 1n distinction from 
that (of) which it is conscious; but it must be separate be-
cause consciousness is always "at a distance" from its 
object. Thus we may conclude that the phenomenon of 
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consciousness (of) the tree has not even phenomenal being 
distinct from the tree. Sartre might term this "Phenomenal 
non-being." 
5. There is the being of the phenomenon of conscious-
ness (of) the tree. This, again, is a realistic assumption, 
since it considers the real being of that which appears as 
consciousness (of) the tree. However, it should also be re-
peated that the question here is not of a reality (noumenal) 
which produces the phenomenon of consciousness (of) the tree; 
the question is only of the being of consciousness as a phe-
nomenon. 
These, then, are the elements of phenomenological re-
search~ It does appear that the surgery has been completed 
without violating the phenomenological platfonn, and yet, at 
the same time, two orders of ontic being have been disclosed. 
How has this happened? It appears to have happened 1n two 
ways. Let us discuss them~ 
1. The analogue of the phenomenon of color has been 
used to illustrate the phenomenon of being. This illus-
tration can be carried only so far, however, because the 
term "being" has ont1c implications which "color" lacks~ It 
is this implication which may prove to be puzzling~ 
Presumably, the difference between phenomenology and 
ontology is that phenomenology considers as data only that 
which appears, while ontology is concerned with some sort of 
order of being. This is not to say that ontology is 
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cosmology, since ontology may only be concerned with priori-
ty and not with connections which show the generation of a 
universe. However, 1t does remain true that ontology deals 
with orders of being. For Perry, for example, logical and 
mathematical configurations were the basal types of being. 
Sartre moves deeper by seeking the being which is even be-
yond typification. Now we must ask, "Is phenomenology as a 
method qualified to deal with orders of being at all?" 
It is true that the phenomenon of being is legitimate 
material for phenomenological analysis~ This, however, 
would not appear to take us even beyond positivism. It 
would seem that 1n order to move to an ontological expli-
cation the discussion must first seek the being of phenome-
non and then the being of the phenomenon of being. Yet it 
has already been suggested that this is a step toward real-
ism and beyond phenomenology~ Even the being of an halluci-
nation, when abstracted from the hallucination fades to a 
realm beyond the reach of a method which purports to examine 
appearance as it appears. The step toward realism (it would 
appear that a theory of being before it is known is real-
istic) is camouflaged because of the ontic implications of 
the phenomenon of being-_ But the phenomenon of being is not 
being, it is only phenomenon~ 
2~ Cognizant, perhaps, that there are many different 
ways of analyzing things, Sartre defends his movement to on-
tology by means of his "ontological argument." In it he 
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intends to show that there must be being because conscious-
ness, in itself, is nothing, and therefore requires being 
"as its support." 
Consciousness is consciousness of something which is not 
itself. This means that consciousness • ~ • is born 
supported by a being which is not itself~ This is what 
we call the ontological proof.l 
We are here on the ground of being, not of knowledge-. 
It is not a question of showing that the phenomena of 
inner sense imply the existence of objective spatial 
phenomena, but that consciousness implies in its betng a 
non-conscious and transphenomenal being. • • • To say 
that consciousness is consciousness of something is to 
say that it must produce itself as a revealed-revelation 
of a being which is not it and which gives i_:t.self as al-
ready existing when consciousness reveals it~ 
Thus we have left pure appearance and arrived at 1'\111 
be1ng·.2 
Sartre has distinguished himself from the position of 
the objective idealist-. Beyond this, it may be that he has 
pinioned himself somewhere between a tautology and an il-
licit assumption. It is tautological because Sartre has 
only succeeded 1n showing what he assumed at the outset, 
that consciousness requires an object; it is an illicit as-
sumption because he assumes, but does not prove, that the 
object is ontologieally real·. 
Now it is doubttul that any philosopher would be pre-
pared to argue against the first premise of the ontologist~ 
"In the beginning there is being" seems indubitable~ Were 
Sartre simply to start here, we doubtless would reply, 11 Yes~ 
1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. lxi. 
2 ~·, -P~ lxii. 
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What is this being like?" But Sartre has already (pre-
cociously, it is felt) prepared us for his answer by reading 
ontological distinctions into his phenomenol~gical research~ 
However, if his phenomenological analysis is not applicable 
to his ontology he is guilty of a ~-sequitur~ 
If it is possible to reach a critical conclusion, it 
may be this: that there is an hiatus between phenomenology 
and ontology so that the phenomenologist is unable to speak 
about being without making a brand-new beginning. Any em-
pirical analysis is valuable if it tells us something, and 
Sartre's phenomenological analysis is no exception. But 
when one has taken such pains to enclose his investigation 
in brackets, he cannot be allowed to imprison only the 
Kantian within them while be, the phenomenologist-ontologist, 
evades them at will. 
However, as we have suggested, anybody can talk about 
being if he wants to~ Let us see, now that the Sartrean 
arguments must stand on their own feet, if his description 
of being is the only plausible one. He has asserted that 
Being is without internal characteristics, is unable to pro-
duce anything, and can claim no necessity or raison d 1etre. 
B. The Nature of Being-in-itself. 
1~ It is asserted that being is utterly without 
character beyond the bare characteristic of is-ness. Apart. 
:from the phenomenological argument that it is like this 
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because this is the type of analysis we chose to make, it 
would appear that, for Sartre, being must be without charac-
teristics because characteristics imply determinateness, and 
determinateness implies negativity~ There can be no nega-
tivity in being because negativity is not-being, and there 
can be no not-being in being~ 
Quite possibly it is true that there can be no nega-
tivity in being~ At least there is a semantical contra-
diction, and quite possibly there is an ontological contra-
diction as well~ But one wonders if it is really true that 
all determinateness implies negativity~ Determination, as 
an epistemic exercise involving a mind trying to order and 
arrange its experiences, requires definition, and defining, 
1n the usual sense of genus and differentia, entails ne-
gation. But here the negation is the judgmental act of the 
knowing mind, and does not seem necessarily to implicate the 
thing lmown 1n negations, even when the lmowledge is true~ 
For example, when you know that I am not Paul, your knowing 
requires a negation. But does my be±ns William (apart from 
anybody's lmowledge of it) require, as part of my nontic" 
structure, the negativity of not being Paul? It seems 
doubtful. 
Even some theories of knowledge are able to dispense 
with negation. For example in "knowledge by acquaintance" 
(possibly the 11 cleartt part of Descartes' "clear and distinct 
ideas") do we not simply know that an object (or "thing;" 
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the point does not lie in this distinction) is what it is? 
There it is; it is what it is~ That it is also not another 
thing does not seem to be central to its being what it is~ 
Possibly nothing descriptive could be said about it, al-
though doubtless it could be given a proper name, but it is 
cognized as what it is in all its richness and plenitude as 
well as all its there-ness~ I~ this is possible, then 
Sartre has not proven his case, and being may contain charac-
teristics Just as it "contains" being prior to its being re-
vealed by consciousness. 
Were this the case, while a considerable portion o~ 
the Sartrean dialectic between consciousness and being might 
have to be modified, at least one baffling aspect of his 
philosophy might be removed~ The illustration of the previ-
ous chapter, of the featureless face which receives ~eatures 
by being reflected in the mirror (which is nothing 1m itsel~) 
would be less perplexing i~ the face had features be~ore it 
was mirrored. Possibly these "primordial" features cannot 
be known, but there is little advantage in solving the 
problem of "unknowable characteristics" if such a solution 
is accomplished by the positive denial that there can be 
characteristics. 
2. It is asserted that being is not only without in-
ternal characteristics, but is also unable to support re-
lationships as well. In one sense this must be dogmatically 
true~ If being is all that there is, then normally there 
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stmply could be nothing exterior to being (there is no ex-
terior) to enter into any relationship. In the Sartrean 
system, however, non-being does stand 1n a relationship of 
exteriority to being~ Let us not quibble about this re-
lationship, or about relationships of subsequence or contra-
diction, but instead focus on the constitutive relationship~ 
Plainly put, being is such that it cannot give rise to non-
being~ 
The main criticism here is a lengthy one that cannot 
be completed in this section~ Briefly stated, it is that 
the functions and duties of consciousness are such as cannot 
be satisfactorily explained without granting a "speck of 
opacity" to it~ This speck of opacity, 1n turn, cannot be 
derived from non-being, but will have to be--being~ If this 
is true, then it would seem that, while being may well not 
be 1n any respect a source of non-being, it may possibly 
"have a hand" 1n the constitution of consciousness. \fe 
shall continue this in the next section, on Being-for-itself. 
Meanwhile, perhaps the only suggestion that can be 
made at this point is that Sartre's argument against the 
productive capacity of being is that such an affirmation 
would mean that being is both a potency and a means for 
activating that potency, and being is neither. Yet it is 
also asserted that non-being is subsequent to being. Suf-
fice, for the moment, to suggest that it is only the phe-
nomenological analysis which protects Sartre from a simple 
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contrary assertion. The description of being as activity 
has bad considerable voicing in philosophy. Perhaps it is 
here that the limitations of an ontological descriptive ap-
proach are most evident. For, even if being is activity, 
the ontologist cannot find it--he is committed to the ex-
clusive examination of ontological structures. 
Let us await further developnents before we draw any 
conclusions from this subsection~ 
3~ It is asserted that being is absolutely contingent. 
This assertion is central both to Sartre's ontology and to 
his existentialism. His intent seems clear: to escape at 
one stroke the concept of created being and that of being as 
causa !B!• Being, then, receives no reason for being, 
either from something above it or from itself. The proofs 
are: first, if being owed its being to something higher, 
then whatever it is that is higher must also be being, thus 
there can ]a nothing higher than being to give it its being; 
second, if being were its own cause, then it would have to 
]2! prior to its own being, which is absurd~ 
The first argument appears to be strong, but it is in-
structive only provided that the phenomenological de-
scription of being is accepted~ Otherwise, it tells us only 
that there is ultimate being, beyond which there can be no 
appeal for a principle of sufficient reason. It is at this 
point, perhaps, that the ontologist and the metaphysician 
must finally declare a truce, for when one considers 
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ultimates (of ontic being--principles which are formal only, 
as with Plato, present another problem) one has, by defi-
nition, ended his search for metaphysical principles of 
explanation. By itself, however, it is not easy to see how 
the argument can distinguish transphenomenal being from 
noumenal being--or indeterminate being from determinate 
being. Thus the argument is strong, but uninstructive in 
terms of the Sartrean system. 
The second argument is not, perhaps, as childish as it 
sounds. We may recall the Thomistic argumemt from con-
tingency, which allegedly proved the existence of a neces-
sary being. The substance of the Thomistic method was to 
accept the least irrational of three irrational conclusions, 
namely that there must be a being upon which all other forms 
or modes of being depend, but which itself is dependent upon 
nothing, 1·~·• is necessary. For Sartre, there is no force 
to the conclusion that "dependent upon nothing" is the same 
as being necessary or causa !Yl• Thus Sartre•s conclusion, 
following from the same empirical observation of contingency, 
is to the notion of absolute continge.acy. 
The force of Sartre's position depends upon a special 
meaning for the phrase "dependent upon nothing~" In order 
for the accidental nature of being to be maintained, posi-
tive connotation must be given to the term "nothing. 11 If it 
is not, then the meaning of 11 dependent upon nothing" is 
identical with "not dependent." For, unless there is the 
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possibility of being B£1 be1n8--if we are able confidently 
to assert that being is, was, and ever more shall be--then 
this is tantamount to saying that being is necessary and (by 
the first argument) therefore causa sui. That is to say, if 
the universe is such that being cannot not be, then being 
must be, and, since there is no higher power to grant being 
to (or withold it from) being, the necessity of being must 
arise from within itself. 
The important conclusion that one might draw from this 
analysis is that 1n order for being to retain its absolute 
contingency, nothingness must be prior to being. This is 
contrary to Sartre's conclusion, and it may entail some 
modification of the concept of Being-for-itself. 
Let us summarize the appraisal thus far. First, the 
suggestion has been made that there is an hiatus between 
phenomenological method and the ontology Sartre has "de-
rived" from it. The hiatus lies between the concept of the 
phenomenon of being--a legitim ate phenomenological discovery, 
and the being of phenomenon, a legitim ate assumption, but 
not one which can support ontology solely on the basis of 
phenomenological analysis. Second, apart from the phenome-
nological analysis, doubt has been cast on the indeterminate 
nature of being. It is possible that determinateness does 
not entail negation (except as determination is a function 
of epistemology) and that the fullness of being is not 
thereby pitted with negativity simply because being may 
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contain determinate characteristics. Precisely what these 
characteristics are may be, however, beyond the reach of 
knowledge, since inspection never reveals being apart from 
the determinations of "our world." Third, Sartre 's as-
sertion that being is incapable of producing anything has 
been challenged by 11 inuendott only, pending an investigation 
of non-being. Fourth, it is possible that, in order to de-
fend his position that being is absolutely contingent, 
Sartre's argument that non-being is subsequent to being may 
have to be altered. 
c. The Nature and Duties of Being-for-itself. 
A widespread criticism of Sartre's system is that 1n 
it an incredible burden is placed on non-being. Non-being 
must be responsible for there being a world; non-being must 
have the epistemic ability to "nihilate 11 and the existential 
ability to form and act in the realization of its projects. 
It must also, 1n some manner, produce its own very nothing-
ness as the contradiction to (denial of) being. Is it equal 
to the tasks set for it? 
Only once again must we repeat that Sartre insists on 
the ontological nature of both being and non-being. It is 
right at this point that he finds a strong disagreement with 
Hegel, to the effect that, for Hegel, both being and non-
being are only abstractions. 
It is appropriate here to observe • • • that being is 
reduced by Hegel to a signification of the existent. 
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••• Hegel's whole theory is based on the idea that a 
philosophical procedure is necessary in order at the 
outset of logic to rediscover the immediate 1n terms of 
the mediated, the abstract in terms of the concrete on 
which it is grounded. But ••• being does not hold the 
same relation to the phenomenon as the abstract holds to 
the concrete. Being is not "one structure among others," 
one moment of the object; it is the very condition of 
all structures and of all moments. It is the ground on 
which the characteristics of the phenomenon will mani-
fest themselves. 
With this, we may assume that when we discuss either being 
or non-being we are discussing ontie entities. 
First, let us ask where non-being comes from. Sartre 
argues against Heidegger that non-being does not surround 
being "like an envelope," but is fotmd coiled within being 
11 like a worm." Yet, while we need not at once lay the re-
sponsibility for non-being on being, we may point out that 
if being is indeed primary, then either it is "everywhereu 
or it is not. If it is not everywhere, then the places 
where it is not are already, so to speak, loaded with non-
being. If it is everywhere, then at some point or points 
being must here and there "split a little" to make room for 
non-being. But since "roam" is all that non-being is, it 
would seem that even in the splitting being must at least 
have a hand in the creation of non-being. But on Sartrean 
premises this is absurd. If the first alternative is true, 
then being and non-being are at least coeval, with the possi-
bility not precluded that non-being is prior to being. 
1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, P• 13. 
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Indeed, if we were to bring forward our argument of the 
previous section, the contingent nature of being requires 
the priority of not-being~ 
Second, it may be asked where being derives its mirror-
like power to be a revealing revelation. Certainly there is 
nothing in the concept of nothingness to force recognition 
of this function. Nothing presumably is nothing and does 
nothing, and yet this kind of nothing nihilates. In order 
to nihilate, non-being needs a capacity to nihilate. This 
capacity is positive content, just as a tendency toward de-
structiveness 1n a child is positive. 
In answer to these questions Sartre uses a popular 
philosophical term, "emergence." However, it should be 
noted that theories of emergence do not, in their wildest 
momenta, theorize about entities emerging from more primi-
tive groupings without some sort of change in the primitive 
•'mixture" preceding such an emergence. Yet for Sartre there 
is no mixture to shift its configurations--only massive 
being, or empty non-being. How emergence takes place 1n any 
case is a mystery, but in Sartre's system it is magical~ 
Third, Sartre may be questioned on the power of non-
being, after it has transmuted itself into Being-for-itself 
and constituted itself a world, to create its projects and 
thus temporalize its existence. Let us make an empirical 
beginning by asking Sartre, once again, the constitution of 
desire. 
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Desire is a lack of being. It is haunted in its inmost 
being by the being of which it is desire. Thus it [de-
sire ] bears witness to the lack in the being of human 
reality.l 
Certainly it is true that desire testifies to a lack--
something is wanting and something is wanted. But is it en-
tirely true that desire is constituted by a lack? First of 
all, desire is a felt lack (a felt want or need). Now, 
aside from the "being" of the desire (which is not a lack 
but a present feeling), it would appear that there must be 
something, so to speak, 11 in hand," even to originate the de-
sire. Sartre seems to grant as much when he says that 
"human reality grasps itself as an incomplete being. 112 How 
does this process get started at the original point where 
human reality cannot even be said to have the content to ad-
mit to incompleteness? How does the nothing which is human 
reality in the beginning, get to desire its own being? 
According to Sartre, the desire for being, from which 
projects presumably are derived as the means, itself springs 
from seeing oneself (the being of oneself)--at a distance. 
"Distance" is a term with some ambiguity. If it means 
11 distance in time, 11 then temporality is prior to the 
projects of the for-itself through which temporality was 
supposed to rise. If it is the "distance" which separates 
the world of phenomena from that which is conscious (of) it, 
1 ~., p. 88. 
2
see above, chap. V, p. 331. 
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then either desire is !Y! generis or is already given 1n the 
for-itself as a motivating factor. Perhaps this needs 
fUrther explanation~ 
Sartre is undoubtedly correct in assuming that desire 
indicates a lack of some sort~ However, is it possible to 
convert the proposition and conclude that therefore all that 
is incomplete, or vacant, contains desire as part of its 
structure--or that the vacancy, alone, defines the desire? 
Does pale blue desire to be royal blue? Does the Venus de 
Milo desire her arms? Let us go one step further. Sartre 
may have been attracted by the common saying, "nature abhors 
a vacuum. 11 That could be interpreted as meaning that there 
is no lack that does not attempt to fill itself. It is true 
that there is a certain pressure on a vacuum to fill it up, 
but it is only elementary physics that the pressure is not 
:f'rom the vacuum but from the fullne as that surrounds it. 
Similarly, it may be that the pressure to fill itself with 
being comes originally not from nothingness but from being~ 
In this case, however, it may be that the "grain of being" 
is not surrounding non-being but is held 1n suspension with-
in non-being, itself~ It may be that human reality is, as 
Sartre says, both being and non-being, but it may also be 
that it is both of these from the very beginning. 
Let us end temporarily with a final question. Does 
non-being act? This is a summary of all the foregoing 
critic ism. Being does not act. Is non-being, simply by 
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being the denial of being, thereby granted activity by defi-
nition? It will, admittedly, be difficult to draw a concept 
of activity from a being-in-itself that is beyond potency, 
beyond characteristics, beyond power for anything but--being. 
However, it is no easier to draw activity tram nothing. 
It might be that some of the difficulties in the 
concept of non-being could be alleviated by modifying the 
system so that there are two orders of non-being. First, 
there might be the pure vacancy which is dialectically 
contraposed to being. Perhaps it is even first in the order 
of being, with being-in-itself accidentally arising within 
it. Then there might be the non-being which is conscious-
ness. This might not be precisely non-being, but would be 
something of a compound. Possibly there 1s a penumbral area 
••on the fringe of being" where it makes contact w1 th non-
being. This "shoreline 11 is not quite being-in-itself, nor 
is it exactly nothingness, but 1 t will contain the being 
requisite for the tasks given it, while it also contains 
vacancy enough for projects, movement, or growth. 
At the risk of being accused of "picture-thinking" let 
us continue just a bit farther. It might be said that this 
fringe area of being-non-being 1s that which ventures forth 
and is not content simply to be. It 1s the realm of possi-
bility. This area of being-non-being is also that which 
gives itself a world. Being is not a world despite the 
possibility of its owning determinate characteristics (one 
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reservation will have to be made, here, pending the exami-
nation of the Sartrean concept of God)~ Instead it is up to 
man to make his world, both epistemically and practically, 
for it is not a world until he finds it and finds himself in 
it~ A world is not a world until this event takes place as 
an environment is not an environment until it stands in re-
lation to a center·. But now the center is not a vacancy; it 
is an incompleteness; it is--a point of view. 
It is doubtful that Sartre would accept this picture. 
To grant to the for-itself the slightest initial content of 
being is to grant it a germ of opacity. This opens the door 
to the Given and to naturalism. Yet, it would appear that 
the only escape f'rom a germ of given-ness is a concept of 
consciousness with the puzzling features criticized in this 
section. It is at least possible, then, to return to the 
earlier question of the productivity of being, that it is 
partially responsible for the "emergence" of consciousness. 
D. Opacity and Human Reality in Concrete Situations~ 
Returning, now, to human reality "in the world, 11 we 
may air what are certainly some natural complaints about the 
Sartrean concept of total responsibility. Responsibility 
may be defined as "consciousness (of) being the incontestable 
author of an event or an object~"l It is a good definition, 
and we may be prepared even to agree w1 th Sartre that we are 
l Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 633. 
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far more deeply responsible for many more events or objects 
than we may realize or want to realize. However, granting 
this, our problem is whether there are any events or objects 
that touch human reality of which it is not the incontesta-
ble author, and therefore for which 1t is not, initially at 
least, responsible. If it can be established that a man 
acts, then he is responsible; but has he always acted in 
every corner of every situation within which he finds him-
self? This much can be said in terms of the Sartrean system: 
that it is always "he" that "finds himself in the situation,n 
and is thus responsible for the finding, at least. Now, let 
us divide the ~oblem into three topics. 
1~ When does selfhood originate, so that Sartre is 
legitimately able to use the pronom1 "he"? We have already 
been assured that 11 the individuality of consciousness stems 
from the nature of consciousness."1 
Thus, it constitutes a synthetic and individual totality 
entirely isolated from other totalities of the same type, 
and the I can evidently be only an expression (rather 
than a condition) of this incommunicability and inward-
ness of consciousness.2 
However, individuality is not, apparently, a characteristic 
of non-being as such. If it were, despite the entire iso-
lation, we should be able (as Sartre is able to speak of 
t•other totalities") to refer to non-beings~ Now at what 
1 Sartre, Transcendence of the Eso, p. 39. 
2 Ibid., pp. 49-50~ 
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point should it be said that there is a self to find itself 
in situations? It must be before the emergence of the re-
flective ego, since that is part of the situation-discovered. 
If it is prior to the emergence of the reflective ego, yet 
subsequent to the impersonality of non-being, then it must 
be at precisely the instant when consciousness gives itself 
a world--that is, when it is founded as consciousness by the 
objects of which it is the revealing-revelation. Thus, it 
would appear that there is simultaneity of appearance of 
consciousness, of the world, and of inwardness. 
Thus, we are thrust back to the point where Sartre 
emptied consciousness of content and showed that it was 
grounded entirely in the objects (of) which it was conscious. 
It would seem, then, that consciousness cannot be the author 
of the objects, nor can the self. These events are all con-
temporary. Inwardness may be the author of the discovery of 
itself 1n the world along with the world, but it is hard to 
see how the individualized self can be called responsible 
for the world. 
2. Let us try another approach. Suppose the problem 
of the origin of selfhood to be solved. Then it may be 
asked of Sartre whether the self, when it gives itself a 
world, could choose not to give itself a world. That is to 
say, could it remain as non-being and refuse the task of 
being a revealing-revelation. Presumably it could not, for 
to give it choice at this point would also mean to give it 
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an inexplicable ability (in terms of non-being) to choose 
from among the choices possible to it~ We must remember 
that here there is no question of "counting the cost." 
There simply is no alternative~ It is the way things are. 
But if there is no choice (if there is not even any meaning 
to the word, "choose") can consciousness be said to be the 
author of this deed of giving itself a world? It is the 
being (as non-being) of consciousness 1n conjunction with 
being-in-itself which produces the world for consciousness; 
and just because there is irrevocably a world-for-a-
consciousness, there seems to be no reason to call this pro-
duction the act of consciousness, and there is some reason 
to refuse to call it such--namely the fact that an act im-
plies an actor who, at this early stage of the process has 
not yet escaped the threat of opacity~ 
Thus it would seem that 1n order for the for-itself to 
be considered responsible for its world, it must have acted 
to produce this world--and this, it is suggested, it cannot 
do~ 
3. Suppose, however, that the self is responsible for 
there being a world of objects for consciousness. Granting 
this, can the consciousness in question be said to be the 
author of the basal structures of this world? The problem 
is not that of whether we should have a world of arbitrary 
whim; there is a patent affront to common sense 1n the 
notion that souls can shop around for their choice of pasts; 
361 
and much of common sense is quite willing to admit that 
certain acts will inevitably lead to certain consequences. 
In short, it is doubtless true that some aspects of facticity 
do not conflict with notions of responsibility~ These we 
shall look at presently. But suppose I were willing to 
"cotmt the cost" and choose a world with different basal 
structures (note: not with no structure, or with stru.ctures 
variable at my bidding). Suppose I chose a world where 
water would not support battleships--and was willing to ac-
cept the conditions of it not, therefore, floating any ships, 
putting out fire, quenching thirst, or whatever. Suppose I 
accepted all the implications of this modification of 
structure even to the extinction of organic life. Would my 
choice eventuate in the production of this kind of world? 
The suspicion is that it would not be possible to alter in 
any respect the world that is presented to me. I take it as 
it is. Then how am I the author of the fact that water 
quenches thirst or puts out fire? If I cannot act, then I 
am not the author of this deed. 
We border, it is true, on the charge of bad faith. 
Yet I am willing to take the consequences of my choice--r 
drive myself into this world of mine knowing the conse-
quences and willing the event nonetheless. I am not a woman 
going to a tryst deluding herself. I will make a compact 
with the devil, if necessary, to gain the end that water 
will not float battleships~ Yet the structures remain the 
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same. 
Let us summarize. Responsibility tmplies authorship, 
which in turn implies activity. Authorship also means 
agency, and it is at least questionable that Sartre has 
shown that the original ttact" by which consciousness gives 
itself a world is the act of an agent. Further, the lack of 
alternatives and the consequent inability of consciousness 
to choose whether it will or will not give itself a world 
indicates that consciousness is better seen as only a step 
in the process and can be given no more responsibility than 
prior or subsequent steps~ Finally, though the world is not, 
1n Sartre's view, given to consciousness, its structures are. 
It may be that the world must await human projects and valu-
ations before it can exceed a certain neutrality, but it 
must be admitted that the neutrality in question is only 
skimming the surface of the structure of the world. This 
mountain may be a help or a hindrance; more deeply, it may 
be inherently "more climbable" than another one. But it is 
also made of rock and earth, and whether or not rock and 
earth are aids or hindrances, climbable or not, they are un-
questionably rock and earth. Am. I responsible f'or the fact 
that mountains are made of' rock and earth? I em this only 
if I am the incontestable author of the fact that mountains 
are made of rock and earth. One may accept with Sartre the 
notion that the world is a world for consciousness, and 
still he might be troubled by this~ 
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E. Freedom and Facticity. 
The concept of freedom c~ot easily be divorced from 
that of responsibility~ They are separated here solely in 
order that special problems pertaining to each may be 
singled out. The problem of responsibility was centered 
largely in that period of growth of the for-itself when 
there might have been some question as to whether the for-
itself was, as it were caterpillar or butterfly·. The 
problem of freedom, on the other hand, is conceived to be 
largely an existential problem, and therefore assumes the 
matrix of human-reality-in-concrete-situations. This is the 
approach we shall make to it. Let us make a beginning with 
Sartre's words. 
Freedom: the very being ·of the For-itself which is 
"condemned to be freen and must forever choose itself--
i.e., make itself. "To be free" does not mean "to ob-
tain what one has wishedn but rather "by oneself to de-
termine onesel:r to wish" (in the broad sense of choos-
ing). In other words success is not important to 
:rreedom.l 
The present writer cannot 1n good conscience quarrel 
very deeply with Sartre's definition of freedom. Because of 
this, criticism will take the form of attempting to show 
that the definition is selective. 
1. "Condemned to be :free" sounds like a contradiction. 
On closer inspection, however, it seems to be not so much a 
contradiction as a partial truth. For example, if I take my 
1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 631. 
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pet cat to the forest and leave it there to shift for itself, 
possibly I have condemned it to be free. I have abandoned 
it, and now it is "on its own." It is free, not by its 
choice, but because there is no longer anybody to care for 
it; what it is to accomplish it must formulate and carry out 
by itself. In an analogous sense, the eagle frees its prey 
after it carries it aloft~ 
This "condemnation'' marks the forlornness of human re-
ality when it sees itself as 11 freed by God." However, there 
is a one-sidedness to this notion of freedom. It is true 
that my cat must now fend for itself, but it is also true 
that when I free it in the forest I loose my hold and give 
it over to other forces. When the eagle frees its prey the 
force of gravity takes sure hold·. Thus, the "condemnation 
to freedom." can only be a meaningful phrase if we are sure 
that the condemnation is to freedom. ·. For this we must dis-
cuss three attendant factors: freedom as the essence of 
self'hood; freedom as self-determination; and "the coef-
ficient of adversity~" For freedom cannot be a simple 
transfer from one external force to another. If it were, 
the stone, in the famous example, would be free at the apex 
of its trajectory--whether it were conscious or not~ 
2. "Freedom: the very being of the For-i tself11 ap.. 
pears to be largely a statement in dialectics. It is not 
based on empirical observation, but is rather the nature of 
the for-itself after it has been dialectically distinguished 
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from being. Since this is its nature, it is therefore im-
possible for human reality ever to renounce freedom and 
still remain hum en reality". But here it would seem that we 
are imprisoned by little more than a defiBition~ The 
question is: "Can human reality ever not be free? 11 and the 
answer is: "No, because this is what human reality is~ 11 
However, the answer does not completely answer the question, 
since it still remains problematic whether human reality can 
ever become something other than human reality. And here 
the answer seems obvious, even on Sartrean terms~ For the 
whole career of human existence is precisely the process of 
human reality becoming something other than human reality~ 
The desire for being, the accumulation of a past, the 
process of ageing entailed in this accumulation, all this is 
the account of the movement of being-for-itself toward being-
in-itself~ 
Now this, by itself, testifies to little more than the 
protean nature of human reality--that its very being is a 
process of self-destruction~ Let us ask, at this point, a 
fUrther question. If human reality is unalterably free, so 
long as it is human reality, can it ever choose, while it is 
1n the condition of human reality, to hasten the self-de-
structive process? Can it ever choose not to be human re-
ality? Sartre • s answer is that it cannot·. The reasoning 
that brings him to this incredible conclusion is that if it 
is human reality which makes such a choice, then it has 
366 
expressed precisely the freedom it seeks to reject by the 
very making of' the choice·. Then, when the choice to become 
other than human reality (fainting, suicide) is carried to 
its successful conclusion, ~ human reality is no longer 
anywhere in the picture. 
This argument would seem to have same weight with ~e­
gard to fainting, bad faith, or other temporary lapses, for 
the man who faints returns to consciousness, human reality, 
and freedom, and his self' assimilates the act as one of' his 
possibilities. But regarding death, even Sartre must con-
cede what is commonplace: a) that suicide is an act of' 
human reality, b) that it is frequently successful, and, 
when successful, final~ This alone should argue strongly 
that it is given to man to choose once not to be free~ To 
expand this point only one more step, it might even be sug-
gested that there is not so much a constant "must" with re-
gard to human reality and freedom--that we must be free be-
cause that is the way things are, as there is a threat that 
human reality ''must n forever continue to choose to be free 
(a positive act) or lose human reality. Freedom is a con-
dition of human reality, not its structure~ 
3·. "Freedom is self-detennination.u Sartre has taken. 
pains to "emancipate" this phrase from those who mean by it 
only a distinction between so-called "external" and "in-
ternal" causes. For him 1 t means not to do as one wishes 
but to determine oneself' to wish. The arguments of 
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Transcendence of the Ego, The Emotions, and Existential 
1 Psychoanalysis seem intended to show that on this level 
there is no such distinction to be made. The ego (re-
flective), the emotions, and "the 1.mconscious" are all alike 
inhabitants of nthe world;" internality belongs to conscious-
ness only. Now, however, there is a difficulty. Having 
placed all of what we normally mean by t•motivation" on the 
periphery of consciousness, there seems to be nothing left 
to provide the motive-force of self-determination·. 
Sartre's solution is not without significance, but it 
may cast some doubt on the absolute emptiness of being-for-
itself~ There appears to be, for him, a "basal desire," 
which is not on the periphery, "in the world." It comes, 
perhaps, as close to defining a human nature as the Sartrean 
system will allow. 
Flmdamentally man is !.a! desire 1Q. be, and the existence 
of this desire is not to be established by an empirical 
induction·. • • • The original project which is expressed 
in each of our empirically observed tendencies is then 
the project £! being; or, if you prefer, each empirical 
tendenc~ exists with the original project of being [as a 
mode] • . 
Is it possible to conclude from this that there is, 
after all, a "natural" desire to be, and that this, at least 
initially, is beyond human control? If so, then it may also 
1The essay, "Existential Psychoanalysis," is included 
in the Barnes translation of Being and Nothingness. See pp. 
557-575. 
2 ~., p. 565. Italics 1n the original. 
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be that here is a stricture on freedom. Mankind may come to 
a point where he wills to reject this original project, but 
at the original point it is prior to him and beyond his sel:r-
determination--for only through it can he become a sel:r. 
4. The coefficient o:r adversity: it is at this point, 
doubtless, that common sense meets its greatest difficulty'. 
Sartre's point seems well taken: that freedom could never 
arise unless there were a background of "refractoriness" 
against which effort can be brought to bear in order to real-
ize projects. At the same time one wonders if adversity, 
even if it is requisite for freedom, does not enter into 
freedom also as its 11mi tation. Much of life is character-
ized by what might be called "progress through conflict;" 
and yet conflict also may result in consequences destructive 
of progress. Similarly w1 th freedom: can it really be said 
that freedom is absolute in all its phases in the face of 
the ract or adversity. 
Sartre might reply by reminding us of two statements: 
first, that success is unimportant to freedom; second, that 
if one is willing to count the cost (endure the conse-
quences), he is free to will to do anything. Both of these 
statements would seem to belittle the limiting role of ad-
versity. Yet it is suggested that the two statements are 
not complementary except in a way that is contrary to 
Sartre's concept of total freedom~ Let us see how this 
might be so. 
369 
One may grant Sartre some acute observations on human 
nature . There is a lassitude that accompanies security and 
the ability to have one's wishes granted that is directly 
opposite to the exhilaration and intense self-awareness of 
acting alone in the face of adversity and danger. It is 
doubtless recognition of this that brings Sartre to the 
opinion that the Parisians were never more free than when 
they were under the yoke of the German anny during the occu-
pation. Further, if freedom is to be related to conscious-
ness (and there are few who would deny some relationship), 
then the heightened consciousness that accompanies a criti-
cal situation may well--up to the point of panic--signal a 
heightening of actual freedom irrespective of the fluctu-
ating sense of freedom that may accompany the critical situ-
ation. 
However, all this only applies to the first statement, 
that success is unimportant to freedom. The second 
statement, if applied to Paris during the occupation only 
points to the fact that freedom to will to do something--to 
attempt to accomplish something--is a very small category of 
freedom indeed when measured against the freedom to succeed 
in realizing what one has attempted. Because of this, one 
may wonder if freedom does not require analysis into two 
types. The first type may well be the freedom to determine 
oneself to choose, and here, the greater the obstacle to any 
project, the greater may be the freedom which was able to 
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make the choice nevertheless. The second type would seem to 
fit under a heading such as "freedom to realize one's 
projects." For this kind of freedom it is entirely possible 
that adversity and effort may yet be both directly pro-
portionate to the degree of freedom provided that the en-
deavor is brought to a successful conclusion. Where the 
effort applied is not sufficient, however, one must admit to 
an inverse proportion between adversity and freedom. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than when the adversary is 
one • a own emotions. One is always free to combat his 
emotions, but if one is unsuccessful in the combat to master 
them, the failure is destructive of freedom. 
It is this second order of freedom which collides with 
facticity; for facticity has a very high coefficient of ad-
versity indeed--so high that no amount of effort will alter 
it in the slightest; only bad faith will even try. Facts 
(in the everyday sense) can be altered, but the facticity of 
the facts (that the mountain will have to be altered if a 
road is to pass here) is unalterable. It is facticity which 
tends toward being-in-itself, and yet, since human reality 
must deal with facticity, it must accept this stricture on 
freedom even while freedom is given its meaning by facticity. 
It might be said, partly with tongue in cheek, that 
when the coefficient of adversity reaches a certain index, 
then human reality may well decide that the universe is de 
trop. With this, freedom is lost. Portions of the Sartrean 
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system suggest that he has reached this point. 
5. A summary of this section is 1n order. Sartre has 
attempted a ~ ~ force in favor of freedom and against 
given-ness and necessity. The attempt is admirable, but it 
may have gone too far to be thoroughly effective. In the 
first place, it does appear that human reality has the 
freedom to make itself unfree, even though the feat means 
destruction (political and social implications here may be 
obvious). It is still humEn reality while it makes the de-
cision even though it is not immediately afterward. Second, 
human reality is free to determine itself and responsible 
for such self-determination (or for the attempt to avoid it 
through bad faith)~ There is no escaping this freedom-re-
sponsibility short of a sudden, unsought death~ However, 
there is a motive-force, called by Sartre "the original 
project," but which might also be called a "governing pro-
pensity," and this "desire to be" is coeval with the origin 
of consciousness and therefore beyond the responsibility of 
human reality in its incipience, though it may not be beyond 
its reach in maintenance. Third, the success of a venture 
is not important to the freedom to choose an end, and a man 
is responsible for whatever choice he makes in the face of 
whatever adversity. However, the success of a venture is 
important when freedom to realize an end is under consider-
ation. This is the normal meaning of freedom. It is to 
Sartre's credit that he has discovered another meaning as 
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well, but it is a meaning which is not incompatible with the 
normal meaning and does not replace it~ 
This has been a lengthy critic ism. 1st us turn, now, 
for some brief remarks on the Sartrean concept of the root 
of sociality: the Other~ 
F. My Relationship with the Other. 
Sartre has posed for us a point of departure into 
social philosophy which is difficult either to accept or to 
reject. It is not easy to reject because Sartre has begun 
and ended with a concept drawn directly from experience--the 
self-experience of being observed (objectified)--and has 
asked us to make no inferences beyond our own experience in 
order to arrive at the basic social concept. My experiences 
of being alone, of watching somebody, of being in a group, 
and of being watched by somebody, are indubitable. It also 
is not easy to reject the suggestion that I become known to 
myself 1n a different way when my experience of myself has 
been "mediated" by these 11 social-type" experiences. Perhaps 
the hardest of all to reject, however, is the possibility 
that through this type of approach the subjectivity of other 
persons may receive a more adequate philosophical expression. 
For me to have as a subjective experience the experience of 
being an object for another subjectivity--for me to know 
that I am another point of view as well as my own--is to 
provide a meeting-ground for subjects as subjects~ Even 
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intuition of the subjectivity of another does not perform 
this feat, since, while it unites us, it does not show me me 
from the point of view of another. It must be granted, 
though, that before this situation can be developed much 
further philosophically there will have, eventually, to be 
an inference from the experience of being objectified to the 
fact (hypothetical) of another subjective center; for there 
is no epistemic connection~ I may have all of the experi-
ences Sartre points to and still be alone in the world. 
This is a Sartrean omission the responsibility for which may 
be laid at the doorstep of phenomenological method~ 
Yet even without departing from the Sartrean de-
scription of the relation between myself and me as mediated 
by the experience of being objectified by the Other, even 
within this framework it may be that Sartre has omitted some 
elements of experience which might alter his social philoso-
phy, if considered. Taka, for example, love. 
Suppose the situation of myself 1n a world composed, 
in part, of self-experiences of the Other. Sartre has 
claimed both a necessity for this type of experience and its 
self-abortive nature, thus concluding that conflict is, and 
must be, the basis of all sociality. But suppose I know all 
this. Suppose I know that the attitude of the Other toward 
me is that of a robber of my subjectivity; I also know, of 
course, that my attitude toward him is precisely the same~ 
But then suppose also that I want him to be as he is--as a 
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subject. Sartre has dealt with the supposition that I need 
the Other and yet cannot tolerate htm. Has he dealt with 
the possibility, over and above this, that I might nonethe-
less want the Other to be in all his subjectivity? Let us 
cast about for a remote analogue to illustrate our point. 
Imagine the fantastic situation where all human beings 
are cannibalistic by nature~ No other food will support 
human life but human flesh (we shall ignore the problems of 
how such a race could ever come into being under these 
circumstances). The point is that we need each other and 
yet we destroy each other. It would be hard to imagine a 
background more unfavorable to the development of love than 
this . And yet it does not seem contradictory to suggest now 
that men might have, within this system, a genuine desire 
that the world be peopled, not just for the sake of po-
tential food, but also (and not as a denial of the desire 
for food) for the sake of the subjects which "inhabit" the 
edible bodies·. 
In Hemingway' a The Old Man and the Sea something like 
this happens between the old fisherman and the giant marlin 
he is battling to destroy". There grew, in the hours of the 
struggle, a kind of feeling of kinship in the old man with 
the fish. It could possibly be called love, or maybe better, 
respect , but this feeling of kinship did not for an instant 
lessen his desire or need to kill the fish. Whether this 
feeling was shared by the marlin is, of eourse, another 
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matter. 
It is a very remote illustration, but it does, perhaps, 
suggest a possibility that Sartre has not dealt with 1n his 
social philosophy~ In essence it is very nearly a Kantian-
ism. I know that 1n the world I shall be treated as a means. 
My skills will be accepted or rejected for what they are and 
what they produce. For my part, I do the same with other 
people. I would not have it otherwise. I also know that 
when I meet another person I must prepare for a kind of 
epistemological joust that may even extend to a comparison 
of our lawnmowers, houses, and bankrolls. I know that the 
attempt is being made to shrink my subjectivity even when, 
at the same time, I required the meeting to provide myself 
with a point of view of me. I am not sure that I would not 
have this part otherwise if I could, but I accept the rival-
ry as part of life. But, most important of all, in spite of 
my rivalry with the Other, I want him to be a subject 1n his 
own right. Sartre has granted that there may be such a want, 
but has taken pains to show its futility. The counter-argu-
ment here is that the presence of the want, 1n itself, justi-
fies and makes room for its own existence. Nobody seems to 
have worried much over the semantical nonsense of the 
Christian imperative that we love our enemies, preferring, 
perhaps, to rest content in the pious belief that the love 
comes from us while the enmity comes from them. Yet here 
one could love his adversary. The very forlornness of the 
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want is only warning that I must tread very carefully indeed 
when I am among subjects, since I am as a leper (or they are 
lepers; however you wish); but knowing this I still want 
(utterly apart from the need I may have for mediation of me 
to myself) to preserve that subject whom I encounter. The 
very narrow path of proper parenthood is within such a situ-
ation, for while it knows that it must impinge on the tender 
subjectivity in order to train the child in his world-skills, 
it does so in the hope that the child will someday belong--
to himself~ 
As a corollary to the above suggestion, the present 
wri t .er is of the opinion that Sartre has done a creditable 
job in distinguishing between the "us" and the "we·." The 
opinion is that Sartre is correct in arguing the impossi-
bility of establishing society on an on tic "We" basis ·. But 
the opinion is also that there is another alternative than 
simply that of "us against them who oppress us." "I and 
Thou"1is neither Us nor We; I and Thou recognizes that we 
are separated forever by the fact that two subjectivities 
are made so that they cannot (and will fight to the death of 
one to resist it) share the same place. But concern for the 
Other as subject, while it does not bring us together to re-
move either our privacy or our loneliness, does make 
1 The phrase, of course, belongs to Martin Buber. Cf. 
I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Charles 
Scribner 1 s Sons, 1958) ·• 
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possible a society which does not need the oppressors (or 
the Goethean facsimile of a perpetually threatening sea) to 
give it substance·. 
G. God·. 
Sartre's description of God is that he is 11Being-in-
i tself-for-i tself." This has various meanings. It means, 
first, that the original project of human reality--filling 
the emptiness of the for-itself with being--is the attempt 
to become God (or, more moderately, to became godlike)~ 
This meaning also indicates that God is the summation of 
human values. Second, it means that God is a synthesis of 
the primary ontological dyad~ Thus God is, 1n at least one 
sense, ultimate reality~ Third, because the synthesis of 
being-in-itself and being-for-itself is what is meant by ex-
isting in the human sense, God is to be thought of as the 
supreme existent. Fourth, since God is not only the synthe-
sis, but is also the elements of the synthesis, God is Alpha 
and Omega--both primordial and consequent--but losing 
nothing in between~ 
There is one thing that God is not~ He is not his own 
necessity. Sartre argues that if there were a God, he would 
be absolutely contingent just as being is absolutely con-
tingent, and, since he is such, he can provide no sufficient 
reason for his own being·. 
For Sartre, we have found that the God described above 
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C8Jlnot be more than an impossible ideal. That it is an 
ideal Sartre grants, as indeed he must. God is an impossi-
bility because the union of being-in-itself and being-for-
itself leaves only being-in-itself, as the union of a hole 
and that which fills it destroys the hole. Thus it is that 
all existence seems to be working toward a missing God, and 
man's divine passion is a useless one. What are we to say 
about this position? 
Let us first dispense with what Sartre seems to offer 
as the coup~ grace: that even if God existed he would be 
absolutely contingent. Let us dispense with it by giving 
our approval to this notion. If this is done, it seem.s 
possible to transfer same of what Sartre says about being-
in-itself to a description of God~ God simply is (is actu-
al). There can be no principle beyond God to grant him his 
actuality; he simply is~ It has been suggested in other 
places that when one reaches what one conceives of as ulti-
macy, that is the place to stop. God is such a place. But 
this means that God is meaningless in himself. Yes. G~d 
provides my meaning, but himself has no meaning, or better, 
since it is at least possible that God is an existent, he 
must carve out his own meaning by virtue of his own projects; 
he must carve it out of--nothing. I would not wish to trade 
places with God and stare constantly at nothingness~ Per-
haps this is what Adam saw just before he repudiated his 
free action. 
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Now we may examine the concept of the impossibility of 
God. God is the synthesis of being-in-itself and being-for-
itself. So am I. It is true that I am not a completed 
synthesis; I am 11 in process." But insofar as I exist, in 
the existential usage of that term, I am a synthesis. Human 
reality is such; is it not possible that divine reality is 
such also? According to Sartre it is not, for when the 
synthesis is completed, the for-itself is destroyed, and 1n 
death all reverts to being-in-itself. However, who has ever 
completed the process and found that there was no longer any 
project, no more tomorrows? Who has ever come to the end? 
Does it not seem that death slips into existence like a 
knife, cutting it off, always prematurely? When it does 
seem that one person has reached the end (of his rope) and 
has willed that there be no tomorrow, is not this described 
by Sartre as bad faith? Sartre has, perhaps, been deceived 
by his own terminology into assuming that the for-itself in 
its emptiness is like a finite vessel that, at a certain 
time, will be all filled up w1 th being. But this is not 
what experience shows~ Except for the "sin" of bad faith, 
experience shows that while there is life there is hope~ If 
a man happened to be immortal, is there any need to assume 
that at some time he would become "all filled up" w1 th being 
so that there was no more to become? Perhaps it might be 
otherwise; might it not be the case also with God? 
God is Alpha and Omega: that is to say that God is 
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not a growing synthesis but is completely synthesized from 
the very beginning. However, let us put this thought to-
gether with the last one in order to see what "Alpha and 
Omega" could mean. Could it not mean that God is "all the 
being there is" from beginning to end (whatever that might 
mean)? Beyond God there is nothing·. But this does not need 
to mean that God does not "exist" in the sense of living and 
growing. God is all the being there is, synthesized with 
being-for-itself~ But tomorrow perhaps there will be more 
being; the synthesis moves forward, and yet, at any time, 
God is all the being there is~ This last statement raises 
two additional problems: time and creativity. 
It will be recalled that for Sartre time is because 
human reality actualizes its present (gives itself a world), 
possibilizes its future, and 11necessitizes" (has to be) its 
past. This jars somewhat on common sense, which feels that 
there is actuality, futurity, and a past irrespective of 
what human reality is or does. Could both of these, Sartre 
and common sense, be the case? Letting Sartre stand where 
he is, we might suggest that because God is a temporalizing 
"thing" there is "real" time. It is not quite the time of 
science, planets and clocks, but when God says 11 let there 
be ~ • ·." this is the future coming into being·. The future 
rests with God's projects. And when God says "Let it be; it 
is good," then the act is done and it is the past. In 
short, it is God letting something be done which gives it 
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its 11 don.e-ness." Thus God is not botmd by time, but because 
God is, there is "God's time." There is also my time, and 
Sartre could be correct here, and there is clock time. But 
clock time is a convention--it is u in the world," and thus 
is only real--from my point of view. It is a perplexing 
array of ''times," but a developnent of this array might 
serve better to account for the equally perplexing clash be-
tween time and facticity without losing sight of Sartre's 
truth that time is a function of existence and not existence 
a function of time. A beginning of such a development will 
come when it is ''time" to compare Sartre with Dr. Brightman-. 
When God says "Let there be ••• " creation occurs. 
One of Sartre 's main arguments against the concept of cre-
ated being is that from subjectivity objectivity can never 
come. Now, while this statement has only been asserted, and 
not demonstrated (the very meaning of creativity may be pre-
cisely making objective what is subjective), let us accept 
it for the sake of argument-. Then, while it may not be easy 
to explain how human reality is created, there arises a 
possible explanation of why it was created. It will be re-
called that the function of the Other was to objectify me to 
myself. Could it not be possible that "the world" is sub-
jective to God until human reality arrives, at which time 
the function of human reality is to objectify the subjective 
content of God's consciousness and make of "God's world" the 
world._ Sartre has allowed that the concept of the Other is 
382 
so pervasive a part of our experience that we may feel the 
eyes of the Other upon us even when the experience of 
another body does not attend the feeling. Sartre might say 
that this feeling leads to the notion of God-watching-us~ 
So God may be "Another." Can we not be God's Other as well? 
"Creativity" is largely a human word for a mystery. 
On the counter-thesis suggested, the mystery is not solved; 
but the concept of the impossibility of such an event has 
been weakened~ It is the job of the Other to objectify my 
act and make of it an event~ Possibly this is our job with 
reference to God~ Let us end with only one more extension~ 
Since God (if there is a God) is God, more may be entailed 
by human relationships to God than mere objectification of 
God's subjective creativity~ This, in fact, may itself only 
be a minor part of creativity--a means rather than an end-. 
Since we do not meet on equal terms, and therefore cannot 
remain merely with two points of view--God's and mine--per-
haps it is the continuing task of humankind to "see the 
world as God sees it~" This vision would be through the 
eyes of faith, not science, since it is not precisely the 
world we seek--there is no such event until we make it such--
but God's world, and there is no scientific way of knowing 
God's point of view• Thus it may be that a return is made 
to what is the most important part of creativity after all: 
myself as an existential creature~ 
The main points of this section have been concerned 
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with showing that God is not necessarily an impossibility 
and that, if he exists, his absolute contingency is not a 
block to a religious attitude toward God. Much in the last 
few pages seems more on the order of extremely "external" 
speculation rather than internal criticism. It is justified 
only on the ground that Sartre has purported to show the im-
possibility of alternate ways of thinking. The speculation 
stands as a suggestion that he has not entirely succeeded. 
Finally, the epistemology of faith is out of place in this 
chapter. Let it serve as an introduction to the thought of 
Soren Kierkegaard, to which we shall turn presently. 
3·. Conclusion~ 
Again there will be no attempt to summarize what may 
have been too tiresomely dealt with as it is. Instead, let 
us conclude with a statement of what may be both new and im-
:portant in the wri tinge of Jean-Paul Sartre. 
First, the use of the concept of nothingness (non-
being) and the attempt to show that both the world and 
consciousness is pitted with non-being, appears to show 
promise of bearing fruit--not, perhaps, as abundantly as 
Sartre believes; but nonetheless it does show promise. The 
notion of contingency is not new, but, linked with non-being, 
it is productive of a theory of the nature of reality which 
is worthy of consideration·. 
Second, the attempt, by Sartre, to combat 
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substantialism and naturalism provides a philosophical 
outlook that could be considered important. Again, perhaps 
the novelty of the viewpoint has obscured what is valuable 
in substantialism and naturalism; however, there is the 
possibility of some sort of synthesis·. 
Third, freedom and responsibility have received the 
attention that is due them. Possibly it is at this point 
that a theory of moral philosophy for our century should 
begin. 
Fourth, the general mood of existentialism is such 
that the individual and his attitudes are central to any 
theme. Among his other characteristics man is the creature 
that questions the meaning of his own existence, who knows 
that he must die and wonders why. Our era may well profit 
by this ''morbid" concern for the existence of the individual. 
Fifth, the curious intermingling of subjectivism 
(consciousness gives itself its world) and realism 
(consciousness is constituted by the phenomenal object) may 
be a refreshing attempt to cope with the two main streams of 
philosophical thought~ 
Sixth, the Sartrean treatment of the Other may provide 
a basis, at least, for a long-needed theory of intersub-
jective relationships~ This cannot be accomplished by 
moving outward from myself to what I suppose to be another 
person, for then the subjective certainty is traded for an 
objective hypothesis; neither can a satisfactory 
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relationship be achieved by theories of intuition (in which 
the separateness of subjects is lost). But when I feel my-
self to be drained of my subjectivity--when I am made an 
object for another point of view--that is when I really feel 
the presence of a subjectivity that is not my own. Should 
it happen to be God who discovers me, then I em truly dis-
covered, and my only recourse is the futility of trying to 
hide behind a fig-leaf~ 
Finally, we have had the barest hint of a possible re-
lationship between what I am and what I do. Further exami-
nation of this relationship may reveal a basis for a moral 
theory along nself-perfeotionism" lines. This will be 
mentioned again 1n the final chapter. 
As we turn to an exposition of the thought of Soren 
Kierkegaard, let us sum up our criticism of Sartre in an 
aphorism somewhat reminiscent of F. H. Bradley: "It is 
always possible that man is a useless passion; but, for all 
of that he is a passion, and if his existence is meaningless, 
still, his passion for existence is real~ In this may lie 
his meaning, and even possibly his salvation. n 
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CHAPTER VII 
EXFOSITION OF THE THOUGHT OF 
S¢'REN KIERKEGAARD 
1. Introduction. 
The general contours o'f the Kierkegaardian "philosophy11 
are well known: that he is primarily a religious writer; 
that his thought centers in the individual rather than the 
general, in the concrete rather than the abstract, and in 
the existential rather than the scienti'fic or speculative. 
It is the task o'f this chapter to expound why his thought 
takes this direction. The search is not, o'f course, for 
what may have been Kierkegaard's psychological motivation 
for his authorship; but 'for those arguments by which he 
shows that the concrete, the individual, and the ethico-re-
ligious are--or should be--the primary targets o'f philosophy. 
In aiming in this direction, it is hoped that a dif'fi-
cult project will be accomplished. Repeated attempts have 
been made by the writer to "render Kierkegaard into tra-
ditional philosophical terms. u The attempts have not been 
successful, largely because the terminology to a consider-
able degree is determined by the philosophic problema en-
gaged, and, 'for Kierkegaard, the problema are di'f'ferent from 
those o'f traditional philosophy. Thus the rendering proved 
to be a 'falsi'fication--and not only because o'f Kierkegaard's 
well-publicized animosity to "systematic philosophy. 11 How-
ever, if Kierkegaard is allowed to define his own topics and 
is only warned that he must show us why they are to be con-
sidered as important, perhaps what could not be done "system-
atically" can yet be achieved philosophically--in the broad 
sensa. 
Accordingly, it is proposed that the present chapter 
be divided in the following manner: 
2. Methodology. 
3. Preliminary Ethical Considerations. 
4. The Development of the Individual. 
5. Philosophy of Religion. 
6. Theology. 
By way of a fUrther introductory hint, it may be sug-
gested that a trend reaches its culmination in this chapter. 
The words used to describe this trend are still clouded, but 
perhaps they may be offered as a movement from "objectivity" 
or "exteriority" to "subjectivity" or "inwardness·." Thera 
is only a remote connection between these terms and philo-
sophical objectivism and subjectivism. It is remote because 
"inwardness" is not an epistemological term, but a more per-
vasive one which contains both methodological and ontologi-
cal implications. It is a term, perhaps unique to the exis-
tential approach to philosophy, that relates knowing to 
baing (the existential being of' the subject) in a manner un-
like either objectivism or subjectivism--both of which are 
388 
concerned with the status of the object of knowledge, ob-
jectivism giving it status apart from the particular knowing 
subject (realism and objective idealism are alike in this), 
and subjectivism denying it such status. Pictorially, 
"inwardness" might be said to characterize a movement away 
from the periphery of experience, whatever its ontic 
structure, toward the center. 
All this has taken the name of 11 the existential atti-
tude . " If one pervasive thought can be said to dominate 
Kierkegaardian existentialism, it might be a unified 
compound of what must be going through the mind of the 
mother grouse and what cannot be found in grouse-like 
consciousness: that all experience centers here, concerns 
me vitally, is rendered meaningful by me; but my meaning is 
not given--it is in doubt. The grouse may know the first 
part well (not cognitively, of course); the second part pre-
sumably does not occur to her~ 
The existential question, then, is: "What does it 
mean to exist as a human being? 11 or, since even that 
question retains a hint of objectivity: "What is the mean-
ing of !!!I. existence?" Let us begin by trying to see what 
methodology this question might indicate. 
2. Methodology. 
A. Inwardness: Concrete, Unscientific, Self-centered. 
1. Dr. Brightman has warned that the methods of 
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science are to be respected, but that there is danger of a 
hidden abstraction if the scientist fails to keep in mind 
that he, too, must be taken into any final account of his 
experience. In this warning, integral to synoptic method, 
Dr. Brightman is defending concreteness. The Kierkegaardian 
existentialist might well accept this as a beginning, and 
then warn that Dr. Brightman is also guilty of a hidden ab-
straction in failing to take the philosopher 1n to account. 
This abstraction, however, would seem to be desirable on the 
ground that what is being abstracted is that the presence of 
which would preclude the philosopher from seeing things 
clearly, without personal bias. Indeed, synoptic method 
would seem to require such a removal precisely in order to 
be synoptic. The data received for investigation must be 
sterilized, even if the data is the fruit of introspection, 
or else it will not be an account of reality (or experience), 
but only a point of view, containing unrevealed, but active, 
biases and pre-evaluations~ In short, true synoptic method 
should not be provincial but catholic. 
However, science is an intentionally restricted disci-
pline, while philosophy purports to be all-inclusive. It is 
for this reason that existentialism gives a slightly differ-
ent meaning to the term, "concrete." Thus, "concrete" does 
not simply mean that one studies his data "in context," but 
rather it means something like "situation lived." It is the 
toothache-hurting, the fear-being-felt; if you wish, it is 
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"the flower-in-the-crannied-wa.ll--enjoyed." It is the recog-
nition that even the philosopher (or perhaps precisely the 
philosopher, since the philosopher cannot afford to leave 
anything out of account) has failed to penetrate the deepest 
meaning of experience. This is what leads Kierkegaard to 
proclaim so loudly against a Hegel who 11 builds a magnificent 
eastle and then lives in the gatehouse." The philosopher 
who wishes to indulge 1n a speculative 11 thought-exper1ment 11 
is as free to do so as is the scientist free to limit his 
field·. But the philosopher must be sure to let us know that 
this is what he is doing-. 
This approach has some claim, also, to the title "radi-
cal empiricism-." However, "experiencen is now not a generic 
term for the various data investigated by the philosopher 
(even including data derived introspectively) ·. Instead "ex-
perience" is a relationship-.· Thus the philosophical and the 
popular meaning of "experience" are drawn together-. Experi-
ence is what I 11go through, u end to fail to go through it 
(to require its sterilization) is--not to have the experi-
ence. It is this type of concreteness which is character-
istic of K1erkegaard 1 s method-. 
All honor to philosophy, all praise to everyone who 
brings a genuine devotion to its service. To deny the 
value of speculation • • • would be, in my opinion, to 
prostitute oneself. It would be particularly stupid in 
one whose own energies are for the most part, · ••• 
consecrated to its service; especially stupid 1n one who 
admires the Greeks-. For he must know that Aristotle, 1n 
treating of what happiness is, identifies the highest 
happiness with the joys of thought-. ••• And he must 
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furthermore have some conception of, and respect for, 
the fearless enthusiasm of the philosophical scholar, 
his persistent devotion to the service of the Idea~ 
•• ~ This sort of thing I am quite conversant with my-
self. But the blessed gods, those great prototypes for 
the speculative philosopher, were not concerned for 
their eternal happiness; and so the problem did not at 
all arise in paganism~ But to treat Christianity in the 
same manner is simply to invite confusion. Since man is 
a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal, the happi-
ness that the speculative philosopher may enjoy will be 
an illusion, in that he desires in time to be merely 
eternal. 1Herein lies the error of the speculative phi-losopher. 
There is, of course, a major problem encountered the 
moment one attempts to apply this method~ Unless one is 
"undergoing 11 the experience of being an existential author, 
there is still a gap between living the situation and writ-
ing about it~ Thus it would appear that if one is going to 
take even the initial step toward expressing himself to 
others about his situations-lived, there must be some sort 
of abstraction. This is what Klerkegaard calls the trick of 
"double reflection." 
A double reflection is implicit in the very idea of com-
munication. Communication assumes that the subject who 
exists in the isolation of his inwardness, and who de-
sires through this inwardness to express the life of 
eternity, where sociality and fellowship is unthinkable, 
• • • nevertheless wishes to impart himself; and hence 
desires at one and the same time to have his thinking 1n 
the inwardness of his subjective existence, and yet also 
to put himself into communication with others~2 
1
slren Klerkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
trans. David F. Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1944), p. 54·. 
2 Ibid., ~· 69. There is a close connection between 
the methOd of double reflection" and Kierkegaard 's famous 
literary method of "indirect communiea tion~" The task of 
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K1erkegaard takes elaborate measures to ensure that this 
"delayed abstraction" is not confused with "speculative ab-
straction," possibly generating some confusion thereby on 
his own. Perhaps so much is not necessary; still, if the 
method of existentialism is not to be lost, this distinction 
must be kept clear~ 
2~ As the long quotation above may have indicated, 
there is more implied in Kierkegaard's method than recog-
nition of the relational nature of experience and of specu-
lative accounts of it~ Kierkegaard gives ample indication 
. 1 
that his method is ••unscientific." That is to say that not 
only is the subject involved in his experience, and unavoida-
bly so, but also that the nature of this involvement is that 
of' 11 inf'ini te interest·." 
This contradiction between the subject who is 1n passion 
infinitely interested, and philosophical speculation 
viewed as something that might assist him, I shall par-
mit myself to illustrate by means of an image from the 
sensible world-. In sawing wood it is important not to 
press down too hard on the saw; the lighter the pressure 
• · •• the batter the saw operates~ In the same way it 
is necessary for the philosopher to make himself ob-jectively light; but everyone who is 1n passion infi-
nitely interested • -. • makes himself subjectively as 
this chapter does not lie 1n areas so well traversed by 
translators and popular writers; so the second phrase will 
not be explored~ 
1The more inclusive German term, 11wissanschaftlieh, 11 
perhaps comes closer to rendering the meanfri8 of K1erke-
gaard1s "uvidenskabelis." The broader meaning doubtless in-
cludes philosophy professors as well as scientists, against 
both of which Kierkegaard expends considerable effort-. 
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heavy as possible. Precisely for this reason he pre-
vents himself from speculating.~ 
Higher than this speculative happiness, therefore, is 
the infinite passionate interest in a personal eternal 
happiness. It is higher because it is truer, because it 
definitely expresses the synthesis of the temporal and 
the eternal.2 
3. Finally, as the foregoing might indicate, when one 
is to consider a concrete situation in which one is involved 
and the nature of which one views with passionate interest, 
the primary "datum" for existential investigation is one's 
self. Thus Kierkegaardian method may be termed practical 
rather than theoretical. 
B. Some Suggestions Pertinent to Cri teriology. 
One may ask Kierkegaard what, in terms of his method, 
can be said about the nature and criterion of truth. His 
reply is both illuminating and surprising. 
When the question of truth is raised in an objective 
manner, reflection is directed objectively to the truth, 
as an object to which the knower is related. Reflection 
is not focused upon the relationship, however, but upon 
the question of whether it is the truth to which the 
knower is related~ If only the object to which he is 
related is the truth, the subject is accounted to be in 
the truth. When the question of the truth is raised 
subjectively, reflection is directed subjectively to the 
nature of the individual's relationship; if only the 
mode of this relationship is in the truth, the indi-
vidual is in the truth ~ 1! he should haPpen 12, ]2! 
thus related to ~a not true.3 
1Kierkegaard, Postscript, P• 55. 
2 ~., p. 54. 
3Ibid., p. 178. The entire passage is in italics in 
the original. The italics in the quotation are mine. 
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The reply is illuminating because it fixes Kierkegaard's 
criterion of truth in the nature of the relationship between 
the subject and that to which he stands 1n relation. In 
short, it escapes the normal criteriological relationship 
between a proposition and a state of affairs altogether, 
since both of these are considered as objective. Presumably, 
then, the criterion of truth, for Kierkegaard, will be the 
degree of passion, inwardness, or "infinite interest" with 
which a subject relates himself to his object. This re-
quires some justification 1n the face of philosophical 
notions t(1> the contrary. 
The reply is surprising because Kierkegaard, in the 
italicized portion of the quotation, speaks of being "re-
lated to what is not true," seemingly indicating that there 
is another order of truth. 
The reader will observe that the question here is about 
essential truth, or about the truth which is essentially 
related to existence, and that it is precisely for the 
sake of clarifying it as inwardness or as subjectivity 
that this contrast is drawn~l 
If there are such, then it is up to Kierkegaard to show that 
his kind of truth is the kind to which we should properly 
address ourselves. He must show that "objective" truth is 
either of an inferior order or that truth cannot be arrived 
at "objectively." He does bot~ 
Almost everything that nowadays flourishes most con-
spicuously under the name of science • ~ • is not really 
1 ~., n. 
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science but curiosity •••• But such a scientific 
method becomes especially dangerous and pernicious when 
it would encroach also on the sphere of spirit~ Let it 
deal with plants and animals and stars in that way; but 
to deal with the human spirit in that way is blasphemy, 
which only weakens ethical and religious passion. Even 
the act of eating is more reasonable than speculating 
with a microscope upon the functions of digestion. 
• • • A dreadfUl sophistry spreads microscopically and 
telescopically into tomes, and yet in the last resort 
produces nothing, qualitatively understood, though it 
does, to be sure, cheat men out of the simple, profound 
and passionate wonder which gives impetus to the ethi-
cal. • • • The only thing certain is the ethico-re-
ligious.l 
Thus it would appear that, for Kierkegaard, science cannot 
deal with the human spirit, and, since for him the human 
spirit is all that is of importance, it would seem that any 
other "truth" is "indifferent. 11 However, there is more; he 
has also said that the only thing certain is the ethico-re-
ligious. Let us ask Kierkegaard for a definition of truth 
in order that we may proceed further. 
Here is such a definition of truth: ~ objective ~­
certainty held !!!1 1ll ~ appropriation-process 2f the 
most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest 
trUth attainable ~ ~ existing-individua1.2 
It would seem, on first inspection, that, for Kierke-
gaard, there is no possibility of "objective certainty." 
This is not precisely true. He readily grants that mathe-
matical truths are objectively true; they are simply not the 
1
s¢'ren Kierkegaard, The Journals, trans. and ed. 
Alexander Dru (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), par~ 
617. Unless otherwise noted, reference to the Journals will 
be by paragraph entries~ 
2 K1erkegaard., Postscript, p. 182. Italics in the 
original. 
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highest truth attainable. Other than these (and philosophy 
itself is undecided as to how to treat of them), it may be 
that there is very little of which we can be certain--that 
is, have knowledge of. It may be recalled from Chapter 
Three above that Dr. Brightman holds, as a strong point 1n 
his criteriology the "open-endedness" of finite hypotheses~ 
All knowledge (we speak here only of synthetic knowledge), 
it would seem, is approximate. It is a generalization drawn 
from the data presently available, and room must constantly 
be made for adjustments in hypotheses dictated by new evi-
dence. In this sense, Kierkegaard seems correct 1n judging 
all objective knowledge to possess, to a greater or lesser 
degree, uncertainty, with the "degree coefficient" being 
furnished only by the regularity and temporal constancy of 
the experiences themselves~ 
Kierkegaard's argument, at this point, fans out into 
several points. Let us mention them separately~ 
1~ This kind of "approximate" knowledge is insuf-
ficient for the individual to whom existence is so important 
that he cannot afford to let it slip by while the evidence 
piles up. There is a kind of "forced option" about life 
that requires us to act on the evidence available~ Who 
could disagree? But it is an objective uncertainty. 
2. However, there is a kind of truth--called by some 
"faith," that appends to an aet undertaken, a commitment, on 
the basis of such an objective uncertainty. The truth does 
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not apply to the objective fact of experience--though I die 
for it--but it does apply to the act. We call this an act 
"in good faith," and we have legal indulgences for such acts. 
3. If the individual has acted on the basis of an ob-
jective uncertainty, particularly if the act is in a criti-
cal situation, we are willing to grant that he, at least, 
has made this hypothesis his own. It has been meaning:t\11 to 
him, and he has acted because it was meaningful. The indi-
cation would seem to be that this type of truth--pertaining 
to action--if it is unappropriated, adopted by nobody, is 
not truth even if whatever it refers to happens to be the 
case. Kierkegaard's developing point is that all truth is a 
basis of activity, and that •'merely cognitiven truth is not 
truth at all, but rather inhabits a realm not unlike 
Santayana's realm of essences, that is, is entertained or 
enjoyed, but nothing more. 
4. Further, he who appropriates something as "true 
for him 11 is conditioned by that which he has appropriated. 
Even if no overt action ensues a man "is what he believes." 
This may even be considered as "objectively" true. Thus an 
actor is born by the act of appropriation and defined by the 
content of what is taken as meening:t\11, en event to which 
the term ntruth" may be applied utterly apart from what it 
is that has been appropriated. 
This process has brought the truth-relationship away 
from the objective utenn" through the activity which related 
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the subject to it and back to the subject. The last sug-
gestion, that the truth of the subject can be seen as 
somewhat on the order of an "objective" truth, is not a step 
made by Kierkegaard; we shall encounter it in the sequel 
chapter when we probe the basis for subjective relationships 
between subjects. Without such a suggestion, it may be 
mentioned in passing, it could prove difficult to understand 
how I can have anything to do w1 th the truth that is another 
person (for example: Christ)~ This sort of transitiveness 
may help us philosophically, if not existentially~ 
Now let us return to the quotation to calculate what 
kind of an individual will be produced by "tentativett action 
(until new evidence requires new tactics) and what kind will 
be produced by "decisive" action. Although both actions re-
ceive their initial impetus from the situation-experienced, 
the first may be called "historical action" while the second 
may be seen as irrevocable action in the face of "eternity. 11 
We need not inquire whether there is such a thing as eternal 
truth; it is sufficient to understand that for the indi-
vidual to act in the face of what he believes to be eternal 
truth--to appropriate it--is to make of himself the type of 
creature who, while inhabiting the realm of historical truth, 
and able to reach no higher, is nonetheless one who is con-
ditioned by eternity. He who acts by tentative appropri-
ation of the evidence of history (experience) both inhabits 
and is conditioned by that tentative appropriation; he is a 
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hesitant one who, no matter how critical his choices, never 
acts decisively~ 
The truth is precisely the venture which chooses an ob-jective uncertainty with the passion of the infinite~ I 
contemplate the order of nature in the hope of finding 
God, and I see omnipotence and wisdom; but I also see 
much else that disturbs my mind and excites anxiety. 
The sum of all this is an objective uncertainty. But it 
is for this very reason that the inwardness becomes as 
intense as it is, for it embraces this objective un-
certainty ~ ~ entire passion Q! 1£! infinite •••• 
But the above definition of truth is an equivalent ex-
pression for faith. Without risk there is no faith~ 
Faith is precisely the contradiction between the infi-
nite passion of the individual's inwardness and the ob-jective uncertainty~l 
c. Conclusion to this Section. 
It is possible that nothing has been said, thus far, 
that would excite disagreement from any philosopher who 
understood that man must not only think, but also go to work 
in his world. Disagreement may come later, in the section 
dealing with Kierkegaard's philosophy of religion, when what 
is now an "objective uncertainty" becomes an "objective ab-
surdity~" The development of this exposition, however, is 
conceived upon lines such that there must be an interruption 
for some preliminary ethical considerations and for 
treatment of the development of the individual~ Following 
this, the disjunction between the real and the conceptual 
will signal our return to this theme~ 
Nonetheless, a step has been made in exposition 
1 I'bid., p. 182·. The italics are mine ·. 
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already. Amid a world of experience where man no longer 
parmi ts himself the luxury of demanding that his rationality 
be the sole key to reality, and without which the concept of 
truth must be stripped of some of its pretensions, it is 
possible that we have found one place where there is truth. 
It is 1n this: that an individual who fathoms his actions 
as conditioned by eternity is, utterly apart from the find-
ings of science as to his behavior and its causes, in truth 
(truly) acting decisively. By his infinite passion he has 
brought about his own birth. Kierkegaard has made a Journal 
comment on authority to the effect that, "personality is 
only ripe when a man has made the truth his own. "1 Perhaps 
it could be added that only then is it the truth, and, even 
if it be an untruth that he has made his own as truth, he is, 
in truth, an individual thereby~ 
3. Preliminary Ethical Considerations~ 
A. Cognition and the Aesthetic Stage. 
Possibly it may be assumed that the life of an indi-
vidual takes its rise in the fact of consciousness. Before 
there is this there may well be something; but from the 
point of view of inwardness, as well as that of epistemology, 
consciousness is a sort of absolute. Kierkegaard speaks of 
1K1erkegaard, Journals, par. 432~ 
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"the miracle of consciousness, "1and states that uconscious-
ness presupposes itself, and to question its origin is as 
captious as the question of the chicken and the egg. 112 For 
most philosophies, the essential characteristic of conscious-
ness is that it is cognitive. This must remain true also 
for Kierkegaard .• 
However, his methodology leads him to seek the meaning 
of cognition only from the point of the subject-cognizing; 
1n short, he does not concern himself either with the cogni-
tive act or with the nature of the object of cognition. 
Thus emptied, the subject stands as a kind of receptacle for 
whatever it is that it receives. It might appear that his 
methodology is at cross-purposes with itself here, for he 
has already told us about the extreme concreteness of the 
situation-experienced. However, he is not now denying this; 
he is only ignoring it in order that he may make preparation 
for the development of subjectivity. When one speaks of a 
"spectator," he has the same problem (of intentional ab-
straction); for a spectator is concretely involved 1n that 
which he watches (if it is a 11 spectator-sport" he is its 
reason for being), but nonetheless he is involved as a spec-
tator. The case is similar with Kierkegaard's scrutiny of 
the subject-cognizing; thus there are no epistemic 
1 ~., par. 617. 
2 Ibid., par. 418. 
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implications to be contended with. 
If we trim the term nenjoyment" down from its generic 
connotation of "watching" or "witnessing" (whether the 
watcher happens to like what he is witnessing or not) to its 
more specific emotional connotation, we will have es-
tablished a connection between cognition and esthetics and 
will have arrived at the definitive characteristic of 
Kierkegaard' a "aesthetic man. 11 He is an observer and an en-
joyer, and, as such, his life is characterized by immediacy. 
"The aesthetical man is that by which he is immediately what 
he is."1 He is, in short, the pleasure that he :feels (or ex-
pects). Then, as the pleasure that he feels has its source 
in that which he observes, the condition of his enjoyment is 
outside--it is not the individual's contribution to himself. 
Perhaps it is evident that the method of scientific objec-
tivity has a close correlate in the "aesthetic. 11 
Kierkegaard uses the term ndialectical 11 for each of 
these characteristics--emptiness in himself and conditioned 
by the external. "If an individual is in himself undialecti-
cal and has his dialectic outside himself, then we have the 
aesthetic interpretation. "2 
Kierkegaard's judgment of the aesthetic stage is not 
unlike that of Schopenhauer. Every mode of the aesthetic 
1
s¢ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, trans. Walter Lowrie 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), II, 150. 
2 Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 507. 
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life is despair. It is despair because there is no conti-
nuity, no assurance of success (as Epicurus understood and 
tried to escape), and, even if there were an abundance of 
pleasures, its very abundancy turns it sour. The desponden-
cy of the 11 Diapsalmata,"1so characteristic of the popular 
interpretation of existentialism, is intended to convey the 
futility of the aesthetic stage. Later we shall find out 
that it may not even be necessary to be conscious of this 
despair as despair 1n order to feel it. 
B. The Ethical Stage. 
It is through despair of the aesthetical that the per-
ceptive individual finds his way out by means of a direct 
reversal of the two characteristics of that stage. In place 
of immediacy he chooses mediation, and in place of external 
conditioning he chooses to bring the condition into h1mself~ 2 
Both of these come to the same thing, for, in either case a 
term is born, and with it a dialectical relationship. It is 
a double dialectic, the first step of which is the dialectic 
between a self and that which environs it; the battle of the 
self to overcome and control its environment establishes the 
self as an actor, a participant, and no longer merely a 
1 Kierkegaard, Either/Or, I, pp. 15-30. 
2 As is the case with many "dialectical" developnents, 
there is an apparent return to the immediacy and externality 
of the aesthetic stage 1n the highest stage of selfhood--
only then one's immediacy is before God, and one's exter-
nality is God. 
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spectator. The second step is the dialectic between the 
self and itself in order that, by taking control, not only 
of its environment, but also of itself, it might overcame 
itself and grow. 
If the individual is dialectical in himself inwardly in 
self-assertion, hence 1n such a way that the ultimate 
basis is not dialectic in itself, inasmuch as the self 
which is at the basis is used to overcome and as~ert 
itself, then we have the ethical interpretation.~ 
Thus, if the characterization of the aesthetic stage 
could be called "enjoyment," that of the ethical stage 
should be "striving. 112 Let us postpone, until the next 
section, the question of the mechanics of emergence of ethi-
cal man from aesthetic man, confining ourselves at this 
point to an account of the nature of the ethical stage. It 
has already been described in essence as a struggle of self-
assertion over control by immediacy and externality, a 
struggle which implies growth. If it is true that "the aes-
thetical in man is that by which he is immediately what he 
is," then "the ethical is that whereby he becomes what he 
becomes. 113 What does he become? 
c. The Ethical as the Universal~ 
It is commonly (and truly) understood that the esthete 
(the hedonist) is essentially selfish. This is to be kept 
1 Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 507. 
2 ~., p. 256. 
3Kierkegaard, Either/Or, II, 150. 
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in mind even when Kierkegaard tells us that he really has no 
self at all; for both are true, and they are not necessarily 
incompatible statements. It is also commonly understood 
that the esthete is not precisely social--even though it is 
very possibly true that he thrives on society--and that 
Kierkegaard has told us that he is conditioned from the 
outside. In view of the distinctions made above let us sug-
gest, with Reidar Thomte that 
the aesthetic mode of life leads to isolation from so-
ciety. The individual has himself as the greatest good 
and goal in life! Everything else becomes a tool to 
this end. The individual is magnified and society be-
comes insignificant~ 
1~ The first task of ethics is to establish oneself 
as an agent in one's own right~ This means that, while one 
still must take account of one's environment (to reject t he 
aesthetic stage entirely would seem to mark a rejection of 
cognition as well), there is now to be a dialectical inter-
change between the acting self and the matter acted upon·. 
But this means that the ethical stage is in some sense a 
concession to objectivity~ This is so, but not precisely; 
for the objectivity engaged by an ethical agent is now medi-
ated by him and not merely observed. K1erkegaard presses 
this point. 
For it is regarded as e. settled thing, that the ob-jective tendency in direction of intellectual contem-
plation, is, 1n the newer linguistic usage, the ethical 
~eidar Thomte, K1erkegaard's PhilosoHhT of Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19 9 , p. 36. 
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answer to the question of what I ethically have to do; 
and the task assigned to the contemplative nineteenth 
century is world history. The objective tendency is the 
way and the truth; the ethical is, becoming an obsarver·!l 
Hence, the movement in the ethical stage is not so much in 
the direction of philosophical rationalism as it is in the 
direction of ethical rationalism (Kantianism), where some 
sort of reconciliation between the individual and the cosmic 
or social order is given as the ethical task or calling of 
the individual. 
The ethical thesis that avery man has a calling is the 
expression for the fact that there is a rational order 
of things in which every man, if he will, fills his 
place in such a way that he exprQsses at once the uni-
versal-human and the 1ndividual.2 
This does not mean that there is a niche already carved for 
one to fill, and that ethical choice is merely limited to 
that of whether to submit or rebel. It means that the indi-
vidual is called to make his place, and this requires a con-
tinuing struggle. If it were otherwise, there is danger of 
the ethical deteriorating into the aesthetic. 
In like manner one often sees men who are afraid that if 
once they were to fall in love they might not get the 
girl who is exactly the ideal which suits them. Who 
will deny that it is pleasant to get such a girl? But 
nevertheless, it is a superstition to believe that what 
is outside a man is what is able to make him happy~3 
2. With this, it may be suggested that the nature of 
1Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 119. 
2 Kierkegaard, Either/Or, II, 244. 
3Ibid. , p. 211. 
the task of realizing the universal consists entirely in the 
exercise of the Kantian Categorical Imperative. That is to 
say that, as the individual wills to make his place in a 
rational order, he likewise wills that no act of his will be 
an act that makes of him an exception. Now and then word-
usage can be confusing, so that we might assume the indi-
vidual who assiduously governs his life in this way to be 
truly exceptional; and we would doubtless be correct. None-
theless, it remains true that while it might require ex-
ceptional effort and character, the realm of ethics has no 
place for the exceptional (no place for special pleading). 
From this follows naturally what we might call the 
principle of the social universal. Insofar as my duty lies 
in making myself a "tool of the universal," so it may be 
that ethically my duty toward other men consists in assist-
ing them in doing the same for themselves. It is precisely 
because "the crowd" is at the farthest remove from doing 
this that Kierkegaard asserts that "there is no truth in a 
crowd. nl If we reflect for a moment on the constitution of a 
mob, we may see that this is the case. The mob presents the 
facade of universality. However, the all-important dia-
lectic which establishes the individual as acting in service 
of the universal is glaringly missing. Ask a member of a 
mob who is acting. His answer: "We are doing it." And if 
1
see S¢'ren Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart, trans. D. v·. 
Steere (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1938), pp. 175-180. 
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it happens to be a lynch-mob, perhaps his answer will be 
"They." Thus it is that Kierkegaard's often vicious attacks 
on the crowd are in service of the excellence of the ethical 
individual in his relationship to the universal quite as 
much as they are in service of the solitary individual be-
fore his God. 
3. What this leads to, however, is the place where 
Kant made his beginning: 11 There is nothing unconditionally 
good except the good will," and with this the attention of 
the ethicist must turn inward, away from the object of ethi-
cal activity and toward the subject. This is the climax of 
Kierkegaard's ethical position.1 For now the concern of the 
individual in "doing the right thing" is seen to be so im-
portant that actually accomplishing the right thing becomes 
trivial. In short, the depth of the individual's concern 
with doing the right thing (that thing required by the de-
mands of a rational ethic) is precisely the measure of his 
having done the right thing, even though the results may be 
disasterous. 
A truly great ethical personality would seek to realize 
his life in the following manner. He would strive to 
develop himself with the utmost exertion of his powers; 
in so doing he would perhaps produce great effects in 
the external world. But this would not seriously engage 
his attention, for he would know that the external re-
sult is not in his power, and hence that it has no sig-
nificance for him, either ~ or contra. He would 
therefore choose to remain in ignorance of what he had 
1It is not, of course, the climax of the category of 
the ttethico-religious·. 11 
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accomplished, in order that his striving might not be 
retarded by a preoccupation with the external, and lest 
he fall into the temptation which proceeds from it~l 
The final result is a step beyond Kantianism. While 
Kant would certainly argue that the will is more important 
than the result, it is likely that his measure of a person's 
moral worth would be in the effort brought to bear on an ex-
ternal situation by that person. Then he might grant that 
the results were not the important thing, so long as the 
will was good. For Kierkegaard, however, there seems to be 
another twist in the trail, so that the ethical task is not 
consummated in the good will trying to bring about rational 
results, but rather continues on (or turns back), making the 
final ethical task of the ethical individual to consist in--
developing oneself as an ethical individual~ Both Kierke-
gaard and Kant leave much up to Providence, but in Kant one 
reads more about desert when the good will has done its work, 
while in Kierkegaard the concern is with growth as an ethi-
cal individual. This is not to say that Kant moves beyond 
the ethical into something ulterior--his treatment of God is 
testimony to the fact that he has not--but it is to say that 
in the Kierkegaardian sense he has left ethics incomplete. 
The apparent circularity of an ethical task to be ethical is 
Kierkegaard's own attempt to keep ethics from culminating in 
the non-ethical after he has come full circle and returned 
1K1erkegaard, Postscript, p. 121. 
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to the existential interest of the ethical man in his own 
developnent. 1 
D. Conclusion to this Section~ 
Aside from reference to the Kantian "good will, 11 
nothing has been said about the good. It is difficult for 
any ethical system to avoid teleology altogether, and Kierke-
gaard's ethic is emphatically no exception. However, for 
him the term belongs to philosophy of religion rather than 
ethics. Thus "the good" must await further developnent. 
We have brought the individual to the point where, as 
an ethical individual, he finds himself defined by his inter-
est in himself. Let us go back, now, and perform a 11 splic-
ing" operation in order to see how he got to be that way". 
4. The Development of the Individual. 
A. Consciousness as Given~ 
It is apparent that in the concept of the ethical 
individual we have progressed a long way into his develop-
ment ·. This section aims at complementing material already 
covered by concentrating on what may be called the "in-
terstices" between the stages of developnent. That is to 
say that, if consciousness is a miracle without explanation, 
1seen in fuller context, but still witnout emerging 
from the ethical into something ulterior, it is one's con-
cern for his eternal happiness that prompts ethical behavior 
in the Christian. It will be at that point that Kierkegaard 
must avoid "religious hedonism." 
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so also are some other emergent levels of growth of the indi-
vidual toward maturity. They are to be treated here~ 
Even a miracle requires some ground, even if the con-
nection between the ground and the miraculous event is mys-
terious. It may be quite true that before there is 
consciousness nothing can be known; it may even be true that 
natural forces work to produce the type of structure that is 
conscious, but neither of these approaches quite meets the 
problem. It will be recalled from the expository chapter on 
Sartre that one of the important difficulties the exis-
tentialist finds with the Hegelian system is that it deals 
1 
only 1n the concrete-immediate, considering anything prior 
to this as an abstraction. Hence there is no beginning. 
If it is at all possible for a human being to abstract 
from everything in his thinking, it is at any rate 1m-
possible for him to do more, since if this act does not 
transcend human power, it absolutely exhausts it~ To 
grow weary of the act of abstracting, and thus to arrive 
at a beginning, is an explanation of the sort valid only 
for costermongers, who do not take a little discrepancy 
so seriously'.2 
The direction of argument seems to be that while it may be 
fitting for us to begin philosophizing "where we are, in the 
present," either this is not a beginning or it is "beginning 
with a leap." Kierkegaard agrees with Dr. Brightman that 
1It is recognized, of course, that the immediate is 
only the beginning of concreteness in the Hegelian system. 
We are looking backward to origins, however, and not forward 
into mediation·. 
2 Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 104. 
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this is the place to begin, but draws the crucial exis-
tential conclusion that, precisely because of this, "an exis-
tential system" in the Hegelian sense of either an absolute 
beginning or finality "is impossible."1 Thus we return to 
the notion that "consciousness presupposes itself," or, it 
is given·. 
Not only is it that the aesthetic man looks outside of 
himself for his enjoyment, but he is quite right in doing so; 
for it appears that naturalism is correct in judging that we 
are all constituted from the outside. This is the meaning 
of given-ness. It does not need to imply a giver, but only 
that there must be a place to begin. The aesthetic man is 
the sophisticated counterpart of the natural man. However, 
there is passivity in discovering oneself as given, and pas-
sivity cannot produce activity--in short, natural man cannot 
produce ethical man (any more than an empirical theory of 
value can produce an ethic) ·. Hence we arrive at an hiatus·. 
The problem is to bridge the gap between human reality 
as passive and human reality as active. In the final analy-
sis, there is no bridge; a leap is required. But there is a 
kind of precondition, given, by Kierkegaard, the name 
11dread." Dread has many develop:nental phases; our present 
concern is only with the first, the presence of dread as a 
1 Ibid., p·. 107; Hegelian, as seen by Kierkegaard. 
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kind of fascination possessed by the natural man (1n inno-
cence--Adam) by which he recognizes his own possibilities 
for inwardness. It signifies the "slumbering" presence of 
spirit. 
Dread is a qualification of the dreaming spirit, and as 
such it has its place in psychology. When awake, the 
difference between myself and my other is posited; sleep-
ing, it is suspended; dreaming, it is a nothing vaguely 
hinted at. The reality of the spirit constantly shows 
itself in a form which entices its possibility, but it 
is away as soon as one grasps after it, and it is a 
nothing which is able only to alarm. More it cannot do 
so long as it only shows itself. One almost never sees 
the concept dread dealt with in psychology, and I must 
therefore call attention to the fact that it is differ-
ent from fear and similar concepts which refer to 
something definite, whereas dread is the reality of 
freedom as possibility anterior to possibility. One 
does not therefore find dread in the beast, precisely 
for the reason that by nature the beast is not qualified 
by spirit.l 
One's first reaction to this passage is that all 
K1erkegaard's care in conceiving of gaps and leaps is de-
stroyed when he posits dread as present in natural man, yet 
a motive-force for inwardness. However, thi s is not pre-
cisely true. As his theology will reveal, Kierkegaard is 
quite willing to grant that spirit is a gift of God--is 
given; on the other hand, the presence of dread (the quiver 
of the preying oat before he makes his leap) does not signi-
fy that anything, leap or bridge, has been accomplished. It 
is only freedom as possibility anterior to possibility~ The 
1
s¢ren K1erkegaard, The Concept of Dread, trans. 
Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), 
p. 38. See also Journals, par. 967~ 
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leap is yet to be made. 
c. Decision: The Reality of Freedom as Possibility~ 
Frequently my cats will quiver and then abruptly lose 
interest and settle down for a nap. Sometimes, however, one 
of them will quiver, and, just before he leaps but after his 
nervous processes have initiated the signal to leap, I will 
restrain him from pouncing on the bird he has stalked. 
There has been no leap, but there was a decision to leap. 
Within this tiny time-span lies our problem. For, whether 
or not his pounce materialized, my cat had "decided" to act. 
For our purposes here, it is the decision to act that consti-
tutes the act. Before this there has been no act, and no 
actor, yet in the decision to act the actor is produced. In 
this instant the existing individual brings about his own 
birth. According to the previous section the realization of 
the ethical individual consisted in his recognition of a 
task or vocation. Yet here, anterior to any concept of duty 
at all, is the real beginning of the eth1co-religious, for 
it is here that the individual realizes himself as possi-
bility. The concept is very similar to Sartre'a notion of 
man as "possibilizing 11 his own possibilities. In this act 
the criteriological act of appropriation of the truth (in 
which the truth consists) and the existential act by which 
the ethical is posited merge--accompanied by a curious re-
versal of the relationships between possibility and 
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actuality (reality). For cognitive reality is ethical possi-
bility, and ethical possibility is the reality of the exist-
ing individual. On the other hand, the merely cognitively 
possible, through the act of appropriation (when "the" truth 
becomes "the truth for me") becomes the ethically real. 
All knowledge about reality is possibility. The only 
reality to which an existing individual may have a re-
lation that is more than cognitive, is his own reality, 
the fact that he exists; this reality constitutes his 
absolute interest. Abstract thought requires him to be-
come disinterested in order to acquire knowledge; the 
ethical demand is that he become infinitely interested 
in existing. 
The only reality that exists for an existing indi-
vidual is his own ethical reality. To every other re-
ality he stands in a cognitive relation; but true 
knowledge1consists in translating the real into the possible. 
It is this point that we have been trying to reach for 
some time; for here we reach the limit of human self-develop-
ment. There are other stages, but they are beyond the reach 
of the ethical conceived as the task to realize the uni-
versal--and because beyond, it may be that there will be a 
countermand. Yet, and this is crucial, if the ethical is 
seen as limited to the realization of the universal so that 
the individual gradually atrophies in the progressive suc-
cess of this process, then there is no need for a "teleo-
logical suspension at all," for Kierkegaard' s whole ethical 
position turns out to be an abrogation of the notion that 
the universal is higher than the individual~ Thus, as 
1 Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 280. 
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hedonism, for example, has an uoperating rule of' thumb 11 that 
one will find pleasure better by not seeking it, so has 
Kierkegaard a rule of' thumb, that in order to ripen the indi-
vidual, his passionate interest in his own existence must 
take the direction of' "losing oneself' in order to find one-
self.11 However, if "the ethical" is seen from Kierkegaard's 
point of' view as consisting in an infinite interest 1n one's 
ow.n existence, then there is, no matter what the operating 
procedure may be, nowhere in Kierkegaard 1 s authorship any 
indication that this is ever to be suspended. It is for 
this reason that 11ethico-religious" is hyphenated. "Christi-
anity is not really a collection of teachings, but is the 
development of character. 111 It is important that we keep 
this 1n mind, for what is to be said in the next section may 
seem to be the opposite. Let us turn, now to Kierkegaard's 
philosophy of' religion in the knowledge that we are also con-
tinuing the topic of' the development of' the individual~ Let 
us remind ourselves that when K1erkegaard tells us that "the 
ethical reality of' the individual is the only reality,"2 
later distinctions to be made are only specifically between 
the ethical and the religious; generically the distinction 
is, and has been throughout, between the ethical as practi-
cal and the merely theoretical. 
1 K1erkegaard, Journals, par. 1294. 
2 Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 291. 
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5. Philosophy of Religion. 
A. Introduction: the Eternal and the Universal. 
In one sense the universal transcends the "historical." 
Insofar as there seems to be no possibility of reaching uni-
versality inductively (historically), that which we experi-
ence, and the generalizations we draw from such experiences, 
must always fall short of universality. However, in another 
sense--but for the same reason--the universal does not tran-
scend the historical, for historical data is the raw materi-
al of the universal·. Appearing in all its vivid particu-
larity, it nonetheless is that upon which the mind works its 
universalization process. Thus we may say that experience 
pertains to the universal·. This is how we "learn by experi-
ence." 
Suppose, however , a peculiar sort of individual. This 
individual is perfectly willing to follow the rules of con-
ceptual thinking in sorting out his experience, and ethical 
acting insofar as those rules apply, and to follow them as-
siduously. But suppose him to have a suspicion that the uni-
versal is the product of a mind at work on its experience--
that "objective truth," in short, "is a property of concepts 
(or propositions) ·." He is aware that there is no thought 
without a thinker; that thought is "attached" to existence, 
but he also suspects that thought does not determine ex-
istence (in any ordinary sense); that thinking requires en 
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existing individual to think, but that thinking does not 
cause existing. He suspects that life is greater than 
1 logic. Since it was a passionate interest that drove him to 
the universal in the first place as "the highest thing possi-
ble," might it not be that his suspicion might lead him to 
seek in another direction for the grotmd and meaning of his 
existence? Suppose he understands that the only reality he 
can know is his own--that "to conceive the real is impossi-
ble. 2 Only the ideal is conceivable"; and suppose he seeks 
the real ground of his existence. Suppose he knows all this; 
is he not in a difficult position, where he cannot trust his 
generalizations from experience; cannot put his faith in the 
universal, and yet can conceive of no alternative? What can 
he do but cry out that whatever is the ground of existence, 
that he seeks with infinite passion. Knowing no more, per-
haps he might give it a name. Let him name it "eternity." 
It is only a name for whatever it is that is the ground of 
his existence, and, as life is greater than logic, so also 
is eternity greater than the universal. And, since it is 
greater than the universal, it must, by the very nature of 
the universal, be other than the universal. 
We are now in the category of the religious·. This 
does not mean that only at this point is mention made of God. 
l There has been intentional borrowing, in the text 
above, from the phraseology of personalistic idealism·. 
2 Kierkegaard, Journals, par. 1054. 
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One can name God as the object of belief aesthetically or 
ethically as well. Nor does this mean that we have reached 
Christianity, or even theism. To reach these, one must also 
believe that eternity is concerned about us as individuals, 
and to believe this is to escape entirely religious bondage 
to the universal. However, we are in the category of the 
religious, which, for Kierkegaard, as we know, means that we 
are concerned about the eternal--the eternally real--and our 
relationship to it~ 
B~ Faith: the Eternal and the Individual·. 
Now we may return, after a lengthy interruption, to an 
earlier problem. Kierkegaard has given us his defin1 tion of 
truth and has told us that it 11is an equivalent expression 
for faith. 11 Let us repeat the definition. 
An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-
process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, 1 the highest truth attainable for an existing individual~ 
One may ask Kierkegaard, now, more about this 11 objective un-
certainty'. 11 This does not, by any means, indicate that we 
must first know all there is to know about the object of be-
lief--or even that we must know all we can know about it--
before we believe; if this were so, then certainty would 
give way to approximation and faith to understanding. Still, 
at the same time, one cannot simply believe; he must believe 
something. The object of religious belief--what he believes 
1 See above, this chapter, p. 396. 
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--is that eternity hGlds the key to his ultimata meaning. 
Either the individual 1n question believes this with 
infinite passion or he does not believe; there are no middle 
points. But if he does believe that eternity holds the kay 
to his ultimata meaning, and believes it passionately (not 
as a tentative hypothesis, waiting to sea if tomorrow's ex-
perience will add mora evidence), than he reveals himself as 
an existing individual (temporal, finite) who is conditioned 
by his relationship with eternity-. That is to say, he is a 
synthesis and a relationship, and he is all this without the 
slightest suggestion of a proof, or even evidence, that 
there is an objective avant such as eternity. This, in the 
opinion of the writer, is possibly the meaning of what may 
wall be one of K1erkegaard 1 s deepest (obscure and ~ofound) 
assertions. 
Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. 
But what is the self? The self is ·a relation which re-
lates itself to its own self, or it is that 1n the re-
lation (which accounts for it) that the relation relates 
itself to its own self; the self is not the relation but 
(consists 1n the fact) that the relation relates itself 
to its own self-. Man is a synthesis of the infinite and 
the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom 
and necessity, in short it is a synthesis.l 
It is not easy, or perhaps even proper, to elucidate this 
quotation, but it might be said that part of its meaning 
seems to be that, thus far, the whole drama takes place 
1
s,ren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, trans. 
Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 
p. 17. 
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within man and presupposes no other term as real in order 
that selfhood, constituted by its relationship, may be a re-
lationship between two factors. The two factors ar e the 
self and eternity; but the relationship is the dominant and 
constituting "factor," for it is in the relationship that 
the self "exists," and eternity is an objective uncertainty. 
This is neither an unphilosophical subjectivism (that 
no other term is required but the self and its dreams, or 
its states of consciousness), nor a fairy-tale realism (be-
lieve, or wish, hard enough and your wish will come true). 
It is more on the order of madness; for certain types of in-
sanity will believe strenuously in events that sanity re-
gards as highly uncertain, to say the least. Yet, while the 
events may not have happened, the insane one is surely re-
lated to them, and is as surely constituted as he is by that 
relationship·. 
It is this that bothers science and philosophy. 
Kierkegaard has told us that religiosity concerns itself 
with an objective uncertainty. But this is surely a euphe-
mism. What is an objective uncertainty may yet have the 
balance of evidence in its favor. But if faith is this, 
while it still may be the opposite of knowledge in that 
faith diminishes as probability increases, faith then be-
comes an unfortunate appendage of finitude which one day may 
be almost removed via the historical method. But Kierke-
gaard has already told us that the eternal is not the same 
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as the universal; eternity is reality and universality is 
conceptual. Thus, even if it happened to be the case that, 
1 in reality, the universal and the eternal were identical, 
faith must take as its object a radically different object 
than that taken by conceptual thought. If Hegel is correct 
and the real is the rational, rationality can never know it, 
because rationality can know only that the rational is the 
rational. But what this means is that faith in eternity is 
fated by definition to be regarded by conceptual thought as 
irrational! 
Thus we arrive at the conclusion that faith, because 
it is in an object that is inconceivable (because it is of 
the order of reality rather than conceptuality), is absurd. 2 
It is this that bothers science and philosophy. 
At this stage we have three points to untangle. It is 
well known that Kierkegaard finds religiosity "riddled 11 with 
paradoxes. Let us separate out three of them at this time. 
More will follow later. 
1~ In the religiosity of paganism there is the para-
dox (illustrated by Socrates) of an individual existing 
1 This is possible, because, for God, an existential 
system may be possible. Later we may discover Kierkegaard 
as something of a finalist-. 
2Normal connotation of 11 absurd" is 11 ridiculous. 11 
While there is certainly a connection, it mi§ht be better to 
think of 11absurdn as "beyond conceivability. Kierkegaard 
is in the camp of Tertullian, but he is not an enemy of 
thought-experiments. 
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religiously by virtue of his "Socratic ignorance." 
In the principle that subjectivity, inwardness, is the 
truth, there is comprehended the Socratic wisdom, whose 
everlasting meri t it was to have become aware of the es-
sential significance of existence, of the fact that the 
knower is an existing individual·. For this reason 
Socrates was in the truth by virtue of his ignorance, in 
the highest sense in which this was possible within 
paganism.l 
Here there is the paradox, not that ignorance is truth, but 
that thought is only a derivative of existence, while ex-
istence is the important thing. The paradox is that 
Socrates kept quiet about existence, or fashioned his daimon, 
and so was in truth, while Plato built a metaphysical 
. 2 
system. 
2. There is the paradox, not only that truth lies in 
a direction other than thought, but also that the eternal 
truth concerns a finite, existing individual~ That it i s 
possible for eternity to intersect time so that an existing 
individual can become a synthesis, even granting that there 
is such a thing as eternity, is a paradox. 3 
3. Finally, there is the paradox that it is precisely 
by virtue of belief in the absurd that an individual 
1Kierkegaard, Postscript, p~ 183. 
2 It is curious that philosophy generally sees these 
two as in almost the opposite positions relative to each 
other, with Socrates the nominalist, concerned only with 
defini tiona, and. Plato the one for whom the dialectic was a 
real~ty. This, of course, is just what Kierkegaard must 
mean. 
3 cr. ~., p. 184. 
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establishes the relationship that constitutes him as exist-
ing in the religious category. 11Now the individual bears 
the stamp of having been essentially altered by existence. 111 
Thus it is that faith is absurd because its object is 
absurd, and by virtue of this absurdity remakes that indi-
vidual, who first showed himself as existing by his concern 
over his existence, into one who now exists under the finger 
of eternity. As such, he exists in truth. 
c. The Opposite of Faith, or, Existing in Untruth. 
1. Without the analysis immediately above, we would 
find ourselves with one paradox too many; for the very 
notion of existing in untruth would be nonsense. Now, how-
ever, it may be suggested that an individual may concern 
himself about his existence, may concern himself in the 
certainty that eternity has its gaze fixed on him, but may 
still fail to relate himself to himself via the religious 
category of eternity. This narrow corridor, excluding 
"natural man112and man under the finger of eternity, is the 
place or sin. 3 "Sin" is therefore a religious term denoting 
the existing but non-religious viewed from the direction of 
1 Ibid., p. 186. 
2This must be a limiting term for Kierkegaard, since 
he gives evidence that all men have the possibility of ex-
istence. 
3rt will be recalled that this is also the category of 
the ethical. Later exposition will deal with this problem. 
See below, this chapter. 
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the category of religiosity. Viewed otherwise, exactly the 
same area might be called the place of "despair." Perhaps 
it .is not such a small corridor after all·. 
2. 
Let us now call the untruth of the individual Sin. 
Viewed eternally he cannot be sin, nor can he be eternal-
ly presupposed as having been in sin. By coming into 
existence therefore (for the beginning was that subjec-
tivity was untruth), he becomes a sinner. He is not 
born as a sinner in the sense that he is presupposed as 
being a sinner before he is born, but he is born in sin 
and as a sinner~l 
The narrow line between ~ugustine and Pelagius is to be 
threaded carefully. The existing individual is not presup-
posed as a sinner; there is no necessity that there be sin·. 
Sin comes into the world by a sin and not by eternal presup-
position; at the same time the individual (as he gives birth 
to himself as an existing individual) is born in sin and as 
a sinner. It is a universal condition, but it is not by ne-
cessity. It is evident that once a sinful condition is 
viewed as necessary, then the responsibility for sin coming 
into the world lies outside of the individual, i.~., it is a 
natural condition. Whereas, for Kierkegaard, sin is an indi-
vidual and historical condition. It is individual because 
sin, like consciousness, presupposes itself. It is histori-
cal (and this is the meaning of the PlZZling "born in sin") 
because I am born into a world which, each time that sin is 
chosen, increases its residue of sin. It is I who choose 
l Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 186. 
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sin, but it is I choosing because my father before me and 
his father before him; my teachers before me and their 
teachers before them, have chosen sin. I am, so to speak, 
educated in sin, and I, in turn, in my choice, "pile sin in 
the world a little higher" so that my children and my 
students, not inevitably, but none the less without ex-
ception,1choose in terms of the world and its encrustations~ 
Thus there is a kind of overlapping of guilt for sin~ 
Nobody but I can sin my sin, and I cannot shrug off the re-
sponsibility onto my forebears; at the same time it is be-
cause I have chosen sin that my children, who are very close 
to me, follow my example. Yet even while I must assume the 
responsibility for their being what they are (because I am 
what I am), they must assume full responsibility for what 
they are (because, and here we would do well to reflect on 
Sartre) because--it is they who are what they are·. "This, 11 
K1erkegaard says, "is what we might call Original S1n. "2 It 
is this "continuity between the generations" that is the 
meaning of history for Kierkegaard and the meaning of the 
solidarity of the race. Thus , historicity draws its meaning 
:f"rom sin·. Though the terms may be used in different 
contexts, it is small wonder that the "historical method of 
1 The close parallel between this and the category of 
the ethical is evident in the notion that 11 in the ethical 
there is never an exception. 11 
2 Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 186. 
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approximation" is a focal point of Kierkegaard's attack on 
philosophy. We shall have more to say about historicity 
later~ 
3. Meanwhile, it is proper to ask for the origin of 
sin and historicity, not in the mood of seeking an expla-
nation for it, but as a psychological investigation of the 
first sinner. Since it is apparent that sin must enter the 
world by the sin of an existing individual, Kierkegaard 
needs no apology for his use of the Biblical first man, Adam. 
The parallel between the genesis of the existing indi-
vidual as ethical and as in sin continues with the dreaming 
presence of spirit signified by dread. As dread presaged 
the decision by which ethical man brought about his ow.n 
birth, so, religiously speaking, does dread presage the de-
cision by which the individual realizes himself as free~ 
The dread which is posited in innocence is, 1n the first 
place, not guilt; in the second place, it is not a heavy 
burden, not a suffering which cannot be brought into 
harmony with the felicity of innocence. If we observe 
children, we find this dread more definitely indicated 
as a seeking after adventure, a thirst for the pro-
digious, the mysterious~ The fact that there are 
children in whom this is not found proves nothing, for 
neither in the beast does it exist, and the less spirit, 
the less dread.l 
Thus we are given dread as a participant in the condition of 
innocence, before freedom is realized (by a decision to be 
free), but as it dangles enticingly before the innocent--as 
an apple might dangle. Without some sort of feeling of 
1 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 38~ 
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prohibition the apple entices only the natural desire to eat, 
so dread needs a feeling of dark and mysterious results if 
the decision is taken--otherwise there is no decision and 
all is still innocence~ "Thus innocence is brought to its 
last extremity~ It is in dread in relation to the prohi-
bition and the punishment. It is not guilty, and yet it is 
in dread, as though it were lost."1 
At this point we may pause to be reminded of exis-
tential method and criteriology~ We may, with Kierkegaard, 
define myth as "an outward expression of an inner experi-
ence."2 This will save us possible confusion over the point 
of origin of the prohibition and punishment. Dread requires 
a feeling of consequences that are darkly important; that is 
all. "I let the voice of the prohibition and the punishment 
come from without ·. "3 If this occasions difficulty, "one need 
only assume that Adam [ or some curiously precocious and dis-
turbed primate] talked with himself·. 114 
The dread does not produce the act; only an act can do 
this, but dread is a precondition of the act of choosing 
oneself as freedom, just as the natural fact of Adam does 
1 Ibid., p. 41~ 
2Ibid. , p. 42·. 
3Ibid., p. 41. 
4 Ibid. This may also account for the serpent, and, 
for thatlmatter, Eve~ 
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not produce the act, but is nonetheless a precondition. 1 
What is the act? Apparently it is that of deciding that I 
am the author of my deeds. It should be added--although 
this is consequent upon the first--that therefore I am also 
the author of the consequences of those deeds. I will as-
similate them to myself and make of this world, my world. 
The temptation (coming mythically from the serpent) says 11Ye 
shall not surely die. • • • Ye shall be as gods, knowing 
good and evil. 112 Thus the act is a rejection of innocence, 
and, consequently, it is the attempt to set oneself up as 
God. 
The result of the rejection of innocence was exactly 
as the serpent predicted; Adam became as a god. So God 
cannot be said to have introduced consequences under the 
table, so to speak, to confound Adam's choice of freedom. 
However, the transition means, as the existentialist and 
neo-orthodoxist are fond of telling us, that the props are 
knocked from under one, leaving him suspended by nothing, 
hovering over nothing. This is the famous "abyss of nothing-
ness" that finds its way into so many contemporary sermons. 
Such a suspension is likely to be a dizzying experience·. 
This also, Kierkegaard calls 11 dread. 11 Thus, the 
"first sin" is sandwiched between experiences of dread·. It 
1Without the "natural" precondition, man would not be 
a synthesis. 
2 Gen. 3:4, 5. 
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is the second form of dread that sends Adam back to the 
barred door of the Garden (barred by his refusal to live 
there any longer) 1to pound desperately on it, proclaiming 
his innocence. Thus dread acts as a continuing precondition 
of a constantly recurring state of sin--only now the sin 
consists in the impossible attempt to "un-act" one' a action 
in bringing himself to birth. It is impossible because, 
while one may forget what he knows, it is in the nature of 
things that, once knowing, he can never "not-know" again. 
However, as surely as dread was a precondition of the in-
itial decision by which the individual placed himself in ex-
istence, so also is dread, at the same time that its re-
sultant is sin, the recognition of oneself as possibility". 
Hence, it is that "progressive" dread signals the growth of 
spirit at the very same time that it prompts its degradation. 
Let us recapitulate for a moment. A series of events 
have been presented: a) innocence-in-the-Garden, b) dread 
(as the prohibition) encountered in innocence, c) the act of 
claiming authorship of one's deeds (eating the apple), d) be-
coming as a god (suspension over the abyss), e) refusal of 
one's authorship (blaming Eve). Where may it be said that 
sin begins? The normal acceptance is that it is in the vio-
lation of the prohibition (c). Yet if this were the case 
then the very act of existing would constitute a sin, and 
1The prodigal son, it will be recalled, admitted his 
guilt. 
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1 Kierkegaard has taken pains to show that this is not the 
case~ Yet, if the initial sinfulness is encountered at (e), 
then it would appear that sinfulness and existence were not · 
evan coordinate~ Once again Augustinianism and Palagianism 
Perhaps it might be suggested that (c) and (a) are re-
lated in a special way, such that, when one acts (or intends 
to produce a certain result), the attendant (proximate or 
remote) consequences of the act may be considered as dis-
tinct from the intention·. For example, if I throw a stone, 
my act and my intention are one--to causa the stone to pass 
through the air. But the broken window at the and of the 
flight is a distinct consequence (though I may wall decide 
that I have to pay for it) '· Now the act of claiming author-
ship (freedom) is related to becoming the author in the same 
way as are the act of throwing and the "stone-thrown·. 11 To 
claim the throwing but not to claim the stone-thrown is ab-
surd·. Similarly, to claim freedom and, upon recai ving it to 
"unclaim" it is absurd·. Thus, while it can be said that sin 
does not enter the world until Adam tries to reclaim his 
innocence, this attempt is to be sean as inseparable from 
his choice of freedom ·. Evan if Adam really believed that he 
was innocent, the very ability to frame such a plea presup-
poses the actuality and not merely the "slumbering presence" 
1s h t · 426·. ea above, this c ap er, p. 
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of apiri t. 
All this may seem picayune. The point has been be-
labored in order to show that the decision to exist is a 
prerequisite to being in a condition of sinfulness, while at 
the same time, consciousness of sin is not a prerequisite. 
What it all comes to is this: that the Sartrean concept of 
"bad faith, 11 the attempt to be free and innocent at the same 
time, constitutes sin, whether one has consciousness of this 
fact or not, and, emphatically, whether one is conscious of 
this fact before God or not·. 
4. The foregoing is an introduction to what Kierke-
gaard calla 11 the dialectical ladder of sin-consciousness. 111 
Even though the consciousness of sin may be nil there is a 
place for this condition on the ladder; for, just as Sartre 
explained that bad faith is futile, so may Kierkegaard say 
that sin (desire for freedom but not the meaning of freedom) 
is futility. This futility is despair. Let us select three 
representative groupings on this dialectical ladder for 
quick analysis. 
a) Sin as refUsal to accept oneself as spirit (in ex-
istence to refuse to exist): this is the minimal sin-con-
dition of the philistine . It might appear that many in this 
world fit this category so successfully that they truly 
merit the title 11 spiri tless. 11 In any normal sense this may 
1 See Kierkegaard, Sickness, chap. III. 
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be correct, yet even the philistine is in sin and its mirror-
image, despair. This is because even he has made a decision. 
The world is no longer the pristine Garden of God, and in 
choosing the world, the spiritless one chooses that which is 
overlaid with sin. His attempt to remain innocent, while 
choosing the world (associating himself historically with 
the race by the same choice), is his sin, and the despair 
which is the lot of the aesthetical man is his lot. 
A self, every instant that it exists, is in process of 
becoming, for the self ••• does not actually exist, it 
is only that which it is to become. Insofar as the self 
does not become itself, it is not its own self; but not 
to be one's own self is despair.l 
There are subtilities of development in the despair of 
which the aesthetical man is capable. This cursory expo-
sition will eschew the distinctions between the vulgar and 
the refined, simply mentioning that it is the acme of aes-
thetic refinement to be aesthetically intoxicated with de-
spair, itself. Yet, even at this pinnacle, the aesthetic 
man is at the lowest rung of the ladder of sin-consciousness 
with the most bestial, because he refuses himself. 2 He is a 
parody of despair. 
1 ~., p. 44. 
2
see Kierkegaard, Either/or, II, 164: "I have often 
Gbserved that the more costly the fluid with which a man in-
toxicates himself, the more difficult it is to cure him." 
In this sense, the refined esthete is in deeper despair than 
others of that category--but not in the way that he thinks 
he is. Thus, in depth, he is lower than the bestial one and 
farther from sin-consciousness~ 
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b) Sin as acceptance of oneself as spirit, but the re-
fusal to understand that spirit is a relationship: this is 
atheism. Now it is not always the case that atheism is 
cynical or defiant. It may be that after a prolonged search, 
perhaps a lifetime of following false leads, one is brought 
to the point of admitting simply, sorrowfully, and honestly, 
that he has failed to find a God. How is this to be under-
stood as a refusal? Objective, or even subjective, certain-
ty might claim that the seeker had sought in the wrong place 
--but suppose there were nobody at all who had found God·. 
It is difficult to see how a futile search can always be 
construed as a refusal. 
However, it does seem to be the case that "the oppo-
1 site of being in despair is believing," and if the atheist 
is unable to believe, than he is in despair. He is not pre-
cisely in despair because he wanted to believe, but couldn't; 
more accurately, the impetus toward belief in the first 
place--the impetus that prompted the question and the search 
--is a tacit recognition of the proximity of the category of 
the religious. He has granted that there is such a category 
by his search and his knowledge that, if there were a God, 
he (the atheist) could be a self. But the believer has not 
one bit more than this, and still the believer is touched by 
the finger of eternity, while the atheist, cynical or 
1 Kierkegaard, Sickness, p. 77. 
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sorrowful, is not. Thus the unbeliever is in sin, not be-
cause he is wrong and there is, after all, an object of re-
ligious belief, but because he has seen the constituting re-
lation from a distance and has refused it. The formula for 
believing is: "By relating itself to its own self, and by 
willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in 
the Power which constituted it."1 This the unbeliever, be he 
ever so righteous ethically, has not done. 2 
c) Sin as acceptance of oneself as spirit, and the 
understanding that spirit is a relationship, but the refusal 
to enter into the relationship: this we ma.y term "defiance." 
The world is short of candidates for this stage right now; 
it is included in order to accentuate the correlation be-
tween sin-consciousness, God-consciousness, and the state of 
being 1n sin. It is here that the "laddertt becomes truly 
dialectical. Let us illustrate. 
Insofar as the ladder under inspection signals stages 
in the growth of spirit, it might be concluded that even if 
sin is not a necessity, it may very well be considered 
highly desirable--a necessary condition for maturity of the 
self. Indeed, Kierkegaard indicates this. 
Despair, just because it is wholly dialectical, is in 
fact the sickness of which it holds that it is the 
1 ~., pp. 77-78. 
2 It is from this vantage-point that ethical virtues 
become t'splendid vices." 
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greatest misfortune not to have had it--the true good 
hap to get it. 
But then he adds immediately: 
although it is the most dangerous sickness of all, if 
one does not wish to be healed of it.2 
Still, we are likely to draw the conclusion that sin-
despair is a kind of fire-baptismal; that it was God's plan, 
God's hope that man would sin. This could result in the ri-
diculous notion that in sinning one was doing God's will--a 
contradiction in terms~ 
Let us take, for illustration, three types·. Call them 
the "saintly, n the "satanical," and ttthe thug." The thug is 
at the bottom of the ladder; the saintly and the satanical 
are at the top, yet the saintly and the satanical are polar 
to each other. 'that, for the thug is a peccadillo scarcely 
worth remembering, for the saint is occasion for the deepest 
despair. And, strangely, the saint is quite right--on two 
counts. First, his despair will be coordinate with his sin-
consciousness and, of course, his God-consciousness. But 
second, as one grows closer to God in religiosity, one's 
chores as well as one's sensitivities increase. Thus, given 
the same situation, the saint sins far more greviously than 
does the thug. It is like taking a trip toward the sun·. 
The higher one goes, the greater becomes the discomfort from 
1 Kierkegaard, Sickness, p·. 39-. 
2Ibid. 
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-any imperfection 1n one's insulation and the more serious 
the results-. This is why Satan is pictured as the former 
lucifer·. However, because of this danger, to refuse to 
mount the ladder at all is also, though in a different sense, 
the deepest sin of all-_ Thus, to grant that sin is a good 
means that sin signifies the presence of spirit, while to 
say that sin is not a good is to recognize the possibility 
of the "evil spiri tual·.ul This returns us to the subject of 
11defiance." 
·For the satanical, the same God-consciousness is 
presupposed as is in the saintly, but, unlike the saintly, 
the despair of the satanical becomes ultimate despair of the 
spirit. It is despair which refuses to be helped, all the 
while knowing that help is at hand. That is to say that, in 
this example, Satan's selfhood has completely turned itself 
inside out and, in clear consciousness of God (for Satan's 
spirit is unobscured by a body), rejects God. In this the 
whole selfhood of Satan consists--in himself aa a rejection. 
The very spirit of Satan is constituted now by his distorted 
God-relationship, and to lose the distortion is, to Satan, 
to lose himself-_ Kierkegaard's illustration brings us 
closer to earth, but the satanic tendency, in rage in a man 
and tantrums in a child, is present. 
1All this is better explained by Luther's advice, to 
"sin boldly--and repent mightily"." 
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A self which in despair is determined to be itself 
winces at one pain or another which simply cannot be 
taken away or separated from its concrete self [the 
pain of a leg severed in a whalehunt]. Precisely upon 
this torment the man directs his whole passion, which at 
last becomes a demoniac rage. Even if at this point God 
in heaven and all his angels were to offer to help him 
out of it--no, now he doesn't want it, now it is too 
late, he once would have given everything to be rid of 
this torment but was made to wait, now that's all past, 
now he would rather rage against everything, he, the one 
man in the whole of existence who is the most unjustly 
treated, to whom it is especially important to have his 
torment at hand, important that no one should take it 
from h1m·.l 
It is important because it is his "claim to fame," but it is 
also important because this sin singles him out--as beyond 
God·. There is pride in being so depraved. 
5~ What is this despair that is the inevitable re-
sultant of sin? That it is a feeling of abandonment is evi-
dent. But one more implication needs to be brought out. It 
is hinted at above in the despair of the demoniac--that de-
spair, itself, is sin·. This topic will carry us over into 
Christianity; let us introduce it here·. 
The condition of sinfulness is rather like that of 
hysterical blindness . One who is hysterically blind has his 
condition entirely within himself·. He is guilty of his own 
blindness in a sense even more acute than if he had put out 
his own eyes; for hysterical blindness requires a continuing 
act. But all the same, he is blind, and cannot see. It is 
the same with sin-consciousness before God. To sin before 
l Kierkegaard, Sickness, p~ 115. 
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God is to break the relationship, and, out of relationship 
with God there is no light·. The problem is this: that, as 
with hysterical blindness, nobody can remove the blindness 
but myself. I, however, am blind and cannot remove it 
either. So with sin all is lost·. Demoniac or thug, one is 
beyond God·. As faith is 11 that the self in being itself and 
in willing to be itself is grounded transparently in God, 111 
so is its opposite, sin, "before God in despair not to will 
to be oneself, or before God [defiantly J to will to be one-
self."2 
When the self is lost through not willing to be itself, 
who can help? If God wishes to help, can he give me myself 
against my will? And I, though I may want desperately to be 
helped, if I have sinned before God and removed myself from 
God, can I believe that God nevertheless can help? And 
finally, is not this disbelief the blackest despair and the 
deepest sin of all--the refusal to believe that even God, 
for who all things are possible, can help such a one as me? 
I am beyond God! In this the saintly and the satanic are as 
one. 
D. Christianity~ 
It is to this situation that Christianity speaks. Sin 
is a qualification of spirit ("for sin is not the wildness 
1 Ibid., p. 132. 
2 Ibid., p. 130. 
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of flesh and blood, but it is the spirit's consent there-
to"), 1and the deepest sin is a qualification of the deepest 
spirit in the deepest travail~ If Christianity comes to a 
pagan land, or to a child, or to an individual who does not 
understand this, it must first teach him that he is es-
tranged from God, and that without God there is no hope. 
Only then can he be offered the Gospel·. This is the truth 
so incompletely understood and so harmfully practiced by the 
missionaries of the last century". 
Now, let us do some supposing~ 2 Suppose a prophet to 
come to one in this condition and to tell him that God has 
found a way to reach this individual who has placed himself 
beyond hope by believing that there is no hope·. 11 Infini te 
God will reach you by coming to you as a finite person~ He 
will enter the realm of hopelessness and present himself as 
one in whom you can believe. In doing this he will show you 
that for God all things are possible, that he can even reach 
into the depth of your unbelief and provide for you himself 
as the condition for the re-establishment of your relation-
ship with God·. " 
1 1.1219:·' p. 132. 
~eference has already been made to the "absurd. 11 
Here a concomitant of an additional absurdity is being dealt 
with: the offensiveness of being asked to believe that help 
is possible in what must be seen as a hopeless situation. 
This absurdity presupposes the previous ones, because the 
individual must be in the category of the religious before 
he can have the requisite God-consciousness to support sin~ 
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Remember, you believe in God, and the blackness of 
your despair consists precisely in your belief that you are 
so deeply in sin before God that no atonement is possible. 
Christianity is a redemptive religion--for sinners--and if 
you have not yet gotten to this point our supposition must 
be directed elsewhere~ But suppose you have. What might be 
your reaction to the news of the prophet?1 
That the human race is or should be akin to God is 
ancient paganism [ or pantheism or moralism]; but that an 
individual man is God is Christianity, and this indi-
vidual man is the God-man·. There is neither in heaven 
nor on earth, nor in the depths, nor in the aberrations 
of the most fantastic thinking, the possibility of a 
(humanly speaking) more insane combination.2 
One's reaction, if his despair is deep enough, might be a 
momentary flash of hope--one grasps at straws. Bu.t it must 
be remembered that the depth of the despair is precisely co-
ordinate with the knowledge that one cannot be helped; and 
so even as one grasps he might restrain himself by asking 
how it is possible for God to become man. This is the theo-
logical question. When it is asked with pathos the question 
is how it is possible for God to reach so low as to grasp me 
.in my utter depravity and isolation·. How can one so exalted 
~aterial for this supposition comes from three 
sources, all with the same basic topic: 11 The Offense." See 
Kierkegaard, Sickness, pp. 133-141; S~ren Kierkegaard, Train-
ing in Christianity, trans~ Walter Lowrie (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1947), pp. 80-144; s¢ren Kierke-
6aard, Philos~hical Fragments, trans. David F. Swenson (Princeton:inceton University Press, 1936), pp. 39-43. 
2 Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, p. 84~ 
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become so lowly? Then suppose even a lowly human being to 
approach one and indicate by one means or another that he is 
the God-man. Then, finally, suppose him to say that no pro-
digious atonement is required for the prodigious depravity; 
that one must only believe in him~ 
What might be the resultant of these progressive steps? 
It is possible that: first the intellect is offended at the 
proposition of the God-man; second, pride is offended (for 
it is a form of pride to be so low as to be out of reach of 
God; third, one's sensibilities are offended by the approach 
of such a man (it is one thing to hope for his coming--quite 
another to accept his arrival) ; fourth, one's moral sense is 
offended at the abrogation of the need for atonement; finel-
ly, if morality is the standard of one's religiosity, religi-
osity is offended. When religiosity is offended, the only 
righteous thing to do is remove the imposter~ 
Until one has reached this depth of religiosity, that 
he can affirm the crucifixion of the God-man, he cannot get 
beyond his despair. From the ultimate hopelessness of the 
rejection of Christ one can only leap absurdly, crazily, to 
belief that, nonetheless, help is at hand. 
And so it is with Christianity. Now the question is, 
Wilt thou be offended, or wilt thou believe? If thou 
wilt believe, then thou must pass through the possi-
bili t~ of offence(! accept Christianity on any terms·. 
Then 'it is a go. 1 So, a fig for the understanding! So 
you say, 11 Whether it now is a help or a torment, I will 
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one thing only, I will belong to Christ, I will be a 
Christianl 11 1 
Christ, then, is the sine gua ~ of Christianity. To 
believe in the Christ (as the God-man) is to believe that, 
whatever the insanity of the proposition, for God, all 
things are possible, even the return of myself that I threw 
away. 
I am again myself·. This self which another would not 
pick up from the road I possess again. The discord in 
my nature is resolved, I am again unified. The terrors 
which found support and nourishment in my pride no 
longer enter in to distract and separate. Is there not 
then a repetition? Did I not get everything doubly re-
stored? Did I not get myself again, precisely in such a 
way that I must doubly feel its significance? And what 
is a repetition of earthly goods which are of no conse-
quence to the spirit--what are they in comparison with 
such a repetition?2 
In answer to Job's question: nvfuat, will a man live again?" 
Christianity answers "Yes . 11 3 
What is implied in the belief in Christ as the God-man? 
Here, once again, a return is to be made to Kierkegaardian 
methodology. If truth is subjectivity and subjectivity is 
truth, then the words of Christ, "I am the truth," are to be 
taken literally. Christ, in the Sermon on the Mount may 
speak the truth, but, for Kierkegaard, the Gospel is that 
Christ is the truth--that the truth of Christianity is 
1 Ibid., p. 117. 
2siren Kierkegaard, Repetition, trans. Walter Lowrie 
(Princeton: Princeton University Prase, 1946), p. 144. 
3This introduces, for later consideration, the problem 
of human immortality. 
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expressed, not in the teachings, or even the deeds, of 
Christ, but in the fact of the God-man itself. For here is 
the synthesis of the temporal and the eternal, the finite 
and the infinite; of freedom and necessity. It is the 
synthesis wrought from above and given to man as both the 
example (paradigm) 1and the cond1 tion for fulfilment of the 
synthesis which is man. It is at this point that "belief" 
and "to believe in (trust) 11 reach their true identity". 
If this were all, it would be excruciating enough. 
But suppose one reaches the point where he accepts the 
wonder that is Christianity~ This, surely is blessedness. 
One falls prostrate with gratitude at God's stupendous deed 
of salvation. Then one looks up with adoration and sees the 
Christ beckoning as he moves away~ Toward heaven? Toward 
Calvary. And one begins to understand that to trust Christ 
is to take up one's cross and follow him, away from the 
world. This is the Christian call to suffering. Thus the 
call of Christ that takes me up from the suffering of de-
. 2 
spair, relieves me by granting me a far deeper suffering. 
For now I am to suffer from the world, and from myself as 
part of the world, as Paul suffered from the world and from 
Saul. The synthesis, hence, is not complete and "so 
1 Kierkegaard, Fragments, p~ 50. 
2 The far deeper suffering is also my eternal happiness 
because it is my absolute telos; see immediately below. 
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regarded, man is not yet a self-. 111 
E. The Absolute Telos. 
Why on earth should I choose suffering? If there were 
no choice, then the fact that religiosity is suffering (as 
the aesthetical is enjoyment and the ethical is striving) 
would at least be understandable; but that I choose suffer-
ing as my greatest good is an outrage, if that is all there 
is to it~ It is all very well to be touched by the finger 
of eternity and to have a self that is grounded trans-
parently in the Power that constitutes it; but if suffering 
is the end result, well, despair is suffering, but despair 
can also be interesting and possibly evan enjoyable. All 
things considered, why not choose the world, flicker enjoya-
bly awhile--or work at making it a better place--and then 
snuff out? Better well hung than ill wed. 
1. Freedom: in a sense there is no choice. For 
Kierkegaard, however, recognition of the fact that there is 
no choice--that one is "compelled by God 11g-constitutes the 
greatest freedom of all. It has been suggested earlier that 
there seem to be "two types" of freedom: the freedom of 
selfhood, which presupposes the possibility of the rejection 
of selfhood, of choosing irrationality and destructiveness, 
1 Kiarkegaard, Sickness, p. 17. This continues the 
11 definition" of man as spirit, as the self, as a relation 
which relates itself~ • • -. 
2Kierkegaard, Journals, par~ 1051. 
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and the freedom of develo~ent of that self, a develo~ent 
that must proceed along certain rational and constructive 
lines·. There is a directedness about the second type of 
freedom that strangles freedom, itself, unless the first 
type is constantly considered. Moral "freedom 11 is of this 
type~ Thus, to be compelled by God is to freely posit one-
self as a self by recognizing the relationship with the 
constituting Power. Hence it is freedom to recognize that 
"one has no choice. tt Actually, one always must choose--be-
tween God or nothing. It is a "Hobsen's choice," but it is 
an absolute choice nonetheless·. 
2·. The telos: by definition of the nature of the 
human will one may say that the individual wills the good, 
only the good, and always the good·. Insofar as a man wills 
he must will the good, for what he wills is what he con-
ceives to be his good~ 1 "Evil, be thou my good" is what is 
meant so far·. 
What Kierkegaard hopes to show is, of course, that the 
individual's good is frequently quite other than what he 
deems to be his good (an amalgam of Socratic and Aristo-
telian themes): that the good of the individual is identi-
cal with his ultimate meaning, that it is one thing, and 
that it is God. It is here that devout pantheism (the po-
sition of the young stranger, Elihu, as he condemns both Job 
1 Kierkegaard, Purity, p. 26. 
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and his comforters) is distinguished from Christianity, and 
where the finite, earthbound hope of the human individual 
finds its Christian answer~ 
The position of devout pantheism is that God is imma-
1 
nent in nature, that it is God's world, and that, because 
nothing in the world is not of God, all things are good~ If 
the individual does not see that all things are good, then 
it is because he is confusing his good with God's good~ 
This is the stoical position of "infinite resignation~"2 
Infinite resignation is the resigning of one's own will in 
the belief that, in God's world, only God's will matters~ 
But the resignation of one's will, though even this is un-
doubtedly an act of will, is not the same thing as willing 
the good, and it is not at all the same thing as willing the 
good in the hope of being its recipient·. Against Epictetus 
Kierkegaard says that "one knows from the outset that he is 
a slave,n3that Stoicism is "character bought at the cost of 
· n4 0 --character. hristianity, on the other hand, has the au-
dacity to will the good, and to will it for the individual; 
the belief is that infinite God cares about me. 
1 Kierkegaard, Postscript, pp. 218-219. 
2
s¢ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans~ Walter 
U>wrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), pp. 
64, 74. 
3Kierkegaard, Journals, par. 1158. 
4
rbid. 
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Thus, to will the good is to will that God's will may 
be done, and the hope of the good is that God's will in-
cludes my highest good. This is the absolute telos of the 
existing individual·. To will the goods of the world is to 
will many things; but to will that God's will may be done is 
constantly to will one thing only, and this is purity of 
heart. 
3. Absolute and relative: it would seem to follow 
that, while there is undoubtedly some connection between the 
good things of the world and the one good thing, so that 
"nature is the work of God, "1there is also an absolute dis-
tinction between willing the multiplicity of good things in 
the world and willing the one good thing. One wills the 
many relative goods relatively, but one wills the one good 
thing absolutely~ Thus, while we are taught to "render unto 
Caesar the things that are Caesar's," we are given to under-
stand that to give absolute allegiance to Caesar is to con-
fer absoluteness onto what is only relative, and this, of 
course, is an absolute, too--it is the absolute rejection of 
the one good thing~ Kierkegaard does not find it strange 
that hell is described far more precisely in literature than 
is heaven, because, since one must will the good in any 
event, the opposite of willing the one good thing (hell) is 
precisely to will the multiplicity of good things, or, to 
1 Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 220. 
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will the relative absolutely. 
4. At this point one may ask Kierkegaard to be 
slightly more specific about the nature of the good. At 
least he may be asked to explain the relation between the 
absolute telos and his ethical category. 
Traditional Christianity has commonly visualized 
heaven as the 11 place 11 where one will "receive his reward." 
In a sense Kierkegaard must be said to endorse this common 
vision, but in another sense he writes that if one wills the 
good in order to receive one's reward, then one has willed 
1 the good for ulterior purposes, and thus, so to speak, "has 
come out on the other side of ethics." In this sense, 
Kierkegaard is unequivocally opposed to any ''suspension of 
the ethical. 11 For him, heaven is (and one's reward is) 
eternal permission to will the good. In this way he remains 
within the ethical. The goal of ethical activity is its 
continuation--to will that God's will may be done. Blessed-
ness consists in this~ This is how, for Kierkegaard, in 
spite of the apparent absolute disjunction between the 
spiritual and the earthly, there is no radical discontinuity 
between mortal life and whatever immortality might be, and 
why, also, there is never a termination of the ethico-re-
ligious. The "suspension of the ethical," as in the case of 
1 Kierkegaard, Purity, p. 57 . 
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1 Abraham and Isaac, is really only a substantiation of the 
basal Kierkegaardian position·. 
5. It is true, however, that the ethical as "duty to 
realize the universal" is transcended, and that one may be 
called upon by God (through faith) to activity that is not 
in accord either with human teleological standards or the 
more formalistic notion of the highest duty of man to real-
ize the universal·. The second part may be dealt with simply 
by pointing out that, for Kierkegaard, the individual is to 
be considered as more important than the universal. The 
first part is more perplexing, since it proposes that an 
individual act in a way that may perhaps be opposed to all 
his notions of what is good. It may even be, as in the 
illustration of Abraham and Isaac, that God is apparently 
countermanding his own orders--for it was through faith that 
Abraham was given Isaac in the first place. This seems 
incomprehensible~ 
However, it may be that Kierkegaard's position is not 
as extreme as it might seem~ Heaven help me if I am ever 
put in the position of Abraham; but, to a lesser degree, I 
am constantly put in that position. I am thrust into the 
world with a certain amount of equipment and told to work 
out my own destiny. I must fashion my actions in view of my 
1 The entire book, Fear and Trembling, deals with the 
question of whether Abraham was a believer or a murderer 
when he took Isaac to Mount Moriah as a sacrifice to God~ 
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own notions of what is good; I have no other guide. Should 
I give all my money to the poor, or should I help by assum-
ing the burden of wealth in order to raise the standards of 
living by raising the level of industrial efficiency? Each 
action may be either good or bad, depending on the devotion 
and insight I bring to it. But this seems to be Kierke-
gaard's point exactly: that whatever I do, if I do it 
humbly, before my God, in the knowledge that alone I can do 
nothing (nothing but destroy myself), but also in the 
knowledge that the individual is more important than the 
universal, then, and only then, will my action in the world 
proceed in the right spirit~ Because my supreme interest is 
in my own eternal validation, my motives must constantly be 
scrutinized by myself (before God--the Other), lest the 
thing I do is done in arrogance, in greed, or for motives 
that reveal that I do not will the one good thing. The re-
moval of pain is not an absolute good; it is a relative good 
(although it may well be an 11 1ntrinsic n good). The removal 
of poverty, or syphilis, is not an absolute good; it is a 
relative good. Yet perhaps I should work diligently to re-
move pain and poverty and syphilis; if I should, it is be-
cause I believe it to be God's will so to act. When one 
moves from one's notions of good to what must therefore be 
God's will, then one's notions of good and evil will become 
definitive of what is good and evil in God's sight--making 
room for the religiously blasphemous hypothesis that no God 
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worth worshipping could value differently~ When one works 
from God to the world, although precisely the same 11 choice-
making" aquipnent is brought into play, my ability to dis-
tinguish between relative goods and the absolute good per-
mits God's will (and my humble interpretation of it) to de-
fine good and evil. 
Do both of these come to the same thing? Undoubtedly 
the command to love one's neighbor can result from either 
position, and may well (although it also may not) issue in 
the same behavior toward him. But in the first case one 
takes as his standard his own notion both of what consti-
tutes love and what constitutes his neighbor's need, and 
absolutizes them. In the second case one has taken the abso-
lute telos as the absolute standard of which the relative 
good of my neighbor is a derivative. Kierkegaard has often 
bean interpreted as baing so concerned with the solitary 
individual and his God-relationship that the relationship to 
one's neighbor is ignored by him, or worse, abused. Yet 
there is a truth contained in the declaration that 11 I could 
not love you at all if I did not love God more" that seems 
to bring the relationship between absolute and relative 
properly together so that my spirituality is better able to 
recognize (and perhaps have a hand in bringing forth--as a 
midwife) the spirituality of my neighbor·. Perhaps only in 
this can true neighborliness consist. "For him who chooses 
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the earthly, his neighbor does not exist."1 
6. Conclusion: why, then, do I choose suffering? I 
choose suffering because not to choose it is to forget that 
sunshine and daisies are not the most important thing~ 
Suffering is the catalyst that enables me to "take the next 
step·." What should I do for the sufferer who is my neighbor? 
I should be compassionate and act to relieve his suffering--
but it would behoove me to examine well the nature of his 
suffering, lest I give him a stone when he requires bread; 
or lest I give him bread when he requires something else. 
My task toward my neighbor would seem to be, then, first, to 
develop myself as a creature capable of compassion; second, 
to help him, also, to take the next step by helping him to 
understand the nature of his suffering. If we do this, God 
will take care of the rest, for the pagan was right after 
all in believing that nature is the work of God~ His mis-
take was in assuming that nature and God were the same, or 
that he could get to God through nature--imagine! to believe 
ld i 1 1. 2 that one cou get to the spir tua through the materia • 
1 Kierkegaard, Journals, par . 696. 
2
see Kierkegaard, Purity, p~ 147. "The earthly hope 
and the heavenly grew up well together and played together 
in childhood like born equals [ in the childhood of the Old 
Testament] , but the difference reveals itself 1n the de-
cision." 
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6. Theology. 
A. Introduction·. 
It may seem strange that a section entitled 11 Theology 11 
should follow such a long one entitled "Philosophy of Re-
ligion~" There is a reason, however·. Strictly speaking, 
Kierkegaard should have no theology". That is, he should 
have no systematic theory of the nature of God; if he did, 
his alienation from Hegel might blur, and the concept would 
be in danger of displacing the reality~ However, the previ-
ous section mentioned that one is thrust into this world to 
•work out his own destiny with a certain amount of equipment~ 
A portion of this equipment includes the ability to frame 
concepts~ A system of such concepts could be called a 
"thought-experiment .• " Existentially speaking, the relation~ 
ship between the existing individual and his absolute telos 
is not to be mediated by any such experiment~ One does not, 
for Kierkegaard, understand first and then believe afterward~ 
Nevertheless, one does not repudiate Descartes completely, 
and it may be that the existing individual is also a thinker~ 
Let us then, select several topics for cursory examination~ 
They will be theological topics concerning the relationship 
between whatever can be called Kierkegaard's ~ realissimum 
and finite experience~ 
B·. The 11 Infinite Quali ta ti ve Dis tinction·. 11 
What is the difference between infinite God and finite 
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man. At least it seems obvious that one distinction is be-
tween "infinite" and "finite." The question is whether or 
not this can be called an infinite distinction. 
Consider two straight lines, both of which are very 
long . One line, however, is of infinite length and the 
other is a finite length~ Both have the defining character-
istics of straight lines. The difference cannot lie here. 
There is, however, a quantitative difference in that one 
line is longer than the other. Now a mathematician might 
say that there is an infinite quantitative difference be-
tween the lengths of a finite and an infinite line, since, 
if one "subtracts" the finite from the infinite length, the 
remainder (difference) is still infinity. Now Kierkegaard 
speaks of an infinite qualitative difference, meaning, pre-
sumably, that there is a difference in kind between the two 
lines. If we ignore the fact that they are both lines, we 
may see that this is so, for one line has a defining bounda-
ry, while the other has not~ But this is no longer merely a 
quantitative distinction; in this one way the two lines 
differ absolutely~ 
Perhaps it is also the case that this trivial point 
may have some bearing on the distinction between man and God. 
One of the strong points in the Hegelian philosophy is the 
assertion that concrete experience is the material of the 
absolute . This may be true; at least it must be true to the 
extent that God and man are similar enough so that they may 
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communicate through prayer. At least Kierkegaard holds this 
to be the case. So the distinction between man and God is 
not that one is subjectivity while the other is not. Where, 
then, does the difference lie. It would appear to lie in 
the proposition that God is infinite while man is finite. 
But, as with the lines, we could say that this is an infi-
nite qualitative difference. It makes sense, similarly, to 
say that there is an absolute difference between anything 
relative, no matter how relative it may be, and that which 
is precisely not relative, even though all the internal 
characteristics of the two might be the same--save, of 
course, for those characteristics that arise from being 
finite or infinite. Thus it can be said that there is an 
absolute distinction between what is absolute and what is 
not~ 
One who distinguishes absolutely has a relation to the 
absolute telos and ipso facto also a relationship to God. 
The absolute distinction is just the thing to clear a 
space about the absolute end, so as to make room for it, just as a marshall clears the way for a proeession~ It 
keeps the mob of relative ends at a distance, in order 
that the absolutely distinguishing individual may effect 
a relationship to the absolute~l 
Then, possibly for Hegel's benefit: 
There is nothing meritorious in the attempt of an exist-
ing individual to approximate the equilibrium which 
possibly exists for the Eternal; for one who exists, the 
passionate decisiveness is precisely the maximum~ Exist-
ing is in this respect something like walking. When 
everything is, and is at rest, it seems plausible enough 
to say that everything is equally important, provided I 
1Kierkegaard, Postscript, pp~ 369-370. 
457 
can acquire a view of it which is equally calm. But as 
soon as movement is introduced, and I am myself also in 
motion, my program in walking consists in constantly 
making distinctions~l 
It is this notion, of the infinite qualitative dis-
tinction between God and man that doubtless gave rise to the 
Bart hi an notion of God as the "totally other. " \ve shall 
have cause to return to this notion in the concluding 
chapter. 
c. Differences in Characteristics: Existence and Being, 
Time and Eternity, Creator and Creature. 
1. Can God be said to exist? To be an existing indi-
vidual, for Kierkegaard, means several things. 
a) When one has acted decisively so as to bring him-
self into existence, the act is that of a constituting re-
lationship--a relationship that brings its terms into being. 
In this sense God could not be said to exist. To talk of 
God having an absolute is nonsense. 
b) To exist is to become; and to continue to exist is 
to continue to become. One, so to speak, grows and ripens·. 
Can God be said to ripen? 
c) To exist is to act within a concrete situation. It 
is doubtful that infinite God is within situations in the 
sense that he discovers them and copes with them in whatever 
way he can. 
1 Ibid., p. 370. 
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d) On the other hand, to exist is to make possibility 
into reality. Now, while there may well be distinctions, so 
that man thinks, while God creates, still, to create is to 
act, and to act is to realize possibilities. In this sense 
perhaps God does exist. 
e) This much is certain (in Kierkegaard's usage of 
that term), that God is not an ideal but an actuality. If 
this is what is meant by existing, then God exists. 
Perhaps it can be said that God exists in the sense 
that he is an actuality, that he creates--that his will, 
which may be eternally 11 steadfast, 11 is still of the nature 
of a will, and that he is capable of entering into personal 
(intersubjective) relationships . In this sense existence 
and being are identical~ 
2. What are the similarities between the temporal and 
the eternal? Kierkegaard tells us that 11 it is the nature of 
eternity to be always the same,"1and that "the eternal is 
not in a process of becoming·. "2 On the other hand, we are 
told that "the reality of the world historical evolution is 
not denied, but reserved for God and eternity, having its 
own time and place. 113 What may be concluded from this? 
First, Kierkegaard's opposition to absolute idealism 
1 255. Ibid., p. 
2 271. Ibid., p. 
3 11&9:·, p. 142. 
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is clear·. Since all his thought is directed tm'lard the 
existing individual absolute idealism--the unity of thought 
and reality--is precluded~ Hegel may be absolutely right--
the difficulty is that he is not absolute, and since it is 
the existing individual who asks the question in the first 
place, even a thought-experiment cannot make this a basis 
for philosophical speculation·. If it is true, from God 1 s 
point of view, that thought and reality are one, human re-
ality can only assume it (realistically) at the outset; it 
cannot argue to i t ·. 1 
If it is true that man's thinking has some correlate 
in God 1 s creating ("Man thinks; God creates 11 ) , 2i t may be 
that an "existential system 11 is not impossible for God·. 
Kierkegaard does speak of Providence--that God is in charge 
of the world-process; the only question remaining is whether 
or not there is, for Kierkegaard, any hint available to 
human speculation as to the nature of this process·. 
Perhaps the definitive statement is offered as an hy-
pothesis in the "thought-experiment·. 11 Suppose we liken time 
to God's love. 3 Is love the less real because it is in God 
and not above? So it may be with time·. If God is our 
1This does not act to refute an objective idealism 
such as Brightman's which takes such a metaphysical unity as 
an hypothesis only". 
2 See above, this chapter, p·. 423~ 
3Kierkegaard, Purity, pp·. 77-78·. 
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absolute, then God is the ultimate anchor beyond which we do 
not look, and to ask the question 11Why is there time? is to 
ask 11 Is the eternal eternal?" This may be the philosopher's 
question; it is also Judas' question. Time is real, because 
God is reality. 
This does not quite satisfy the philosopher, however, 
who might still wonder whether God can see our future, or, 
whether God has a fUture. With regard to the external world, 
Kierkegaard appears to admit to a considerable degree of 
finalism. But this, as his methodology and ethics both show, 
is also a trivial matter. Human existence is, however, up 
to me, and, as such it must be in doubt. It may be true 
that God is infinitely patient and infinitely able to raise 
up any number of men until he finds one to do the job;1but 
it is also true that until I accept the job it is not known 
that I have accepted the job. In this, Kierkegaard is not 
in agreement with Calvinism. Yet, on the other hand, 
"Eternally the good has always been victorious, but in time 
it is otherwise, temporally it may take a long time. The 
victory is slow, its uncertainty is a slow measure of 
2 length." 
Let us attempt to break the puzzle down into parts~ 
a) It is the mark of omnipotence that it can create 
1 Ibid., p. 112. 
2 ~ •• p. 76. 
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1 
men free. This is not incomprehensible, but it would seem 
to follow from man's freedom that in some sense the future 
is in doubt--that is to say, there is a future. God may 
know precisely who will choose to be tools of God in faith 
and who will not (Calvinism), but, even so, it would appear 
that until the choice is made it simply is not made. The 
freedom of man has this as a prerequisite. 
b) Man, refusing himself as a tool of God, presumably 
cannot frustrate God's plan in nature. Man's effectiveness 
seems to consist solely in his recognition that whatever is 
done is done with God's power and that man, apart from God, 
can do nothing. God, in short, does not need man as his 
helper·. At the same time it is man, by choosing "to be made 
a tool of" who fits himself into God 1 s plan, and, should he 
not so choose, then God must raise up another, perhaps many, 
until he happens on one who chooses properly. This is a 
process. 
c) Man can, of course, frustrate God in an important 
way. He can, by refusing to accept the gift of himself as 
freedom, frustrate God's love for him. Sparrows (nature) 
are what they are, and God will take care of them. It may 
be the acme of human religiosity to make of oneself 
something like a sparrow (this, it might be said, is proper 
1 See Kierkegaard, Journals, par. 616. 
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objectivity), 1but man can also choose not to let God take 
care of him . If this happens, then God has failed, not in 
"getting the job done, but at least in getting me to do it~ 
d) However, if Kierkegaard is correct in his thesis 
that it is the individual who is important to God, then all 
the finalism in the world is as nothing compared with the 
destinies of men, and here we may find a closer connection 
than mere analogy between love and temporality . It is God's 
concern over the individual that causes God to 11 finitize " 
himself to the point where he can suffer for man and sorrow 
over man's defection. In the same sense it may be his love 
for man that "fini tizes" God to the point of hope for the 
destiny of man. Hope impl ies uncertainty, and uncertainty 
implies futurity--even for God. 
e) It is this, at least, that Kierkegaard holds as the 
Christian message to the world. Eternity is not temporality; 
in this sense , time is not real. But eternity has created 
time, and in this sense time has a derivative reality". But 
finally , and most important of all , God ' s love for the 
finite individual has caused him to fuse time and eternity , 
so that , by virtue of the eternal , eternity has entered the 
process of history to lend it eternal validation. In this 
sense, and this is crucial, time, which was not real 11 in the 
beginning" becomes real , real to the point of the eternal 
1 See Kierkegaard, Purity , p. 194. 
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becoming temporal . It becomes such, not through the cre-
ation of the heavens and the earth, but in God, himself, 
"realizing" time by bringing himself to birth in it as 
Christ . 
In a sensa this was an ontological event; time became 
eternally significant then. But it is, at the same time, a 
subjective event in the grasping of time by each existing 
individual . There is time for each of us only when we are 
able to see the eternal significance of each instant of our 
existence . With this, l ife becomes a very serious business 
indeed. For God: he is temporal , because he is omnipotent~ 
3. What are the distinctions between creator and 
creature? It is banal to try to show that the distinction 
consists in the fact that the first creates while the second 
is created; that the first is active while the second is the 
passive result of that activity. Instead, let us try to 
show that the dignity of the human spirit depends precisely 
upon keeping this distinction clear. We have mentioned that 
it is a high mark of free selfhood to see oneself as "com-
pelled by God. " The sparrow is compelled by God through its 
nature ; the human existent is compelled by God through his 
freedom . Thus, even though it is the same word in each case , 
there is an absolute distinction between man and sparrows. 
However, it is the mark of the deepest religiosity to 
recognize oneself as grounded t r ansparently in the power 
that constitutes one . In this case this means that one 
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recognizes that that very freedom by which decisive action 
comes into being is also a gift of God. It is this that 
generates the feeling of creatureliness. What it means is 
that worship is not the feeling of 11 kinship 11 with God (con-
gratulating ourselves that we are not sparrows), but is pre-
cisely the recognition of the absolute distinction between 
ourselves and God; it is the knowledge that "before God we 
are always in the wrong. " One can in faith strive with God 
(a prayerful argument with God that things will work out 
well in God's universe if we do this thing my way), but it 
is a comfort to know that we are always in the wrong . This 
is the difference between creator and creature and the abso-
lute distinction between man and God : that that very quali-
ty by which he was absolutely distinguished from the rest of 
nature, freedom, is also God's creation and comprises, thus, 
my 11na ture . " 
It is in this absolute distinction between man and God 
that absolutism, which takes its rise in naturalism, is 
finally repudiated. For, with an absolute distinction, 
there can never be identity. 
D. The Problem of Evil . 
"His omnipotence, considered thus is his goodness."1 
At this point one is confronted by the crux of the problem 
of the thought-experiment. Either there is no evil in the 
1 Klerkegaard, Journals, par . 616. 
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world, or there is evil and God either wills it or cannot 
help its being there . 
With the division of finitude into nature and ex-
istence, and the hypothesis that Kierkegaard is a finalist 
with regard to nature, we presumably have confined the 
problem of evil to human existence. It has been suggested 
that, for Kierkegaard, God is man's absolute telos, his abso-
lute good . It has also been mentioned, more recently, that 
for God the good is always victorious . This does not quite 
mean that God will work things out for the best, for if it 
meant this, then at least evil would have to be posited as 
an opponent to be vanquished. For the good always to be 
victorious, evil must be seen as a constant defeat, as never 
in the position to cause God any effort in overcoming it . 
Evil , thus, does not pertain to the natural world. To view 
pain as evil is to view evil esthetically, emotively . To 
view evil as 11 the wrong" or 11 the bad" is to view it ethi-
cally or teleologically. But existentially there is only 
one evil, and that is the evil of failure to exist . This is 
sin. 
Perhaps it could be said, without violating the abso-
lute distinction, that , for Kierkegaard, evil consists in 
man-seeing-the-world, and judging it as evil because man has 
not yet brought about his God-relationship, recognized his 
absolute telos; and thus he is unable to see the world 
(through faith) "from God ' s point of view." Thus there is 
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no fact of evil but sin, and it is only through the eyes of 
sin that even the cognitive-judgmental problem of evil 
arises. This does not mean that striving and suffering are 
not of the order of reality--even God strives and suffers--
but that suffering is only evil if it is suffering unrelated 
to the absolute telos. This is why Job went to see God; not 
because he suffered, but because he could not understand 
that it had any meaning--he could not see why he had been 
born. Herein lies the problem of evil religiously con-
sidered. 
There is evil, and it is the evil of man's sin and his 
consequent judgment, while in sin, upon God and his creation. 
This is the truth of pantheisms from Epictetus to Mary Baker 
Eddy. But the main problem seems to be that man defines as 
evil that which hurts--which is certainly to be expected--
but fails to recognize the true hurt. There is suffering in 
the world, and striving, and man calls this evil and wishes 
for a time when there shall be no more suffering and striv-
ing. He calls that time "heaven" and believes it to be his 
absolute telos. But this leads to the association of evil 
with finitude, not with sin, and the damage is done; now he 
must treat everything earthly as evil and strive to get away 
from it or ignore it, or he must help God win out over it·. 
For Kierkegaard, however, 
Either it is my fault that things go badly--and so God 
is love; or else things will come right and evil will be 
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seen to have its meaning--but then too God is lova. 1 
E. Conclusion to this Section. 
The thought-experiment ends on an earthy note·. 
Through all the talk about absolute distinctions, about the 
Christian dying away from the world, absolute telos, and 
rendering unto God what is God's, one fact remains: that I 
am an existing individual, at best a synthesis, thrust into 
the arena of nature and told to work out my destiny there. 
It is at this end, not at the beginning, that Kierkegaard 
discovers the close relationship between the existential and 
the natural. The journey has been a movement of spirit 
"from the spot, 11 back to the same spot, but now conditioned 
absolutely by the eternal. The lilies of the field are, per-
haps, lucky that they have to make no such journey, as a 
child is not required to make such a journey until he comas 
of age in the fullness of his time. But it is a man's digni-
ty that he must, if he is to exist. 
Yet, in the end, the existing individual finds himself 
back in nature, in the world, as a cobbler or a bus-driver, 
a father and a neighbor~ The only thing that has changed is 
that now he is conditioned by eternity and, because of this, 
life takes on an absolute seriousness. Other than this 
nothing has changed. He is not necessarily told to enter a 
monastary (or told not to); he is not commanded to give his 
1 Ibid., par. 617. 
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son up as a sacrifice~ The only change is that now he lives 
his life before God and grounded in God·. Doubtless this 
will lead him to try to be a good cobbler, or father, or 
neighbor, but as to how to be these things, God gives him no 
special gnosis--just the knowledge that it is God's world~ 
This does not mean that now an aura of blessedness descends 
upon everything~ That is naturalism, too~ But it possibly 
is not a little thing, nonetheless, to know that one exists 
in God 1 s world·. 
T. Conclusion·. 
Kierkegaard has taken us on a strange journey, to God 
and back without ever having left the precincts of empiri-
cism~ A synthesis of this journey and the more systematic 
philosophies preceding it will not be easy. However, Kierke-
gaard does give some hope that the attempt at least may be 
made, even if it is only to be made posterior to the journey, 
itself·. Perhaps a few quotations will serve to bridge the 
gap and make the transition back to philosophy~ 
Personality is only ripe when a man has made the truth 
his own:.l 
Faith must not rest content in unintelligibility~ 2 
Spirituality ia: the power of a man 1 s ·understanding 
over his life .• -' 
1rbid·., par·. 616·. 
2Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 540~ 
3Kierkegaard, Journals, par~ 1177"· 
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Providence has given every man certain characteristics. 
The important thing should therefore be to develop that 
characteristic~l 
Perhaps it is not impossible to exist as a philosopher, in 
which case he possibly whould philosophize. 11 His task is 
that of understanding himself in his existence·. "2 
1 Ibid. , par·. 1389~ 
Kierkegaard, Postscript, p~ 316. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
APPRAISAL OF THE THOUGHT OF 
s¢REN KIERKEGAARD 
1. Introduction. 
In the previous chapter an attempt was made to weave 
together several strands of Kierkegaard's authorship into 
one main developmental theme. The success of such a weaving 
will, to a considerable extent, determine the success of the 
following appraisal; for the attempt has been to expound 
Kierkegaard 11 systematically, 11 and thus to make room "for 
philosophical criticism. The attempt may seem gratuitous~ 
Kierkegaard has given ample notice that he will not submit 
to criticism from such a quarter on the grounds that--apart 
from the Greeks, who had some notion of being--philosophy 
has persistently mistaken thought for reality, thinking for 
existing, and thus disqualifies itself from criticism at the 
outset. 
The disqualification seams to be mutual. The dispari-
ty which is seen by Kierkegaard between the conceptual and 
the real certainly gives ground for enmity between the "exis-
tential" and the ''philosophical." From the philosophical 
point of view Kierkegaard may be termed an 11 irrationalist 11 
and opposed on that basis. Care needs to be taken in apply-
ing that label, however. It is true that philosophy is a 
name for an enterprise which seeks after coherence , which 
means that the effort of minds in understanding their experi-
ence is directed, perforce , toward considering the most 
rational explanation (the most reasonable) the best one . 
But this , of course , is a far cry from being a rationalist 
in the technical usage of that term, and the truth of the 
matter is that many first-rate philosophers are not ration-
alists . The same may be true of "irrationalism . 11 The 
Kierkegaardian outlook does , if the weaving has not been ex-
cessively faulty , make a strong appeal to reasoning minds . 
Because Kierkegaard has certainly thought about his position, 
and because philosophy may not yet have reached the point of 
sterility where it refuses to entertain thoughtful sug-
gestions that are not already precut to a specific pattern, 
it may be possible to appraise Kierkegaard's thought without 
violating the precepts of philosophical internal criticism·. 
However, we still have no justification from the 
Kierkegaardian side. Here is where the difficulty lies·. It 
is probable that the most usual general criticism of Kierke-
gaard is that he is "too one-sided." Yet Kierkegaard is at 
his polemical best in warning off those followers who would 
try to incorporate his thoughts as moments of a new 11 specu-
lati ve system . 11 Like Nie t zsche he fears most a dedicated 
band of disciples who will raise a new "school" on his grave . 
The trouble is that Kierkegaard is too one-sided. Con-
ceding, for the moment, that there is a distinction to be 
• 
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made between thought and existence, Kierkegaard has provided 
us with a dialectic every bit as dialectical as that of 
Hegel; the difference is that Kierkegaard 1 s is an exis-
tential dialectic while Hegel's is a logical dialectic--with 
a connectedness between moments that gives the emergent syn-
thetic totality the appearance of taking precedence over the 
contributing moments, thus causing the development itself to 
become an illusion. For Kierkegaard, on the other hand, the 
gaps between the stages leave every new movement in doubt 
until it is accomplished. Thus, the motive force for the 
dialectic springs from the decisive act which has its root 
in inwardness. 
It is because of this that Kierkegaard s~es inwardness 
as the ~ qua ~ of any movement at all and therefore as 
the ~ realissimum of human reality~ It is quite possible 
that he is correct. He has undoubtedly made an important 
contribution to philosophy in directing attention toward the 
individual, a contribution that may have powerful impli-
cations for epistemology as well as for ethics and social 
and political philosophy~ 
However, any dialectic must have two sides; moreover, 
if it is to be a dialectic in the usual sense of that word, 
it must lead, or at least point in the direction of a synthe-
sis~ This is true of an existential dialectic as well as a 
logical dialectic. Now the dialectic of Kierkegaard may be 
int&rpreted in various ways, but (perhaps with the exception 
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of the "dialectical tension" between the demoniacal spirit 
and God) any interpretation must at least take aceount of 
the dialectic between the "inward" and the "outer. " The 
"outer" may be seen as "objectivity, 11 as "the worldly, 11 or 
as "the aesthetical," but in any case its opposite is 
inwardness. 
Perhaps because the motive force does spring from 
inwardness, Kierkegaard has focussed attention there, and, 
perhaps intentionally, has ignored the fact that human ex-
istence does have an out-side. Or rather, since he has not 
ignored this precisely, the Kierkegaardian dialectic takes 
the form of a persistent attempt to escape from one ' s out-
side. This lends confusion to the meaning of "finitude." 
Let us pursue this for a moment . 
Certainly K1erkegaard is plain and unequivocal in his 
assertion that the human individual is finite spirit. The 
entire panorama offered to us by Kierkegaard is dotted with 
references to the distinction between the infinite and the 
finite , the temporal- existential and the eternal~ What 
could be less confusing than the Kierkegaardian polemic 
against Hegel for forgetting that he is an existing indi-
vidual and usurping the duties of the infinite? Yet, at the 
same time, finitude is more than finite inwardness; it is 
finite inwardness in a finite context. That is to say that 
finitude is spirit involved in and with its environment. 
Once again, however, Kierkegaard would seem to have 
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taken this well into account. He recognizes clearly that 
the believer (as either the 11 lmight of faith" or the 11 dis-
ciple11) is not transported out of the world by his belief, 
but is deposited firmly in existence and told to answer to 
his calling. But this takes place after the process of matu-
ration of spirit has undergone its critical phases. The 
path of the Kierkegaardian dialectic is, hence, unilaterally 
away from the world (the out-side) and then back to it again. 
Now nobody should be prepared to argue against Kierkegaard 
that when one is seeking spirit he should look away from 
where spirit resides; but it does seem possible to remind 
Kierkegaard that in every phase of man's development he is, 
at every instant, both an in-side and an out-side. One must, 
so to speak, hold the reins of two steeds, both at once. To 
loose one or the other is either to lose inwardness, and 
Kierkegaard has well informed us of this, or to lose outward-
ness--and he has not told us that a finite spirit without an 
out-side is only an abstraction~ 
What we are attempting to suggest is that there is 
even a dialectic which encompasses either/or and both/and. 
If both/and is the spirit of objectivity and either/or is 
the spirit of inwardness, then it may be, if man is a synthe-
sis, that each of these is a contributory moment~ One might 
do well to seek aid from mathematical usage, and express 
this synthesis as [Both (either/or) And (both/and)]. 
The few critical comments to follow are an attempt to 
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substantiate this general criticism. Whatever more man 
might be, he is also the type of creature who experiences 
and who thinks about his experience. Perhaps Bradley's 
famous aphorism will serve as an introductory summary of 
what is to be said. Metaphysics may be the finding of bad 
reasons for what we already believe instinctively; but think-
ing is also an instinct ; and if Descartes ' Cogito ergo ~ 
has proven to be a battleground, it is nonetheless true that 
§Bm ~ cogito . If thought is not necessarily reality , it is 
still true, even on K1erkegaard's own principles, that what 
may be the only reality we can know--the existing individual 
--finds that one of its characteristics is thought. 
The following specific questions are to be asked of 
Kierkegaard : 
A. What is the relationship between cognition and ex-
istence? 
B. Is an existential system possible? 
c. Is either/or sufficient as a generic guide for the 
existing individual? 
D. Can faith support a theory of intersubjective re-
lationships? 
It is doubtful that these questions will be thought to 
probe very deeply into the material already expounded. It 
will be found, however, that the final chapter of this study 
will take up the matter again. In this way, it is felt, the 
evils of mistaking criticism for constructive thought can 
best be avoided. This is particularly true of K1erkegaard 1 s 
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"theology." 
2. Critical Comments. 
A. The Relationship Between Cognition and Existence. 
If exposition has not assumed too much, there is a 
close correlation 1n Kierkegaard's mind between the "aes-
thetical," the "contemplative," and what we shall call the 
11 cognitive 11 individual. Let us try to set up a model in 
order to suggest that Kierkegaard may have ignored the part 
which "the external" plays 1n molding the nature of the ex-
isting individual. We are asking 1n what sense it may be 
true that the "features" of a conscious being are influenced 
by the objects of which he is conscious. It may be argued 
tha t this is so basic that a term. other than "cognition" 
should rightfully be applied. "Cognition," it might be sug-
gested, should be reserved for the more sophisticated oper-
ation which has knowledge as its result. The term is used 
advisedly, however--to mean the "act" of receiving data re-
gardless of the orderliness of its structure. The contrast-
ing term, "conation, 11 will then designate the more "active" 
act of "joining" the receiver with his object. The conative 
act can be seen as operating at a number of levels: as that 
which initiates cognition (opening the eye, turning the 
head), that which might obstruct or adulterate cognition 
(determining the experient to see what is not there, or to 
draw inaccurate conclusions from what is there), or that 
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which follows from cognition (the practical volition which 
acts to bridge a stream in order to cross it) . The two 
functions are almost inextricably intertwined in actuality~ 
This alone should give Kierkegaard pause, and suggest to him 
that the germ of existence is more primitive than the ethi-
cal stage. However , our present hope is that we may be al-
lowed to eschew this problem , disregard conation entirely, 
and then to ask if the surgically isolated cognitive act 
bears any relationship to existence~ 
What we are left with is an experient devoid of any 
activeness at all save the act of receiving data . Let it be 
granted that this is a fantastic experiment-- and one for 
which Kierkegaard must share the bl ame ; our present problem 
is not the influence of the experient on his data, but the 
influence of the data on the experient. In order to do this, 
of course , there has been a surreptitious concession to dual-
ism: that the data and the experient are not one and the 
same . Nbw, what we have would seem to approximate Kierke-
gaard 1 s 11 aesthetical man 11 generically seen·. He is no longer 
just a despairing rake, but is 11 the spectator" (Ishmael) in 
the broadest possible sense . We may recall the 11 tm.dialecti-
cal" nature of such a conscious being: his condition is 
outside himself; he is entirely constituted from without~ 
He is , in a sense, the "mirror" used to describe Sartre ' s 
being- for-itself . 
Now let us grant that the decisive move by which the 
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individual posits himself as existing has taken place. Does 
this mean that there is no l onger any outside, or that the 
individual is , or should be , no longer influenced by what is 
outside? Does he have nothing more to do with cognition? 
Assuredly not. On the contrary, it is not until such a de-
cisive move is made that one can regard his environment as 
significant. It is precisely upon becoming an existing indi-
vidual that he gives meaning to what before was merely an 
accidental assemblage of things in space and time . But 
while it may be the individual who gives meaning by his 
presence in the center of an environmental matrix, it is the 
environmental matrix which provides the content to which he 
gives meaning, and , to that degree , is important in the mold-
ing of the content of the individual , himself. Perhaps it 
could be said that whether or not I am to be depends on my 
decision to be; what I am to be depends upon my cognition of 
the context within which I find myself . This does not mean 
that I am defined by circumstances; it may be that I am 
called precisely to triumph over circumstances. Yet even so , 
they are part of me, even as I, in another sense, am part of 
them. 
Let us be fair to Kierkegaard. His emphasis on inward-
ness has led him to postpone, not ignore entirely, this 
facet of human reality~ In large part the totality of 
thought of Kierkegaard is not out of harmony with our presen-
tation. If the world in time is God ' s creation, then my 
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place in it is God 1 s will for this finite spirit . However, 
what has emerged as important for this finite spirit is that, 
even as he searches for eternity with infinite passion, he 
would do well to observe, organize, and understand to the 
very best of his ability, lest he miscalculate who he is . 
And he must do both at the same time . 
Why both at the same time? Kierkegaard may tell us 
that concern for the world (or for understanding--we are 
close to Faust) is at the expense of spirit, and that too 
many moments of such indulgence may be eternally fatal . 
Doubtless he is correct; yet let us attempt to turn the as-
sertion and suggest that , if one is indeed a synthesis of 
the temporal and the eternal, of the finite and the infinite, 
then perhaps he should not indulge himself overmuch in get-
ting ready to be a disciple, and, before it is too late and 
too many moments have passed, he should set about appraising 
where and how he is to be used. This , too, is correct. 
Both are correct , and that is why being a synthesis is a 
terrible task~ For when one is a synthesis, he must himself 
contain the conflicting moments and effect their synthesis, 
and this is a continuing existential effort. 
Now let us return to the act of cognition. Kierke-
gaard seems to be epistemologically accurate in describing 
the origin of consciousness as a mystery. It is surely im-
possible to know about anything prior to consciousness when 
consciousness is prerequisite to knowing. Thus, 
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epistemologically speaking we are not entitled to assume 
that there is any initial or primordial relationship between 
consciousness and its object. However, immediately upon 
origination consciousness is such that it must stand in an 
internal relationship with its object, so that each term 
(subject and object) is constituted by the relationship and 
by the other term, with the growth of consciousness exactly 
measurable by the growth of internality of the relationship·. 
This type of situation may require a new name. Let us call 
it a relationship of 11 polar internality . " 
Now, what has been done to the Kierkegaardian process 
of growth of the spirit away from the world? This is not to 
be repudiated; if it is, then the internal relationship be-
tween consciousness and its object loses its "polarity," and 
consciousness becomes nothing but the simple location of ex-
periential events·. This is what Brightman has fought so 
hard to avoid and what Perry has asserted to be the case. 
However, if 11 dying away from the world 11 is taken to mean 
turning one 1 s back on cognition, then the environment be-
comes nothing and consciousness is left as a center of empti-
ness. Kierkegaard has both wooed and rejected this type of 
11monasticism. 11 He has also granted that the aesthetical is 
not to be nullified, but only dethroned. However, only if 
11 dethronement 11 means that cognition assumes its rightful 
place as a relationship which brings together two terms into 
one composite term can its dethronement be permitted. This 
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has repercussions throughout the Kierkegaardian development . 
What it seems to mean is that at whatever stage of the 
development of the individual we may choose to pause for 
analysis, his environment must always come to light as a 
factor; and the cognitive abili ty of that individual to ap-
praise , order, form hypotheses about, and act upon that en-
vironment becomes the determining factor of that portion of 
"synthetic " man which is temporal and finite . Kierkegaard 
tells us that the high-water mark of demoralization is the 
1 
statement, "what the age requires . " Admitting that this 
savors of a compromising spirit-- the spirit of Peer Gynt-- it 
nonetheless remains true that , a) historical method is the 
method by which one calculates where he is, b) where he is 
matters considerably in what he sees , and c) what he sees 
influences what he is . The contemplative individual, the 
ethical individual (with a task to do), and the religious 
disciple, all are alike in this . Without it concreteness is 
lost and the existing individual exists- -as an abstraction. 
One does not bury his talents in the ground . 
Let us conclude this comment by asking about rendering 
unto Caesar and unto God . Kierkegaard might quickly agree 
that one does not find God through Caesar (the world); he 
should also grant that while one may find the relative im-
portance of Caesar through God, one does not learn one 
1 Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 129. 
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specific thing about the world except by scrutinizing the 
world. And even in the relative realm of Caesar there are 
relative rights and wrongs so that it may be true, even in 
the eyes of the absolute, that a splendid vice is better 
than a vicious one . 
While one may find no contradiction in himself when he 
does justly, loves mercy, and walks humbly with hie God, to 
do justly and to love mercy are not the same thing as walk-
ing humbly with God~ It is this that Kierkegaard has well 
pointed out . But it is also the case that walking humbly 
with one's God does not point the way to (prescribe) the act 
which is just or merciful. This may depend on 11 "t>That the age 
requiree. 11 
B. Is an Existential System Possible? 
The argument of the last section has been intended to 
show that an existing individual must take account of his 
environment even when he seeks himself as spirit, since both 
his cognizing and that which he cogni zes play an important 
part in his development·. In this section another notion is 
entertained : that of the practical conduct of the existing 
individual-- the forming of plans and the carrying out of 
them-- and the influence that this conduct may have on the 
development of spirituality~ After we do this, we shall 
take one last backward glance at the aesthetical (contempla-
tive) individual to see if, in some cases, he does not 
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deserve better than Kierkegaard is willing to allot him . 
Let us review what is meant by a logical system and an 
existential system·. A logical system is a thought- construct 
which may or may not purport to refer to reality and whose 
structural laws are the norms of rationality . An exis-
tential system is the same thing , except that the structural 
laws are affirmed as descriptive of reality (empirical) or 
determinative of reality (rationalistic) . An existential 
system can , hypothetica~ly , be either temporalistic or non-
temporalistic , but it must , in either case (if "system" is 
to be meaningful) depend on a pattern or plan which is in-
ternally consistent . 
For Kierkegaard : a) a logical system is possible for 
a rational individual , b) an existential system is impossi-
ble for a finite individual , c) an existential system may be 
possible (may also be actual) for God. Let us examine this 
last statement in order to see more clearly what it implies. 
When "man thinks, while God creates , " one assumes that 
there is a sort of parallel between the two activities--with 
this difference : that man weaves a conceptual system, while 
God creates an existential system. The primary parallel 
factor would seem to be that thought is involved in each 
case; the primary difference is that for man planning and 
executing the plan are two distinct activities, while for 
God they are not~ Possibly this is what Descartes meant in 
asserting that in God thought and will were the same ~ If so, 
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then it would appear that Spinoza was mistaken in assuming 
Descartes' hypothesis to imply an irrational God. All it 
needs to imply is that there is no separation for God be-
tween a plan and its execution. With man, of course, it is 
different . First he formulates his purposes and then he 
acts to carry them out . But , one strongly suspects that, 
insofar as he does act to carry them out , he is attempting 
to construct an existential system; and to the degree that 
he is successful in realizing his purposes , and to the de-
gree that his purposes constitute a system, no matter in 
what direction these purposes aim, he has succeeded in con-
structing an existential system . Thus , it would appear that 
for man in the ethical category (seen generically as one who 
assumes the authorship of his deeds) an existential system 
is possible . 
Suppose Kierkegaard were to reply that this is all 
well and good , but he who observes , then plans, then acts, 
then observes the results of his action has never escaped 
the conceptual at all--that the type of existence he re-
ferred to was the reality of human existence . Can it not be 
replied that , even if this is so (for Kierkegaard both em-
piricism and rationalism share the same limitations), the 
active individual who 11 becomes" through the application of 
the ethical category insofar as he pl ans his objective be-
havior , plans also his own growth, and therefore is an exis-
tential system . 
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It must be admitted that Kierkegaard would not concern 
himself very deeply ·vti th this criticism. His attack is 
against the contemplative system-builder (Hegel) who knows 
that the real is the rational, not the worker who labors to 
make the rational into the real. Perhaps, however, before 
we turn to this "system-builder" we may chide Kierkegaard 
for presenting us with a broom which sweeps too broadly and 
removes the possibility of an individual positing his own 
existence by "taking charge 11 of his condition according to 
his own rationale, just as completely as it removes the con-
templative concept-weaver. 
Now let us glance at the speculative philosopher. 
Kierkegaard's Graecophilia leads him to admire the (aes-
thetic ) "speculation-for-the-joy-of-speculating" that may be 
the mark of Greek philosophy . Now let us suppose a curious 
thing. Let us suppose a man to speculate about the nature 
of reality, but suppose also that he does not speculate with 
either an ulterior practical motive (to make the world 
better) or an intrinsic or ulterior aesthetic motive. There 
are scientists like this·. We call them "pure" scientists·. 
The speculating thinker speculates about the nature of re-
ality because he considers it important that he have a clear 
picture (not, to repeat, because he plans to do anything 
about it). It is this peculiar disease that seems to af-
flict philosophers sporadically, and one cannot help but 
feel that there is something to be said for it. The strange 
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thing is that a great deal can be said for it, because this 
individual is not an undialectical observer at all, but has 
determined himself to be an observer because it is important 
to get a clear picture . He is, in short, much more on the 
ethical level than he is on the aesthetic level. His self-
determination to speculate on the nature of reality has re-
dounded to him to determine him as a certain type of exist-
ing individual. 
Kierkegaard's rejoinder is that a man who seeks after 
his eternal validation by philosophical speculation seeks in 
a wrong and dangerous direction. But this was not '"hat v-re 
meant . This philosopher is not speculating in order to save 
his soul (an exceedingly practical motivation), but because 
it is important that the fund of common knowledge be given 
as clear a picture of reality as he can give to it. Kierke-
gaard is "quite conversant with this sort of thing" himself, 
but would insist that a man should have his own salvation as 
his primary aim. Yet it might be that the purely intel-
lectual activity of the philosopher defines him, perhaps 
even in the eyes of eternity, as one who cared what the 
world was all about . Socrates may have kept quiet about his 
existence, but he is credited with allowing that the unex-
amined life was not worth living. Perhaps the philosopher's 
care should fit him, at least for a share of the mantle of 
Socrates. If so, then his contemplation has produced his 
existence. 
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At least the philosopher, limited by the conceptual 
though he might be, gave what concepts were available to him 
his best. One does not deal cavalierly with the depth of 
spirit of a Hegel or a Spinoza. 
c. Is 11Ei ther/Or" Sufficient as a Generic Guide for the 
Existing Individual? 
This question has been touched on in the introduction 
to this chapter . Kierkegaard has asserted that only the 
absolute has the calmness and the perspective to knoi-T both/ 
and; that the existing individual must make distinctions, 
must , in short, live the decisive life of either/or. 
Doubtless Kierkegaard is corr ect. Even in trivial 
matters life is full of options . Either I shall wear a hat 
or I shall not; I cannot do both at the same time . In the 
matter of spirit there are also options, although in this 
case they are not trivial . Either one chooses a life ground-
ed in eternity or one chooses a life grounded in the worldly; 
one cannot do both. Moreover , human finitude being what it 
is, one must choose, frequently understanding only the im-
portance of the choice; for time is not available for ex-
amining all the pertinent data there are or will be . 
The decisiveness which is the spirit of either/or may 
be contrasted with two characteristics of both/and . Both/ 
and is the spirit of hesitancy and it is the spirit of 
compromise. Yet, to look at the matter from another angle, 
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it may be that decisiveness implies also a harshness of 
judgment unbefi tting to a finite being, while hesitancy and 
compromise may similarly imply gentleness and understanding. 
It is a maxim of social life that we should be uncompromis-
ing in self-judgment, but tolerant in our judgment of others·. 
This raises two questions~ 
1. Does a refusal to judge others with the harshness 
that we are to judge ourselves imply a lack of concern for 
their spiritual possibilities--a kind of Epicurean de-
tachment? It could. Perhaps in the case of judgment of 
those who influence the thoughts and behavior of others it 
always does. This may account for Kierkegaard 1 s treatment 
1 
of Bishop Mynster. 
However, the very inwardness which is the condition of 
the movement toward existence is beyond the reach of ex-
ternal judgment. One can 11 point out," 11 instruct, 11 "lead, 11 
"be an example for," but beyond this one does not judge 
without betraying himself as confusing the in-side with the 
out-side·. Kierkegaard tells us that 11 for one who clings to 
earthly life, his neighbor does not exist for h1m~ 112 He 
might have added that when my neighbor does exist for me, my 
either/or cannot be applied to him~ Judgment is an 
1
cf. S¢ren Kierkegaard, The Attack Upon Christendom, 
trans·. 1flal tar Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1946), pp. 6-25. 
2 Kierkegaard, Journals, par. 696~ 
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inescapable aspect of finite existence; it is only in the 
absolute that distinctions are transcended . But, to turn 
the question, judgment of the spirit is not an aspect of 
finite existence; it is the prerogative of God. Understand-
ing--that which seeks the both/and of another person is an 
important key for dealing with the world and its people . 
Perhaps it is even true t hat , for us, both/and (the 
diligent seeking of both sides) is indeed requisite for the 
production of individuality. This is important; one 
sometimes sus pects that Kierkegaard is so concerned over the 
growth of the spirit, its absolute commitment to the abso-
lute and only relative commitment to the relative, tha t he 
fails to provide a properly fertile field (world) for the 
flowering of individuality . Would it matter to Kierkegaard 
whether he lived under a dicta torship or in a democracy? A 
peculiar reversal seems to be the rule when one compares the 
eternal with the world, and this is no exception; for pre-
cisely to the extent that I am bound to God will I refuse to 
parmi t political and social s ystems to bind me ·. The impli-
cation of Kierkegaard's religious absolutism is finite indi -
vidualism, but finite individualism can only flourish when 
all points of view are permitted their voice . This is the 
both/and of another type of individualist , Jobn Locke , and 
it is the both/and of democracy . Respect for the individual 
requires it, and certainly, if my neighbor exists for me, my 
respect is due him . 
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2. A suggestion has been made regarding judgment di-
re·cted outside . Now it might be asked, "At what point does 
uncompromising self- judgment sour into arrogance? " We have 
seen how sin- consciousness can grow to the point where the 
sinner feels himself to be beyond God's help. This is the 
mortal sin of pride . Kierkegaard has checks against this 
sort of arrogance ; the humble knowledge that one accomplish-
es nothing without God; the recognition that one's very ex-
istence (both originally and as he is reborn from sin) is a 
gift of God. However, there is one area of human endeavor 
that seems not to be protected. 
The practical behavior of the individual who exists in 
the ethico- religious category is marked by an intense and 
continuous self- scrutiny of his motives in performing any 
action~ Though the outcome is unimportant to the agent (is 
in the hands of God in any event) , he must examine, with the 
utmost seriousness, his own part in the event. This can be 
a frustrating and debilitating process--even more so, per-
haps, than is the attempt to foresee all the overt conse-
quences of the action. One twists and turns through laby-
rinths of self- glorification, self- abnegation, sadism or its 
converse, destructive instincts subtly intertwined \>Tith con-
structive instincts·. Here lies the real i'lilderness and the 
real temptation. One does this trying to judge the spirit 
in which the act was done, until, quite possibly, one is 
dizzied, and the time for the act is past . This can be the 
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result of self-judgment that is so concerned about either/or 
(either in the right spirit or not) that the effect is the 
worst kind of both/and. 
Kierkegaard is a superb dialectician-- certainly good 
enough to know that just about everything turns into its 
opposite if it is pushed to that extreme . This may well be 
the case for what he has called "subjective heaviness ." 
Possibly one can probe his intentions and their spirit only 
so far, and then he must grant a little lightness to his 
subjectivity and hope to heaven that this act , which he so 
desperately wants to do in the right spirit, will turn out 
that way in the judgment of God . Possibly "too much" either/ 
or in any personality acts as a deterrent to doing justly, 
loving mercy, and walking humbly with one's God. If it is 
true that man is a synthesis, then it should not be for-
got ten that a synthesis is a both/and. 
D. Can Faith Support a Theory of Intersubjective Relation-
ships? 
We find ourselves constantly reminded that for every 
in- side there is an out-side·. Complexities enter to pro-
hibit us from assuming anything like a "one-to-one" corre-
spondence between external characteristics and modifications 
of spirit, however . I n this comment we continue the theme 
of "concrete spirit" or the self as a synthesis in the world 
of events and other selves . 
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A beginning may be made by reviewing the Kierke-
gaardian attitude toward an individual 's relationship with 
God~ Faith, throughout all phases of development, is posed 
as the grasping of an objective uncertainty with infinite 
passion. Generically, fait.h is the opposite of unbelief; 
specifically, it is belief irrespective of the objective 
evidence~ or contra. Thus, depending as it does on the 
passion of the subjective believer, both for its conception 
and for its validation, faith shows itself to be of an order 
different from hypotheses, resulting in certainty rather 
than knowledge~ All, thus far, remains "'i thin the believing 
subject--his passion, his belief, his sin-consciousness, and 
his God-consciousness·. 
The object of the certainty, however, is God, and the 
faith that the believer has is that God is an objective 
event. To put together a confusing set of terms: the actu-
ality of God is an objective uncertainty, but subjective 
certainty is in the objective actuality of God. Thus, while 
Kierkegaard may not want to get beyond faith, the very at-
tempt to give content to that faith should force him into 
some sort of theory about the nature of, and communication 
between, a plurality of spiritual entities. 
He does tell us that there can be no direct communi-
1 
cation between two spirits. Presumably this works both ways, 
1 Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 221. 
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so that if all my God- consciousness must be based in faith--
if I can never confront or be confronted by the actual 
presence of God, then God would seem to be in the same pre-
dicament relative to me . If I must have faith in God, then 
perhaps he, also , must have faith in me·. 
Novr it is not quite as "even-up" as all that . God can 
doubtless get along very well without me; I am not his ulti-
mate meaning, whereas I cannot do without God. Further, God 
is the origin of my spirit , so he doubtless knows far more 
about my spirit than I do of his . Finally, he has seen fit 
to shroud this invisibility which is my spirit in a body, 
which can be seen. Still, the epistemic fact (now without 
religious implications) remains in Kierkegaard's assertion 
that a direct communication between two spirits is unthink-
able , \vhether they be divine or human. Thus it would seem 
to fol l ow that I am, in some sense , objective to God's 
subjec tivity--that God sees my externality, and perhaps sees 
nothing else, although he may be otherwise aware of very 
1 
much more . Now this may be very well and good with regard 
to God. I t may be that the acme of spirit is to be 
"grounded transparently'' in God, to become a nothing before 
1For example, if God's logical system is our exis-
tential system ; if the world is a rational order, then it 
may be that only one spiritual attitude will produce a given 
act or complex of acts . This is not so for us, but it might 
be for God . In that event , God coul d watch, and judge, the 
behavior of men , and on the basis of their doing their job 
or not , calculate their existence-quotient . 
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God. 1 But now let us return to the normal social situation 
concerning a community of finite spirits. 
My faith that you exist as spirit consists in my trust, 
and my acting in accordance with that trust, that you are 
activated by spirit . Now it may be that whether or not you 
are spirit is no business at all of mine--that it is a 
matter between you and God. But this would hardly serve to 
support a theory of social relationships . So perhaps it is 
better to assume that the spiritual growth of others, par-
ticularly those who are given partly into our charge, is 
properly our concern. Unless we assume this we are in the 
position of Cain . How does this concern bear fruit? The 
radical schism which exists for Kierkegaard between sub-
jective spirit and objective action would seem to indicate 
that there is simply no way of recognizing anything in the 
way of spirit at all . This is substantiated by the Kierke-
gaardian notion of Providence, where all that is overt con-
forms to God's plan without the slightest infraction, only 
man's spirit being in doubt . It is also indicated by the 
description of the 11 1might of faith, 112\'rho behaves exactly 
like a greengrocer, and by the fact that what actually re-
sults from an ethical action is unconnected with the 
rightness or wrongness of the act, itself . 
1K1erkegaard, Postscript, p·. 220. 
2 See Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, pp. 52-57. 
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Thus, we are in a dilemma. There is no way to recog-
nize another spiritual entity; behavior in the external 
world is the only means of recognizing anything, yet be-
havior has nothing to do with spirit. Through all this we 
are notified that we are responsible for the sinfulness of 
our children. There would seem to be no way out except to 
assume that behavior is in some sense indicative of spirit-
ual growth or decay. But then inwardness is replaced by 
ritual, sweat, and pious expressions. Without this indi-
cation, no community seems possible~ This seems to be where 
Kierkegaard has left us . Perhaps it is the fault of a sub-
jective approach that can see no way to any sort of reci-
procity by which I can require that evidence of spirit (in 
its relationship with me, not with God--that is his and 
God's business) be presented·. Res::pect for persons, and the 
requirement of respect for oneself from persons, is not one 
of Kierkegaard's virtues. 
This is not to say that Kierkegaard does not under-
stand who is his neighbor and what is to be done for him. 
But that was not the point·. The point was whether or not a 
theory of intersubjective relations can be supported by 
faith. It seems difficult to see how it can. In this, 
though the thoughts are far apart, a parallel may be seen 
between .Klerkegaard and Sartre·. 
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3. Conclusion·. 
The primary argument of this chapter has been that any 
treatment of human reality, spiritual or otherwise, must 
take account of its context. This is not to say that 
"context" is all there is to human reality--and it is this 
that gives Kierkegaard his importance to twentieth century 
philosophy. On the other hand, an entity called "human re-
ality" without context, whatever else it may be, is simply 
not human reality--and it is this that Kierkegaard appears 
to have neglected. The context of human reality consists in 
its physical environment, its historical environment, its 
social environment, and in whatever rational understanding 
human reality can bring to bear on these. The proper re-
lationship between myself and my context may well define the 
precincts of moral philosophy in its broadest sense; a label 
(though by no means an explanation) has been suggested for 
this relationship: polar internality. "Polar" refers to 
the possibility that there are two irreducible components to 
human reality; 11 internality 11 means that the relationship be-
tween these components is such that the actuality of each 
implies and is constituted by the other. Thus, spirit is, 
and must be, related to its world·. 
It has been suggested that the study of moral philoso-
phy should find its beginning in an examination of this re-
lationship·. On the other hand, moral philosophy should not 
preclude an independent study of each of the components of 
497 
human reality in abstraction. It is in this sense that one 
may argue that science (the study of the environment) is a 
justifiable endeavor and that the justification of science 
implies the justification of a study of the other component 
of human reality: spirit . This is what Kierkegaard has 
given us, and, if the analysis resulting in the label, 
"polar internality, 11 is not mistaken, then he is perfectly 
justified in excluding from that study all that is pertinent 
to science. Science, in its investigation, is similarly 
justified. 
Philosophy, however, is allotted the task of investi-
gating the relationship between spirit and its context, and 
consequently, it must avoid the temptation of interpreting 
either pole in terms of the other . Realism or subjectivism 
may be the one-sided result of such reduction. The conclud-
ing chapter will begin here . 
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CHAPTER IX 
A rroNCLUDING ESSAY 
1~ Introduction·. 
The material to follow should probably be considered 
more as a preface than a conclusion. We shall see k, in this 
chapter, to bind together and present a prolegomena, not, 
indeed, to any future metaphysic (although it certainly is 
true that a strong trace of Kantianism will be recognized), 
but rather a prolegomena for the future thoughts of the 
present writer. Insofar as this is the case, tentativeness 
will be our watchword. Perhaps "tentativeness" is not a 
strong enough word. The writer is assailed by doubts, even 
now, as to the reasonableness of his vision, and yet more 
doubtful, even if reasonable, as to its novelty. Perhaps 
its only claim to such will be contingent upon the vali-
dation of a similar claim to reasonableness and novelty by 
existential thought. This claim will be decided upon in 
time; meanwhile, let us suggest, in broadest outline, the 
nature of this vision·. 
In some sense, each of the philosophers under investi-
gation must be correct; moreover, it does not even seem 
possible to divide philosophy in such a manner that each 
thinker can be neatly assigned a section in which his 
viewpoint may be allowed to prevail--not, at least, without 
producing an incoherent eclectic potpourri thereby. It 
almost appears that each is most correct precisely at the 
points where his thought conflicts most sharply with those 
of the others. As the present writer views the problem, it 
appears that a salient point of conflict is to be found in 
the varying positions regarding the nature of selfhood, par-
ticularly selfhood as it functions epistemically. This, ac-
cordingly, will be our primary point of focus; our endeavor: 
the impossible one of satisfying alike the realist, the 
idealist, the phenomenologist-ontologist, and the spiritual-
ist·. If such a task could possibly be successful, it might 
entail a reconciliation (instead of an 11 emancipation") of 
epistemology and metaphysics~ 
The approach to be used will be that of subjecting ex-
perience to a re-examination 1n the hope of finding evidence 
for inferring the being of an entity which, while neither 
exclusively epistemic nor metaphysical in nature, may 
function to the benefit of both. And, since sometimes even 
impossible battles are won solely by virtue of a banner or a 
rallying-cry, let us provide that as well~ Let us call our 
approach that of a 11 subjective realism·." 
2·. Epistemology and Metaphysics·. 
A. The Point of Departure: Empiricism~ 
The four men under investigation have, each, to be 
sure, in his own way, claimed themselves to be empiricists~ 
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It is difficult in the twentieth century to do otherwise. 
Dr. Brightman, whom we shall take for the moment as 
spokesman, must be quite correct in asserting that it is all 
we have that is immediate--that we can be sure of. Let us 
continue with Brightman and suggest that the realist is 
premature in his assignment of reality-status to the data of 
his experience, since the most that can be said with certain-
ty is that the data of experience exhibit objective refer-
ence. It will be wise to pause at this point in order to 
examine what is meant by "objective reference." 
There appear to be two different "directions of flown 
of objective reference. They are not opposite, but they are 
different. If we have not completely misunderstood 
Brightman's position, these two directions are defined by 
two divergent meanings of the term "object. u If we may use 
two major philosophers as "props" for a moment, it might be 
suggested that one type of objective reference is entirely 
epistemic in nature and, in a Humean sense, "flows" from an 
idea to the object of experience to which it refers. Both 
the idea and the object are data of experience, but their 
difference-in-kind is productive of an epistemic dualism 
that renders meaningful (and necessary) a portion of the co-
herence criterion of truth. This "difference-in-ld.nd" is, 
of course, a non-Humean addition. The other type of ob-
jective reference seems not to be entirely epistemic in 
nature, since its "flow" seems to be (in a more Lockean 
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sense) from the field of experience-data in general to 
somewhere extra-experiential. Hypotheses based on this ob-
jective reference are also part of the coherence criterion, 
but they are metaphysical hypotheses and refer to metaphysi-
cal objectivity. These hypotheses are formed by virtue of 
the "clues, signals, and messages" fo1md in experience and 
are the assumptions a philosopher may be parmi tted "as long 
as they make sense~" 
The validation of the second type of objective refer-
ence is dependent upon validation of the first type. That 
is to say that, unless conceptual activity can first be es-
tablished as relevant to truth about experience-data, but at 
the same time not derived from sense-data, the equipnent for 
framing hypotheses about realities beyond experience has not 
been provided. In short, sensationalism must first be re-
futed before intelligent thought can hypothesize at all~ 
The refutation may well take the general form of an accu-
sation of reductionism where experience does not provide a 
warrant. Certainly there is concept~al as well as perceptu-
al experience, and there does not seem to be any really good 
reason for assuming them to be of the same order. Hence, at 
least a cursory analysis of experience reveals these two 
types of data, and reveals, also, that there seems to be 
some reference that relates them. Whether this reference is 
symmetrical is not made clear, but is also, perhaps unim-
portant for the problem at hand. It could be extremely 
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important except that, since empiricism requires us to con-
sider only the data at hand, we are not permitted to read 
irnto the term "reference" any sort of "active referral" what-
ever. What should be meant by 11 reference," it the analysis 
is to be clearly made is simply that concepts "apply to" 
percepts, not that they "do anything" in this reference or 
application. Otherwise, we should find that our line of de-
pendency is violated and we are inferring an active source 
before we are legitimately able even to infer. 
So much for that portion of the analysis. Thoughts 
somehow apply to things. Thoughts are "about" things. Ana-
lyzing, now, again, it is found that within the immediacy of 
the shining present is an activity. Concepts do not pile 
themselves up in certain ways of their own nature or vo-
lition. A concept is only a datum. They are worked into 
shape, and, whatever this is, we shall name it "activity." 
We could also call it "thinking." However, there are two 
distinctions to be made·. The first is between the "thoughts" 
and the "thinking." This distinction has to be made or else 
concepts cannot be claimed as data of experience according 
to the earlier analysis~ It is quite true that there cam be 
no separation between thinking and thoughts--each, alone, is 
an absurdity. The same, it may be added, is true of 
percepts. These three, concepts, percepts, and activity, 
give us the factors of Brightman 1 s "shining present. tl 
The second distinction is between an empirical 
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derivation of thinking and an ~ priori derivation. The 
thinking-activity we have been considering is part of the 
data of experience, and, as such, it is discovered by analy-
sis of the shining present. Once again, it is true that 
there must be activity before there can be any observation 
of it, but at the moment we are trying with might and main 
to be faithfUl to ratio oogqoscendi, and what the presuppo-
sitions may be of experience--what conditions must be 
present in order that there be experience--must be deleted 
with unusual care from the analysis, lest we lose our cre-
dentials as empiricists. 
The foregoing analysis is complete. The next task is 
to examine the relationship between the data of experience 
and the activity of experiencing. Thus far, it is suggested, 
we may perfectly well say with Brightman that the shining 
present shows immediately an activation ot the potential re-
lationship between concepts and percepts. If we choose to 
call that activation a mind, then we can say with some as-
surance that mind is at work trying to understand per-
ceptions. We would be unwise, however, to say that mind was 
at work trying to understand its experience, since that 
which we are calling "mind" is not the owner of any experi-
ence at all, but only a part of experience being experienced 
as acting on another part·. Now we may continue with the 
analysis of experience as a whole into data and conscious-
ness. 
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Brightman asserts that there can be no separation of 
consciousness from its data. This is undoubtedly true. But 
again, there may be distinctions within inseparables. It 
may be suggested that the denial of this seems no less specu-
lative than its assertion--no more empirical. The hypothe-
sis that the seamless robe of experience admits of no split-
ting is just that--an hypothesis; it is a good hypothesis if 
it makes sense, and if it does not, then perhaps another 
should be entertained. This brings us to our point. 
If we are to discover, empirically, mind at work in 
the field of experience, then that mind which we discover 
cannot be identified with that which discovers it. It may 
well be--quite possibly it is--true that the data of experi-
ence as experienced are the product of some sort of cooper-
ative enterprise; but there seems no empirical reason for 
concluding from this possibility that therefore mind has any 
greater claim than any other phenomenon to special treatment~ 
On the other hand it does seem that if any distinction can 
be made within experience between data and the consciousness 
for which they are data, no account of this consciousness has 
yet been given. The trouble is that none can be given even 
at the same time that this consciousness is at least a neces-
sary condition for there being any experience at all. 
Again, to emphasize, we are well aware that Brightman 
wishes no seams; there is no such analysis to be performed 
as would divide that which is experienced from that which is 
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experiencing. Our reply is that this is an hypothesis con-
structed to account for problems inherent within the experi-
ence-situation and is only due the deference that any hy-
pothesis is due. What it is suspected that Brightman has 
done is to make use of one of the fundamental assumptions of 
pragmatism, but without classifying it as an assumption. 
Pragmatism wants to look no deeper and so it looks no deeper, 
and if rival systems want to get back to an absolute be-
ginning, pragmatism has an answer for that, too~ But 
personalism cannot parmi t itself this luxury--not without 
drawing a _B! quogue from the realist. Thus it might appear 
that the root of any dynamic knowing process that activates 
the knower has not been discovered as a. datum. Now there is 
nothing wrong with this as sucq; but what we cannot agree 
with is that a. basis in epistemology has been provided for 
the interpretation of data and the framing of metaphysical 
hypotheses about the existence of anything independently of 
its data-existence. This is the limitation of empiricism: 
that, strictly considered, it can lead nowhere but to a.n 
equally strict phenomenalism. It is this, perhaps, that 
makes Perry's pa.nobjectivism attractive. Since all that oc-
curs, thus far, occurs at the phenomenal level of experience-
data, there seems to be nothing lost (because nothing so tar 
gained) in simply ignoring distinctions between the mind-
mowing and the anti ty lm.own~ They are the same because the 
two differentiating dimensions have so far not been fixed. 
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Then, with the mind-knowing identified with the entity known, 
it becomes only a matter of secondary importance to install 
a double-aspect theory to account for empirically evident 
differences in type between concepts and percepts. Then, 
with the theory complete, all that is required is to rename 
the phenomenon and call it reality. With this, knowing be-
comes a function of certain structural formations, and being 
known becomes an accidental characteristic of other 
structures. However, it is our opinion that neither of 
these philosophers probes deeply enough into the nature of 
experiencing. Let us justify this charge. 
B. Experience Reconsidered~ 
Following Brightman once again as he describes the 
shining present, we may be reminded that it displays an im-
mediacy of place as well as of time. Experience is always 
"here" and it is always "mine . " Without pausing to quibble 
over the meaning of proprietorship at this early stage for 
Brightman, let us focus on the center of "here." Now the 
content of this center is not a datum--only that there is a 
centeredness about the experience-manifold. The picture is 
rather like a doughnut--there is a vacancy at ita core, but 
it is a vacancy without which there could be no doughnut. 
Our suggestion is that this vacancy is the way out of phe-
nomenalism. Unfortunately, at the same time we must bid 
farewell to empiricism and are in a fair way to depart from 
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rationalism as well. In a way, however, we have Brightman's 
blessing for this, since we have already been told that with-
out consciousness there can be no experience and without ex-
perience there can be no consciousness. Our only difference 
of opinion is that we think we are dealing with two concrete 
realities, while Brightman considers them to be a single 
event. 
Now, since we have gone beyond empiricism in order to 
examine its conditions, we must grant that an inference is 
being made--an inference from the empirical fact of "here-
ness" to the supposed eXistence of consciousness. Naturally 
we must carry with us the reminder that this supposed 
consciousness stands in a dynamic interrelationship with its 
data; without this (Brightman is correct) there could be no 
consciousness. This we may later call the relationship of 
"polar internality." But we must forget this for the 
present and concentrate only on one of the poles, conscious-
ness. It is this that ' we have called "subjectivity"; and, 
since the centeredness of the field of experience has pro-
vided us with our signal or message, let us say that experi-
ence indicates not only objective reference but subjective 
reference as well. 
c. Distinctions Between Objective and Subjective Reference. 
At this point it may well be wondered why so much 
effort has- been expended merely to assert what Brightman 
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already has asserted, namely, that selfhood has not only 
epistemic being but metaphysical being as well. This is the 
culmination of his whole system; why the apparently polemi-
cal reassertion? 
It is entirely possible that we have attached undue 
importance to what may merely be a matter of nomenclatura. 
However, let us see. We are not now concerned with the ob-
jective reference that terminated with the epistemic object, 
but rather with that reference which pointed beyond experi-
ence to reality. Now it must be remembered that Brightman 
did not embark upon this t'bold hypothesis" until the episte-
mological theory was complete~ Then, so to speak, with all 
the equipment laid out, the search began for ratio essendi. 
It is a healthy way of philosophizing, but in this particu-
lar system theories of being are thus made dependent upon 
theories of knowing. Another path, taken by Perry and other 
realists, would reverse this ord~r by simply insisting that 
before anything can be known it must first be. However, to 
return to Brightman, unless there is an ambiguity in the 
meaning of the term "objective reference, 11 that to which the 
signals refer is an objectively existing thing--that is to 
say, it is objective to the knower himself. Thus, it does 
not seem that any metaphysical hypothesis based on objective 
reference can prove out the existence of the knower as 
knower. For example, the cosmological argument may seem to 
prove out my existence (justify my assumption) by tracing a 
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line from me to God and then back to me again, so that I 
really know I exist when I can find the causal chain that 
produced me. This is somewhat like feeling my own pulse to 
see if I em alive. Thus, what Brightman has done is to 
present an admirable hypothesis for the person as the key to 
reality, but the key is an epistemological key only, since 
it is founded only on empirical findings plus inferences 
from them. 
In summary, then: without the existence of the knower 
be1ng posited as an event logically prior to his knowing 
(not "coeval with" but logically prior to) such an eXistence 
is never really established at all, and the person developed 
with such care becomes an externality only~ This is just as 
true for data arrived at introspectively as it is for data 
arrived at by other means: just as true, in short, for con-
ceptual data, perceptual data, or emotional data. 
On the other hand, if the prior existence of the know-
ing self is posited, it is so posited neither by epistemolo-
gy nor by metaphysics, but as a kind of surd that furnishes 
a basis for both. If both the realist and the subjectivist 
are correct--if being depends upon the lmowing of it and 
knowing depends upon something to be known--then perhaps it 
is possible to unite these incompatibles by suggesting to 
the realist that the real being of the knower must indeed be 
that upon which everything depends ratio cogqoscendi, while 
at the same time suggesting to the subjectivist that the 
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only being that is of present concern is precisely and 
solely the being of the knower as knower ratio essendi. 
This is the existence of the subject over which Berkeley 
paused momentarily before passing on to God. But this momen-
tary tribute to the knower that cannot be known--lest in 
that act knowing cease--may yet provide something in philoso-
phy worth framing notions about. At least it seems a plausi-
ble distinction to suggest that subjective reference flows 
inward, toward subjectivity, while objective reference flows 
in the other direction. 
D. A Conjectural Suggestion Concerning Subjectivity. 
Let us make haste to state that our case for reconcili-
ation is not yet complete. We may continue by attempting to 
describe hypothetically some of the characteristics of 
subjectivity. After this has been done it may be possible 
to present what ordinarily should come first: a quasi-
substitute theory of knowledge. This will come in the next 
section. 
If it is the case that a distinction is legitimately 
to be made between objective and subjective reference, so 
that the subject referred to may be seen as a reality, but 
as a reality that stands as a precondition for metaphysical 
hypotheses rather than as the content of a metaphysical hy-
pothesis, it may also be clear that some amb1gu1 ties of ex-
pression will have to be assimilated. The first ambiguity 
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consists in the problem of referring to subjectivity (or 
consciousness) as an "it." The objective connots.tion of 
such expression is too deep to be expunged simply by calling 
it to our attention; however, let us nonetheless attempt it 
by understanding that the very "first-personal" nature of 
experience requires something on the order of what Kierke-
gaard has called 11double reflection." The second ambiguity 
follows from the first, but is of a more quantitative sort~ 
For the present we must refrain from questioning whether 
"it 11 refers to a unity, a plurality, . or a totality. In this 
sense, the 11 object11 of our investigation is "pre-categorial," 
as well as pre-epistemological and pre-metaphysical. It is 
strange how difficult it is to present a sophisticated ex-
pression of primitive matters; but its difficulty does not 
seem to be an adequate warrant for not trying. 
Insofar as determinateness cannot be assumed of 
consciousness, we are left with something of a poverty of 
character by means of which consciousness can be described 
at all~ All we can infer of being conscious, abstracted 
from that of which it is conscious, is its being and its 
being as consciousness. This is both that it is and what it 
is: that it exists, but that its existence is solely that 
of a pole in the epistemic process. Sartre would say, thus, 
that it is a nothing~ A realist such as John Wild would 
agree, and both would concur in the qualification that this 
nonetheless by no means indicates that it is not a factor 
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worthy of consideration. Wild, however, makes use of this 
nothingness as the basis for a realistic argument to the ef-
fect that the fundamental act of knowing in no sense con-
1 tributes to the nature of the object which is known. Thus, 
for Wild, the "pure, scientific observer (our bird-watcher)" 
is validated in the deepest recesses of subjectivity. Wild 
is to be commended for seeing that here is where the problem 
lies; it is our belief that he is mistaken in granting that 
consciousness is an activity, bu.t that it is an activity 
with no "constructive power;" that is, its activity is 
2 purely noetic. It may be this, but its activity is still 
rooted in its being; it is not simply consciousness, it is 
being-conscious. We side, in short, with idealists such as 
Isibniz (and Bowne and Brightman) who are unwilling to grant 
being to that which "makes no difference whether it is or is 
not." On this point, we fancy that we are taking a position 
more consistently realistic than that of the realists, for 
we are unwilling to sever consciousness from its being, even 
while we must grant, non-realistically, that this entails a 
relational structure of knowing that is, in some sense, 
idealistic. Our realism, in short, lies solely in insisting 
on the reality-being of consciousness. It is an event, and 
the fact that it is an event cannot be sidestepped by 
lwild, The Challenge of Existentialism, p. 191. 
2Ibid. 
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classifying that event as exclusively noetic~ We feel this 
so strongly that we are even willing to accept with it the 
implication that we have penni tted a tiny germ of "given-
ness'' to seat itself at the very core of htnnan reality'. 
More of this later. 
To continue, then, consciousness is 11 in the world"--a 
phrase only, since the characteristics of the "world." are 
not available. But it is "there," and because it is there, 
even if its "there-being" is only as consciousness, it makes 
a difference because it is there. All we are trying to say 
is that reality, whatever it is, would be different if the 
reality of consciousness were annihilated. Perhaps we 
should be reminded at this point that the reality of 
consciousness by no means is built around a 11 something," 
such as an organism, out of which consciousness emerges~ 
The question of what is the cause of consciousness can be 
treated only on a phenomenal level or a metaphysical level~ 
In this discussion it is considered to be a surd~ 
Surd-consciousness (or ''primary" consciousness), then, 
is under consideration as that which has its being rooted 1n 
reality, but which has as its sole characteristic and 
function the entering into of a relationship with its en-
vironment. At this point we may suggest what seems to us to 
be a plausible conjecture--that the product of this primi-
tive relationship is--the data of experience. With this, it 
may also be suggested, the conditions are right for the 
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primary consciousness to "grow up" into the cognitive 
consciousness. We must leave this discussion for a moment, 
however, and return to the primary consciousness tn order, 
if possible, to suggest what can only be called a "theory 
of non-cognitive knowledge." Doubtless this is a contra-
diction in terms; doubtless "knowledge" is not the proper 
word~ Let it stand, however, as a kind of signal for what 
we are trying to do. 
E. Existential Awareness. 
We all have "lived through" experiences. It is diffi-
cult not to do so continually, but we generally reserve this 
phrase for critical situations 1n which we find ourselves--
but find ourselves to be peculiarly impotent. It is almost 
as if we were incapacitated but by no means cast in the role 
of spectators~ We emphatically do not mean the kind of 
transcendence by means of which a man, for example, might 
almost idly observe himself committing some horrible crime~ 
We mean just the opposite, the "undergoing" of the adventure 
in its most concrete sense~ We, so to speak, suffered the 
experience~ The experience would not have been an experi-
ence had it not been 11lived through." This may be what the 
existentialist means by his particular brand of empiricism: 
that experience is not data to be viewed cognitively, but is 
instead concrete situations that become situations precisely 
because consciousness feels itself, as it were, trapped 1n 
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their center. Experience is a web, and I am in it. 
It is because of this involvement that the existential 
epistemologist fails to comprehend the heretofore primary 
epistemological question~ "How do you lmow?" is a question 
that connotes a demand for justification--proof 1n the form 
of an argument. In answer, the existential epistemologist 
tries to say, ni know, because I was there; it was my experi-
ence~" But 't-rhen he tries to convey his meaning this way, it 
is all-too-frequently interpreted as meaning that his being 
there furnished him with first-hand knowledge, and this is 
not what he meant at all. 11 How do you know that you exist?" 
11 I don't 'know' my existence, I am my existence." Knowing 
proceeds from this, and does not condition it~ 
Can this be called "knowing"? Probably not. If it 
were to be called "knowing," then the existentialist has 
merely adopted an intuitional theory of knowledge, with the 
attendant values, and also the attendant drawbacks, of such 
a ~heory. The main drawback would seem to be a tendency 
toward monism, a pos1t1on not 1n keeping with existentialism. 
Let us call this primitive 11 being-as-consciousness-wi thin-
situations" simply a theory of awareness, but let us not 
discard it by so doing·. For, as we mentioned above, it is 
this awareness that furnishes the cognitive consciousness 
with its data. 
The picture presented above seems almost absurd. Can 
we possibly mean to present seriously a theory that seems to 
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suggest that when we are living through an experience we 
first undergo the experience and then get it in data form? 
If this were true, we would have a situation something like 
this: I find myself in an indeterminate situation, but one 
that indeterminately involves me with an onrushing loco-
motive. The absurdity is that there simply cannot be any 
situation at all unless it is a. situation with character-
istics. However, to try to think this way is to see the 
whole problem as nothing more than the interesting (but 
trivial) phenomenon most of us have experienced of walking 
into a. room and suddenly feeling that "all of this has been 
done before." This type of psychological "lag" is indeed 
temporal ; what we are en terta.ining is not temporal, it is 
simply a relationship of dependency. Before I can know the 
qualities of any situation, I must be in that situation, and 
if I am 1n that situation, if I am a real event, then that 
situation has been altered (has, indeed, become precisely a 
"situation") for my being there. The existentialist theory 
of awareness is really only an attempt to save us from a 
complete agnosticism rega.rd1ng this event. In answer to the 
question, "How do you know?" the existentialist may have to 
answer, "I don't know, I wa.s.u 
F. The Production of the Object of Knowledge. 
It is, hence, not incorrect, according to the theory 
being presented, to state that "consciousness is a dynamic 
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event that activates the knower." This statement does not 
seem to be substantially different from Professor Bertocci's 
assertion quoted above in Chapter IV, with the exception 
that knowledge is resultant upon the activity of conscious-
ness 1ft its situation rather than being that activity~ Per-
haps its main difference is that our statement seems in-
clined away from rationalism and toward voluntarism~ This 
is neither good nor bad in itself; judgment will have to be 
suspended until it is discovered whether the shift ac-
complishes anything or not~ 
The hypothesis that the data of experience is the 
joint product of the primary consciousness and the situ-
ations within which it finds itself is an attempt to harmo-
nize the two incompatible positions of realism and subjectiv-
ism--that in some sense (in the production of the data) the 
self is active 1n the knowing process, and in some sense (in 
cognizing the data presented) it is a passive observer·. 
Later perhaps we can show that this position is not tmfriend-
ly to the assertion of the "primacy of the practical reason.'' 
Meanwhile, let us continue with our development~ 
If one grants that the primary consciousness partici-
pates in the formation of the data of experience, an immedi-
ate question intrudes, a question reminiscent of one put to 
Sartre: ''Does this mean that it is consciousness, and 
consciousness alone that gives determinate structure to the 
world?" It was Sartre's position that it did·. We see no 
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reason for this extreme a stand·. On the other hand, it does 
seem inescapable to concede that insofar as consciousness 
makes a difference, some alteration in reality has taken 
place in the process of bringing data to the cognitive 
consciousness . Thus we are somewhere in the middle again 
between the thoroughgoing subjectivist and the thoroughgoing 
realist. There is a reality antecedent to my existence and 
within which I find myself entangled. It is this reality 
that primary consciousness meets and joins . There is no 
reason to assume that it is not a structured determinate re-
ality--but it cannot be assumed that the data of experience 
are a faithfUl reproduction of it . At this point the task 
confronting the metaphysician becomes both clear and diffi-
cult . For it is his lot to try, as well as he can, to recon-
struct on the basis of all the data he can get, what reality 
was like before it was infected by consciousness . Perhaps 
he is doomed to failure even before he begins--like a 
surgeon with a rubber scalpel-- because the very data from 
which he is . to draw his inferences are distortions . Perhaps 
the best he can do is hope for an approximation and be 
guided meanwhile by his good common sense and his under-
standing that the ultimate goal of the metaphysician may not 
be an accurate picture of reality ~ ~ at all, but the 
production of a coherent Weltanschauung for himself and his 
age . Taken in this sense , we accept the jibes of the posi-
tivists--that metaphysics is about like poetry . Unlike the 
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positivists, however, we have a high regard for poetry, and 
for that peculiarly ennobling poetry of concepts which is 
metaphysics. Yet, for all of that, it still remains as an 
implication of this hypothesis that the philosopher cannot 
safely assume that the structures of his experience hold 
good and true for reality~ 
This is hard on the systems of both Perry and 
Brightman·. However, its harshness should not be over-esti-
mated. We have not scoffed at metaphysics, and we need not 
scoff at the metaphysics of Brightman and Perry. They are 
to be examined according to the rules of rational exami-
nation, and if one or a combination of the two are found to 
be satisfactory, they are to be adopted. The human being is 
less than human without a metaphysical viewpoint. Perhaps 
he may get his chance later on to compare it with the origi-
nal. 
3. Moral Philosophy. 
A. Consciousness and Morality~ 
Dr. Brightman's radical empiricism does not permit him 
to ignore moral data found in experience. His discovery of 
the empirical fact of obligation marks, for him, a middle 
position between naturalism and moral objectivism that loses 
nothing of value in each of the more extreme standpoints. 
Our attempt to examine, so to speak, the 11underside 11 of ex-
perience may have jarred this data somewhat, even as it 
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jarred the data of experience generically. Let us see if we 
have damaged it. 
It has been suggested that it is the encounter of the 
primitive consciousness with reality that produces the data 
for the cognitive consciousness. In same sense, this en-
counter could be seen as a violation of the natural purity 
of the world. This real event, consciousness has descended 
upon the world from heaven only knows where, and the world 
is no longer the same as it was. The cognitive conscious-
ness, in short, stands in an important intermediate position 
with regard to human endeavor. It is cognition which sur-
veys not only the field of proposed practical action, but 
the somewhat more battle-scarred field over which human en-
deavor--as the primary consciousness--has already worked. 
The cogRitive consciousness surveys what has been done and 
points out what needs to be done (and a coherent ethic is 
essential for this). In this sense cognition acts remedi-
ally--and perhaps Schweitzer is correct for all of us when 
he says that all of his career has been an act of penitence--
and the practical activity which follows upon cognitive ap-
praisal is founded, at its deepest, in the awareness that it 
is only when, and because, consciousness came into the world 
that anything needed to be done. It is not that conscious-
ness was put into the world to do a job, but that because 
consciousness was put into the world there is a job to do~ 
Consciousness is an assertion to reality of ita own presence; 
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its existence consists in this assertion. Thus, in a sense 
the Sartrean statement is correct, that consciousness posits 
its own existence. Our addition is that at the same time it 
intrudes i tselt" upon the world, it shoulders i te own impera-
tive~ Thus, subjectivity is, in ita inmost center, morality. 
It may be that this is what appears to the cognitive 
consciousness as the sense ot" obligation·. Perhaps we have 
not jarred Dr. Brightman's moral system too severely at"ter 
all~ It may also mean something not too t"ar removed t"ram 
ttvalue is the object of any intereet.n 
B. The Inner and the Outer ot" Selfhood. 
We have been considering almost exclusively the under-
side ot" experience--that which could be called "inwardness~ 11 
Now we must give what promisee to be a contusing developnent 
ot" other layers ot" eelfhood~ It will be wise to separate 
our developnent as much as possible by virtue ot" sub-head-
ings~ This will not be entirely successful, but it might be 
ot" same help to the reader who has not entertained these 
nations in precisely this form~ 
1. Let us begin by recalling the encounter of the 
primary consciousness and its world. It has been suggested 
that both are real events, each with the structure peculiar 
to its own nature. However, consciousness cannot be 
consciousness in a vacuum. Consciousness requires the world 
as a necessary condition of ita own being~ This is the 
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condition we have referred to as 11 polar internality. 11 lfuat 
is meant is that the relationship between consciousness and 
its world is neither external nor internal, but some of both. 
It is something like monadism, perhaps, in that the being of 
consciousness is a fact (and thus external to the other 
term), but it is a fact that is posited as a fact by there-
lationship in which it stands to the other term (and is thus 
internal). This is the way it is with consciousness; it is, 
but it only is as a "point of view·. 11 
2·. \fuen consciousness, in its relationship with its 
world, produces a record of that relationship in the form of 
data of experience, an analysis of these data by the cogni-
tive consciousness reveals what has been called the 11 datum 
self." The datum self is, for the cognitive consciousness, 
something like what my career is for those who want to know 
who I am. It is the result of what I am rather than what I 
am, and yet it is evidence of a sort--of what I was and did. 
We take the data of experience to be, as it were, the "be-
havior" of consciousness. This is referred to cognition for 
scrutiny and for judgment·. 
3. The datum self, ho,"lever, is only a small part of 
the field of my experience. In part it is data differently 
apprehended than other data, introspectively apprehended; 
and in part it is only a more intimate--more constant--
portion of the field of experience. My perception of parts 
of my body are an example of this·. The datum self is the 
523 
phenomenal self, and it obeys the laws which govern phenome-
na--in this the introspectively apprehended self is no 
different from the rest of the field·. It is here, however, 
that my appraisals, judgments, purposes, and intents, all 
open to cognitive analysis, are to be found~ And it is here 
that ethical theories pertinent to these are directed.. This 
is the truth of the deontologists~ On the other hand, those 
who really want to know who I am will not usually confine 
their scrutiny to my person, but will also investigate my 
surroundings, my possessions, my friends; all that I have 
influenced is gennane~ The same may be true of selfhood·. 
It is the primary nin that is involved in the production of 
the whole of the field of experience, and it is the whole of 
the field--the total record of the impact consciousness has 
had on the world--that is the "behavior" of consciousness~ 
This is what I em: everything. This is the truth of tele-
ology. 
4~ There is still one more level of personality to be 
mentioned. It is the level of my continuing practical ac-
tivity in the world of nature and society". This level is 
parallel to metaphysics to this extent: that the "hubris" 
committed against the world by the existence of conscious-
ness has altered and distorted the world in preparing it for 
cognition, and the task of the moral individual 1n nature 
and society is that of arranging as coherently as possible 
according to the skills and techniques available to him, not 
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only his world-view, but his world-relationship. In so 
doing he constructs himself, and perhaps when the time comes 
the self that he has constructed will also be compared with 
reality~ 
5. The point of all this analysis of levels is simply 
that as there is a polar relationship at the most primitive 
level, so is there also a polar relationship at the practi-
cal level of human endeavor. I am something more than what 
I have done--the courses I have taught, the clubs I have 
joined, the kindnesses and cruelties that have gone out from 
me--but all these things count, for they are the self that I 
have made for myself~ They are the outside of my inside. 
It is this that K1erkegaard has forgotten, and it is this 
that is the truth of utilitarianism. K1erkegaard has for-
gotten that it is difficult for a man to work out his own 
destiny in a world where Providence is absolute--at least it 
is difficult if a man has both an inside and an outside. 
And a man cannot be spirit--if spirit is activity--without 
stretching outward, into the world~ None of the levels of 
human reality can be ignored if' the task of' mankind--the 
task of constructing himself a world, and a self--is to be 
fulfilled. At the level of primary consciousness the task 
is generated, or rather, the fact that there is a task is 
generated. Because consciousness is present, and because 
consciousness is consciousness, there is a task. Yet we 
have tried to suggest that the very being of consciousness 
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is an activity that enters into and influences the world. 
From this it might follow that the nature o~ the specific 
function of consciousness, other than that of being 
conscious, is to choose the manner in which it will remake 
its world. Its choice here is between chaos and can-
struction. The type of construction is to be left to the 
cognitive consciousness. It would appear that we must grant 
that there is such a choice open to primary consciousness, 
or else we have abandoned its primacy and granted, before 
cognition has even entered the picture, that all conscious 
activity must proceed according to some plan, some purpose. 
This does not seem to us to be so, and that is why it was 
suggested 1n Chapter IV that the self is rree to choose to 
be rational. It may even be considered as possible that 
primary consciousness choose neither chaos nor action ac-
cording to some plan--that it choose not to act (beyond its 
primary action, of course) at all~ In this case, however, 
it has repudiated its task and is an aborted eel~~ 
Thus, we might name the characteristics o~ the primary 
consciousness, inso~ar as we regard its career as generative 
of a task and as freedom: freedom to do nothing more, 
freedom to choose chaos, freedom to choose itself as cogni-
tive consciousness. It is ~ram the latter choice that 
ethics as a theory of human endeavor arises. But it is in 
the primary consciousness that morality has its base. That 
there is something to be done is the ef~ect of consciousness 
• 
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upon its world; what that something might be, is the 
question confronting the cognitive consciousness. This is 
the truth of ethical rationalism: that it is incumbant upon 
the consciousness that has chosen the way of reason--to be 
reasonable; but it is only incumbant upon such a conscious-
ness ·. Reason 1s not "better," it is only rational. In 
terms of the primary consciousness, nothing is better than 
anything else, not even existence--not until a decision has 
been made, and then the good comes into being. Thus the 
second circle of human endeavor is the circle of appraisal, 
judgment, purpose, and intent, all 1n terms of the primary 
choice as scrutinized by the cognitive consciousness and it 
is to the second circle that ethical theories concerning ap-
praisal, judgment, purpose and intent properly belong. This 
is the circle of the moral laws. 
The outer circle, that of human behavior 1n the natu-
ral and social world, where the action planned is executed, 
is the circle to which naturalistic and utilitarian theories 
are pertinent~ It is the arena in which plans are executed, 
and it is the executed plan that is to be judged rather than 
the plan, itself (except insofar as the planning or the at-
tempted execution is also a factor for social judgment, in 
which case it, too, is an execution of a sort). 
The point is that all of these levels are levels of 
the self. Decision, no matter how hidden from the social 
world, is self-activity, and external behavior, no matter 
527 
how externally it is judged, is action of a self. If one 
were able to observe, from some Archimedean point, the total 
process of the self coming to affective maturity, one would 
be able to see the beginning and the end as a continual 
event, and only from such an Archimedean point is it possi-
ble to judge a person. From this vantage-point it then 
could be seen the extent to which an intended result is actu-
ally frustrated by "circumstances," and the extent to which 
one's judgment, or one's refUsal to shoulder the task actu-
ally created or hopefUlly sought the frustrating circum-
stance. Unfortunately, this Archimedean point is not availa-
ble to us~ 
However, at least formally, we make the suggestion 
that any distinction between the growth of selfhood and its 
influence on the world of social events is at best an .!:9: hoc 
distinction, designed to indicate when children should be 
spanked or adults imprisoned, and at worst is a bifurcation 
of being and doing which tends toward either the extreme of 
deleting the person and valuing only the job (democracy), or 
ignoring the job and valuing only the person (aristoeracy)~ 
Together, they are the inner and the outer of selfhood. The 
difficulty of passing judgment on such a continuum except 
from the inside of self-experience (the cognitive level), 
perhaps only indicates that one should not attempt to judge 
persona, but only jobs. Nor need this mean that, once again, 
the self is ignored, for if it is understood that there is no 
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job done except by a person, then, if one is forbidden to 
judge persons, perhaps respect for personality--even when 
the job deserves condemnation--is the only course. This, it 
is suspected, is what love might mean. It is remarkably 
close to the description given of love by Perry~ 
Let us conclude this strange and rambling suggestion 
with a concise statem.ent of its intent. We eubnit that a 
radical distinction is to be made between what we have 
called the inwardness of selfhood and its exteriority; the 
inwardness of sel:f'hood is in the world, but not of it, and 
yet, because selfhood, as primary consciousness, interacts 
with the world, the moral self is born, a self which acts to 
remake its world·. Thus, the inwardness of · the self loses, 
so to speak, its insulation and finds that the moral self is 
the self which posits 1 tself as part of the world of natural 
and social affaire~ The exteriority of the self is the self 
.../ 
as it makes itself felt in this world of natural and social 
events. That is to say, it is what it accomplishes overtly. 
The inward self cannot be seen from outside, and the exteri-
or self is, to inwardness, of no account. Yet both are the 
same self, end each must be taken into consideration. One 
turns away from the world ( 11 the job") and tends to the 
spirit, but only at the risk of stunting the growth of that 
very spirit the concern for which prompted the forsaking of 
the world; and one turns away from the spirit to act in the 
world, only to risk losing that well-spring without which 
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there can be no activity at all. Thus both are true: that 
I am more than simply what I have accomplished, and that 
when one sets out to accomplish, he is well advised to for-
get himself in the deed~ What Kierkegaard has forgotten is 
that one may embrace the world--as a battlefield upon \'Thich 
the destiny of inwardness, itself, may be decided. And what 
Sartre may have forgotten is that the conflict between 
subjectivity and objectivity is only insoluble epistemically; 
it may be the definition of morality~ 
4·. The Religious Attitude . 
The task of this dissertation is not specifically that 
of constructing or criticizing either metaphysics as a disci-
pline or any specific metaphysical system . It is true that 
our suggestions thus far have not smoothed the road of the 
metaphysician--the implication of our treatment of experi-
ence-data seemed to indicate that if the metaphysician took 
as his task that of calculating the nature of reality as it 
might exist apart from the incursions of consciousness, the 
data for which he hopes to account and from which he draws 
strength for his hypotheses do not hold much promise for 
reaching this end satisfactorally'. On the other hand, if he 
is willing to grant the distorting effects of consciousness 
there is no reason to suppose that his task is not a useful 
one . 
However, theology need not be considered precisely as 
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an adjunct to metaphysics. It can be cut loose and, utterly 
apart from the metaphysical question of the existence of God, 
become a subject unto itself. That is to say, we may specu-
late on the possible nature of God, if he were to exist, 
without dealing with the question of whether he exists~ 
On the other hand, speculative theology has an arti-
ficial ring about it that is not in keeping with its serious-
ness. Theology, at its best, should spring from deep within 
subjectivity; it should be the conceptualization of the re-
ligious attitude toward the universe felt by subjectivity~ 
Let us make a suggestion: that as metaphysics was seen te 
be man's attempt to discern the nature of reality as it is 
independently of his presence within it, religious meta-
physics, or theology, again, at its best, might be man's at-
tempt to frame a conceptual system of thought about the 
nature of reality as it is now, including his own reality--
as primary consciousness, cognitive consciousness, and 
practical activity. As such, it is very close to, but also 
very different from, metaphysics. It is close because ideal-
ly their objects are the same: ultimate reality. It is 
very different because the very nature of theology forces it 
to give primary consideration to reality as it embraces that 
very being which is a point of view of it. Both metaphysics 
and theology are enjoined to do their best to attain a clear 
vision; but the two visions are different visions, as differ-
ent as might be the vision of a man outside the cage 
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watching a snarling tiger from one exposed inside the cage·. 
Our assertion is that the fundamental position of man 
is that he is inside the cage, and that his fundamental re-
ligious attitude, insofar as it is religious, is one of anx-
iety about the disposition of the 1miverse toward himself. 
What Brightman seems to have assimilated into his system, we 
cannot assimilate. If the religious attitude is blended 
with the metaphysical attitude (as additional evidence) the 
result is that each is impaired in its ability to do its job. 
Metaphysics cannot afford the "emotional coloring'' of re-
ligious conceptualization, and if religious conceptual-
ization tries to don the "cloak of invisibility" of the meta-
physician, it has lost precisely that which was its dis-
tinguishing characteristic--reality-including-itself. 
Strangely enough, each may consider the possible existence 
of God. Moreover, there seems to be little reason for say-
ing that a single person cannot entertain this hypothesis 
from each point of view. But they cannot be allowed to in-
fect each other. Our position, in short, is Augustinian, 
rather than either that of Pelagius or Tertullian~ The 
world of Caesar is not evidence for the world of Christ~ We 
agree, 1n substance, w1 th Kierkegaard as he has been pre-
sented above in Chapter VII and hold that the scope and in-
tensity of a man's concern about his relationship with re-
ality is the measure of his worship, and that his theology 
is the conceptualization of this concern--not its 
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justification. With this, perhaps we may return to the re-
ligious hypothesis, itself~ 
We agree with Dr. Brightman that there are character-
istics without which God would not be God, and that there 
are situations relative to human reality of which a God-
concept should take account if it is to be a God-concept in-
stead of merely a concept of Being. We hope, however, to 
suggest a God-concept which places God, as it were, on the 
rim of the universe as its creator and sustainer, rather 
than within the universe as one of its subordinate parts. 
As we understand Dr. Brightman's metaphysics, four 
elements of human experience combine as the paramount 
features of God. ·These are: temporality, reason, morality, 
and evil~ Certainly there are other elements worth consider-
ing; these, however, seem to be paramount~ Of these factors, 
three appear to reach beyond God, forming aspects of reality 
incumbent upon God~ These are, temporality,. rationality, 
and evil~ Time is so real that if God exists he is temporal 
because everything that exists must be temporal--otherwise 
it cannot exist. Rationality, while it cannot properly be 
said to exist, is yet so real that God can neither abrogate 
nor fail to create according to its law. Evil is a charac-
teristic of the Given--not the sole characteristic, nor yet 
a characteristic of all the Given, yet it is one character-
istic of the Given, and, as such is coped with by God, but 
not created by him. The sum of these characteristics is the 
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moral nature of God's creative activity--the gradual control 
of disvalue through the operation of the rational will~ It 
indicates a universe growing better, infinitely. 
The image presented is of a loving and creative God, 
dominated by reason, limited by temporality (even if God's 
temporality is without beginning or end) so that he must 
wait out results, and committed to the struggle against. 
evils that he did not create. This is what Brightman seems 
to mean by a finite God. It is a concept of a worthy God--
worthy of human worship and emulation. With one exception, 
it is a fair description of a worthy human being. The 
single exception is that God is the generator of the realm 
of nature while we are receivers and manipulators. 
We would like to suggest a picture of God that is more 
parallel to Brightman's concept of God as creator of nature. 
Brightman might well say that because there is God, nature 
is and is what it is. We are not now concerned with what 
nature is, but only that it receives its being from God. We 
wonder if that might not also be true of the laws of reason, 
and, in a slightly different sense, of temporality as well". 
Evil and morality we shall have to deal with later. In the 
discussion to follow, our guiding principle is a kind of re-
verse law of parsimony; it would appear that if the re-
ligious needs of man are to be best served, that concept 
which envisions God as the nearest to ultimate reality will 
be the best concept, so long as the God so conceived does 
534 
not lose contact with the world and the affairs of men. It 
is charged that while absolutistic 11 impersonaliam" conceives 
of a very great God, indeed, it (as well as deism) has done 
precisely this. Our task is to envision a God who is, ideal-
ly, both ultimate reality and personal-. Let it be granted, 
as extraneous to the present discussion, that if to be a 
conscious personality implies limitation, then, to that ex-
tent, God is limited-. We grant, in short, that the dis-
tinction between consciousness and its object applies to any 
consciousness, divine or finite, and that this is a kind of 
limitation on God. We simply do not think that it is a very 
important limitation-. We do think that "energizing" is a 
term with some unexplained ambiguities, such as how a 
thought can linger in a limbo adjacent to no consciousness, 
or such as how the human mind can experience directly the 
states of God's consciousness without being God; but this is 
not a treatise on metaphysics-. 
So, the picture that emerges is of a God limited by 
the fact that he is conscious personality". One may now ask 
to how great an extent temporality, rationality, and morali-
ty are requirements for personality-. Certainly 1n some 
sense they are requisite; but 1n what sense? 
A. Temporality. 
In what sense can God be said to be temporal? We sug-
gest that God is the source of time and to that extent is 
535 
beyond time. On the other hand, to be beyond time would 
seem to deny God what may well be one of the deepest charac-
teristics of personality. Thus, God is both beyond and not 
beyond time. \ihat is meant is that that which gives tempo-
rality to the world is the enduring activity of God. Be-
cause God is what he is, there is time. Were God not what 
he is, there would be no time. Time, thus, is not precisely 
the creation of God, as nature may be the creation of God, 
but nevertheless there is temporality because God is and is 
what he is. God exists, and there is temporality, and the 
temporality that is is not the time of the clocks and 
planets and stars, but the temporality of God's existence~ 
The same is true, finitely speaking, of human subjectivity-• 
in this we agree thoroughly with Sartre. Because human 
subjectivity is a temporalizing event, there is human tempo-
rality. It may follow that the time of the stars and 
planets is nothing but a convention, or, at best, one of the 
characteristics of nature-created. What we hope this all 
means is that God is truly durational, but that he is not a 
creature of time. Time, like everything else, finds its end 
in God. 
B. Rationality. 
Perhaps there is a parallel possibility with regard to 
the rationality of God. We suggest that there can be no 
point in asking the question, "Must God be rational, or does 
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he choose rationality from among alternative modes of 
thought or operation?•' Drawing our lead from the de-
scriptive philosophies and sciences, we suggest that ration-
ality is simply the way God's creative activity works~ If 
God creates at all, then that is the way rationality is~ 
Suppose our experience suddenly turned up a set of strange 
facts: that water today runs uphill, that two plus two 
equals seven. In the first case very probably we would set 
about finding "the rationale" of this event, and until we 
did, we would not be satisfied~ It is worth betting that we 
would find a rationale, too, and would then be satisfied be-
cause the waterfall was indeed, "behaving quite normally 
tmder the circumstances." That is to say that, very possi-
bly, we would have to revamp some of our hypotheses about 
waterfalls, but isn't that precisely what we do do when we 
are applying the criterion of empirical coherence? Were God 
so inclined, he might play any trick on us that whimsey de-
creed, and we, dutifully would adapt our theories to include 
it~ We have done this all along and called it scientific 
method~ In the second case, that of two plus two suddenly 
being found to equal seven, would this not appear in our ex-
perience as the new number-theory of a mathematician that 
was found to express better a great deal more than the 
present system? Rationality is the way things go together, 
and if it is God who puts them together, then, whatever way 
they go together--that is the rational way. 
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o. Evil. 
The problem of good and evil may have some parallel to 
rationality and temporality~ In this case, however, an ac-
count of evil will have to consider possible discrepancies 
between human endeavor and divine endeavor. Once again, 
however, we may suggest that goodness, as well as ration-
ality and temporal! ty, finds its end in God~ God, thus is 
neither goodness alone (in a non-theistic sense) nor is God 
good (is judged according to a standard of goodness) ·. What 
God is is goodness, and what God does, that is the good. It 
would seem to follow that the presence of evil in the world 
must receive its account as emanating from another source~ 
We propose humankind as that source. 
It has been suggested that the primary consciousness 
is a real event in real interaction with a real world~ Our 
thesis is that this real world is valuationally neutral for 
the primary consciousness. This is so because the primary 
consciousness is not a judging consciousness; for that, it 
would seem that the cognitive consciousness is required~ It 
will have to be granted that this is not exactly the con-
dition of a man inside a tiger's eage, but we must remember 
that religiousness is not confined to the primary conscious-
ness~ It is a property of the whole man--religiously seen~ 
The primary consciousness is alert--indeed this is what it 
is, a little kernal of alertness sprung into being in its 
world--but it need not judge~ However, the fact that it is 
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there is also the fact that something is to be done. Thus 
the moral self produces itself, while yet there is no human 
valuing or disvaluing at all. For God, of course, the world 
may be good·. It is when the question of "what is to be done" 
emerges as a result of cognition that evaluation sets this 
aside as 11 what is to be done," that as 11what is to be 
changed or avoided, 11 this "left alone. 11 It is this moral 
attitude of primary consciousness that may produce for the 
cognitive consciousness the experience of distaste or dis-
value for what it experiences. What we hope to suggest is 
that morality is primary and that values are derived from it, 
rather than the normally considered reverse. It is because 
there is the moral consciousness that there is, 1n experi-
ence, evil, but the moral consciousness cannot thereby be 
judged as evil. This rather strange arrangement is compa.ti• 
ble with the theological concept that the good is what God 
does--that is to say that neither God nor man wills in his 
primary consciousness because he recognizes and chooses 
values. For both, the good is what we choose, not because 
it is good, but because we choose it~ This, presumably is 
what Socrates meant 1n arguing that no man could choose evil. 
My good is conditioned by my choice; so is God's; but, since 
God is God and I am not, it is quite possible that our 
choices, when they are rendered determinate by cognition 
(and thus become "choices" in the usual sense), may show 
some different directions. 
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The task of human endeavor, seen from the vantage.-
point of cognition, is to bring value out of disvalue. The 
practical task of accomplishing this is what we may call 
moral behavior~ Theologically, however, the goal of morali-
ty is to act so that one's experience may be as near as 
possible to "what God created. 11 That is, our task is to 
make the world, by our practical effort, as nearly what it 
was when God originally created it, but now it will be a 
different world because it has us in it. Thus, our job is 
not that of negating ourselves and returning to the original 
condition of "natural innocence" before primary conscious-
ness tampered with it, but to remake the world with our-
selves in it, as nearly like ••what God had in mind·." Blunt-
ly, our task is to see the world as God sees it--not from 
the point of view of God, but from our own point of view. 
Thus, one sees the world through the eyes of faith and one 
acts on the world through the mechanism of morality. The 
discrepancy between our view and God's is the crack from 
which evil crawls. The refusal to see and work at narrowing 
that crack is what we may call sin·. 
Can God, then, be moral? Yes, and at the same time 
God is God~ Here we must move to a summary description of 
what God may be doing while we are seeking God. We hope to 
have suggested that God is temporality, not that he stands 
impassively behind time as its non-temporal creator. At the 
same time we do not understand this as fini tism. Let us 
540 
make use of what may appear to be a play on words 1n order 
to express our point~ 
Our thesis is that nothing is exterior to God. This 
is the road to absolutism~ But let us suggest, making use 
of a Sartrean concept, that that which is external to God is 
nothingness--non-being. God is all that there is, or is the 
source of all there is·. Without God there is nothing and 
nothing is possible. Now, what does it mean to exist? Per-
haps it means precisely to be but to be not as being but as 
its possibility~ God is possibility, and it is possibility 
that, through all eternity, moves against nothingness to 
produce being. God is not being, except so far as he per-
mits creating to become created. Then God has being, and he 
has being only so long as such permission to be is granted 
by him. Thus God· is the conserver of the world, of the past, 
and of necessity, yet none of these is binding on him. The 
future is God's possibility; it is God, battling against 
nothingness to carve out a tomorrow. There is no evil 1n 
nothingness, nor good either, but because God creates, what 
is created is good. Thus, nothing is external to God and 
yet God moves forward, creating. Why does he create? Be-
cause God's existence is as possibility, and 1n possibility 
God finds that he, too, shoulders an imperative of his own 
making; for to refuse to work at possibility is no longer to 
exist. Must God eXist? That again is a meaningless 
question, because God's existence is the first principle~ 
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The first principle is the surd. It gives meaning and, per-
haps, necessity, but the term, "necessity," cannot be ap-
plied to <k>d. 
5. Conclusion. 
It is time we stopped~ This dissertation has been an 
attempt to explore, expound, and criticize the philosophies 
of four diverse philosophical thinkers in the hope that some 
community might be possible as a basis from which to move 
forward. The writer believes that the concept of subjec-
tivity may hold some promise of being this basis. It is my 
subjectivity as an existing event from which flows any 
lmowledge I might have·. It is my lmowledge, and what I do 
with it, that constructs me and my destiny. Thus, my Given 
is my subjectivity--my possibility for selfhood. That is 
our single concession to substantialism. But for that much 
I am beholden, and for what I do with it I must answer~ For 
what I do with it is what I am, and if it is I who am called 
who else can answer? 
We have suggested the seeds of what doubtless is a 
thoroughly dualistic system~ Yet it is our opinion that 
there is a unity that surrounds the dualism: surrounds it 
1n such a strange way that when one renders unto Caesar what 
is Caesar's and unto God what is God's somehow the result is 
integration rather than bifurcation. In some sense morality 
is the core of selfhood~ If one acts toward Caesar as a 
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moral individual and toward God as a moral individual, then 
one should be able to discover in short order that only by 
directing his morality toward God as his absolute telos can 
he behave as he should toward Caesar~ It is when one hopes 
to comprehend God by comprehending Caesar that he stands 1n 
danger of making Caesar into God~ Of course, if Caesar is 
God, then one would do well to worship Caesar. But if it is 
different in Heaven from what it is on earth, then it is 
possible that no amount of cursing Heaven for having pro-
vided us with faulty equipment is likely to do much good, 
and, as a matter of fact. the equipment is not bad--for its 
purpose~ 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate, by 
an examination of four philosophic points of view, the nature 
of selfhood. Although their thoughts diverge, the common as-
sumption of Ralph Barton Perry, Edgar Sheffield Br ightman , 
Jean-Paul Sartre, and S~ren Kierkegaard appears to be that 
the self, rather than society, nature, or God, is the root of 
morality. 
Perry's philosophy, operating from the springboard of 
his polemic against idealism, is an expression of his 
doctrine of scientific method: that reality, including the 
reality of the self, is best discovered when the distorting 
effects of the observing self are minimized. These dis-
tortions include the several "fal l acies of idealism" as well 
as the general idealistic error of assuming that being and 
being known are synonymous. Removal of the distortions re-
veals a self integrated with nature; a) epistemologically, 
in that consciousness means a structural unity of the 
objects of consciousness without residue; b) naturalistical-
ly, in that responses of the self to its environment are 
those of a natural, organic entity; c) morally , in that 
interest is the determiner of value, and the consummation of 
values--harmonious happiness--is derivable from that interest. 
It is charged that Perry has provided selfhood with an 
outside only, t ha t descriptive analysis and the behavior-
istic method of general observation can provide no more, and 
tha t the synthetic self presented is incomplete and , taken 
by itself, as great a distortion as the one idealism is ac-
cused of. 
Brightman's philosophy acts as a corrective to Perry's 
by escaping the charges against idealism , while recognizing 
that the abstraction of the self and the rigorous adherence 
to descriptive analysis is desirable for science , but not 
for philosophy . This enables Brightman to affirm the "prima-
cy of the practical reason" and the justificat i on for meta-
physical inferences . In addition , Brightman's epistemic 
dualism safeguards the thought-activity of the self, while 
his empiricism permit s the reference of thought to thing . 
The dualism possesses metaphysical potency, since it leaves 
the possibility open for an interpretation of reality as 
personal in nature . 
Brightman ' s empiricism, however, requires the interpre-
tation of selfhood to rest on inferences drawn from the data 
of experience. It is questionable that such inferences are 
referrible to the self as subject; rather, it ivould appear 
that their objective reference is to a mind as object . This 
leaves subjectivity out of account . 
The dualism offered by Sartre as an alterna tive is be-
tween consciousness and its object . An ontological ex-
pe~sion produces Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself. This 
2 
dualism appears to reverse the viewpoint of Perry and 
Brightman. The relationship of these t1·ro antithetical 
moments consists in the fact that consciousness has its 
object for its content. This provides selfhood with its 
polar nature , while placing selfhood squarely within its 
v-rorld--engendering , thus, an existential dialectic which 
might be called the career of selfhood . 
Difficulties within the Sartrean philosophy occasion 
doubts as to whether all the implications he has deduced 
necessarily follovr. Perhaps it is possible that the world 
is not as hopeless a place as Sartre envisions it. 
Kierkegaard's philosophy seems to indicate, not that 
the world is hopeless, but that without God it is hopeless. 
Kierkegaard provides selfhood with the inwardness approached, 
but not reached, by Perry , Brightman , and Sartre . Unfortu-
nately, so occupied is Kierkegaard with inwardness that he 
fails adequately to ac count for that without which inward-
ness cannot complete itself, namely, an exterior side. 
This synthesis, of a proper subjectivity with a proper 
objectivity, is the goal of the concluding constructive 
thought . Its theoretical title is "subjective realism, 11 and 
its aim is to suggest a pre-e pistemic and pre- metaphysical 
fountainhead of selfhood from \·thich can flow self-activity in 
the purest sense. The self begins its relation to its world 
at this point . 
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